商业银行的“大资管”策略

实施资产管理计划，银行可以将信贷资产或其他资产投向同业债券市场上交易的债权直接融资工具，这意味着债权直接融资工具从非标准化债权转化为可交易的、具有公允价值的标准化债权投资工具。     

PPP模式与公共项目财政投资的转型

PPP(Public-Private-Partnership)是近年来新兴的一种公共项目投融资结构。它以公、私合作为核心,以有效引入市场要素为基础,充分发挥财政资源在调动市场力量、优化资源配置方面的杠杆作用,为公共产品和服务的供给以及财政投资项目安排开辟了一种有效模     

国务院发布通知加强固定资产投资项目资本金管理

日前国务院发布通知(国发[2019]26号),要求加强固定资产投资项目资本金的管理,内容如下。对固定资产投资项目(以下简称投资项目)实行资本金制度,合理确定并适时调整资本金比例,是促进有效投资、防范风险的重要政策工具,是深化投融资体制改革、优化投资供给结构的重要手段。     

中国人保27亿保险资金入泉投资泉州跨海大桥

正2013年10月18日,由中国人保发起的"人保一福建泉州跨海大桥债权投资计划"募集工作顺利结束,共募集保险资金27亿元,所有资金于26日到位,投资期限10年,将全部投向泉州湾跨海公路通道工程建设。据悉,这是中国人保在福建第二只、泉州第一只基础设施债权投资计划。2011年12月,中国人保与省政府签署了战略合作协议。2012年4月13日,人保一向莆铁路债权投资计划落地,成为中国人保在闽首只保险资金债权投资计划,募集保险资金15亿元。此外,为支持漳州市古雷港口     

保险资金参与衍生品市场的境外经验及启示

无论坚持审慎原则的监管制度安排,抑或自由主义的监管价值取向,境外市场对保险资金从事衍生品交易的禁限性设置较少,其保险公司参与衍生品交易经验成熟,期货、期权等场内衍生品在保险资产管理中发挥了重要作用。借鉴成熟市场的制度经验和实践做法,有必要将保险资金的投资目的从严格的套期保值拓宽至替代交易、收益增强交易等风险管理活动;进一步丰富保险资金可投资的衍生品范围,尤其是国债期货等场内衍生品,以弥补债券为主的保险资产结构与利率风险管理工具缺乏的不匹配问题;在制定衍生品投资限额时可参考不同类型衍生品的风险价值衡量方式,进一步完善限额管理,以促进我国保险资金参与衍生品交易的市场化水平。     

DX置业专属债权投资项目案例分析

为化解DX置业有限责任公司潜在风险贷款，工行运用了“专属债权投资计划”方式，成功办理了全国首笔次级贷款风险化解专项债权投资业务，同时也实现了一笔中间业务收入。工行投行部在该项目中担任了财务顾问，通过制定积极，有效的方案.     

个人投资者股指期货投资策略浅析

已平稳运行一年的股指期货不仅为机构和大资金运作者提供了很好的套期保值与套利交易的风险管理工具,为风险爱好者提供了一个全新的交易品种,而且对广大的股票投资者来说,也多了一个观察市场、对比市场和跟踪市场的好工具,从这点来说,即使不参与股指期货交易,也有必要了解和关注股指期货市场表现。本文将对股指期货以及个人投资者的投资策略进行分析。     

中国人保财险获“亚洲最具竞争力非寿险公司”奖

国务院常务会议日前确定了金融促进经济发展的九条政策措施.其中关于保险资金融通功能的表述,传递出两个明确信息:支持关系国计民生的重点领域;在债权方式之外为其他投资方式譬如股权投资留下了空间.国务院常务会议明确提出,要发挥保险的保障和融资功能,引导保险公司以债权等方式投资交通、通信、能源等基础设施和农村基础设施项目.早在2006年,中国已实施<保险资金间接投资基础设施项目试点管理办法>,规定保险资金可以通过债权计划的形式间接投资于国家级重点基础设施项目,且保险公司用于该项投资的金额不得超过其上年末总资产的5%.     

可供出售债权投资人行为对当期财务的影响及建议

该文分析了新会计准则在债券投资计量上的变化,指出新会计准则要求交易性债权投资和可供出售债权投资按公允价值计量。该文介绍了可供出售债权投资核算的基本原则,并分析了浅谈债权投资人行为对当期财务的影响,最后对如何更好地管理可供出售债权投资提出相关建议。     

保险债权计划:新兴项目融资工具的新发展北大核心SSCI

随着近两年以来货币政策不断趋紧的市场环境变化,保险资金债权计划作为一种新兴的项目融资工具,成立的数量和涉及行业都明显增多,使之逐步成为保险资金的重要运用方式之一,越来越受到各类市场主体的广泛关注和认可。本文首先通过对保险债权计划发展历史的梳理、业务结构和实施流程的总结进行概况介绍;然后通过对现行公开披露保险债权计划信息的整理分析,对目前保险债权计划的市场现状进行描述;最后从商业银行角度,提出保险债权计划作为新兴的项目融资工具给商业银行提供的业务机会以及相应建议。     

MANAGING LOCAL PUBLIC DEBT IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: AN ISSUE OF SELF-CONTROL

One and a half decades after the end of a centralised regime in Central and Eastern Europe, the policy literature on local debt management in transition economies reveals that there is a general confusion about the appropriate use of debt finance at the municipal level. The literature is mainly concerned with institutional borrowing restrictions and sanctions against excessive debt. Both emphasise the responsibility of the centre and consider local government unable to pursue a sound financial management without central patronage. Breaking with the traditional focus on budget  discipline , this study advocates budget  responsibility . Favourable credit ratings and compliance with legal norms are necessary but not sufficient conditions for municipalities to borrow. Successful financial management requires a more proactive attitude in which local governments adjust their investment policy to their financial capacity, assessing the costs and benefits of each investment project.     

