The Effects of Strategy–Management Control System Misfits on Firm Performance

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of misfits between business strategy and management control systems on performance. We address the following research question: Do firms that align their management control systems with the specific requirements of their business strategy perform significantly better than those that do not achieve the required match? We define a misfit as the degree to which management control systems deviate from empirically derived optimal configurations for a given type of business strategy. We use the two‐stage approach proposed by Ittner and Larcker (2001) to measure misfit and to investigate the impacts of misfit on performance. Based on a questionnaire survey of executives from 109 banks, we hypothesize and find that the strategy–control systems misfit has a significantly negative correlation with both self‐rated and publicly available performance measures.     

WHOM YOU CONNECT WITH MATTERS: DIRECTOR NETWORKS AND FIRM LOCATION

We examine whether board members serve as a channel for remotely located firms to access the benefits from business‐dense areas due to economies of agglomeration. We find that geographically remote firms benefit from connections to firms in top metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) for business density. After controlling for director compensation, we find connections to top MSA firms mitigate the negative effect of increased distance from business‐dense areas. We address concerns of endogeneity by exploring a sample of firms whose directors gain board seats at top MSA firms and find a similar positive impact of connections to top MSA firms.     

Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firms

We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.     

Does it cost to be sustainable?

We investigate whether firms’ corporate social performance (CSP) ratings impact their performance (cost of capital) and risk. Using a proprietary CSP ratings database, we find no difference in the risk-adjusted performance of UK firms with high and low CSP ratings. Additionally, the firms do not differ in their amount of idiosyncratic risk. We find some evidence of high-ranked firms being larger. The empirical evidence therefore indicates that investors and managers are able to implement a CSP investment or business strategy without incurring any significant financial cost (or benefit) in terms of risk or return.     

Business strategies and annual report readability

This study investigates the association between firm-level business strategy and the readability of narrative disclosures in annual reports. As business strategy affects the information environment and financial performance of firms, we expect the readability of narrative disclosures to vary with the particular business strategy that a firm pursues. In accord with this expectation, we find that firms with prospector-type business strategies produce less readable narratives, while those with defender-type business strategies produce more readable narratives. We also document that the association between strategy and readability is partially mediated by organisational performance, although the mediation effect is rather modest. These findings are robust when subjected to a series of sensitivity tests.     

The influence of international status and operating segments on firms’ choice of bonus plans

This paper investigates why firms select different accounting measures of performance when determining executive bonus compensation. Specifically, we investigate whether firms with a greater multinational presence and with more operating segments are more likely to use after-tax bonus plans. Newman (1989) investigated the relation between multinational status and bonus plan choice for the mid-1970s and did not find strong results. However, given the increased global implications of business decisions over the last two decades, it should be beneficial to investigate this issue for a more recent time period. We obtained financial information from 266 firms, 70 with after-tax compensation plans, 186 with before-tax compensation plans, and 10 with hybrid compensation plans. Logistic regression analysis suggests that large firms reporting a large number of operating segments and having a high level of multinational operations are more likely to select after-tax rather than before-tax compensation plans.     

Corporate Innovation Strategy,Analyst Forecasting Activities and the Economic Consequences

We examine the impact of corporate innovation strategy on analyst following and forecasting performance, as well as the associated economic consequences. Using a sample of US firms from 1992?2012, we find that firms pursuing an exploration‐oriented innovation strategy (as opposed to an exploitation‐oriented innovation strategy) are associated with lower analyst coverage, higher forecast error and dispersion. The effect is less pronounced for firms with greater disclosure of innovation activities, and for firms followed by analysts with more firm‐specific experience. We also examine how innovation strategy affects the perceived credibility of analyst forecasts and find that investors appear to be less responsive to forecast revisions issued for exploratory firms. Such firms also incur a higher level of cash holdings, greater internal financing, and lower dividend ratio. The findings of this paper advance our understanding of how a public company's choice of innovation strategy affects its performance in the capital markets as well as the associated economic consequences.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on CEO compensation structure: Evidence from accounting comparability

This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance.     

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay‐to‐performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay‐to‐performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.