Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Re‐equitizing Corporate Balance Sheets: Choosing Among the Alternatives

Companies are generally reluctant to issue new equity because it can be expensive capital. Among the largest costs of an equity offering are so‐called “market‐impact” costs. To the extent the typically negative market reaction to a stock offering causes an issue to be underpriced, such underpricing dilutes the value of current shareholders. Despite such costs, many companies—particularly financial institutions—are raising equity capital to “delever” balance sheets that have been squeezed by the credit crunch and economic slowdown. And far from transferring value from existing shareholders, these offerings can preserve and even increase the value of highly leveraged companies by shoring up their capital bases and providing the flexibility to get through a difficult period. According to recent studies, announcements of equity offerings by distressed companies have been accompanied by positive stock returns in excess of 5 %. The challenge for CFOs is to determine why and when issuing equity is the value‐maximizing strategy. The kinds of companies that are most likely to benefit from equity offerings are those that score low on credit metrics, have experienced cyclical declines in operating performance, and have growth opportunities as part of their recovery. There are a number of options for raising equity capital, but no set rules for identifying the optimal one. Nevertheless, the author offers a number of suggestions designed to help CFOs make smarter decisions: Communicate clearly to investors the intended uses of the proceeds from the equity offering and how they are expected to create value; Consider judicious cuts to the dividend to preserve capital; Involve current shareholders to minimize dilution, perhaps by considering a rights offering, and strengthen their commitment; Seek out “smart money” such as private equity or SWFs as long‐term investors; Get the offer size right the first time so a second offering can be avoided; and Monetize volatility in uncertain markets by issuing convertible securities.     

Risk and return in convertible arbitrage: Evidence from the convertible bond market

In this paper, we identify and document the empirical characteristics of the key drivers of convertible arbitrage as a strategy and how they impact the performance of convertible arbitrage hedge funds. We show that the returns of a buy-and-hedge strategy involving taking a long position in convertible bonds (“CBs”) while hedging the equity risk alone explains a substantial amount of these funds' return dynamics. In addition, we highlight the importance of non-price variables such as extreme market-wide events and the supply of CBs on performance. Out-of-sample tests provide corroborative evidence on our model's predictions. At a more micro level, larger funds appear to be less dependent on directional exposure to CBs and more active in shorting stocks to hedge their exposure than smaller funds. They are also more vulnerable to supply shocks in the CB market. These findings are consistent with economies of scale that large funds enjoy in accessing the stock loan market. However, the friction involved in adjusting the stock of risk capital managed by a large fund can negatively impact performance when the supply of CBs declines. Taken together, our findings are consistent with convertible arbitrageurs collectively being rewarded for playing an intermediation role of funding CB issuers whilst distributing part of the equity risk of CBs to the equity market.     

Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.     

Emerging Market Exposures and the Predictability of Hedge Fund Returns

We examine emerging market and global macro hedge funds and find a significant positive relation between hedge funds’ future returns and their exposure to both emerging market equities and emerging market currencies. We present evidence that the strong predictive power of emerging market betas is related to the superior market‐timing ability of these fund managers. Results are robust after controlling for commonly used hedge fund factors, the emerging market equity index, lagged fund returns, liquidity risk, and fund characteristics. Our results suggest that hedge funds can earn positive excess returns by timing their exposure to emerging market securities.     

Which institutional investor types are the most informed?

We examine the informativeness of quarterly disclosed portfolio holdings across four institutional investor types: hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds and private banking firms. Overweight positions outperform underweight positions only for hedge funds. By decomposing holdings and stock returns, we find that hedge funds are superior to other institutional investors both at picking industries and stocks and that they are better at forecasting long‐term as well as short‐term returns. Furthermore, our results show that hedge funds, mutual funds and pension funds are able to successfully time the market. The outperformance of hedge funds is not explained by a liquidity premium.     

Hedge fund politics and portfolios

Consistent with the well-documented relation between political orientation and psychological traits, hedge funds’ political orientations are related to their portfolio decisions. Relative to politically conservative hedge funds, politically liberal hedge funds exhibit a preference for smaller stocks, less mature companies, volatile stocks, unprofitable companies, non-dividend paying companies, and lottery-type securities. Politically liberal hedge funds are also more likely to enter new positions or fully exit existing positions, and make larger adjustments to their U.S. equity market exposure. Our results suggest that psychological characteristics can influence the portfolio decisions of even those at the very top of the financial sophistication ladder.     

