Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy

Empirical research about tax evasion and the informal economy has exploded in the past few decades, seeking to shed light on the magnitude and (especially policy) determinants of these phenomena. Quantitative information informs the analysis of policy choices, enables the testing of hypotheses about determinants of this phenomenon, and can help with the accurate construction of national income accounts. Even as empirical analysis has burgeoned, some have expressed doubts about the quality and usefulness of some prominent measures. The fact that high-quality data is elusive is neither surprising nor a coincidence. The defining characteristic of tax evasion and informal economic activity—that they are generally illegal—often renders unreliable standard data collection methods such as surveys. Unlike invisible phenomena in the natural sciences, these invisible social science phenomena are hard to measure because of choices made by individuals. Analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy must proceed even in the absence of the direct observability of key variables, and theory should guide the construction and interpretation of evidence of the “invisible.” In this paper, we address what can be learned using micro or macro data regarding tax evasion and the informal economy under given conditions and assumptions, and critically review some of the most common empirical methods in light of our conclusions. We conclude with an entreaty for researchers in this field to enlist in the “credibility revolution” (Angrist and Pischke in J. Econ. Perspect. 4(2):3–30, 2010) in applied econometrics.     

Valuation before and after tax in the discrete time, finite state no arbitrage model

We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear taxation system to be neutral—within the multi-period discrete time “no arbitrage” model—in the sense that valuation is invariant to the exact sequence of tax rates, realization dates as well as immune to timing options attempting to twist the time profile of taxable income through wash sale transactions.

“In the study of investments, taxes are largely a source of embarrassment to financial economists.” (Introduction to Dybvig and Ross 1986) “Accordingly, my approach in this chapter is to examine the restrictions on the income measurement rules applicable to financial instruments implied by the requirement that the rules be linear. . . . Linearity is a desideratum of a tidy tax system.” (Bradford 2000, p. 373–374)

     

Public Investment Criteria in Overlapping Generations Models of Open Economies

This paper derives criteria for worthwhile public investment in an overlapping generations model of an “almost small” open economy- an economy with access to external funding at a given interest rate, but with some influence over its temporal terms of trade. If the economy is dynamically efficient (i.e. the interest rate exceeds the growth rate), committed to free trade, public investment is debt financed and lump sum taxes are feasible, two results follow. First, the “social opportunity cost of public funds” will exceed the government's borrowing rate because of the adverse effect of government borrowing on the terms of trade. Second, the marginal rate of return on worthwhile public investment will be greater than the social opportunity cost of public funds if public and private investment are complements (substitutes) and the tax on capital is below (above) the rate that minimizes the steady state burden of servicing the debt. JEL Code: F21, H43     

Tax-tariff reform with costs of tax administration

As is broadly recognised, the straightforward application of the Diamond–Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem implies that when lump-sum taxation is not available, then it is optimal for the government in a small open economy to rely on taxes on the net demand of households rather than on border taxes to finance its resource requirements. However, the theorem does not hold when taxation is associated with administrative costs. The present paper explores the implications for optimal taxation and for desirable directions of tax-tariff reform of taking into account the costs of tax administration in countries at different levels of economic development. The paper clarifies the reasons for, and lends support to, the criticism by Stiglitz (Presentation to Congress of International Institute of Public Finance, Prague, 2003) of the IMF and the World Bank’s recommendation to developing countries to adopt VAT to replace border taxes.      

The makings of an information leader: the intraday price discovery process for individual stocks in the DJIA

The main purpose of this paper is to construct an intraday arbitrage price series for each stock in the DJIA using information in the Diamond Trust Fund ETF. We then compute the information shares (Hasbrouck in J Finan 50(4):1175–1199, 1995) for the actual versus the arbitrage prices for each stock. While previous literature documents that ETFs lead stock indices in information origination, we find that some firms are “information leaders” in that the information share that comes from the stock price is larger than that which comes from the ETF-related arbitrage price. Further analysis is conducted to uncover the firm-specific factors that are related to a stock’s role in information generation.     

Universal bounds for asset prices in heterogeneous economies

We establish universal bounds for asset prices in heterogeneous complete market economies with scale invariant preferences. Namely, for each agent in the economy we consider an artificial homogeneous economy populated solely by this agent, and calculate the “homogeneous” price of an asset in each of these economies. Dumas (Rev. Financ. Stud. 2, 157–188, [1989]) conjectured that the risk free rate in a heterogeneous economy must lie in the interval determined by the minimal and maximal of the “homogeneous” risk free rates. We show that the answer depends on the risk aversions of the agents in the economy: the upper bound holds when all risk aversions are smaller than one, and the lower bound holds when all risk aversions are larger than one. The bounds almost never hold simultaneously. Furthermore, we prove these bounds for arbitrary assets.      

Optimal income taxation and social norms in the labor market

This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One norm refers to “normal behavior” with respect to work hours (the hours of work norm), whereas another means that “one should earn one’s living by working” (the participation norm). The results show how the hours of work norm gives rise to a corrective motive for using income taxation. We also show how the interaction between the hours of work norm and the private incentive to participate in the labor market (which reflects the participation norm) gives rise to an employment motive for using the income tax.     

