Regional capital mobility in China: Economic reform with limited financial integration

This paper assesses the changes in the regional capital mobility in China during the period of economic reform in 1978–2008 by employing a panel time varying coefficient (TVP) model. This approach is much more suitable to model China's evolution in the regional capital mobility than a standard structural break model as China's reforms took place gradually and were often implemented over several stages. Using the TVP model, we find that (1) China's provincial capital mobility demonstrated a moderate improvement over the sample period, but worsened temporarily between 1994 and 1997. This is probably due to the government's effort to combat inflation which reduced the investment and transfers to regions; (2) regions with the most developed and least developed provinces experienced higher degree of capital mobility improvement than those in the middle.     

Social capital and access to informal finance – evidence from Chinese private firms

This study investigates how firms’ social capital affects their access to informal finance. We argue that social capital helps reduce information asymmetry, increase trust between related parties and enforce lending contracts, so it has positive effects on firms’ access to informal finance. Using novel survey data of Chinese private firms, we find that firms with more social capital have more access to informal finance with lower costs. Further tests show that the effect of social capital is more significant when firms are located in regions with less developed market and lower community’s social capital and during the 2008 financial crisis.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Joining the club? Procyclicality of private capital inflows in lower income developing economies

Using a newly developed dataset this paper examines the cyclicality of private capital inflows to low-income developing countries (LIDCs). The empirical analysis shows that capital inflows to LIDCs are procyclical, yet considerably less procyclical than flows to more advanced economies. The analysis also suggests that flows to LIDCs are more persistent than flows to emerging markets (EMs). There is also evidence that changes in risk aversion are a significant correlate of private capital inflows with the expected sign, but LIDCs seem to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion than EMs. A host of robustness checks to alternative estimation methods and control variables confirm the baseline results. In terms of policy implications, these findings suggest that private capital inflows are likely to become more procyclical as LIDCs move along the development path, which could render the conduct of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies more challenging in these economies.     

The Choice of Private Versus Public Capital Markets: Evidence from Privatizations

We examine the impact of political, institutional, and economic factors on the choice between selling a state‐owned enterprise in the public capital market through a share issue privatization (SIP) and selling it in the private capital market in an asset sale. SIPs are more likely in less developed capital markets, for more profitable state‐owned enterprises, and where there are more protections of minority shareholders. Asset sales are more likely when there is less state control of the economy and when the firm is smaller. Our results suggest the importance of privatization activities in developing the equity markets of privatizing countries.     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

How Does Being Public Affect Firm Investment? Further Evidence from China

What role does the stock market play in the allocation of capital? Few studies have examined how being public affects firm investment in emerging markets. This study fills this gap by comparing investment behavior in public and private Chinese firms over the period 2004–2010. We find an overall improved capital allocation of public firms relative to private firms in China. By disentangling the financial constraints effect from the agency effect, we show that public firms are less likely to underinvest when there is cash flow insufficiency and more likely to overinvest when there is free cash flow. We conclude that both effects coexist and that whether or not being public improves investment behavior depends on the net effect of loosening financial constraints and worsening agency conflicts. Further examination shows that financial information plays a limited role in these effects, implying that the association between being public and firm investment may not be attributed to information asymmetry but, rather, institutional arrangement in China.     

Strategic alliances,venture capital,and exit decisions in early stage high-tech firms

We study the trade-offs that biotech start-ups face in the private equity market when they choose between raising firm-level capital from venture capitalists or project-level capital from strategic alliance partners. Increased alliance activity makes future alliances more likely, but future VC activity less likely. In contrast, venture capital (VC) activity makes both future alliance and future VC activity more likely. Both types of private capital raise the hazard of going public. Acquisition as an alternative to initial public offering is made more likely by increased VC activity, but the link between acquisition probabilities and alliance activity is less clear-cut. These results highlight both the importance of alliance partners in resolving asymmetric information problems in the capital acquisition process and the potential conflict of interest between different sources of private equity.     

Potential Spatial Labor and Human Capital Mobility in China: Evidence from College Admissions Under the National College Entrance Examination System

Abstract:

Higher education in China plays an important role in promoting labor and human capital mobility. In this paper, I empirically address the issue of regional disparities, college admissions under the National College Entrance Examination (CEE) system, and potential interregional labor and human capital mobility in China. The results show that examinees from western provinces have a strong preference for coastal universities, compared with examinees from central provinces. College admissions in China then seem to have a stronger effect on potential labor and human capital movement from the western to the coastal regions than from the central to the coastal regions.     

The Impact of Business Groups on Investment Efficiency: Does Capital Allocation Matter?

Using data on internal capital markets in China, this paper examines the influence of internal capital markets on investment efficiency in business groups. The empirical results show that using internal capital markets can alleviate over invests within business groups. In addition, it can alleviate deficiencies in R&D investment in business groups effectively. The impact of internal capital markets on investment efficiency varies between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. At private enterprises, internal capital market operations significantly alleviate overinvestment and promote R&D investment. However, at state-owned enterprises, internal capital market operations increase overinvestment and reduce investment in R&D.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.     

