会计稳健性与公司融资约束——基于两类稳健性视角的研究

作为会计信息质量特征之一的会计稳健性在公司融资活动中的经济后果,近来受到学者们的关注。本文基于四种计量模型度量样本公司的会计稳健性水平,实证发现稳健性的提高总体上有助于缓解公司的融资约束;更进一步,将会计稳健性区分为事前的非条件稳健和事后的条件稳健,对比回归后发现——内生于会计制度的非条件稳健性的提高,比条件稳健性这种事后稳健能更好地缓解公司的融资约束,其效果在2008年金融危机后尤为显著。此外,本文采用Granger因果检验方法,首次得到了条件稳健性是对公司融资约束的事后反应的实证依据。以上结论对于我国上市公司提高会计信息质量、降低融资约束具有很好的启示作用。     

会计稳健性、非效率投资与企业价值研究综述

会计稳健性即谨慎性原则,不仅是一项会计确认和计量原则,更是一种有效的公司治理机制。我国公司一直存在非效率投资现象,改善投资效率提升企业价值是利益相关者的心愿。本文系统的评述了会计稳健性、企业非投资效率和企业价值的关系,并指出了会计稳健性与投资效率未来研究的方向。     

过度投资、投资效果与会计稳健性

与已有研究不同,本文结合投资规模和投资效果来界定过度投资,并将会计稳健性区分为条件稳健和非条件稳健,以研究过度投资与会计稳健性的相互关系.通过对我国2007-20013年A股上市公司样本的分析,本文发现在结合投资规模和投资效果来界定过度投资的情况下,过度投资和会计稳健性的相互影响明显比仅仅根据投资规模来界定过度投资的情形更显著,而且更为精确.与价值(业绩)上升企业相比,价值(业绩)下降企业的条件稳健性对过度投资具有更强的治理作用,而价值(业绩)下降企业的过度投资行为对非条件稳健性产生了显著的负向影响.     

会计稳健性、融资约束与投资效率

会计稳健性是一项备受争议的会计信息质量要求,考虑到我国企业普遍受融资约束影响的背景,本文以2007-2015年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了会计稳健性、融资约束及投资效率之间的关系。研究发现:(1)会计稳健性对投资过度和投资不足均具有抑制作用,融资约束会抑制投资过度而加剧投资不足;(2)融资约束加强了会计稳健性对投资过度的抑制作用,二者在一定程度上存在协同效应;(3)融资约束加强了会计稳健性对投资不足的抑制作用,会计稳健性表现出治理效应。本文揭示了会计稳健性与融资约束的交互作用对投资效率的影响机制,从而提供了改善投资效率的有效途径,证明了会计稳健性存在的必要性,有利于为企业的决策提供理论指引。     

高管团队背景特征视角下的会计稳健性与投资效率关系研究

本文以2008-2011年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,区分产权性质,实证检验了会计稳健性对投资效率的影响,以及高管团队背景特征对二者关系的影响。研究发现,会计稳健性会抑制投资过度,加剧投资不足;国有企业的会计稳健性加剧投资不足和抑制投资过度的程度要弱于非国有企业。进一步研究发现,国有企业高管团队的平均年龄、任期异质性、教育背景及其异质性显著影响会计稳健性与非效率投资的关系,非国有企业高管团队的任期及其异质性、教育背景及其异质性显著影响会计稳健性与非效率投资关系。     

会计稳健性与投资效率——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

会计稳健性是财务报告的一项重要特征,而投资效率则是企业生存和发展至关重要的制约因素,稳健的会计政策对企业投资效率的影响值得深入探讨.通过实证研究发现,会计稳健性越好的企业,在投资机会下降时,会更及时地削减投资,即投资效率更高.     

资产替代、会计稳健性与债权人保护

"资产替代"是股东债权人冲突的主要表现形式之一,在实证分析中通常用过度投资来表示.稳健的会计政策能从事前和事后两方面减少股东和管理层的过度投资倾向,从而减少了债务契约中的资产替代行为,保护债权人的权益.本文的实证研究表明,截面的会计稳健性具有真实的投资效应,抑制了非理性的过度投资倾向.经过分样本的实证检验发现,会计稳健性抑制过度投资的作用只存在于非政府控制的样本中,地方政府控制削弱了会计稳健性保护债权人利益的作用.     

货币政策对企业劳动投资效率的影响研究

基于2010—2020年我国A股上市公司的相关数据,对货币政策与企业劳动投资效率之间的关系进行探讨。研究发现,在货币政策紧缩时,企业劳动投资效率会有明显的提高,会计稳健性的提高以及自由现金流量的减少是紧缩性货币政策影响企业劳动投资效率的主要作用机制。进一步研究发现,高质量的公司治理水平会抑制紧缩性货币政策对企业劳动投资效率的影响。非效率劳动投资分组检验结果表明,紧缩性货币政策对企业劳动投资效率的促进效应,更多地表现为抑制劳动投资过度。     

会计稳健性与投资效率理论分析

会计稳健性可以从三个方面影响企业的投资效率,一是稳健性是对信息不对称的应对手段,二是会计稳健性在解决管理层代理冲突方面扮演了重要的角色,三是会计稳健性可以帮助公司吸引外部投资,减低融资成本,本文将沿着这个框架详细分析会计稳健性对企业投资效率的影响。     

会计稳健性与投资效率理论分析

会计稳健性可以从三个方面影响企业的投资效率,一是稳健性是对信息不对称的应对手段,二是会计稳健性在解决管理层代理冲突方面扮演了重要的角色,三是会计稳健性可以帮助公司吸引外部投资,减低融资成本,本文将沿着这个框架详细分析会计稳健性对企业投资效率的影响。     

Accounting conservatism and the profitability of corporate insiders

We predict that accounting conservatism influences insiders' opportunities to speculate on good and bad news, and thus, insider trading profitability. We find that greater conditional (unconditional) conservatism is associated with lower (higher) insiders' profitability from sales. We find limited evidence that conservatism influences profitability from purchases. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses on the different informational roles of conditional and unconditional conservatism, and on the asymmetric influence of conservatism over the opportunities to speculate on good versus bad news. Our research design takes into consideration the endogenous nature of insiders' trading and conservatism. The results are robust to different measures of conservatism and a number of additional analyses.     

