Subprime Lenders and Mortgage Market Completion

Without a subprime market, some borrowers by virtue of poor credit history, unstable income, and other characteristics are unable to qualify for a mortgage. With a subprime market, there is a more complete credit supply schedule with the market pricing for poorer credit quality in the mortgage rate. By completing the capital market, subprime lenders reduce borrowing constraints. The result is a social welfare gain. Low-credit applicants otherwise denied funding are able to qualify by paying higher interest rates in exchange for offering more equity or lower loan-to-value ratios. This prediction is consistent with the subprime applicants financing or refinancing their mortgages at relatively low loan-to-value ratios.     

The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending

Subprime lending in the residential mortgage market, characterized by relatively high credit risk and interest rates or fees, has developed over the past decade into a prominent segment of the market (Temkin, 2000). Recent research indicates that there is geographical concentration of subprime mortgages in Census tracts where there are high concentrations of low-income and minority households. The growth in subprime lending represents an expansion in the supply of mortgage credit among households who do not meet prime market underwriting standards. Nonetheless, its apparent concentration in minority and lower income neighborhoods has generated concerns that these households may not be obtaining equal opportunity in the prime mortgage market. Such lending may undermine revitalization to the extent that it is associated with so-called predatory practices.     

Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law

This paper estimates the effect of North Carolina's high-cost mortgage law on the subprime mortgage market in that state. The results indicate that creditors sharply restricted lending to higher risk consumers in North Carolina following passage of the law. Creditors did not restrict lending in neighboring states or to lower risk consumers in North Carolina. These results suggest that the restriction in North Carolina was due to rationing in response to higher costs imposed by the law. The findings of this study are of importance beyond North Carolina. Other states and municipalities have proposed or passed similar or more restrictive laws. These laws risk taking back some of the gains in credit availability that lower income and higher risk consumers gained in the 1990s.     

Borrower Self-Selection,Underwriting Costs,and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply

In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the efficiency and equity of mortgage lending. This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on risk characteristics by the market.     

What Drives Default and Prepayment on Subprime Auto Loans?

This paper uses novel data on the performance of loan pools underlying asset-backed securities to estimate a competing risks model of default and prepayment on subprime automobile loans. We find that prepayment rates increase rapidly with loan age but are not affected by prevailing market interest rates. Default rates are much more sensitive to aggregate shocks than are prepayment rates. Increases in unemployment precede increases in default rates, suggesting that defaults on subprime automobile loans are driven largely by shocks to household liquidity. There are significant differences in the default and prepayment rates faced by different subprime lenders. Those lenders that charge the highest interest rates experience the highest default rates, but also experience somewhat lower prepayment rates. We conjecture that there is substantial heterogeneity among subprime borrowers, and that different lenders target different segments of the subprime market. Because of their higher default rates, loans that carry the highest interest rates do not appear to yield the highest expected returns.     

The Subprime Panic*

Understanding the ongoing credit crisis or panic requires understanding the designs of a number of interlinked securities, special purpose vehicles, and derivatives, all related to subprime mortgages. I describe the relevant securities, derivatives, and vehicles to show: (1) how the chain of interlinked securities was sensitive to house prices; (2) how asymmetric information was created via complexity; (3) how the risk was spread in an opaque way; and (4) how trade in the ABX indices (linked to subprime bonds) allowed information to be aggregated and revealed. These details are at the heart of the origin of the Panic of 2007. The events of the panic are described.     

An Empirical Investigation of Alternative Contingent Claims Models for Pricing Residential Mortgages

Researchers have employed option pricing techniques to analyze mortgage financing and valuation. Alternative models (one-, two-, and three-variable models) employing different variables (short- and long-term interest rates and building value) have been designed to price mortgage securities. No prior research has addressed the question of whether the pricing accuracy of these contingent claims models improves as states increase or whether contingent claims models' valuation abilities generate reasonable estimates of primary mortgage market prices. The articles investigates the relative efficiency of each of these alternative mortgage valuation models in predicting primary market mortgage values. Our results show that a two-variable model (short rate and building value) is the most efficient. Valuation results indicate a positive pricing spread between the primary market and the theoretically estimated value.     

Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification and Redefault

We examine how the structure of mortgage modification affects the likelihood that the mortgage redefaults over the next year. We focus on pre‐HAMP (Home Affordable Modification Program) subprime modifications where the borrower was seriously delinquent and the monthly payment was reduced. The average redefault rate over the year following the modification is 56%. Redefault rates decline with the magnitude of reduction in monthly payments, and redefault rates decline more when the payment reduction is achieved through principal forgiveness as compared to lower interest rates.     

On the Economics of Subprime Lending

US mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent years. An important part of the change has been the rise of the subprime market, characterized by loans with high default rates, dominance by specialized subprime lenders rather than full-service lenders, and little coverage by the secondary mortgage market. In this paper, we examine these and other stylized facts with standard tools used by financial economists to describe market structure in other contexts. We use three models to examine market structure: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing in which we argue that subprime options are different from prime options, causing different contracts and prices; and two models based on asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and one with the asymmetry between lenders and the secondary market. In both of the asymmetric-information models, investors set up incentives for borrowers or loan sellers to reveal information, primarily through costs of rejection.     

