Accruals and ‘accounting numbers management’ in UK executive agencies

Public sector reforms have implemented business techniques, including management by results, cost management and accrual accounting, to make public entities more efficient and accountable. As a consequence, ‘accounting numbers management’ has become a way for managers in the public sector to adapt accounting figures to their interests. This study focuses on ‘earnings management’ (manipulation of earnings) in government agencies. The authors provide evidence of earnings management in which agencies try to keep net operating costs to around zero. The authors' findings question the effectiveness of financial targets associated with accrual-based measures.     

Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital

The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short‐term stock price performance. This paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated, we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle. Depending on a firm's earnings profile, it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times. Because of this dependence on the state of the economy, earnings manipulation can influence a firm's cost of capital despite the forces of diversification.     

Overvalued equity,benchmark beating and unexpected accruals

We investigate the extent to which the overvaluation hypothesis provides incentives for managers to beat earnings benchmarks, and whether this benchmark beating can be reliably interpreted as evidence of earnings management. We carefully identify firms immediately above earnings benchmarks that have a priori, overvaluation‐based incentives to achieve the benchmark. We therefore focus on benchmark‐beating observations where manipulation is most likely, providing a more powerful test of the existence of opportunistic financial reporting. Consistent with overvaluation‐related incentives encouraging earnings management, we find that overvalued firms that just exceed levels‐related earnings benchmarks have higher unexpected accruals than firms with less extreme valuations.     

Financial crisis,GDP variation and earnings management in Europe

The purpose of this study is to examine the consequences of the financial crisis on the European companies’ in conjunction with earnings management practice. It focuses on financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor during recession years. The study makes use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management and studies the influence of big 4 auditor, in order to shed more light on possible causes for shifting earnings. The findings of the study provide evidence that financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor exhibit lower discretionary accruals. The results reveal that Greek and Spanish companies reduce earnings management manipulation during recession. In contrast, Portuguese, Irish and Italian companies show mixed results. They tend to reduce earnings management practices, but there are reasons that influence managers’ behavior to increase earnings management. The findings of this study can be useful for both investors and standard setting authorities.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.     

股权结构与上市公司应计和真实盈余管理行为

过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管理行为方面,显著影响更多体现在异常现金流和异常生产成本方面.     

The impact of climate risk on earnings management: International evidence

This study explores the influence of climate risk on properties of firms’ financial reporting practices with observations collected from 64 countries between 2005 and 2016. We use a country-level climate risk indicator developed by Germanwatch to measure the degree of damage from extreme weather events, and find that climate risk positively influences firms’ engagements in both accruals-based and real earnings management. Furthermore, we document that the above-mentioned effects of climate risk are moderated by the quality of country-level public governance. Subsample analysis suggests that the main effect of climate risk on earnings management is more pronounced for firms from developed countries, for firms in environment-sensitive industries, and for firms reporting losses. Our findings, which are supported by a battery of robustness tests, have important implication for regulators and policymakers.     

Visible Reserves in Banks – Determinants of Initial Creation,Usage and Contribution to Bank Stability

The opportunity of building up visible “Reserves for General Banking Risks” by the bank management represents a peculiarity in the German financial accounting framework for banks. We investigate German banks' motives for the creation and usage of these reserves and assess their role in financial stability. We find that banks primarily create and use GBR reserves to build up Tier 1 capital for regulatory capital management and earnings management purposes. Most importantly, however, we also reveal that banks using these reserves are less likely to experience a future distress or a bank default event. We therefore conclude that the existence of GBR reserves within the financial accounting framework represents both a convenient capital and earnings management tool for bank managers and a beneficial regulatory instrument to enhance bank stability.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

The Effect of IFRS Adoption and Investor Protection on Earnings Quality Around the World

This study examines the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption and investor protection on the quality of accounting earnings in forty-six countries around the globe. The results suggest that earnings quality increases for mandatory IFRS adoption when a country's investor protection regime provides stronger protection. This study extends the current literature that shows that accounting practices are influenced by country-level macro settings. The results highlight the importance of investor protection for financial reporting quality and the need for regulators to design mechanisms that limit managers' earnings management practices.     

