A market test of investor reaction to disagreements

The SEC currently requires that firms disclose recent disagreements with their auditors over accounting or auditing matters when a change in auditor is reported. The effectiveness and usefulness of requirements to disclose disagreements have been questioned, and previous empirical research on the issue has been inconclusive. This study investigates the information content of disclosure of the auditor-firm disagreements. The analysis indicates a significant negative market reaction in the week that the Form 8-K is filed with the SEC. This finding is consistent with the position that the disclosure provides information useful to investors.     

The Effects of Uncertainty and Disclosure on Auditors' Fair Value Materiality Decisions

Financial accounting standards increasingly require fair value measurements. I experimentally examine how uncertainty affects auditors’ adjustment decisions when evaluating fair values. I manipulate two types of uncertainty, input subjectivity and outcome imprecision, and one reporting choice, supplemental disclosure. I find that auditors are most likely to require adjustments when fair values contain both more input subjectivity and more outcome imprecision, but that this likelihood diminishes when clients supplement recognized fair values with additional disclosure. Thus, consistent with moral licensing, I find that auditors tolerate greater potential misstatement in the financial statements when clients provide disclosure, suggesting that the SEC's preference for supplemental disclosure may have the unintended consequence of affecting fair values recognized in the body of the financial statements. I also provide evidence that auditors determine adjustment size by comparing recorded fair value to the nearest bound, rather than the midpoint, of the auditors’ own range estimate, consistent with strict application of auditing standards.     

The adoption of international accounting standards by small and closely held companies: evidence from Bahrain

This study examines the accounting practices and the degree of adoption of international accounting standards (IASs) by small and closely held companies in Bahrain. It finds that 86% (31) of the 36 companies responding to the questionnaire applied IASs and they considered IASs to be very relevant for them. All firms prepare balance sheets, and the majority prepares income statements and cash flow statements. They also duly audit these statements. The data collected also revealed that the quotient influence on whether or not a firm adopted IAS was exerted by their external auditors. External auditors exerted the greatest influence on getting firms to adopt IASs. Banks and company partners were the primary users of company financial statements; inventories, depreciation, disclosure on financial statements, and the presentation of current assets and liabilities. The main IASs followed by a majority of firms are those pertaining so. Some of the standards were considered totally irrelevant, contrary to the prevailing idea that adoption of IASs creates an information overload for small and closely held companies. The results of this study indicate that a majority of our respondents did not find that it was costly to adopt or interpret IASs. Those few firms that experienced some difficulties sought clarification from their external auditors. About 84% of those who adopted IASs strongly agreed that using IASs improves their organization's ability to financial assistance from the banking sector. Also, about 90% of the respondents fully agreed that IASs help to achieve the objectives and improve the effectiveness of financial reporting.     

The choice between private and public capital markets: The importance of disclosure standards and auditor discipline to countries divesting state-owned enterprises

For a sample of 1866 privatizations from 37 countries, we estimate the impact of disclosure standards and legal institutions that discipline auditors on the method chosen to divest state-owned enterprises. The agency conflict between minority and controlling shareholders can impede a government from privatizing by selling its stake to diffuse investors in the public capital market with a share-issue privatization (SIP) that typically generates important spillover economic benefits, rather than an asset sale to a small group of buyers. However, prior research implies that accounting transparency plays a natural role in preventing controlling shareholders from siphoning corporate resources by helping minority investors identify any diversionary practices. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that SIPs become more likely when countries mandate strict disclosure standards, although this result is sensitive to model specification. In comparison, we provide strong, robust evidence that SIPs are more likely in jurisdictions that relax the burden of proof in civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions against auditors, leading to more credible financial statements. From a policy perspective, our cross-country research suggests that investors value reforms that subject auditors to more severe private and public enforcement over several other legal determinants, including enhancing disclosure standards.     

Some Implications of Auditor and Client Lobbying Activities: A Comparative Analysis

This paper examines the degree to which auditor and client lobbying is related in a UK context. This may help to identify any linkage between the wealth of clients and auditors that is affected by accounting standards, as propounded in the ‘economic consequences’ literature. It also might have some implications for the independence question. Three tests are conducted to see if auditors tend to support the lobbying position of the majority, or the most financially influential, of their clients. The third test is also used to identify any evidence that the comments of smaller clients tend to follow the lead of their audit firms/professional advisors. Auditor and corporate client written submissions on 22 proposed accounting standards are included in the study. The analyses are conducted both at an aggregated and also at a disaggregated level. The results do not indicate that auditor and client collusion took place. In particular, the results are consistent with the view that auditors are independent of their clients. Some suggestions are made for further research.     

