Response of Tax Credit Claims to Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment in Chile

Diesel in Chile receives different tax treatments depending on its use. If diesel is used in industrial activities, the diesel taxes paid can be fully used as a credit against VAT, but if it is used in freight or public transportation – basically trucks and buses – only a fraction of diesel taxes paid can be claimed as a tax credit for VAT payments. As a result of this different tax treatment, firms have incentives to use ‘tax‐exempted’ diesel in activities requiring ‘non‐tax‐exempted’ diesel. This tax wedge therefore generates an opportunity for tax evasion, especially for firms with multiple economic activities, one of them being transport. In this paper, we analyse the impact of a tax enforcement programme implemented by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (IRS), where letters requiring information about diesel purchases and use and vehicle ownership were sent to around 200 firms in 2003. Using different empirical strategies to consider the non‐randomness of the selection of firms, the empirical results show consistently that firms receiving a letter decreased their diesel tax credits by around 10 per cent.     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information,Peer Effects and Tax Compliance

In this paper, we suggest that individuals’ tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their ‘neighbours’, or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this ‘neighbour’ information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information.     

Reducing complexity and compliance costs: a simplification safe harbour for the global minimum tax

I present a simplification safe harbour based on tax administrative guidance for Pillar Two, the global minimum tax, developed together with Cedric Döllefeld, Joachim Englisch, Simon Harst and Felix Siegel. It aims at reducing unnecessary compliance costs by avoiding effective tax rate (ETR) calculations if a minimum tax of 15 per cent has already been paid. The simplification safe harbour consists of a two-level test to determine if a full GloBE ETR calculation is required from a multinational enterprise (MNE) or if a simplified ETR calculation or no calculation at all is sufficient. The test consists of a country-level test and – only if necessary – an MNE-level test. The country-level test assesses a country's tax system. It seeks to determine whether the national tax system's nominal tax rates are (too) low and whether significant deviations between a country's tax base and the GloBE income exist. The second level, the MNE-level test, is only carried out if the country-level test has identified potential ‘red flags’. Even if this second test is required, the simplification safe harbour offers a significant reduction in compliance costs. This reduction is achieved by relying on national tax data, which are readily available in firms, instead of highly adjusted accounting data.     

Income Shifting in the Spanish Dual Income Tax*

Based on a model of behavioural response to taxes, and using the Taxpayers Panel from the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales for the period 1999–2009, we analyse whether the dual nature of the Spanish personal income tax (PIT), reinforced by the 2007 reform, has influenced taxpayers’ behaviour, causing them to convert part of their ‘general income’ (from labour, real estate or economic activities) into ‘savings income’ (from movable capital or capital gains). We also extend the analysis of income shifting and study whether Spanish taxpayers also responded to the different tax treatments given to the two types of savings income (from movable capital and capital gains) until 2007, transforming savings income from one type to the other. The results of our study demonstrate three facts. First, Spanish taxpayers did respond to the different tax rates, shifting income from the general base to different forms of savings, especially capital gains. The highest‐income individuals and the self‐employed and business owners are the groups where this behaviour was most marked. Second, the self‐employed and business owners also turned income from movable assets into capital gains, guided by their different tax rates. And third, we find signs of ‘anticipation’ and ‘learning’ effects caused by the 2007 tax reform. We believe that the results obtained will enrich the growing literature on income shifting.     

Attitudes towards Tax Levels: A Multi‐Tax Comparison*

We analyse Swedes' opinions about the levels of 11 different taxes to see which taxes people are most averse to and why. The most unpopular tax is the real estate tax, while the corporate tax is the least unpopular. We find a strong self‐interest effect in tax attitudes and that knowledge and education increase support for corrective taxes.     

An Investigation of Some Factors Affecting Taxpayer Non-compliance

A growing concern in almost every nation today is the amount of ‘tax gap’ (i.e. the difference between the taxes actually paid and what would be paid if all taxpayers filed complete and accurate returns and paid all the taxes they owe). Because the tax gap is often quite substantial, the problem of taxpayer non-compliance is one that requires careful scrutiny. This article addresses the problem of taxpayer non-compliance in an international context. The article briefly presents three of the main factors said to affect taxpayer non-compliance (rate structure, tax complexity, and control system). Next some estimates of the extent of non-compliance in seven countries (Sweden, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Italy and the United States) are reported and an examination made of the three factors in each country's tax system. It concludes with a discussion of how each factor analysed affects taxpayer compliance.     

The ability of deferred tax to predict future tax

We examine the usefulness of tax allocation accounting (deferred tax) for predicting future tax paid and future tax expense. Deferred taxes increase the explanatory power (R²) of regression models where future taxes paid or future tax expense is the dependent variable. However, the mean out‐of‐sample forecast errors for tax paid (future tax expense) is 30 (45.5) percent. Deferred tax increases predictive ability on pooled data, but is inconsistent on a year‐by‐year basis. We examine three explanations for poor predictive ability: losses, tax changes and asset growth. We discuss the policy and practical implications of our findings.     

How Should Business Profit Be Taxed? Some Thoughts on Conceptual Developments During the Lifetime of the IFS*

This paper reviews developments since the 1970s in economic thinking about the design of taxes on business profit. It charts developments from proposals for a cash flow tax from the Meade Committee, to refinements of this in the form of an ‘Allowance for Corporate Equity’ and the levying of the cash flow tax in the country of destination. It describes how the development of international trade and investment has led to ever‐increasing problems in the international tax system with respect to economic efficiency, profit shifting, complexity and tax competition. It also identifies why a response to these problems requires a major reform in the location of taxation.     

我国间接税与收入分配公平关系的实证分析

税收理论认为间接税具有累退性,有利于征管效率但不利于社会公平。采用1994～2009年时间序列数据,计算出库兹涅茨比率以衡量居民收入分配差距,通过对增值税、消费税、营业税、资源税、城建税、全部间接税对库兹涅茨比率影响的实证研究表明,目前我国以增值税为代表的间接税占税收总收入的比重过高,不利于发挥税收调节收入分配差距的作用,需要在今后逐步加以调整;同时间接税中的消费税有一定的缩小我国居民收入分配差距的作用,可以适当加以规范,以发挥其促进社会公平的作用。