高校负债的成因与对策

高校负债表面上看是高校扩招的直接后果,但其本质却是由高等教育准公共产品性质所决定,政府的宏观经济政策推动的。过度负债导致了目前高校的还贷危机。为此,政府一方面要通过各种手段协助高校清偿旧债;另一方面,要合理控制债务规模,加大投入,加强管理,拓宽教育融资渠道,做好高校债务风险防范工作。     

Bank Concentration and Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence from India

This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration on firm-level investment across firm groups classified according to size, investment destination, and debt maturity structure. Using data of 302 manufacturing firms for the period 2000-2009, we show that elevated financial constraints are associated with small and medium-size enterprises and firms that are dependent on short-term debt and exhibit high levels of sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Our empirical finding confirms that bank concentration exerts a positive impact on firms' financial constraints on investment. This effect is more pronounced for small firms and firms dependent on short-term debt. However, our results are indifferent to domestic versus foreign investing firm groups.     

Which criteria matter when impact investors screen social enterprises?

Impact investors pursue both financial and social goals and have become an important source of funding for social enterprises. Our study assesses impact investor criteria when screening social enterprises. Applying an experimental conjoint analysis to a sample of 179 impact investors, we find that the three most important criteria are the authenticity of the founding team, the importance of the societal problem targeted by the venture, and the venture's financial sustainability. We then compare the importance of these screening criteria across different types of impact investors (i.e., donors, equity investors, and debt investors). We find that donors pay more attention to the importance of the societal problem and less attention to financial sustainability than do equity and debt investors. Additionally, equity investors place a higher value on the large-scale implementation of the social project than do debt investors. We contribute to the nascent literature on impact investing by documenting how impact investors make investment decisions and by providing a nuanced view of different investor types active in this novel market. Practical implications exist for both impact investors and social enterprises.     

Financial reporting quality,debt maturity and investment efficiency

This study, conducted with a sample of Spanish listed companies during the period 1998–2008, examines the role of financial reporting quality and debt maturity in investment efficiency. The results show that financial reporting quality mitigates the overinvestment problem. Likewise, lower debt maturity can improve investment efficiency, reducing both overinvestment and underinvestment problems. We further find that financial reporting quality and debt maturity are mechanisms with some degree of substitution in enhancing investment efficiency: firms with lower (higher) use of short-term debt, exhibit higher (lower) financial reporting quality effect on investment efficiency.     

Financial experts on the top management team: Do they reduce investment inefficiency?

We examine the effect of the top management team (TMT) professional finance experience on firm investment efficiency. Top managers with a career background in finance help reduce deviations of investment from the level warranted by firm fundamentals. Reductions in investment inefficiencies are achieved by financial expert managers using project-specific rather than company-wide, discount rates for project evaluation and facilitating debt and equity issuance at lower costs. Greater investment efficiency due to the financial expertise of TMT improves firm performance. We demonstrate that these improvements are driven by the collective expertise of the TMT rather than solely by chief executive officers.     

Incomplete contracts,renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and public debt issues

In a two-period model where an investment project is funded with standard debt, the probability distribution of final cash flow is determined, at the interim date, by an unverifiable state of nature together with a choice by the controlling party (entrepreneur or creditor). With a control allocation contingent on a noisy default signal, renegotiation may improve efficiency in two ways: (i) reduce excessive risk-taking – due to the entrepreneur's moral hazard – through debt forgiveness; (ii) avoid the costs of financial distress associated with excessive liquidation or underinvestment by debt-holders, by letting them receive an equity stake in the firm. Such efficiency gain is an advantage of bank loans over publicly traded debt, given that the former are more easily renegotiated than the latter. The difference between the two types of debt is increasing in the degree of contractual incompleteness (noise present in the default signal) and in the portion of project value accounted for by future discretionary investment options.     

Debt and equity as optimal contracts

This paper shows the simultaneous optimally of debt and equity contracts in a principal-agent model. The agent (an entrepreneur) has an investment project but does not have the necessary funds to finance it. There is moral hazard in the model, generated by the dependence of the project's expected return on the (unobservable) agent's effort. Key to the optimality of these financial instruments is the nonassignable rent produced by the project and captured by the entrepreneur when the investment is successful.     

Debt enforcement,financial leverage,and product failures: Evidence from China and the United States

Building on capital structure and product market interactions, and the role of debt enforcement in leveraged firms' investments, we examine whether cross-country debt enforcement can produce different associations between financial leverage and product failures. Results show that different debt enforcement systems can generate opposite leverage effects. In countries with weak/nearly ineffective debt enforcement, financial leverage shows an incentive investment effect due to low default costs, and thus highly leveraged firms tend to invest more and are less likely to have product failures. Conversely, in countries with strict/effective debt enforcement, distressed companies tend to have an underinvestment effect and more product failures.     

高等院校债务风险管理研究

高校在依靠银行贷款缓解高校事业发展与资金短缺的矛盾、实现学校超常规发展的同时，面临着巨额本息支付的严峻债务风险，阻碍了高校可持续健康发展。文章通过对当前我国高等教育发展形势及高校面临的主要问题进行分析，提出了如何有效缓解高校还贷的巨大压力，保证高等教育健康、平稳、可持续发展的具体措施和办法。