Perceptions of accounting professionals in the adoption and implementation of a single set of global accounting standards: Evidence from Bahrain

In the quest for a single set of global accounting standards, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) continues to work with regulators in other countries toward adoption of IFRS. This study reports on an exploratory study of Bahrain's accounting and auditing professionals' perceptions about important issues relevant to developing and implementing global accounting standards. Bahrain is a financial hub of the Middle East with distinct features that could provide some insights to harmonization issues. The respondents' views portray optimism by auditors and non-auditors that harmonization of accounting standards is a worthwhile objective that can be fairly, but gradually accomplished. However, the survey data indicate expected challenges in applying the IFRS principles-based accounting standards. The survey findings suggest that there will be a growing demand for detailed application guidance for IFRS. Also, it appears that nationalism may well continue to be a major impediment to global adoption of IFRS.     

Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China

Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.     

The meaning of a defined accounting concept: regulatory changes and the effect on auditor decision making

Accounting standards exist in an attempt to “standardize” accounting practice. These standards contain definitions of accounting concepts whose function is to guide judgments made in practice. However, such judgments can have a major impact on a firm's externally reported accounting numbers, as their inherent subjectivity and discretion may be lent to the manipulation of earnings. This study provides empirical evidence of the effect of measured meaning on an accounting judgment, in the context of regulated changes to the definition of one key accounting concept used in measuring operating income. The extraordinary items classification decisions made by auditors were found to be systematically associated with differences in measured meaning of the extraordinary items definition. The study has important policy implications for accounting standard-setting.     

Auditor objectivity as a function of auditor negotiation self-efficacy beliefs

This study empirically examines whether an auditor's perceived ability to negotiate discretionary accounting issues with clients (auditor negotiation self-efficacy) is related to auditor objectivity, and whether an auditor's negotiation self-efficacy has a greater impact on her objectivity when the auditor's accuracy motive (professional identity) is strong rather than weak. We tested the hypotheses using a cross-sectional survey design and obtained 146 responses from among 800 surveyed experienced Swedish auditors. The findings indicate that auditors with higher negotiation self-efficacy were more likely to make decisions on a material and discretionary accounting issue contrary to their clients' desires compared to auditors with lower self-efficacy. The relationship between negotiation self-efficacy and auditor objectivity was not moderated by professional-identity strength. These research findings suggest that recruiting and training auditors to increase their negotiation self-efficacy may be an effective method to enhance auditor objectivity without the problems inherent in other methods, such as auditor rotation. Our sample was obtained in Sweden, which allows long auditor tenures. We caution that, although our analysis controlled for auditor tenure, the effect of auditor negotiation self-efficacy may not be generalizable to countries that limit tenure through regulation.     

Accounting disclosure and firms' financial attributes: Evidence from the UK stock market

This paper focuses on the disclosure of accounting information in the financial statements of UK firms. The primary objective of the study is to analyse the financial characteristics of firms that provide extensive disclosures, and assess the financial impact of their motives, such as for example the need to raise equity finance. The study examines the financial attributes of firms that disclose information about key accounting issues including risk exposure, changes in accounting policies, use of international financial reporting standards and hedging practices. Firms are inclined to disclose accounting information in order to assure the market participants that their accounting policies are consistent with the accounting regulation and meet the information needs of their stakeholders. The study shows that in order to raise finance in the capital and debt markets, firms tend to provide extensive accounting disclosures. Firms that provide informative accounting disclosures appear to display higher size, growth and leverage measures. The findings also show that the disclosure of sensitive accounting information has not adversely affected firms' profitability. In fact, firms that provide detailed accounting disclosures tend to exhibit higher profitability. The implementation of international financial reporting standards enhances the quality and the comparability of financial statements; hence it promotes consistency and reliability in financial reporting and facilitates companies in raising capital internationally.     

