The (non-) effect of labor unionization on firm risk: Evidence from the options market

Labor unionization has no causal effect on firm risk. Using a regression discontinuity design to study the impact of labor union elections on option-implied firm risk, we find that unionization per se does not affect investor perceptions about firm price, tail, or variance risk. This finding is robust to studying very short (5-trading day) and long (up to 2-year) windows around the elections. Moreover, there is no unionization effect on firm risk either in subsets of firms facing strong union bargaining power, or with characteristics that prior literature identifies as important determinants of the effect of unionization on firm outcomes.     

Employment quality and 10-K report readability

This study examines the relationship between firms’ employment quality and annual report readability. Using 9,366 U.S. firm-year observations from 1994 to 2018, we find that a favorable employment quality is positively associated with a more readable 10-K report. Such a positive relationship can be observed when firms recruit industry-specialist auditors and when employees are considered important stakeholders to the firm. However, we find a negative association between employment quality and 10-K report readability when there is a presence of firm-level unionization. Our findings inform policymakers that initiatives to promote disclosure readability may be undermined by firms that place less emphasis on employment quality. Further, firm-level unionization can reduce the incentive for firms with a favorable employment quality to provide readable disclosures.     

The effect of unionization on firms’ earnings management and employee compensation: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

This study examines the effect of unionization on US firms’ accruals-based earnings management and future employee compensation expenses by employing a research design that overcomes the inherent endogeneity issue of the relationship between unionization and earnings management. First, by comparing firms that just pass unionization by a small number of votes to those that just barely lose elections, the regression discontinuity design estimations document significant downward accruals earnings management for firms that barely pass unionization, compared to those that barely fail to pass unionization. Second, the association between unionization and earnings management is only significant in US states without right-to-work legislation, where unions are more powerful. These findings are consistent with recently unionized firms’ incentives to report lower earnings in order to mitigate unions’ demands for greater employee compensation. Further, for firms that barely pass unionization, we find that: (1) unions cannot fully “undo” the effects of earnings management, that is, downward managed earnings depress future compensation expenses, and (2) firms cannot fully “undo” the effects of unionization, that is, compensation expenses increase after unionization despite the downward earnings management.     

SECURITIES PRICE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION LEGISLATION

Prior studies document that firms experience negative stock price effects in response to unionization. We study the economic effects of a radical change in unionization legislation in New Zealand and hypothesize that the stock price effect of unionization is a function of prior unionization status of firms. We provide evidence that legislative events that increase the likelihood of introducing more stringent legislation do not affect stock prices of high‐unionized firms, whereas low‐unionized firms are affected negatively and significantly. Legislative events that signal less stringent unionization legislation result in significant stock price increases for all firms.     

Do labor unions affect firm payout policy?: Operating leverage and rent extraction effects

While previous literature documents weak effects of unionization on payout policy on average, we find that this average relationship hides significant heterogeneous effects of unionization on payouts across firms that depend on firm profitability. The effect of unionization on payouts is negative for low-profitability firms but positive for high-profitability firms. We posit that labor unions (i) increase operating risk, which negatively affects payouts, but (ii) increase potential for rent extraction from unions, which could induce shareholders to demand positive payouts. Higher profitability mitigates the negative effect while strengthening the positive effect, making the relation between unionization and payouts less negative or more positive. We provide evidence consistent with both the negative and positive effects of unionization on payouts. Our empirical design mitigates endogeneity concerns. Further, an instrumental variable analysis and a cross-sectional test using right-to-work laws confirm that endogeneity is unlikely to drive our results.     

Does unionization affect the manager–shareholder conflict? Evidence from firm-specific stock price crash risk

This study examines whether and how labor unionization influences firm-specific stock price crash risk. Using a regression discontinuity design that leverages locally exogenous variation in unionization generated by close union elections, we find that unionization leads to a significant decline in crash risk. We further explore the underlying mechanisms through which unionization affects crash risk and find that unions limit risk-taking, constrain overinvestment, and improve information flow, which in turn reduces crash risk. Overall, our study resolves some of the current debate over the implications of unions and sheds new light on their net impact on shareholder welfare.     

The effect of unionization on industry merger activity around negative economy-wide shocks

We investigate the effect of labor unionization on industry-level takeover activity after negative economy-wide shocks. Focusing on the 2008 financial crisis, we find that merger intensities drop significantly during the post-crisis period, though the degree of unionization in an industry attenuates this negative effect. Our analyses of the 2001 and 1990 economic recessions lead to similar results. While unionization is known to deter M&A activity on average, our results indicate that in dire times, when firm survival is at risk, unions appear to resist relatively less to restructuring activities in the form of mergers.     

The rising skill premium and deunionization

During the past 50 years, the US economy has seen a rapid decline in labor union membership and a substantial rise in wage inequality. Since labor unions compress wages between skilled and unskilled workers, a rising skill premium encourages skilled workers to withdraw from the union. If this withdrawal is accompanied by a fall in the productivity of unskilled workers, firms become reluctant to hire the relatively expensive union workers, reinforcing the decline in the unionization rate. Evaluating this hypothesis, we find that the rise in the skill premium explains about 40% of the decline in the unionization rate.     

The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions

We provide evidence that firms in more unionized industries strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unions and shelter corporate income from their demands. Specifically, we show that corporate cash holdings are negatively related with unionization. We also find that this relation is stronger for firms that are likely to place a higher value on gaining a bargaining advantage over unions and weaker for those firms in which lower cash holdings provide less credible evidence that a firm is unable to concede to union demands. Additionally, we show that for unionized firms increases in cash holdings raise the probability of a strike. Finally, we show that unionization decreases the market value of a dollar of cash holdings. Overall, our findings indicate that firms trade-off the benefits of corporate cash holdings with the costs resulting from a weaker bargaining position with labor.     

