基于信息不对称的信贷配给均衡模型研究

本文建立了竞争和信息不对称条件下,信贷市场的信贷配给均衡模型,模型表明在为不同的借款人提供由贷款利率和贷款额度组成的相同贷款合同的情况下,信贷市场存在稳定的单合同均衡,信贷市场的均衡在信贷配给点达到,因而从信息不对称和均衡的角度解释了信贷配给现象。     

信息不对称理论与银行信贷

在传统经济学框架下，银行是多余的机构；有效解释银行功能的是信息不对称理论。同样，在银行在发挥作用，开展信贷业务时，也受到信息不对称的影响，如信贷配给。银行之所以广泛采用抵押担保的信贷方式，正是因为低押担保在信息不对称的情形下起到了信号传递的作用。如果信息能够进一步完备，银行是可以发放信用贷款的，如信用卡信贷，这对借款人来说，降低了信贷的成本。     

信息非对称对住房抵押市场的影响

在住房抵押贷款市场中存在着信息非对称，银行不知道借款人的风险状况。在住房处置成本比较高的环境中，信息非对称对银行的贷款决策产生重要影响，造成信贷配给。降低住房处置成本与增加借款人的违约成本可以减轻信息非对称的影响。     

贵州省信贷配给问题研究

信息不对称造成信贷配给成为一种普遍存在的现象，而贵州省的特殊经济结构，使金融机构产生了固定的贷款风险与盈利预期，形成了一个相对固定的信贷配给行为。本文从风险认同性、贷款投放取向和资金运营渠道等方面，对贵州省银行金融机构的信贷配给行为和成因，及带来的问题进行了分析，并从改变金融机构风险和盈利的预期为基本的出发点，提出相关政策建议。     

国家助学贷款银行惜贷之理论分析与破解路径

本文运用信贷配给理论,建立新的分析框架,从单个银行的信贷配给过程入手,研究信息不对称条件下商业银行的信贷配给行为,寻找国家助学贷款银行惜贷的内在原因,提出破解惜贷的两条路径：一是以小银行为主体开展有担保的国家助学贷款业务;二是以高校为单位“打包”贷款,增大单笔额度,由大银行开展国家助学贷款业务。     

中小企业财园信贷通融资模式的经济学分析

本文运用信息不对称条件下的信贷配给理论,采用动态博弈模型,对江西省近年推出的中小企业财园信贷通融资模式进行了深入分析。研究发现,在财园信贷通融资模式下,政府直接介入中小企业信贷市场,为符合条件的中小企业提供担保,起到了政府增信的作用,缓解了银行与中小企业的信息不对称,可以有效治理逆向选择和道德风险问题;财园信贷通融资模式下,政府的风险代偿保证金担保可以激励银行提供贷款;政府和银行对违约贷款的追偿力度、中小企业履约还贷的诚信收益是影响中小企业还贷决策的重要因素;中小企业因履约而获得的诚信收益,即中小企业与政府、银行建立的长期信用关系至关重要,直接影响中小企业的履约决策。     

信息不对称条件下银行如何防范代理风险

信息不对称理论比早期西方经济理论中的信息对称假设更贴近现实经济情况，为凯恩斯宏观经济学提供了微观基础，也使凯恩斯经济学得到了一定的发展。信息不对称现象存在于整个经济生活中，在信贷市场表示得尤为突出。所以我们应当加深对信贷市场中不对称信息的认识，提高银行防范代理风险的能力，加强银行贷款的安全性，保障银行正常收益，促进社会经济稳步发展。     

信贷配给的效率分析

导致信贷配给现象的原因有利率上限管制，信贷市场上的逆向选择和道德风险。利率上限条件下的信贷配给会导致信贷市场低效率，而信息不对称条件下的信贷配给则是帕累托改进。通过信贷配给的效率分析可得到我国利率市场化的相关启示。     

我国公共征信系统发展研究

一、理论概述 通常,信贷的理论研究有一个假设,即在还款能力上,申请贷款的消费者与放贷机构相比占有信息优势.这种借贷双方信息不对称导致了道德风险与逆向选择等问题.借款人总是比放贷机构更了解自己还款意愿和能力.显然,掌握更多信息,能使放贷机构更精确地度量借款人的风险,制定出与借款人风险相称的利率水平,低风险借款人能享受较低利率,减少被信贷市场排斥的借款人数量.     