Accounting regulations,enforcement, and stock price crash risk: Global evidence in the banking industry

This study uses the banking industry as a unique testing setting to examine the impact of accounting and enforcement regulations on stock price crash risk. We find that stocks are less likely to crash in countries with stricter accounting regulations and enforcement standards. More importantly, we provide evidence that the impact of accounting regulations is more significant in countries with stricter enforcement standards, suggesting that enforcement mechanisms and accounting regulations are complementary. We find that the main channels for accounting regulations and enforcement standards to affect stock price crash risk are regulations that strengthen information disclosure and improve the effects of direct supervision and external auditors. Our findings are robust after we include more control variables, employ regional regulatory developments as instrumental variables, conduct change regressions, use alternative measures of enforcement, and estimate in various subsamples. Our study has policy implications for how to design accounting regulations and enforcement mechanisms in a more effective manner.     

International operations and voluntary disclosures by U.S.-based multinational corporations

This study uses analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures to examine how the differences between U.S. and foreign disclosure environments affects the voluntary disclosures of U.S.-based multinational corporations. We hypothesize that these different disclosure environments discourage U.S-based multinationals from releasing costly information to competitors. Examining how these differences impact U.S. MNCs' reporting may further our understanding of the relationship between voluntary disclosures and differences among countries' accounting standards. Furthermore, it may explain how convergence of mandated accounting standards might impact voluntary disclosures. Controlling for industry membership, firm size, profitability, earnings-return relations, and capital market activity, we find that U.S. firms with more extensive foreign operations tend to provide fewer voluntary disclosures. These results are most robust for informal and flexible disclosures, such as investor relations, where the findings indicate a negative relation between foreign operations and disclosure.     

The effects of problem severity and recovery strategy on managers’ going concern judgments and decisions

Accounting standards now require management (as preparers of the financial statements) to assess and disclose going concern problems to stakeholders. However, important questions exist about managers’ ability and willingness to provide credible going concern assessments given their role as financial statement preparers and incentives to avoid self-reporting problems. The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of problem severity and recovery strategy on managers’ going concern disclosure judgments and decisions. We conduct an experiment with 84 experienced managers involved with financial reporting and find they are most likely to recommend going concern disclosure when financial distress is high and the recovery plan focuses on debt and equity. The results also suggest that managers have higher “substantial doubt” thresholds than auditors, and their perceptions regarding the fairness of the going concern standard also influence their decisions about disclosures of going concern issues.     

Lease transaction structuring,earnings management,and management credibility

Despite recent regulatory concerns regarding off-balance sheet financing, and concerns about lease accounting in particular, relatively little is known about how financial statement users view lease transaction structuring compared to other forms of earnings management. We examine sell-side financial statement analysts’ views on lease transaction structuring and its impact on their assessments of management credibility. Although operating leases often act as the prototypical example of transaction structuring, survey responses suggest that lease structuring and related voluntary reconciliations do not raise the same concerns for analysts as do other earnings management activities (which lower analysts’ perceptions of management credibility). Our findings are consistent with prior research demonstrating that, with precise accounting standards, managers are more likely to attempt earnings management by structuring transactions, but auditors are also less likely to adjust such attempts, and suggest that financial statement users may also be less concerned with transaction structuring than with other forms of earnings management.     

Why good accountants do bad audits

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. Accountants might seem immune to such distortions because they work with seemingly hard numbers and clear-cut standards. But the corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status, thereby misleading investors, regulators, and even management. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.     

The audit expectation gap: existence,causes, and the impact of changes

Recent regulatory initiatives targeting the statutory audit regime support the notion that the audit expectation gap is still a driver of change. This study seeks to analyse causes of the gap as well as the impact of proposed changes to the current statutory audit regime using an approach that differs from those used in prior literature. This approach allows us to attribute the audit expectation gap under the current regime to a failure of the public, the standard-setter, or the auditor. Based on a questionnaire survey conducted in 2011 in Germany, we find the public to have exaggerated expectations of auditors' responsibilities under current standards. Other causes of the gap relate to the public's difficulty in assessing the performance of auditors, but also to deficiencies in auditors' performance. In addition, we find that auditors are not fully aware of their responsibilities. Increasing the information content of the audit opinion is expected to narrow the gap. By contrast, recent proposed changes, such as mandatory rotation and a ban on non-audit services, may reduce the gap only to a lesser extent. Overall, it can be shown that the audit expectation gap is by its nature a persistent phenomenon comprising complex social aspects and interactions with changing accounting requirements, such as increased uncertainties in accounting estimates.     