Multiple Trigger CoCos: Contingent Debt Without Death Spiral Risk

This paper starts with the observation that the average issue size during 2012 of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds was more than $1 bn. Typically a CoCo is converted into shares when a pre‐defined capital ratio such as the core tier 1 ratio (CT1) drops below a minimum level. In some other cases, the contingent convertibles investors will suffer from a pre‐defined haircut instead of a conversion into shares. Investors could dynamically hedge the equity exposure embedded within a contingent convertible by taking an offsetting short position in the underlying shares. This dynamic hedging can in some circumstances have a negative impact on the share price of the bank. It could indeed lead to a spiral of falling share prices. This so‐called death spiral effect can only be avoided if the size of the contingent convertible is moderate compared to the amount of outstanding public traded shares. In this contribution we advocate the use of contingent debt where there is more than one conversion trigger. Banks should move away from one large single CoCo issue towards issues with multiple accounting triggers spread across an extended range. This will alleviate the death spiral risk. The expected dynamic behavior of a CoCo bond has been modeled using a credit derivates approach. From these models we then quantify the equity sensitivity and the negative gamma resulting from the design of a contingent convertible and illustrate the possible pitfalls of a death spiral on the share price.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON WHY COMPANIES USE CONVERTIBLE BONDS

The popular argument for convertibles holds that they provide issuers with "cheap" debt and allow them to sell equity at a premium over current value. Objecting to the "free lunch" implied by such an argument, financial economists have offered other explanations that show how the combination of debt and equity built into convertibles can serve to reduce information and agency costs faced by companies and their investors.
In this article, the authors use the results of their recent study to reconcile the two positions. Following Jeremy Stein's view of convertibles as "backdoor equity," the authors argue that convertible bond financing is an attractive alternative for companies that have large growth potential but find both conventional debt and equity financing very costly. Such companies are often deterred from funding their capital investments with straight public bonds by their high risk, relatively short track records, and high expected costs of financial distress. At the same time, the information "asymmetry" between management and outside investors can make equity very expensive in such cases. In layman's terms, management may feel that the company's share price does not accurately reflect its growth prospects, or be concerned that the mere announcement of a new equity offering will cause the share price to fall sharply.
To the extent the stock market is persuaded that management's choice of convertibles is based on this combination of promising growth prospects with limited financing options, it is likely to respond more favorably to the announcement of a new convertible offering. The authors furnish evidence in support of this argument by reporting that the market reacts less negatively to those convertible issuers with higher post-issue capital expenditures and higher market-to-book ratios, but with lower credit ratings and higher (post-offering) debt-equity ratios.     

The long-run performance of firms that issue convertible debt: an empirical analysis of operating characteristics and analyst forecasts

Many firms issue hybrid securities, such as convertible debt, instead of standard securities like straight debt or common equity. Theoretical arguments suggest that convertible debt minimizes costs for firms facing high debt- and equity-related external financing costs. Theory also suggests that an appropriately designed convertible security provides efficient investment incentives. We show, however, that firms on average perform poorly following the issuance of convertible debt. The empirical evidence suggests that the efficient investment decisions predicted by theory are not in fact achieved by the actual design and issuance of convertible debt securities. An alternative interpretation of convertible debt offers is that investors ration the participation of some issuers in the seasoned equity market.     

The Capital Structure of PE‐Funded Companies (and How New Debt Instruments and Investors Are Expanding Their Debt Capacity)

The capital structures and financial policies of companies controlled by private equity firms are notably different from those of public companies. The concentration of ownership and intense monitoring of leveraged buyouts by their largest investors (that is, the partners of the PE firms who sit on their boards), along with the contractual requirement of PE funds to return their capital within seven to ten years, have resulted in capital structures that are far more leveraged than those of their publicly traded counterparts, but also considerably more provisional and “opportunistic.” Whereas the average U.S. public company has long operated with roughly 30% debt and 70% equity, today's typical private‐equity sponsored company is initially capitalized with an “upside‐down” structure of 70% debt and just 30% equity, and then often charged with working down its debt as quickly as possible. Although banks supplied most of the debt for the first wave of LBOs in the 1980s, the remarkable growth of the private equity industry in the past 25 years has been supported by the parallel development of a new leveraged acquisition finance market. This financing innovation has led to a general movement away from a bankcentered funding base to one comprising a relatively new set of institutional investors, including business development corporations and hedge funds. Such investors have shown a strong appetite for new debt instruments and risks that banks have been unwilling or, thanks to increased capital requirements and other regulatory burdens, prohibited from taking on. Notable among these new instruments are second‐lien loans and uni‐tranche debt—instruments that, by shifting the allocation of claims on the debtor's cash flow and assets in ways consistent with the preferences of these new investors, have had the effect of increasing the debt capacity of their portfolio companies. And such increases in debt capacity have in turn enabled private equity funds—now sitting on near‐record amounts of capital from their limited partners—to bid higher prices and compete more effectively in today's intensely competitive M&A market, in which high target acquisition purchase prices are being fueled by a strong stock market and increased competition from corporate acquirers.     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