Accounting conservatism and voluntary corporate governance mechanisms by Australian firms

This study examines the relationship between voluntary adoption of selected corporate governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism for a sample of firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) over the 11‐year period prior to the promulgation of the ASX Corporate Governance Council Good Governance Principles and Best Practice Recommendations in 2003. Using four accounting and market‐based accounting conservatism measures, our results provide evidence of both conditional and unconditional conservatism in accounting reporting for Australian firms. We find that voluntary audit committee formation, increasing board independence and decreasing board size are positively associated with unconditional accounting conservatism and negatively related to the degree of conditional conservatism. Our results support the contention that firms voluntarily adopting perceived best practice corporate governance mechanisms employ unconditional accounting conservatism as a complimentary agency control device and are consistent with the observed negative association between the unconditional and conditional forms of accounting conservatism practice.     

Unexpected Accruals and Conditional Accounting Conservatism

Abstract:  This paper examines the impact of management discretion over accruals on conditional accounting conservatism, defined as the tendency of accountants to recognize bad news on a timelier basis than good news. Prior research suggests that conditional accounting conservatism reflected in earnings is mainly due to the accrual component of earnings, not the cash flow component of earnings. After decomposing total accruals into expected and unexpected accruals, I find that (1) conditional accounting conservatism reflected in accruals is mainly due to unexpected accruals; (2) the negative association between unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism is mainly attributable to unexpected accruals; and (3) firms with higher leverage exhibit conditionally more conservative accounting primarily through unexpected accruals. These results are robust to accrual models that take into account the systematic association between accruals and cash flows and their non-linearity and to the asymmetric persistence of earnings changes specification of conditional accounting conservatism. Taken together, these results suggest that managers exercise their discretion over accruals to expedite the recognition of bad news rather than good news.     

Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in monitoring managers’ investment decisions

Watts (2003), among others, argues that conservatism helps in corporate governance by mitigating agency problems associated with managers’ investment decisions. We hypothesize that if conservatism reduces managers’ex ante incentives to take on negative net present value projects and improves the ex post monitoring of investments, firms with more conservative accounting ought to have higher future profitability and lower likelihood (and magnitude) of future special items charges. Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms with more conservative accounting have (i) higher future cash flows and gross margins and (ii) lower likelihood and magnitude of special items charges than firms with less conservative accounting.     

Agency costs of free cash flow and conditional conservatism

This study investigates whether agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are associated with conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that conditional conservatism improves ex ante efficient investment decisions and facilitates ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions. As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF. Using excess cash as a proxy for the agency costs of FCF, I provide evidence that firms with higher agency costs of FCF incorporate losses in a timelier manner relative to gains compared to their counterparts. Additionally, the association between excess cash and conditional conservatism predictably varies with the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms that mitigate FCF problems, such as debt or dividend payouts or repurchases. Further investigation suggests that greater conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of overinvestment among firms bearing high agency costs of FCF, demonstrating the ability of conservatism to reduce agency costs of FCF.     

Accounting Conservatism and the Cost of Capital: An International Analysis

This paper examines the role of conditional accounting conservatism in mitigating the cost of equity and debt capital in an international setting. The findings are that firms domiciled in countries with more conservative financial reporting systems have lower cost of equity and debt capital. The paper further explores the cross‐sectional variation of the above relationships, finding that the negative association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity and debt capital is more pronounced in countries with stronger legal enforcement, suggesting a complementary role between conservatism and legal institutions in capital markets. In addition, the paper finds that conservatism only reduces the cost of debt in countries where accounting‐based covenants are widely used, consistent with the argument that conditional conservatism improves the efficiency of debt contracts via accelerating covenant violations.     

Conditional conservatism and labor investment efficiency

Prior literature documents that asymmetric timely recognition of losses versus gains (also known as conditional conservatism) can induce management to make more efficient investment decisions by mitigating information asymmetry between management and investors and providing early signals about the profitability of projects that are undertaken. In this paper, we investigate the impact of conservatism on an important investment decision that has been overlooked, namely, investment in labor. We find that conservatism is negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency; more specifically, conservatism reduces inefficient investment practices on the labor market, including over-hiring, under-firing, under-hiring, and over-firing. Our results hold after controlling for managerial ability, corporate governance, and other investments.     

The relationship between R&D intensity,conservatism, and management earnings forecast issuance

R&D-intensive firms suffer from high information asymmetry and high proprietary costs and are prone to exhibit bottom-line losses given the unconditional conservative accounting treatment of R&D expenses. We examine how R&D intensity influences the issuance of management earnings forecasts (MEFs) across levels of accounting conservatism, controlling for proprietary costs and other earnings guidance determinants. We provide insights into how managers view the tradeoffs of using MEF disclosures to lower information asymmetry versus the costs of releasing proprietary information to competitors and the loss of reputational capital that could arise from providing inaccurate forecasts. We find that although R&D intensity and conditional conservatism are negatively related to the issuance of MEFs, as shown in prior research, at high levels of research intensity and the accompanying uncertainty about future payoffs, the negative association between conditional conservatism and MEF issuance is mitigated. These findings point to a role for conditional conservatism as a credibility enhancer for managers of R&D intense firms.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.