AUDITOR'S SKILL,AUDITING STANDARDS,LITIGATION, AND AUDIT QUALITY

This paper introduces a model of the market for audit services in which auditors differ in their levels of skill, which may or may not be observable and capture differences in ability. The model captures the interplay amongst auditing standards, litigation, and auditors’ levels of skill, which determines auditors’ responses to auditing standards. The paper shows that the quality of audit supplied by any auditor is increasing in the auditor's level of skill regardless of whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. An increase in the quality of audit prescribed by auditing standards is shown to induce some auditors endowed with low levels of skill to decrease the quality of their audits so that the average quality of audit and economic welfare may actually decline as auditing standards are raised. Auditors’ choices of audit quality are furthermore shown to be increasing in trial awards. Incentives for trials and out-of-court settlements are shown to depend crucially on whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. Only when auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable do trials obtain with some probability. When auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable, the introduction of either restrictions on costs awarded by the courts or an imperfection in the courts’ technology is shown to lead the most skilled auditors to supply audits of a quality strictly exceeding the quality prescribed by the prevailing auditing standards. When the courts err often enough, the most skilled auditors having exercised due care furthermore make offers to settle when sued.     

The influence of process accountability and accounting standard type on auditor usage of a status quo heuristic

There has been considerable discussion about the U.S. reporting standards becoming less rules based, similar to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). One proposed advantage of a change to IFRS is increased comparability across multinational and non-U.S. companies. Additionally, some believe that IFRS afford greater flexibility in its principles, thereby enabling firms’ accounting choices to better reflect the true economic nature of any given transaction (FASB, 2002; SEC, 2003). With fewer rules, both financial statement preparers and auditors would be expected to adjust to having more options with regards to financial reporting. However, some proposed changes leave the option open to implement IFRS (or other principles-based standards) in ways that still follow rules in U.S. GAAP. This paper investigates whether prior year accounting treatments influence the judgment for current year treatments when one way to implement the standard is to follow the prior year treatment. We find that some auditors fixate on prior year scenarios and judgments, even if the current year scenario and applicable accounting standards are different. We find that holding auditors accountable for their decision making process reduces the likelihood of sticking with the prior year treatment most notably when the prior year standards were U.S. GAAP.     

Auditor liability and excess cash holdings: Evidence from audit fees of foreign incorporated firms

Auditors of foreign cross-listed firms face liability arising from the nature of the institutional monitoring framework of legal claims that can potentially be brought against the auditor in both the home country and the US. This paper is the first to document the relationship between auditor liability and auditor pricing of excess cash holdings for foreign firms cross-listed in the US. Our findings indicate that auditors demand a fee premium for foreign incorporated clients with greater excess cash holdings, consistent with auditors recognizing the potential for legal exposure to agency conflict arising from foreign listed US traded clients. Furthermore, we examine aspects of foreign capital market protections, such as disclosure requirements, the strength of legal enforcement, and the strength of shareholder rights to better understand auditor perception of the liability they incur due to the agency costs associated with excess cash holdings. We find that there is a significant positive association between audit fees and excess cash holdings for firms where the country of incorporation permits greater liability of auditors in criminal and civil litigation. In addition, auditors assign higher audit fees to firms holding greater excess cash incorporated in countries with greater required accounting disclosure, stronger legal enforcement and stronger shareholder rights.     

签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响

本文考察了中国证券市场中签字注册会计师的自然轮换规律以及强制轮换政策产生的初步影响。自然轮换状态下的经验证据显示,会计师事务所与上市客户之间的长期业务关系普遍以个别签字注册会计师的长期连续签名方式维系。强制轮换政策施行后,各证券特许会计师事务所对该政策的遵循程度从2003年审中的50%左右提高到了2004年审中的80%左右。通过观察签字注册会计师强制轮换前后的审计结果变化,我们初步估计签字注册会计师的强制轮换对提高证券特许会计师事务所公开报告上市公司潜在财务报告问题的促进作用是有限的。