Analysts' Roundtable on Integrating ESG into Investment Decision‐Making

In this third of the three discussions that took place at the SASB 2016 Symposium, practitioners of a broad range of investment approaches—active as well as passive in both equities and fixed‐income—explain how and why they use ESG information when evaluating companies and making their investment decisions. There was general agreement that successful ESG investing depends on integrating ESG factors with the methods and data of traditional “fundamental” financial statement analysis. And in support of this claim, a number of the panelists noted that some of the world's best “business value investors,” including Warren Buffett, have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment decision‐making. In the analysis of such active fundamental investors, ESG concerns tend to show up as risk factors that can translate into higher costs of capital and lower values. And companies' effectiveness in managing such factors, as ref lected in high ESG scores and rankings, is viewed by many fundamental investors as an indicator of management “quality,” a reliable demonstration of the corporate commitment to investing in the company's future. Moreover, some fixed‐income investors are equally if not more concerned than equity investors about ESG exposures. ESG factors can have pronounced effects on performance by generating “tail risks” that can materialize in both going‐concern and default scenarios. And the rating agencies have long attempted to reflect some of these risks in their analysis, though with mixed success. What is relatively new, however, is the frequency with which fixed income investors are engaging companies on ESG topics. And even large institutional investors with heavily indexed portfolios have become more aggressive in engaging their portfolio companies on ESG issues. Although the traditional ESG filters used by such investors were designed mainly just to screen out tobacco, firearms, and other “sin” shares from equity portfolios, investors' interest in “tilting” their portfolios toward positive sustainability factors, in the form of lowcarbon and gender‐balanced ETFs and other kinds of “smart beta” portfolios, has gained considerable momentum.     

ESG Investing in Graham & Doddsville

The author describes how and why the world's best “business value investors” have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into their investment decision‐making. As the main source of value in companies has increasingly shifted from tangible to intangible assets, many followers of Graham & Dodd have delivered exceptional investment results by taking an “earnings‐power” approach to identifying high‐quality businesses—businesses with enduring competitive advantages that are sustained through significant ongoing investment in their core capabilities and, increasingly, their important non‐investor “stakeholders.” While the ESG framework may be relatively new, it can be thought of as providing a lens through which to view the age‐old issue of “quality.” Graham & Dodd's 1934 classic guide to investing, Security Analysis, and Phil Fisher's 1958 bestseller, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, both identify a number of areas of analysis that would today be characterized as ESG. Regardless of whether they use the labels “E,” “S,” and “G,” investors who make judgments about earnings power and sustainable competitive advantage are routinely incorporating ESG considerations into their decision‐making. The challenge of assessing a company's sustainable competitive advantage requires analysis based on concepts such as customer franchise value, as well as intangibles like brands and intellectual property. For corporate managers communicating ESG priorities, and for investors analyzing ESG issues, the key is to focus on their relevance to the business. In this sense, corporate reporting on sustainability issues should be viewed as analogous to and an integral part of financial reporting, with a management focus on materiality and relevance (while avoiding a “promotional” approach) that is critical to credibility.     

Investors as Stewards of the Commons?

The author makes the case that business generally, not just government, should assume responsibility for social and environmental problems. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) formally recognize the role of the private sector in addressing some of the world's most pressing environmental and social challenges. What started as a corporate social responsibility movement now a focuses on integrating positive social impact into the core mission of the organization. Encouragingly, studies document that improving firm performance on business‐relevant ESG issues has a positive association with future financial performance. Investors can enable better societal outcomes by exercising ‘voice’ and voting rights in corporate governance. He acknowledges that competitive businesses face a “commons” or “free‐rider” problem where a defector avoids the full cost of his actions. Overcoming this problem requires legally sanctioned collaboration between business enterprises and large institutional shareholders, particularly pension funds. He also acknowledges that the corporate level free‐rider problem has a counterpart that at the investor level. Investor engagement with companies involves resources, money and time. It is no simple matter to justify increased costs in the context of asset managers that compete on the basis of low management fees, such as index funds. Collaboration between companies can mitigate some of these free riding problems. Large institutional investors with long time horizons and significant common ownership across different companies may have the best opportunities for collaboration. But, smaller activist funds and retail investors also have an important role in pushing large institutional investors to engage. While it is unlikely that investors will be able to solve all of the pressing societal problems, progress can be made.     

