巨灾债券与巨灾保险风险分散

巨灾债券,作为一种债权合同,相对于巨灾再保险而言,虽然是一个两极端产品,但在分散风险方面具有其不可比拟的优势。在大额损失时,巨灾债券是巨灾再保险的一种很好的替代产品。另外,巨灾风险债券的发行对巨灾再保险免赔额具有积极影响。     

Catastrophe Bonds,Reinsurance, and the Optimal Collateralization of Risk Transfer

Catastrophe bonds feature full collateralization of the underlying risk transfer and thus abandon the reinsurance principle of economizing on collateral through diversification of risk transfer. Our analysis demonstrates that this feature places limits on catastrophe bond penetration, even if the structure possesses frictional cost advantages over reinsurance. However, we also show that catastrophe bonds have important uses when buyers and reinsurers cannot contract over the division of assets in the event of insolvency and, more generally, cannot write contracts with a full menu of state‐contingent payments. In this environment, segregation of collateral—in the form of multiple reinsurance companies, as well as catastrophe bond vehicles—can ameliorate inefficiencies due to reinsurance contracting constraints by improving welfare for those exposed to default risk. Numerical simulation illustrates how catastrophe bonds improve efficiency in market niches with correlated risks, or with uneven exposure of buyers to reinsurer default.     

巨灾风险可保性研究

以近年来巨灾保险相对萎缩的现实为背景,通过界定风险可保性来分析巨灾风险的可保性内涵以及影响巨灾风险可保性的因素。在此基础上,基于破产理论找出了巨灾风险的可保性边界,并给出了拓展巨灾风险可保性边界的政策建议。研究认为:巨灾风险的模糊性、低频高损失、难以聚合以及保险人的偿付能力、管理能力和经营目标等因素都可能会影响巨灾风险的可保性。具体而言,巨灾风险的可保性边界主要由保险人的初始资本金和保费附加共同决定,初始资本金越大、保费附加越高,巨灾风险的可保性边界就越宽,保险人的承保范围就越大。因此,通过提高保险人对巨灾风险认识、提高保险人的财务实力、对巨灾保险进行保费补贴、分保、共保以及通过资本市场和公共部门对巨灾风险进行融资均有助于扩大巨灾风险的可保性。     

Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market.     

巨灾债券的运作原理及在我国的应用

随着保险公司承担越来越多的风险,巨灾债券逐渐发展成为其分散风险的又一种工具。本文将巨灾债券的运作过程分为三个阶段,对其运作原理进行了分析,并介绍了巨灾债券的定价模型,为巨灾债券的定价提供一种方案：一种金融产品能否顺利发行取决于其发展的前景。本文最后分析了我国发行巨灾债券的必要性和可行性,并提出构建我国巨灾债券的相关建议。     

Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds

We argue that corporate bond yields reflect fears of debt deflation. When debt is nominal, unexpectedly low inflation increases real liabilities and default risk. In a real business cycle model with optimal but infrequent capital structure choice, more uncertain or procyclical inflation leads to quantitatively important increases in corporate log yields in excess of default‐free log yields. A panel of credit spread indexes from six developed countries shows that credit spreads rise by 14 basis points if inflation volatility or the inflation‐stock correlation increases by one standard deviation.     

巨灾风险管理中的行业损失担保

行业损失担保是一种赔付主要由巨灾所造成的整个保险行业损失所触发的保险连结证券。与传统再保险相似,它也要事先确定合约的涵盖地域、灾害种类、责任限额和有效时间等。但它与传统再保险不同在于,赔付取决于两个损失触发条件,即购买者的实际损失和整个保险行业的损失。本文从行业损失担保的市场发展、定义与运行机制、精算定价等角度,对其进行了系统梳理分析,并把它与其他巨灾风险连接证券进行了比较。     

巨灾风险放大及其影响因素测度

巨灾风险放大是现代风险社会的显著特征。文章基于自然灾害学与灾害社会学理论融合视角,对巨灾风险放大机理及其影响因素进行了分析,并采取随机权神经网络方法,以中国地震灾害为例,对巨灾风险放大影响因素进行了测度。研究表明:巨灾风险放大是由自然与社会双重因素耦合而成的灾情“加重性”、“脱域性”、“加快性”和“延时性”复杂现象,巨灾风险放大程度由致灾因子破坏力、承灾系统脆弱性、承灾系统抗逆力和风险沟通有效度共同决定,且越来越取决于社会性因素。在巨灾风险管理实践中,既要合理避免遭遇破坏力强的灾害,降低风险的自然放大,也要从降低承灾系统脆弱性、提高承灾系统抗逆力、做好风险沟通的维度,降低风险的社会放大。     

Financial Innovation in the Management of Catastrophe Risk

Like the preceding article, this article argues that the high costs of reinsurance present the opportunity for hedging instruments to be offered to primary insurers that are both competitive with current reinsurance and that offer investors high rates of return. But the combination of high reinsurance premiums and the vast capacity of the capital market for diversification is not sufficient to ensure the success of these new instruments. If new instruments such as catastrophe options and catastrophelinked bonds are to compete successfully with reinsurance, they must provide a cost-effective means of resolving incentive conflicts between the primary insurer and the ultimate risk bearer that are known as "moral hazard." Without an effective solution of this moral hazard problem, the use of past insurance loss data to estimate the potential returns for purchasers of catastrophe bonds and other such instruments will be misleading and unreliable.
As the author demonstrates, both traditional reinsurance and each of the new catastrophe hedging instruments presents insurance companies and other hedgers with the challenge of managing a different combination of moral hazard, credit risk, and basis risk. For example, traditional catastrophe reinsurance is subject to significant credit risk and moral hazard, but little if any basis risk. By contrast, both catastrophe options and bonds can be designed in ways that reduce moral hazard and credit risk, but at the cost of taking on some basis risk. The risk manager's task in such circumstances is to design an instrument that embodies the optimal, or cost-minimizing, trade-off among these three sources of risk.     