Market Interest in Nonfinancial Information

During the past two decades, more and more companies have volunteered to provide “corporate social responsibility” or “sustainability” reports that include information about their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies and performance. Such reporting has come about largely in response to demands by a wide range of stakeholders for information about how the company's operations are affecting society in a number of different ways. But do investors really care about companies' ESG performance and policies? Using data from Bloomberg, the authors provide the first broadly based empirical evidence of investors' interest in ESG data. More specifically, the authors show how interest in the top 20 ESG metrics varies with geographical location (European vs. American), asset class (fixed income vs. equity), and firm type. At the aggregate market level, there is greater interest in environmental and governance information than in “social” information. U.S. investors are more interested than their European counterparts in governance and less interested in environmental information. Equity investors are interested in a wider range of nonfinancial information than are fixed income investors. And whereas sell‐side analysts are primarily interested in greenhouse gas emissions, money managers tend to focus on a broader set of metrics. Similarly, pension funds and hedge funds have shown interest in more nonfinancial metrics than insurance companies. The authors' bottom line: Companies need to recognize the growing market interest in nonfinancial information and ensure that they are providing it according to the specific information needs of market users.     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*

As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.     

Luck versus Skill in the Cross‐Section of Mutual Fund Returns

The aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suggest that few funds produce benchmark‐adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in fund expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true α) in the extreme tails of the cross‐section of mutual fund α estimates.     

CDS and the Resolution of Financial Distress

The dramatic growth of Credit Default Swaps (CDS)—contracts that allow creditors to hedge their default exposure or take leveraged credit positions—threatens to complicate the resolution of financial distress in ways that existing reorganization methods and institutions have yet to adapt to. CDS contracts undermine a major premise that underlies current reorganization methods—namely, that the holder of legal rights has, and is motivated by, corresponding economic interests. Because hedging in the CDS markets immunizes creditors from the debtor's financial condition, they effectively separate their legal rights and economic interests. In this article, the authors discuss the challenges this separation poses for the resolution of distress both in and out of bankruptcy, and consider ways in which “on‐ground” realities may be reconciled with the legal structure that underlies the resolution of distress. At a minimum, disclosure of CDS positions in times of financial distress—along the lines of the disclosures presently required of equity investors under the Williams Act—are an essential first step toward a solution.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Investment beliefs of endowments

United States university and college endowments now hold close to one‐third of their portfolios in private equity and hedge funds. We estimate the implied beliefs of endowments on these alternative assets’ returns relative to equities and bonds. At the end of 2012, the typical endowment believes that its private equity investments will outperform a portfolio of conventional assets by 3.9% per year, and hedge funds will outperform by 0.7% per year. Taking into account the implied equity exposures in alternative asset positions, the effective equity holding of endowments is approximately 60%.     

CONVERTIBLE BONDS: MATCHING FINANCIAL AND REAL OPTIONS

For companies whose value consists in large part of “real options”‐ growth opportunities that may (or may not) materialize‐convertible bonds may offer the ideal financing vehicle because of the matching financial options built into the securities. This paper proposes that convertible debt can be a key element in a financing strategy that aims not only to fund current activities, but to give companies access to low‐cost capital if and when their real investment options turn out to be valuable. In this sense, convertibles can be seen as the most cost‐effective solution to a sequential financing problem‐how to fund not only today's activities, but also tomorrow's growth opportunities (some of them not yet even foreseeable). For companies with real options, the ability of convertibles to match capital inflows with corporate outlays adds value by minimizing two sets of costs: those associated with having too much (particularly equity) capital (known as “agency costs of free cash flow”) and those associated with having too little (“new issue” costs). The key to the cost‐effectiveness of convertibles in funding real options is the call provision. Provided the stock price is “in the money” (and the call protection period is over), the call gives managers the option to force conversion of the bonds into equity. If and when the company's investment opportunity materializes, exercise of the call feature gives the firm an infusion of new equity (while eliminating the debt service burden associated with the convertible) that enables it to carry out its new investment plan. Consistent with this argument, the author's recent study of the investment and financing activities of 289 companies around the time of convertible calls reports significant increases in capital expenditures starting in the year of the call and extending three years after. The companies also showed increased financing activity following the call, mainly new long‐term debt issues (many of them also convertibles) in the year of the call.