Market Interest in Nonfinancial Information

During the past two decades, more and more companies have volunteered to provide “corporate social responsibility” or “sustainability” reports that include information about their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies and performance. Such reporting has come about largely in response to demands by a wide range of stakeholders for information about how the company's operations are affecting society in a number of different ways. But do investors really care about companies' ESG performance and policies? Using data from Bloomberg, the authors provide the first broadly based empirical evidence of investors' interest in ESG data. More specifically, the authors show how interest in the top 20 ESG metrics varies with geographical location (European vs. American), asset class (fixed income vs. equity), and firm type. At the aggregate market level, there is greater interest in environmental and governance information than in “social” information. U.S. investors are more interested than their European counterparts in governance and less interested in environmental information. Equity investors are interested in a wider range of nonfinancial information than are fixed income investors. And whereas sell‐side analysts are primarily interested in greenhouse gas emissions, money managers tend to focus on a broader set of metrics. Similarly, pension funds and hedge funds have shown interest in more nonfinancial metrics than insurance companies. The authors' bottom line: Companies need to recognize the growing market interest in nonfinancial information and ensure that they are providing it according to the specific information needs of market users.     

The Evolution of Integrating ESG Analysis into Wealth Management Decisions

Retail investors rely heavily on the advice of their financial advisors. But relatively few of those advisors have begun to incorporate investment strategies based on environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors for their client's portfolios. The author attributes this lack of interest to the disappointing returns of the “first generation” of ESG retail investment products, which approached the topic through a “socially responsible investing” (SRI) lens with mandates to exclude companies and industries viewed as having negative impact on society. These early “negative screening” directives had the effect of reducing the size of the manager's investable universe, which effectively ensured that SRI portfolio would underperform the overall market. The author, who is himself a practicing financial advisor, proposes that an innovative evolutionary process is underway in which investment managers are shifting away from a penchant for “negative screening” to a more inclusive approach he refers to as “best‐in‐class ESG Factor Integration.” And he identifies three main catalysts for this evolution: (1) greater disclosure of ESG data by public companies; (2) the growing accuracy and accessibility of ESG research, from commercial as well as academic sources; and (3) the inclusion of ESG factors with the traditional value drivers emphasized by the fundamental and quantitative methods used by portfolio managers. Although such integration is yet in its early stages, the author is optimistic that this growing trend will become an important part of an overall sustainable investing movement. No longer confined to large institutional investors, ESG factor integration is now available through a growing number of products and investment platforms.     

Sustainability and Capital Markets—Are We There Yet?

The High Meadows Institute issued a report in 2016 called ‘Charting the Future of Capital Markets’ that surveyed the mainstream capital market ecosystem by soliciting the views and practices of its key stakeholders around the issue of long‐term value creation. In this follow‐up report, the authors report that much has changed during the past three years. The role of investors in proactively shaping corporate practices is gaining more attention as ESG issues and responsible investment have become mainstream concerns, as new responsible investment regulations and frameworks have been implemented, and as shifting demographics continue to pressure capital market participants and stakeholders to change their practices. At the same time, the report notes significant remaining challenges. The lack of a standard industry definition and framework for ESG data and reporting on ESG continues to be a significant impediment, as does the shortage of qualified ESG analysts and infrastructure to support true ESG integration. Surveys also suggest most corporate boards have yet to recognize the full significance of ESG integration or its value to the firm.     

How to Integrate ESG into Investment Decision‐Making: Results of a Global Survey of Institutional Investors

The authors review the findings of their global survey of 582 institutional investors that were either practicing or planning to practice some degree of integration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into their investment decision‐making process. The investors were evenly split between asset owners and asset managers, equity and fixed income, and across the three regions of the Americas, Asia Pacific, Europe, Middle East, and Africa. The survey explored reasons for ESG investing; the barriers to such investing and investor approaches to overcoming them; and the time frames used for making investment decisions, evaluating the performance of managers, and awarding compensation. The authors report finding that the commonly perceived barriers to ESG integration—the belief that ESG integration requires sacrificing returns, that fiduciary duty prevents one from doing so, and unrealistically short‐term expectations for ESG to deliver outperformance—were not as great as commonly believed. The biggest barrier is the lack of high quality data about the performance of companies on their material ESG factors—a scarcity that the authors attribute to the lack of standards for measuring ESG performance and the lack of ESG performance data reported by companies. The results were very similar between asset owners and asset managers, equity and fixed income, and across regions. However, the investment horizons of asset owners were notably longer than those of asset managers, and the same was true of equity vs. fixed income investors. Investors in the Americas were more patient about time frames for seeing outperformance from ESG, while those in Asia Pacific were the least patient. There were also differences across regions in how to overcome the barriers to ESG integration.     