Insurer's insolvency risk and tax deductions for the individual's net losses

Using the representative agent approach as in Kaplow (Am Econ Rev 82:1013–1017, 1992b), this paper shows that providing tax deductions for the individual’s net losses is socially optimal when the insurer faces the risk of insolvency. We further show that the government should adopt a higher tax deduction rate for net losses when the insurer is insolvent than when the insurer is solvent. Thus, tax deductions for net losses could be used to provide an insurance for individuals against the insurer’s risk of insolvency. These findings could also be used to explain why a government provides supplementary public insurance or government relief. Finally, we discuss that, if the individuals are heterogeneous in terms of loss severity, loss probability, or income level, providing a tax deduction for the individual’s net losses may not always achieve a Pareto improvement, and cross subsidization should be taken into consideration.

Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and the price level:Background and beyond

The paper presents the fiscal theory of the price level in a variety of models, including endowment economies with lump-sum taxes and production economies with proportional income taxes. We offer a microeconomic perspective on the fiscal theory by computing a Slutsky-Hicks decomposition of the effects of tax changes into substitution, wealth, and revaluation effects. Revaluation effects arise whenever tax changes alter the value of outstanding nominal government liabilities by changing the price level. Under certain assumptions on monetary and fiscal behavior, the revaluation effect reflects the fiscal theory mechanism. When taxes distort, two Laffer curves arise, implying that a tax increase can lower or raise the price level and the revaluation effect can be positive or negative, depending on which side of a particular Laffer curve the economy resides. Jel Code: E31 · E52 · E62     

The stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants and the marginal cost of public funds

This paper tests the hypothesis that the stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants increase with the marginal cost of public funds of the recipient government. We present a simple theoretical framework that shows how a lump-sum transfer stimulates the marginal expenditures of a recipient government through an income effect and a price effect. We then test the prediction of this model using Canadian provincial data and exploit the discontinuity in the equalization grants allocation formula to identify the effects of grants. Our results indicate that the stimulative effects of lump-sum grants on spending increase with the provincial government’s marginal cost of public funds (MCF). One policy implication of our results is that higher intergovernmental transfers may be welfare improving if the federal government has a lower MCF than the provinces.     

A positive analysis of labor-market institutions and tax reforms

In this paper, we investigate the structure of the “Laffer curve” for taxes on labor and other factors of production, under different institutional frameworks of the labor market. Using a Cobb–Douglas production technology allows us to characterize important properties of the “Laffer curve” in terms of the wage share for a competitive labor market, the monopoly union model, the right-to-manage approach, the insider-dominated union, and efficient Nash bargains simultaneously. In this way, we are able to highlight the menu of factor tax systems, and thus of potential tax reforms available to a government, without perfect knowledge of the mechanism of the labor market. In particular, we show that the employment-maximizing tax system features a constant energy tax, while the energy mini-/maximizing tax system features a constant labor tax. We also illuminate to what extent these results must be modified if we either employ a CES production function, or if we allow for an endogenous reservation wage.     

Saving by buying ahead: stockpiling in response to lump-sum payments

By purchasing larger quantities of goods and saving them for future consumption households are able to reduce transaction costs and acquire goods at a lower price per unit, presuming they can manage the transportation and storage costs. This study uses variations in state income tax refunds over time to estimate consumption responses to lump-sum payments. Households purchase around 20 per cent more of easily stored toilet paper in the months in which tax refunds are issued, but do not increase purchases of perishables such as bread and eggs. In addition to purchasing more goods at a lower per-unit price, households also appear to increase the time until their next purchase, which implies that they are saving goods for consumption over time. These in-kind savings allow people to smooth their consumption over time, much like pecuniary savings. Government payments that provide lump-sum payments can benefit consumers by providing additional liquidity to buy and store goods at a lower cost.     

Base independence in the analysis of tax policy effects: with an application to Norway 1992–2004

The analysis contrasts results of two recently expounded microlevel data approaches to derive robust intertemporal characterizations of redistributional effects of income tax schedules; the fixed-income procedure of Kasten et al. (Tax progressivity and Income Inequality, Cambridge University Press, 1994) and the transplant-and-compare method of Dardanoni and Lambert (J. Public Econ. 86:99–122, 2002). Our study is normative in that the Blackorby and Donaldson (Can. J. Econ. 17:683–694, 1984) index of tax progressivity is employed. This enables contributions from vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity also to be assessed, using for the latter one classical measure and one no reranking measure. When the competing methodologies are applied to Norwegian data for 1992–2004, their respective strengths and weaknesses are revealed. The transplant-and-compare procedure is found to have a number of advantages.      

Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.      