中小企业贷款难:一个基于信贷决策模型的分析

本文以信贷配合理论为基础,结合我国当前实际,融入抵押品价值、抵押清算成本、银行信贷审查成本等因素,分析得出结论:在信息不对称的信贷市场,信贷配给是银行理性选择的结果;中小企业在银行信贷配给中将处于不利地位,导致其贷款难问题。并在文末对中小企业贷款难问题提出相应对策。     

劳动力成本与中小企业融资约束

本文利用世界银行提供的中国企业调查数据,基于信贷配给理论,考察劳动力成本对企业融资约束的影响。分别以劳动力成本占企业总成本的比重和劳动力成本相对于企业销售额的比值作为劳动力成本代理指标,通过考察企业是否需要银行贷款的自主决策与贷款可得性两方面信息,甄别企业受到的不同类型的信贷配给,进而系统考察劳动力成本对企业信贷约束的影响。研究发现:第一,劳动力成本显著地提高了企业受到信贷配给约束的概率,信贷对劳动力成本较高的企业具有明显的“筛选效应”;第二,劳动力成本对企业受到银行信贷配给和自我信贷配给约束的概率均有显著的正向影响,说明劳动力成本较高的企业不仅会受到更高的来自银行的信贷约束,还会受到来自自身的信贷约束,形成双重“筛选效应”;第三,机制分析表明,较高的金融发展程度和市场化水平通过减轻信息不对称问题,能够显著缓解“筛选效应”的不利影响。本研究为深化金融供给侧结构性改革、破解企业融资难题提供了新的政策启示。     

劳动力成本与中小企业融资约束

本文利用世界银行提供的中国企业调查数据,基于信贷配给理论,考察劳动力成本对企业融资约束的影响。分别以劳动力成本占企业总成本的比重和劳动力成本相对于企业销售额的比值作为劳动力成本代理指标,通过考察企业是否需要银行贷款的自主决策与贷款可得性两方面信息,甄别企业受到的不同类型的信贷配给,进而系统考察劳动力成本对企业信贷约束的影响。研究发现:第一,劳动力成本显著地提高了企业受到信贷配给约束的概率,信贷对劳动力成本较高的企业具有明显的“筛选效应”;第二,劳动力成本对企业受到银行信贷配给和自我信贷配给约束的概率均有显著的正向影响,说明劳动力成本较高的企业不仅会受到更高的来自银行的信贷约束,还会受到来自自身的信贷约束,形成双重“筛选效应”;第三,机制分析表明,较高的金融发展程度和市场化水平通过减轻信息不对称问题,能够显著缓解“筛选效应”的不利影响。本研究为深化金融供给侧结构性改革、破解企业融资难题提供了新的政策启示。     

Wholesale bank funding,capital requirements and credit rationing

This paper analyzes how different types of bank funding affect the extent to which banks ration credit to borrowers, and the impact that capital requirements have on that rationing. Using an extension of the standard Stiglitz–Weiss model of credit rationing, unsecured wholesale finance is shown to amplify the credit market impact of capital requirements as compared to funding by retail depositors. Unsecured finance surged in the pre-crisis years, but is increasingly replaced by secured funding. The collateralization of wholesale funding is found to expand the extent of credit rationing.     

Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information

The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well-known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high-quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high-quality borrowers may put up more collateral.     

The Effects of Formal and Informal Contracting in Credit Availability

This paper investigates how the use of collateral (formal contracting), along with the market power of banks (which facilitates relational contracts), affects the availability of credit for business firms. Using loan data from the Spanish Credit Register, we show that the average credit quality of borrowers in a provincial market decreases with market concentration and the availability of collateral. Additionally, the marginal effect of each variable decreases with the higher values of the other variable. We also find that credit line interest rates increase with the availability of collateral, although the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets. Therefore, market power (relations) and collateral (formal contracting) act as substitutes to increase the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information.     

Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance

A large body of literature has shown that small firms experience difficulties in accessing the credit market due to informational asymmetries. Banks can overcome these asymmetries through relationship lending, or at least mitigate their effects by asking for collateral. Small firms, especially if they are young, have little collateral and short credit histories, and thus may find it difficult to raise funds from banks. In this paper, we show that even in this case, small firms may improve their borrowing capacity by joining Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGI). Our empirical analysis shows that small firms affiliated to MGIs pay less for credit compared with similar firms. We obtain this result for interest rates charged on loan contracts which are not backed by mutual guarantees. We then argue that our findings are consistent with the view that MGIs are better at screening and monitoring opaque borrowers than banks are. Thus, banks benefit from the willingness of MGIs to post collateral since this implies that firms are better screened and monitored.     

中国金融业改革对双重信贷配给影响的实证检验

双重信贷配给,指我国信贷市场对国有企业的信贷偏向（非均衡信贷配给,McKinnon,1973）和基于信息不对称原因造成的信贷配给（均衡信贷配给,Stiglitz和Weiss,1981）。本文采用深市A股上市公司2001—2009年的数据,检验了国有商业银行改革对双重信贷配给的影响,结果发现,随着利率市场化和国有银行改革的深入,民营上市公司遭遇非均衡信贷配给的程度减轻,而与信息透明度有关的均衡信贷配给的现象增强。     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

银行治理、信贷配给与中小企业融资

中小企业贷款难问题是目前困扰这些企业迅速发展的重要因素,国内外对这一问题成因进行了诸多研究与分析.从我国银行治理结构特点的这一独特视角出发,结合信贷配给理论,对不同治理结构下银行信贷行为进行建模与比较分析发现,银行治理结构通过影响银行信贷选择行为,将会对信贷市场配给程度以及中小企业获得贷款的可能性产生重要影响.     

The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).