Do REITs Manipulate Their Financial Results Around Seasoned Equity Offerings? Evidence from US Equity REITs

This study addresses two questions: Is there earnings management in the REIT industry around seasoned equity offerings (SEO)? How is earnings management affected by financial and governance factors? Discretionary accruals methods are used to measure earnings management. In addition, the difference between actual and calculated FFO is used to capture the potential FFO manipulation. We examine how these manipulation measures change in the five quarters around SEOs. Moreover, we investigate how a REIT’s earnings management decision is affected by its financial structure, operating style, external auditor and corporate governance. We find clear evidence of FFO manipulation around SEOs, but the extent of earnings management is relatively weaker. We find that REITs issuing SEOs more often are more aggressive in manipulating FFO than earnings. Moreover, there is a notable difference between these two types of financial results manipulation. A mean-reversion trend is found in discretionary accruals, but not for FFO manipulation. Manipulation in financial results is influenced by various factors. A diminished capability to generate cash flow, high leverage, volatile cash flow, frequent SEOs and slack corporate governance are all the features of REITs more likely to manipulate financial results.     

Covid-19 pandemic,a catalyst for aggressive earnings management by banks?

This paper investigates the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the financial reporting quality of European banks by examining the occurrence of earnings management specifically income smoothing. Using a sample of listed European banks, we employ panel estimation to compare income smoothing in the pre-pandemic period (2019Q1-2019Q4) and the pandemic period (2020Q1-2021Q4). We find that earnings management has significantly increased during the pandemic years, evidencing how the quality of financial reporting is affected during the crisis period. Our findings further suggest that amid the crisis, governance quality limits the incidence of earnings management and emphasizes how the strength of country-level governance and institutional framework affects the quality of financial reporting. Further analysis shows that though banks are inclined to manage earnings during a crisis, nevertheless, the presence of high-quality audit is a limiting factor on the incidence of earnings management in the face of crisis. Our findings which are relevant to investors, market participants, and regulators among others make a significant contribution to the accounting literature and specifically complement the strand of literature on the discretionary use of loan loss provision for earnings management during crisis.     

The effect of board‐manager agency conflicts on non‐profit organisations’ earnings and cost allocation manipulations

Taking into account agency problems between board and management within non‐profit organisations, for the first time a comprehensive formal model of earnings manipulations is developed. Both organisational earnings as well as disaggregated financial performance indicators are looked at, the last ones being affected by possible indirect cost allocation manipulations. The model takes into consideration the impact of disclosed earnings and performance indicators on externally raised funds, and assumes risk‐neutral managers. In the last section, it is generalised by introducing risk‐averse managers.

The conditions for optimal manipulation levels (from a managerial point of view) are derived. Depending on the (dis) utility parameters involved, different solutions emerge. As to the agency problems, it is shown that, at least for all interior solutions, a single mechanism is at work in all the situations analysed: more agency problems lead to more manipulations, both at the organisational level and the disaggregated level.     

盈余管理与所得税支付：基于会计利润与应税所得之间差异的研究

公司在进行盈余管理时,往往面临着财务报告成本与税务成本的权衡。为了摆脱该困境,公司有动机通过操纵非应税项目损益,以规避盈余管理的所得税成本。本文通过考察会计利润与应税所得差异(Book-Tax Differences)和盈余管理之间的关系,证实了该假设。我们的研究表明,上市公司盈余管理幅度越大,则会计利润与应税所得差异(本文定义为非应税项目损益)也越高,即上市公司通过操纵非应税项目损益,以规避盈余管理的税负成本。我们的研究进一步发现,上市公司通过非应税项目损益规避盈余管理税负成本的行为主要发生在高税率组别,而享受所得税优惠的公司则没有呈现出该特征。另外,我们的研究还发现,上市公司主要通过操纵长期应计项目规避所得税负。但我们的研究也表明,上市公司通过非应税项目损益规避的盈余管理税负成本较为有限,平均每1元操纵利润中,只有1．8分的操纵利润可以规避所得税成本,这或许表明进行盈余管理的公司为了避免引起资本市场或税务当局的怀疑,而为其大部分利润操纵支付了所得税成本。此外,本文研究还发现,高税率公司存在强烈的通过非应税掼益项目规避所得税的动机。我们的样本公司中,平均而言,所得税税率每增加1个百分点,操纵非应税项目损益占资产的比例将增加0．029％;适用33％税率的公司与适用15％优惠税率的公司相比,为此所规避的所得税成本平均高达330万元。     