Fixed‐Rate Mortgages,Labor Markets,and Efficiency

The paper studies the effects of mortgage choices between fixed‐rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable‐rate mortgages (ARMs) on labor market efficiency. FRMs provide insurance for risk‐averse borrowers in the sense that they pay the same rate over time and are not subject to uncertain spot market rates. FRMs, however, discourage borrowers from moving to other regions despite better employment opportunities, as they terminate the FRM contracts in order to move and their new loan interests may be higher. As FRM‐borrowers do not move to other regions due to the interest lock‐ins, entrepreneurs in other regions lose the potential surpluses from productive matches that would have occurred between borrowers‐workers and entrepreneurs. Borrowers ignore this negative externality they impose on the entrepreneurs when choosing their mortgages, and too many borrowers choose FRMs relative to the efficient level. If FRMs are eliminated and ARM‐insurance (that protects ARM‐borrowers against uncertain adjustable interest rates) is created, it will improve efficiency. The paper also assesses quantitatively the welfare effects of eliminating FRMs and providing ARM‐insurance.     

次贷危机中资产证券化对金融市场流动性的影响

次贷危机是一场金融市场流动性紧缩的危机.在流动性紧缩的过程中,连接多个利益主体的资产证券化负有很大责任.本文采用计量经济理论中的VAR模型对次贷危机中资产证券化对金融市场流动性的影响进行实证分析,发现在次贷危机的演进过程中,资产证券化确实对金融市场的流动性产生了持久的负面冲击效应,并导致了流动性紧缩的传导和扩散.因此,...     

次贷危机与主要金融危机比较

次贷危机愈演愈烈,对美国实体经济产生巨大冲击,亦对金融市场影响深远。本文将次贷危机与美国80年代的储蓄信贷机构危机、北欧90年代金融危机,30年代大萧条和日本90年代银行危机等主要金融危机进行了细致的比较分析,并得出政府救市的经验教训。     

Foreclosure Sales: The Effects of Price Expectations, Volatility and Equity Losses

Where borrowers are personally liable for shortfalls when they default on their mortgages, lenders have to exercise a duty of good faith in securing a reasonable value for the foreclosed property. The lender is entitled to recover the outstanding loan as quickly as possible, and is not bound to sell the foreclosed property at the highest price. Such an institutional setting allows us to study lender and borrower behavior, specifically the influence of price expectations, volatility and equity losses on foreclosure transactions using non-foreclosure transactions as a comparison. Our results show that differences in seller response to market expectations and equity losses exist across foreclosure and non-foreclosure transactions. Seller behavior matters. While price expectations, volatility and equity losses are influential factors for individual households, past price movements is the most important. This study also further seeks to distinguish loss aversion from disposition effect. By controlling for properties that suffered losses in equity but did not sell, we are able to examine the disposition effect in house owners. The result shows that there is disposition effect for non-foreclosure properties, where individual homeowners are reluctant to sell if the properties suffer losses.

美国次贷危机成因及影响研究综述

本文对美国次贷危机成因及影响的研究文献进行了梳理和归纳,首先从外部的经济周期和内部的资产证券化运作两方面概述了美国次贷危机的成因,然后归纳了次贷危机对全球及中国的金融机构、资本流动、实体经济的影响,在此基础上从风险防范、加强监管、把握宏观政策平衡及转变经济增长模式等方面提出了次贷危机对我国的几点启示。     

Information Effects During the U. S. Subprime Crisis

We investigate the impact of the U. S. subprime crisis on the stock markets of the Asia-Pacific countries on various event dates. Using data from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, we find that the subprime crisis negatively affects these stock markets and investor behavior, especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In addition, the subprime crisis generally works through more financial linkages than trade linkages. However, when the subsamples are classified according to industry, this result exists only for the banking industry, but both financial and trade linkages become important to explain the impact of the crisis on the manufacturing industry.     

Do Savings Associations Have a Special Commitment to Housing?

In this paper, we investigate whether elimination of the savings association charter might reduce lending to nontraditional mortgage borrowers. We present a theoretical model of lender portfolio choice, in which nontraditional lenders have some market power and traditional lenders are price takers in the mortgage market. The comparative statics indicate differences between nontraditional and traditional lenders in terms of their asset allocation responses to changes in borrower income and house prices. Empirical tests indicate the absence of such differences between savings associations and commercial banks, suggesting that elimination of the savings association charter would not impair lending to nontraditional mortgage borrowers.     

美国银行贷款损失准备计提制度研究及其启示

本文研究了美国银行贷款损失准备金制度发展的历程,以及美国会计界、银行监管部门和税务部门在贷款损失准备金政策上曾经存在的冲突和协调完善的进展情况,并分析了我国现阶段同样存在的一些问题。在此基础上,本文认为贷款损失准备对银行抵御风险、真实反映资产和经营业绩都具有重要作用。会计界、银行监管部门和税务部门应该加强协调,完善法规,指导银行合理计提贷款损失准备金,尽快健全我国银行的计提贷款损失准备金制度。