The Effects of Labour on Accounting Choice in Canada

This study examines the effects of labour considerations on accounting choice in Canada. Two potential labour‐related incentives are considered: ability to pay and employee attraction and retention. Measures of these incentives are developed based on Canadian data: unionization for ability‐to‐pay incentives, and labour intensity and the percentage of white‐collar employees for the attract and retain incentives. Our results indicate that ability‐to‐pay incentives, measured by unionization, are not associated with depreciation policies in Canada. In contrast, the findings provide mixed support for the attract‐and‐retain perspective, because labour intensity was significantly correlated with these choices, while the percentage of white‐collar employees was marginally significant.     

Zero leverage puzzle: Do labour laws matter?

Exploiting the staggered passage of labour protection laws in the United States, we find that higher labour adjustment costs increased the likelihood of observing zero leverage firms by 22%. This effect is significantly larger in states with stronger unionization, in industries with higher volatility and concentration, and in firms with higher labour intensity. Both within-firm changes in debt policies and higher propensity of newer firms to be debt-free are important in explaining these patterns. Overall, our work contributes to the literature on the relation between financial and labour markets by highlighting the role of labour laws in explaining the zero-leverage puzzle.     

Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm–supplier relationships

We examine optimal leverage for a downstream firm relying on implicit (self-enforcing) contracts with a supplier. Performing a leveraged recapitalization prior to bargaining increases the firm's share of total surplus. However, the resulting debt overhang limits the range of credible bonuses, resulting in low input quality. Optimal financial structure trades off bargaining benefits of debt with inefficiency resulting from overhang. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that leverage increases with supplier bargaining power (e.g., unionization rates) and decreases with utilization of non-verifiable inputs (e.g., human capital).     

Be nice to your innovators: Employee treatment and corporate innovation performance

This paper investigates the effect that employee treatment schemes have on corporate innovation performance. We find that firms with better employee treatment schemes produce more and better patents through improving employee satisfaction and teamwork. Additional tests suggest that our main findings cannot be attributed to job security, unionization, reverse causality, and omitted variables. We also find that firms with better employee treatment schemes produce patents that enhance market valuation and facilitate better future operating performance. Collectively, our findings show that treating employees well benefits firms and shareholders, for well treated employees are encouraged to create intellectual property.     

Labor unions and corporate financial leverage: The bargaining device versus crowding-out hypotheses

We examine the empirical relation between labor unions and firm indebtedness in the contemporary United States. Our identification strategy exploits two negative exogenous shocks in union power and the threat of unionization. Further, in the context of panel regressions, we develop a novel firm-level proxy for the bargaining power of labor using collective bargaining information from mandatory IRS filings from 1999 to 2013. Across a battery of tests, we document evidence in favor of a crowding-out hypothesis — namely, a substitution effect between labor power and financial leverage. Notably, this effect is more pronounced in firms in labor-intensive and unionized industries.     

The Demand for Health Insurance in the Group Setting: Can You Always Get What You Want?

To what extent do health benefits obtained in the employment‐based setting reflect individual preferences? We examine this question by comparing the relationship between person‐level characteristics and the plans they obtain in a group setting to the relationship observed in the individual insurance market, using data from the 1996‐1997 and 1998‐1999 Community Tracking Study's Household Surveys. We also examine the effect of unions on group choice. Our structural models of the demand for insurance indicate that plans obtained in the group setting often reflect underlying individual preferences for insurance, but we consistently observe significantly different effects of ethnicity and unionization.     

Disclosure tone management and labor unions

By analyzing the influence of labor unions on the narrative content of corporate disclosures, we provide empirical evidence that managers deflate the tone of earnings press releases in order to convey to unions a less optimistic image of firm financial performance. We find that the tone of the qualitative information in earnings press releases is significantly less optimistic as the degree of unionization increases, and particularly when financial performance is strong. The results of quasi‐natural experiments suggest that labor unions causally affect the use of tone deflation, and the deflation is stronger during labor negotiations. Our findings also indicate that labor unions lead to a significant weakening of the signaling value of the tone of earnings press releases in predicting future performance.     

Labor unions and tax aggressiveness

We examine the impact of unionization on firms' tax aggressiveness. We find a negative association between firms' tax aggressiveness and union power and a decrease in tax aggressiveness after labor union election wins. This relation is consistent with labor unions influencing managers' in one, or both, of two ways: (1) constraining managers' ability to invest in tax aggressiveness through increased monitoring; or (2) decreasing returns to tax aggressiveness that arise from unions' rent seeking behavior. We also find preliminary evidence that the market expects these reductions around union elections and discounts firms that likely add shareholder value via aggressive tax strategies.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

Labor Unions and Forms of Corporate Liquidity

We examine how the presence of labor unions affects a firm's choice of corporate liquidity between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. We find that firms in industries with higher unionization rates hold a higher fraction of corporate liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit. We divide the firms into sub‐groups and find that this positive relationship holds for firms that are not in a state with right‐to‐work legislation and for firms that are financially constrained. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a firm chooses the forms of corporate liquidity to take advantage of the bargaining benefits associated with bank lines of credit.     

The impact of labor unions on investment-cash flow sensitivity

This paper empirically examines how labor unions affect investment-cash flow sensitivity using samples from the US covering the period of 1984–2009. We find a significant positive union effect using a q model of investment. The capital expenditures of firms are 1.71 times more sensitive to internal cash flows when unionization rates increase one standard deviation from the mean. This effect holds when we control for other proxies of financial constraints. In addition, unionized firms are associated with lower cash–cash flow sensitivity, which suggests that the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in unionized firms is primarily driven by the incentive of these firms to reduce liquidity and enhance bargaining power against the union. We also show that the above union effects become more pronounced during labor contract negotiation years.