ESG Integration in Investment Management: Myths and Realities

The number of public companies reporting ESG information grew from fewer than 20 in the early 1990s to 8,500 by 2014. Moreover, by the end of 2014, over 1,400 institutional investors that manage some $60 trillion in assets had signed the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI). Nevertheless, companies with high ESG “scores” have continued to be viewed by mainstream investors as unlikely to produce competitive shareholder returns, in part because of the findings of older studies showing low returns from the social responsibility investing of the 1990s. But studies of more recent periods suggest that companies with significant ESG programs have actually outperformed their competitors in a number of important ways. The authors’ aim in this article is to set the record straight on the financial performance of sustainable investing while also correcting a number of other widespread misconceptions about this rapidly growing set of principles and methods: Myth Number 1: ESG programs reduce returns on capital and long‐run shareholder value. Reality: Companies committed to ESG are finding competitive advantages in product, labor, and capital markets; and portfolios that have integrated “material” ESG metrics have provided average returns to their investors that are superior to those of conventional portfolios, while exhibiting lower risk. Myth Number 2: ESG is already well integrated into mainstream investment management. Reality: The UNPRI signatories have committed themselves only to adhering to a set of principles for responsible investment, a standard that falls well short of integrating ESG considerations into their investment decisions. Myth Number 3: Companies cannot influence the kind of shareholders who buy their shares, and corporate managers must often sacrifice sustainability goals to meet the quarterly earnings targets of increasingly short‐term‐oriented investors. Reality: Companies that pursue major sustainability initiatives, and publicize them in integrated reports and other communications with investors, have also generally succeeded in attracting disproportionate numbers of longer‐term shareholders. Myth Number 4: ESG data for fundamental analysis is scarce and unreliable. Reality: Thanks to the efforts of reporting and investor organizations such as SASB and Ceres, and of CDP data providers like Bloomberg and MSCI, much more “value‐relevant” ESG data on companies has become available in the past ten years. Myth Number 5: ESG adds value almost entirely by limiting risks. Reality: Along with lower risk and a lower cost of capital, companies with high ESG scores have also experienced increases in operating efficiency and expansions into new markets. Myth Number 6: Consideration of ESG factors might create a conflict with fiduciary duty for some investors. Reality: Many ESG factors have been shown to have positive correlations with corporate financial performance and value, prompting ERISA in 2015 to reverse its earlier instructions to pension funds about the legitimacy of taking account of “non‐financial” considerations when investing in companies.     

Stock market reactions to adverse ESG disclosure via media channels

This study examines the value relevance of corporate reputation risks (CRR) from adverse media coverage of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues on stock performance at the firm level. Empirical results advance signalling theory and resource-based view by providing evidence that corporate reputation is considered a valuable intangible asset by investors and adverse ESG disclosure via media channels have a significant and negative impact on firm valuation. The research is extended using various factors and indicates that heightened CRR have a substantially negative corollary effect on stock price of smaller and less liquid firms that are typically not S&P500 constituents. Further analysis using industry classifications reveals that stock performance of companies in the ‘sin’ triumvirate (i.e., alcohol, tobacco, and gaming) is not significantly affected by negative ESG media coverage. Instead, firms in candy & soda, steel works, banking, and insurance industries are the most susceptible to investors' repercussion from undesirable media spotlight. These findings provide new insights and indicate that beyond the type and delivery method of ESG disclosures, firm characteristics, corporate reputation status and industry explain differences in investors' reaction to ‘bad’ news.     

Bridging Sustainability and Finance: The Value Driver Adjustment Approach

Even though most large corporations view sustainability considerations and concerns as having the potential to affect their revenue and profits, and studies have shown that sustainability can affect stock returns, investors and corporate managers continue to struggle to incorporate such concerns into their financial decision‐making. As a consequence, the valuation effects of sustainability issues are not fully reflected in either the valuation of companies by investors or in capital investment decisions by corporate managers. The author argues that sustainability can be integrated into both of these kinds of financial decision‐making by linking it to business models, competitive positions, and value drivers using what the author calls a “value‐driver adjustment” (VDA) approach. The basic idea is simple: material sustainability issues affect business models and competitive positions, which in turn affect the company's value drivers—notably, sales, margins, and capital. The VDA approach explicitly considers these linkages by taking three steps: (1) identifying a company's material sustainability issues; (2) analyzing how these issues are expected to affect the company's business model and competitive position; and (3) quantifying the effects of such changes in business model and competitive position on the company's value drivers, including its cost of capital. In the first part of the article, the author provides an investor perspective that shows how sustainability can be integrated into investment decisions by asset managers. There he explains how and why ESG integration has so far failed to become mainstream, and what needs to be done to make it successful. The second part of this article takes the corporate perspective and shows how sustainability can be linked to value drivers using much the same ingredients as in asset management, but slightly different tools that can help corporate managers incorporate sustainability concerns into strategy and operations, including the finance function. And in closing, the author brings together corporate and investor perspectives while showing how sustainability programs can be used to make the relationship between companies and their shareholders both stronger and longer‐lasting.     