Government venture capital and cross-border investment

We use data on venture capital investments from 26 countries from 1998–2013. We investigate the following questions: Do domestic government sponsored venture capital funds augment or curtail domestic private venture capital funds from cross-border investment? Do government sponsored venture capital funds attract or repel foreign private venture capital investment? The results show that a preponderance of mixed-structured over pure-structured government venture capital investment has a crowding-in effect overall: it attracts domestic and international private venture capital to the domestic venture capital market while simultaneously increasing total private venture capital investment. In contrast, a preponderance of pure-government over mixed-government venture capital fund investment repels foreign private venture capital investment (has a crowding out effect). We find that both these effects are more pronounced for domestic rather than foreign private venture capital and that the attraction effect is stronger than the repulsion effect.     

财政分权、贸易不平衡与区域间资本流动

本文基于经典的宏观经济理论及储蓄与投资相关关系检验法,采用空间面板模型,对中国的财政分权与贸易不平衡对区域间资本流动性的影响及分地区的资本流动性进行了研究.研究发现,在全国层面,财政分权的提高或贸易不平衡度的降低会促进区域间资本流动,在地区层面,环渤海、东南、西北、中部、西南和东北地区内的资本流动性依次减弱.总体上,为提高区域间资本流动性,政府应进一步财政分权,同时着力降低区域的贸易不平衡度.     

The global financial crisis and the capital structure of firms: Was the impact more severe among SMEs and non-listed firms?

Using a dataset covering about 276,998 firms across 75 countries over the period 2004–2011, this paper examines the short-run evolution of firms' capital structures following the start of the global financial crisis and its immediate aftermath, comparing the experience of already levered SMEs, large non-listed firms, and listed companies. We find that firm leverage and debt maturity declined both in advanced economies and in developing countries, even in those that did not experience a crisis. The deleveraging and maturity reduction were particularly significant for non-listed firms, including both SMEs as well as large non-listed companies. For SMEs, these effects were larger in countries with less efficient legal systems, weaker information sharing mechanisms, less developed financial sectors, and with more restrictions on bank entry. In contrast, there is weaker evidence of a significant decline in leverage and debt maturity among listed companies which are typically much larger than other firms and likely to benefit from the “spare tire” of easier access to capital market financing. Though our results are robust to many changes in sample and specification, we cannot rule out that survivorship bias and attrition could affect our estimates to some degree.     

Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies

Using a sample of U.S. dual-class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value-destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders' expense, and help explain why firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights.     

Capital Structure Choice in a Nascent Market: Evidence from Listed Firms in China

We study the capital structure decisions of listed firms in China between 1992 and 2001. The Chinese market exhibits high information asymmetry, phenomenal growth, highly concentrated ownership, and a lack of external market for corporate control. We find that Chinese firms use little long-term debt, which is positively (negatively) related to firm size and tangibility (profitability and growth options). These results are robust to the degree of seasoning after the initial public offering and private versus State ownership. Although industry membership is important, the development and growth of the stock market did not affect the long-term debt ratios over the years.     

金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究

本文以我国证券市场2002～2004年329家民营上市公司为样本，考察了金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值之间的关系。发现民营上市公司的金字塔控制不利干公司价值：民营上市公司的最终控制人主要通过关联方担保、关联方资金占用和上市公司与关联方的商品购销活动来侵占小股东的利益，其政策含义是应该鼓励自然人直接持股上市公司，加强对关联交易的监管。更为重要的是必须改营公司外部治理环境、尤其是法律对投资者权益的保护，从而从根本上杜绝民营上市公司及其最终控制人对小股东的侵害行为，改善公司治理，提高公司价值。     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: Evidence from China

As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.     

Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank specific variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics. The model is estimated with annual data for an unbalanced panel of the 78 largest private banks in the world headquartered in 12 industrial countries over the period between 1992 and 2005. The results indicate that bank capital ratios are significantly affected in the hypothesized directions by most of the bank-specific variables. Several of the country characteristic and policy variables are also significant with the predicted sign: banks maintain higher capital ratios in home countries in which the bank sector is relatively smaller and in countries that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures.     

Explaining Industrial Growth in Coastal China: Economic Reforms ... and What Else?

In the 1980s China experienced "an explosion of pent-up entrepreneurship"facilitated by wide-ranging, although often unorthodox, economicreforms. This article uses data on the output of 23 industrialsectors in seven coastal regions (provinces and counties) overthe period 1985 to 1989 to study the correlates of growth. Althoughindustry-specific feature—the degree of specializationand competition—had some influence on growth, much ofthe action came from region-specific influences and regionalspillovers. Regional influences included the open-door policiesand special economic zones that successfully attracted investmentsfrom overseas Chinese to particular locations. Existing regionalstrengths, especially high-quality human capital and infrastructure,also contributed to growth. The results illuminate the interplaybetween conditions conducive for growth—for example, thecontribution of foreign expertise is greatly enhanced by availablehuman capital. China made judicious use of the advantages ofbackwardness by targeting areas that were less developed andless encumbered by the legacy of existing institutions, althoughit was fortunate in this regard that the backward regions werein close proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan (China). Importantalso was the transmission of growth impulses across the provincesand counties, possibly through prereform cadre and administrativenetworks.