Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

税收竞争和税收套利对国际税收制度的挑战

当前被动投资的税收竞争、主动投资的税收竞争和税收套利等问题阻碍了单一税收原则和受惠原则的实践运用。本文介绍了税收竞争和税收套利对国际税收制度的挑战,并以OECD成员国的应对为例,阐述了OECD成员国不断与时俱进修订税收法规的历程,试图引起人们关注国际税收制度的完善。     

国际税收协定与反避税

税收协定除对所得消除双重征税外,还有防止偷逃税(“财政逃避”)的重要目的。税收协定和反避税之间的关系十分紧密,反避税是税收协定的一个重要内容,是各国谈签协定的主旨之一。本文从反避税角度对协定中可能出现的协定滥用和避税问题进行了列举,并提出适时修订协定、完善国内法规、有效打击跨国偷逃税活动的建议。     

国际税收情报的证据效力

国际税收情报是缔约国的主管机关相互交换的税收信息。它对于加强国际税收征管,减少税收逃避行为具有非常重要的作用。但是,在现实执法过程中,国际税收情报如何具体运用,是否是证据,是否具有证据效力,是否可以直接作为定案的依据等问题尚没有明确的法律规定。本文就国际税收情报的证据效力问题进行初步的分析和探讨,认为税务机关应当正确认识国家税收情报的性质,一方面应重视其提供的信息和线索,另一方面又不能直接把国际税收情报作为定案的证据。     

The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity

The effects of bilateral tax treaties on FDI activity have been unexplored, despite significant ongoing activities by countries to negotiate and ratify these treaties. This paper estimates the impact of bilateral tax treaties using both U.S. inbound and outbound FDI over the period 1980–1999. Robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications, we find little evidence that bilateral tax treaties increase FDI activity, contrary to OECD-stated goals for such treaties.     

国际税收竞争的实质及应对

国际税收竞争实质上是市场竞争规律在政府行政领域的体现形式。良性税收竞争有助于降低总体税负、减少经济扭曲、提升公共产品生产效率,但对此类竞争的国际协调难以取得实质成效。恶性税收竞争则会掠夺性地侵占他国税基,对此类竞争的遏制具备理论的必要性和可行性。政府可通过改革现行税制、精简规范收费、优化公共服务以及加强国际合作来应对国际税收竞争。     

电子商务环境下的国际逃税与避税

由于电子商务的迅速发展和各国税收立法的相对滞后,电子商务逃、避税问题日益突出。各国根据电子商务环境下的国际逃、避税的新特点,在原有防范措施的基础上,采取了一些新的措施,如加强税务机关自身信息化建设、提高网络技术、推行电子商务税收登记制度、从支付体系入手解决电子商务税收的征管问题,加强国际间的交流与合作等。     

Exemption vs. Credit Method in International Double Taxation Treaties

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation.     

税收优惠的国际竞争与影响

税收优惠竞争具有促进自由竞争、保障发展中国家的利益、保障外国投资者利益、对征税权力的约束的正面影响,也具有破坏生产效率、损害税收公平与社会福利、侵蚀其它地区的税基、破坏所得税的累进效果等负面影响。我国在新时期的税收优惠调整中,应该根据税收优惠竞争的正、负面影响综合考虑吸引投资与全民福利最大化双重因素。     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

我国税收情报交换中存在的主要问题及建议

税收情报交换是目前跨国税收征管合作中最重要和最有效的手段之一,对发现和查处跨国偷避税行为具有不可替代的作用。本文首先介绍了我国税收情报交换工作的特点,然后对存在的问题提出了有针对性的解决方法。     

打击“避税天堂”国际准则的主要内容

本文以有关打击避税天堂的国际准则为主线,在理解和分析避税天堂的含义和危害的基础上,指出保障税制透明度和进行税务信息分享是打击避税天堂的国际准则中最重要的内容。     

Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not

The issue of capital tax competition is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital-taxation exists. However, the sustainability of residence-based capital taxation depends on the exchange of information about foreign financial investments between tax authorities. This paper analyzes the incentives of tax authorities to voluntarily provide information. We show that voluntary information exchange is an equilibrium in a standard small-country model of tax competition, whereas it may not be an equilibrium when the size of the financial sector has a positive impact on the wage structure of an economy.     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

"税收协定优于国内税法适用"不可绝对化

《中华人民共和国外商投资企业和外国企业所得税法》和《中华人民共和国税收征收管理法》规定,在国内税法与税收协定发生冲突的情况下,优先适用税收协定。①但是这一规定过于绝对化,在大多数情况下,我们应该善意履行国际义务,遵守税收协定的规定,但是,如果国内税法的规定能够维护本国税收利益,打击国际逃避税,或者国内税法给跨国纳税人带来的利益优于税收协定给跨国纳税人带来的利益,则国内税法可以优先于税收协定适用。     

国际视角下中国环境税研究

目前,环境税体系在欧盟国家已经相对成熟,中国的环境税的开征方案也正在制定过程中。本文厘清了国际上不同口径的环境税定义,并分析了环境税的经济效应,最后,阐述了中国开征环境税的必要性及改革思路。     

证券流转税:现状分析、国际趋势与改革思路

我国目前的证券税制以证券交易印花税为主体税种。从长远来看,我国应逐步完善证券流转税制,实行证券交易税和印花税兼征制度。改革我国的证券流转税,在证券交易环节用证券交易税代替印花税,不能仅限于更名,而应有实质性的改变。     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union

This paper examines the tax competition literature and attempts to draw out its implications for the debate on corporate tax coordination within the EU. It begins with the early basic tax competition model, which derives conditions under which underprovision of public services occurs and tax harmonization unambiguously improves welfare for all states in the union. The paper then turns to a wide variety of extensions of this model, some of which reinforce its results and others that yield rather different conclusions. The analysis concludes by considering the implications of the tax competition literature for the debate on EU corporate tax coordination, drawing on some recent efforts to synthesize this vast literature by estimating the efficiency costs of tax competition and simulating the efficiency gains from various tax coordination palns.     

Some Equity and Efficiency Considerations of International Tax Competition

The paper uses a dynamic 2-country equilibrium model with imperfections in the labour market calibrated for the US and EU economy to investigate dynamic efficiency and equity aspects of international tax competition. We focus on tax policy where governments can only decide on the levels of corporate and labour taxes, given a constant share of government consumption and transfers in GDP and a constant VAT rate. We find that the welfare effect of a tax shift from capital to labour depends heavily on the distortionary nature of labour taxes. In contrast to existing results we find substantial positive international spillover effects of corporate tax reduction in one country, with long term gains outweighing short term losses. Results are very different, however, if one goes beyond the representative agent framework. According to our results, a tax switch is most likely not Pareto improving since net wages tend to decline in both regions even in the long run.     

税收竞争理论发展综述

上世纪80年代中后期以来,税收竞争理论研究已经成为公共经济学领域研究的重要课题之一。近年来,国外对税收竞争的研究取得了众多的研究成果。而我国的研究起步较晚,仍处于介绍与评析国外理论阶段。随着全球化进程的加快,跨国公司活动的日益活跃,国家与国家之间的联系日益密切,如何充分运用税收竞争理论完善我国涉外税收制度、维护我国在对外经济交往中的税收利益、促进我国国内经济的发展将成为以后重要的研究方向。