The ESG Integration Paradox

Today, most investment managers have something to say about environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, and written ESG policies are ubiquitous. Yet, a written policy is not a reliable indicator of a firm's commitment. Actual ESG incorporation practices vary greatly, with most investment managers falling well short of full integration. Only a few firms seem to be using ESG factors to deliver alpha, hence, the paradox. If not implemented wholeheartedly, responsible investing can lead to lower financial returns. So, why have so few investment managers gone all the way? The paradox involves a “valley” of lower returns where portfolios first absorb the costs of ESG integration before the promised benefits materialize. In the early days of ethical investing, the focus was on using negative screens to exclude certain companies for moral or ethical reasons but lower financial returns are inherent to exclusionary screening. Hard exclusions force managers to tradeoff certain risks for others. So, for example, if the market discounts tobacco stock prices to account for changing consumer behavior, eventually tobacco stock prices become attractive again as, indeed, has been the case over the last two decades. Exclusionary screening alone is a self‐limiting strategy. By contrast, ESG strategies range from active ownership and engagement, to positive screening (selecting for certain attributes), to relative weighting (sometimes called “best‐in‐class selection”), to risk factor investing, to full integration. Because the relationship between an asset manager's ESG efforts and its risk‐adjusted performance is not classically linear, asset owners should look for managers that are on the upward slope of the ESG intensity curve and are fully committed to advancing up it.     

Corporate site visit and tax avoidance: The effects of monitoring and tax knowledge dissemination

This study examines how institutional investors' corporate site visits affect tax avoidance. Using quantile regressions, we find that corporate site visits decrease tax avoidance for firms at high levels of tax avoidance and increase tax avoidance for firms at low levels. The effect of corporate site visits on tax avoidance is stronger for firms subject to a weaker information environment, which suggests that institutional investors acquire additional firm-specific information via corporate site visits and play a more effective monitoring role. We also find that visitors who visited low-tax firms in prior years share tax-planning knowledge with high-tax firms which they visit in the current year. The effect of tax knowledge transfer is more pronounced when the visitors are from incumbent institutional shareholders. This study identifies corporate site visits as a channel via which institutional investors serve as monitors to managers and as facilitators of tax knowledge transfer.     

Motivated monitoring by institutional investors and firm investment efficiency

We find that motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm investment inefficiency, estimated by Richardson's (2006) approach. This relation is robust when using the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes as exogenous shocks to institutional ownership during the period 1995–2015 and after classifying institutional ownership by institution type. We also show that closer monitoring mitigates the problem of both over‐investing free cash flows and under‐investment due to managers’ career concerns. Finally, we document that the effectiveness of the monitoring by institutional investors appears to increase monotonically with respect to the firm's relative importance in their portfolios.     

ESG as a Value‐Creation Tool for Active Investors: A Profile of Inherent Group

A growing number of investment managers claim to integrate environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment strategy and processes, but few have described how they do so in depth. Even fewer reinforce the importance of sustainability within their own firms by becoming a certified ‘B Corporation.’ This article offers a rare, inside look at how one such value‐oriented manager uses ESG as a tool for differentiated investment sourcing, underwriting, and corporate engagement with the aim of achieving superior risk‐adjusted returns. One of the main arguments of the article—and a key principle of the firm's investment approach—is that ESG, as applied to both corporate strategy and operations, is an important factor in determining a company's cost of capital. The authors present specific examples of their investment process at work, highlighting how active engagement with management on ESG issues can catalyze progress that becomes valued by the capital markets.     