The Impact of Financial Arrangements and Institutional Form on Housing Prices

Dwellings in housing cooperatives constitute 15% of the Norwegian housing property market. The price paid for such dwellings consists of two elements: An equity price and a share of the mutual debt held by the cooperative. The interest rate paid on the housing cooperative’s mutual debt is in Norway lower than the interest rate paid on private loans. This gives rise to an “interest discount effect”. We find convincing empirical support for the interest discount effect, which contributes to a higher equity price for dwellings in housing cooperatives than for self-owned dwellings. On the other hand, we also find empirical support for a co-op discount of 9.3%. The co-op discount work in the direction of making cooperative dwellings more affordable.     

A Quarterly Transactions-based Index of Institutional Real Estate Investment Performance and Movements in Supply and Demand

This article presents a methodology for producing a quarterly transactions-based index (TBI) of property-level investment performance for U.S. institutional real estate. Indices are presented for investment periodic total returns and capital appreciation (or price-changes) for the major property types included in the NCREIF Property Index. These indices are based on transaction prices to avoid appraisal-based sources of index “smoothing” and lagging bias. In addition to producing variable-liquidity indices, this approach employs the Fisher-Gatzlaff-Geltner-Haurin (Real Estate Econ., 31: 269–303, 2003) methodology to produce separate indices tracking movements on the demand and supply sides of the investment market, including a “constant-liquidity” (demand side) index. Extensions of Bayesian noise filtering techniques developed by Gatzlaff and Geltner (Real Estate Finance, 15: 7–22, 1998) and Geltner and Goetzmann (J. Real Estate Finance Econ., 21: 5–21, 2000) are employed to allow development of quarterly frequency, market segment specific indices. The hedonic price model used in the indices is based on an extension of the Clapp and Giacotto (J. Am. Stat. Assoc., 87: 300–306, 1992) “assessed value method,” using a NCREIF-reported recent appraised value of each transacting property as the composite “hedonic” variable, thus allowing time-dummy coefficients to represent the difference each period between the (lagged) appraisals and the transaction prices. The index could also be used to produce a mass appraisal of the NCREIF property database each quarter, a byproduct of which would be the ability to provide transactions price based “automated valuation model” estimates of property value for each NCREIF property each quarter. Detailed results are available at .     

Taxpayers' responsiveness to tax rate changes and implications for the cost of taxation in Sweden

Historically, labor supply elasticities have been used to evaluate tax policy and predict tax revenue effects. They are likely to underestimate taxpayers' response to tax rate changes, and hence to underestimate changes in potential tax revenues, however, because they measure only how taxpayers alter hours worked. Taxpayers can also respond to tax rate changes by altering, for instance, their work effort and form of compensation. An alternative measure that accounts for these responses as well as hours worked is the elasticity of taxable income. This paper estimates the elasticity of earned taxable income for Swedish taxpayers using two different approaches and a number of control variables and the 1990/1991 tax reform as a “natural experiment”. The preferred elasticity estimates fall in the range of 0.4–0.5, comparable with recent estimates for the U.S. and larger than most of the labor supply elasticity estimates used to evaluate tax policy in Scandinavia previously, which suggests that deadweight losses are two to three times higher than previously thought. JEL Classification H21 · H24 · H31 · J22     

An evasive topic: theorizing about the hidden economy

This paper reviews some central issues that arise in theorizing about tax evasion decisions and the hidden economy. It starts from the Allingham and Sandmo (J. Public Econ. 1:323–338, 1972) modeling of the tax evasion decision as a choice under uncertainty based on expected utility maximization and risk aversion. It goes on to discuss alternative specifications of the taxpayer’s preferences with particular regard to the explanation of the extensive margin, i.e. the decision on whether or not to engage in tax evasion. It extends the model to the case of variable labor supply with work in both official and black labor markets. It then considers the application of the theory to taxes on wealth and income from capital, indirect tax evasion, and smuggling. It also includes a consideration of general equilibrium effects and of the problems that evasion causes for the theory of optimal income and commodity taxes. It concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of tax evasion for economic policy in the welfare state.     

Disentangling the Short and Long-Run Effects of Occupied Stock in the Rental Adjustment Process

In the current stand of literature on the rental adjustment process starting with Hendershott et al. (Real Estate Economics, 30, 165-183, 2002a, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 24, 59-87, 2002b) it has become practice to treat the compound variable “occupied stock” as a supply variable. In this study we show that this variable deserves a more critical investigation and that the general view of a supply variable may be misleading. Using panel data covering 30 urban areas for 17 years, we investigate the rental adjustment process in the German office market. The application of recently developed cointegration techniques for non-stationary panel data in conjunction with the corresponding error correction model (ECM) enables us to overcome the data limitations, particularly existent for most European real estate markets. Hence, our primary motivation is (a) to demonstrate how “occupied stock” should be interpreted correctly and (b) to provide useful insights into the long-term relationships and short-run dynamics of real office prime rents. The empirical evidence suggests that a one percent rise in office employment increases real rents on average by 1.64% through higher demand for office space. On the other hand, a one percent increase in the supply of office space decreases real rents in the long run by 2.25%. The results from the error correction model show that deviations from the long-run equilibrium lead to an adjustment process which restores equilibrium within approximately 3 years.