Do firms change earnings management behavior after receiving financial forecast warnings?

This study investigates whether government-issued financial forecast warnings are associated with earnings management in Taiwan. In particular, we examine whether firms receiving warnings use different earnings management tools than firms without warnings. We find that firms that were warned prefer to use real activities manipulation than accrual-based earnings management to avoid potential litigation and penalties. In addition, we document that firms receiving warnings employed both accrual-based and real activities earnings management especially through over-production in response to the regulatory change from mandatory to voluntary disclosure in 2005. Our results suggest that while the government warning mechanism might constrain the forecasting firms from using accrual-based earnings management, the adoption of voluntary financial forecast disclosure did not necessarily prevent them from engaging in accrual-based manipulation.     

The dynamic of financial crises and its non-monotonic effects on earnings quality

Despite the wealth of research examining earnings quality and earnings management, we still have much to learn about the effects of macroeconomic factors on accounting discretion’s decisions; the recent financial crises may be one of such factors. Nevertheless, the extant literature is inconclusive about the direction of the relationship between earnings quality and economic downturn. In this study, we focus on the extent to which organizational survival may be an objective of earnings management. In this manner, we add to research considering earnings target as an objective of earnings manipulation. Furthermore, our results suggest that these objectives likely change as crisis becomes worse. Consequently, we argue that the relationship between financial crises and earnings management is non-monotonic. Earnings management decreases when the intensity of the crisis is low, while it increases when the crisis is acute.     

Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.     

Changes in bonus contracts in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley era

We examine whether the relation between earnings and bonuses changes after Sarbanes–Oxley. Theory predicts that, as the financial reporting system reduces the discretion allowed managers, firms will put more weight on earnings in compensation contracts to encourage effort. However, the increased risk imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley on executives may cause firms to temper this contracting outcome. We examine and find support for the joint hypothesis that the implementation of Sarbanes–Oxley and related reforms led to a decrease in earnings management and that firms responded by placing more weight on earnings in bonus contracts. We find no evidence that firms changed compensation contracts to compensate executives for assuming more risk.     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.     

Capitalized customer acquisition costs and earnings quality: A case study of PhotoWorks,Inc

This case examines issues related to accounting method choice, earnings management, and earnings quality. Specifically, the case examines a company (PhotoWorks, Inc.) that chose the less conservative approach of capitalizing and then amortizing a certain type of advertising expenditure rather than expensing the costs as incurred. The primary purpose of this case is to illustrate the role of judgment in accounting method choice and how it provides potential opportunities for earnings management. The case also allows students to explore the multi-dimensional nature of financial reporting decisions and to develop a greater appreciation for how their accounting coursework relates to important “real-world” issues. After completing this case, students should be able to do the following: (1) describe factors that are involved in accounting method choice and support the appropriateness of an accounting method choice based on a search of the accounting standards; (2) understand and evaluate the effects of accounting method choice on the financial statements; (3) describe the conflicting motivations managers face when deciding on financial accounting methods versus tax accounting methods; (4) explain what is meant by earnings management, factors that motivate managers to manage earnings, methods they can use to manage earnings, and how earnings management affects earnings quality; and (5) describe the role of auditors in analyzing a company’s accounting method choices and in assessing the quality of a company’s earnings.