How does institutional investors' information acquisition inhibit share pledging? Evidence from China

This study investigates whether and how institutional investors' information acquisition affects controlling shareholder's share pledging. Taking a unique data of institutional investors' corporate site visits in China, we find that institutional investors' corporate site visits significantly inhibit controlling shareholder's share pledging. This effect is robust to a series of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity concerns, propensity score matching method, alternative model specifications, and alternative measures of the independent variable. We then provide evidence that the negative relation between institutional investors' corporate site visits and controlling shareholder's share pledging is more pronounced for listed firms with less efficient information environment and weaker corporate governance. Further analysis indicates that the negative relation is also more pronounced when controlling shareholders are under higher margin call pressure and when the visiting institutional investors consist of more fund companies. Overall, our study is the first to provide direct evidence of the governance mechanism of financial intermediaries on shareholders' pledging decisions.     

On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings management in Australia

This study examines the association between institutional ownership and Australian firms' aggressive earnings management strategies. In contrast to similar studies, this study does not assume that the two views on how institutional ownership associates with firms' earnings management behaviour are mutually exclusive. The association between institutional ownership and firms' income increasing discretionary accruals is expected to vary as the level of institutional ownership increases. The results support the predicted non-linear association between institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary accruals. In particular, a positive association is found at the lower institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that transient (short-term oriented) institutional investors create incentives for managers to manage earnings upwards. On the other hand, a negative association is found at the higher institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that long-term oriented institutional investors' monitoring limits managerial accruals discretion. These findings suggest that institutional investors can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating myopic aggressive earnings management by corporations when they have a sufficiently high ownership level.     

ESG for All? The Impact of ESG Screening on Return,Risk, and Diversification

A large body of research has documented a positive relationship between different measures of sustainability—such as indicators of employee satisfaction and effective corporate governance—and corporate financial performance. Nevertheless, many investors still struggle to quantify the value of ESG to investment performance. To address this issue, the authors tested the effects of using different ESG filters on an investable universe that serves as the starting point for a fund manager. In this way, they attempted to determine the extent to which ESG data can add value to any investment approach, regardless of preferences towards sustainable investing. The authors report “an unequivocally positive” contribution to risk‐adjusted returns when using a 10% best‐in‐class ESG screening approach (one that effectively removes companies with the lowest 10% of ESG rankings), both on a global and a developed markets universe. More specifically, as a result of such screening, both the global and developed markets portfolios show higher returns, lower (tail) risk, and no significant reduction of diversification potential despite the reduction in the number of companies. Use of a 25% screening filter was also found to add value, especially by reducing tail risks, but with a larger deviation from the unscreened universe. Overall, then, the authors’ finding is that the incorporation of ESG information contributes to better decision‐making in every investment approach, with the optimal configuration depending on a fund manager's preferences and willingness to deviate from an unscreened benchmark.     

Innovation in Stock Exchanges: Driving ESG Disclosure and Performance

Stock exchanges are in a unique position to promote ESG transparency and leverage their institutional capacity to build more sustainable capital markets. To facilitate the quick uptake of material ESG disclosure and raise the quality and comparability of the data, the Athens Stock Exchange has created ESG guidelines for listed companies that will be published in the summer of 2019. One important feature of the guidelines is their degree of sectoral specificity and emphasis on materiality. The guidelines and supporting metrics they propose are based on reporting practices endorsed by international sustainability standards like the SASB's industry standards. This materiality‐oriented approach will help issuers focus on the sustainability value drivers inherent in their business, and so ensure that corporate ESG disclosures satisfy the demand of investors for comparable quantitative and accounting metrics that help companies communicate their commitment to long‐term value creation.     

When ESG talks: ESG tone of 10-K reports and its significance to stock markets

Since the ESG topic consistently gains on importance in the investment universe, companies provide investors with information regarding recent and future ESG activities through different reporting channels. The most recent research finds relevance of ESG-related corporate activities for formation of investors' opinion regarding companies' valuations and growth prospects. Based on a sample of more than seventeen thousand unique 10-K reports of US companies filed with SEC in period 2013 to 2019 and the word-power methodology proposed by Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), this study also shows evidence for significant relation of ESG textual tone of 10-K reports to stock market returns of filing companies around the report filing dates. Using the ESG linguistic dictionary recently proposed by Baier, Berninger, and Kiesel (2020), this study shows evidence for significant relation of social and governance-related topics disclosure to stock returns, while environmental narratives being ignored by the markets. When looking at individual words from the ESG lexicon, such words as “community”, “health”, “control” imply positive reaction of markets, while “discrimination”, “embezzlement”, and “crime” are related to negative returns. The robustness analysis based on the inverse document frequency word weightings and actual ESG performance scores confirms the significance of ESG information disclosure of 10-K reports for investors. Thus, this study sheds light on the mechanics of ESG information perception and its influence on capital markets.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.