Risk Changes around Calls of Convertible Bonds

We examine changes in equity and asset betas around convertible bond calls and report two major findings. First, calling firms exhibit an increase in asset betas following the call. We argue that the finding is consistent with the implications of the sequential financing theory but not of the backdoor equity financing theory. Second, abnormal returns at call announcements are negative only for the subsample of firms that also exhibit an increase in equity beta. We conclude that risk changes help explain the market reaction to convertible bond calls.     

Market Price of Insurance Risk Implied by Catastrophe Derivatives

Abstract

Insurance derivatives facilitate the trading of insurance risks on capital markets, such as catastrophe derivatives that were traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. Simultaneously, insurance risks are traded through reinsurance portfolios. In this paper we make inferences about the market price of risk implied by the information embedded in the prices of these two assets.     

巨灾债券对投资组合分时期影响的实证分析

近十多年来,作为连接保险市场和资本市场的工具,巨灾风险证券化的产品很多。其中,巨灾债券的发行量最大、最为成功,它在扩大了保险承保能力的同时,为资本市场的投资者提供了一种高收益、低风险的投资工具。在分析巨灾债券的发行情况的基础上,对金融危机前后以及金融危机期间,巨灾债券对投资组合有效前沿的影响进行实证分析。分析的结果表明,巨灾债券作为一种特殊的资产,能够改善投资组合的有效前沿,并扩展投资组合的有效前沿,特别是在金融危机期间,这种影响更为显著。     

政府在应对巨灾风险中的角色定位

当今世界,巨灾事故频发,各国政府为应对巨灾风险相继建立了巨灾风险保障制度,但是这些制度在运营过程中出现了一些问题,使得政府的投入与预想的效果相差甚远.本文重点分析了政府在参与应对巨灾风险组建巨灾保障制度的过程中,常用手段的利弊及遭遇的问题,以此来探讨政府在对应巨灾风险中应确立的合适角色定位.     

Reinsuring Climatic Risk Using Optimally Designed Weather Bonds

The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal structure of a weather bond, i.e. a bond whose coupons depend on the occurence of a weather event. The stress is put more on the structuration than on the simple pricing of the bond. Therefore, instead of looking only at the bond issue, we consider it as a part of a more general transaction, involving three agents: a firm, which wants to be hedged against its weather risk, an investor, which buys the bond and a bank, which has an intermediary key role. Then, we derive the optimal characteristics of the whole transaction. But the bond structure which is obtained, corresponds to a minimal structure: indeed, only the bond optimal price function and its optimal reimbursement level (amount which is paid back when an event occurs) can be determined while there is a degree of freedom in the choice of the optimal coupon. Therefore, this indeterminacy may be interpreted as a marketing tool and it could play an important role in the negotiation process between the issuer and the investor.     

Pricing Bonds and Bond Options with Default Risk

The pricing of bonds and bond options with default risk is analysed in the general equilibrium model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). This model is extended by means of an additional parameter in order to deal with financial and credit risk simultaneously. The estimation of such a parameter, which can be considered as the market equivalent of an agencies' bond rating, allows to extract from current quotes the market perceptions of firm's credit risk. The general pricing model for defaultable zero-coupon bond is first derived in a simple discrete-time setting and then in continuous-time. The availability of an integrated model allows for the pricing of default-free options written on defaultable bonds and of vulnerable options written either on default-free bonds or defaultable bonds. A comparison between our results and those given by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) is also presented.     

现金抵押贷款债券的定价与风险测量

作为资产证券化的一个重要组成部分,现金贷款抵押债券(CLO)在金融交易市场占据了很大的比重。而目前为止的对于该类产品的定价与风险测量,业界与理论界仍在探索之中。将现行的CLO产品定价方法进行了改良,对其输入参数进行了合理的修正,力求找出一种更加合适的定价方法,并在此基础上,对此类产品的市场风险敏感度进行测量。     

巨灾风险管理中金融创新品种研究综述

创新是保险业发展的永恒主题,而保险风险管理技术的提升则是保险业可持续发展能力的重要象征。近年来,伴随着金融工程技术的推广,各类金融创新产品在保险业尤其是巨灾保险和寿险风险管理中得到了广泛应用,相关研究涉及品种介绍、效用评价、定价技术以及运作机制等诸多方面。     

中小企业集合债券总体信用风险度量研究

中小企业集合债券总体信用风险既包括系统风险产生的周期性违约风险,又包括相互关联关系导致的传染性违约风险。首先通过对因素模型的改进构建模型Ⅰ,研究集合债券的周期性违约风险;在此基础上引入违约传染建立模型Ⅱ,分析违约传染对违约概率及违约相关性的影响,研究集合债券的总体信用风险。最后基于模型Ⅱ进行算例研究,得出结论：企业间的相互关联关系降低了其1次违约概率,增加了其多次违约概率即违约相关性。     

Is Default Event Risk Priced in Corporate Bonds?

This article provides an empirical decomposition of the default,liquidity, and tax factors that determine expected corporatebond returns. In particular, the risk premium associated witha default event is estimated. The intensity-based model is estimatedusing bond price data for 104 US firms and historical defaultrates. Significant risk premia on common intensity factors andimportant tax and liquidity effects are found. These componentsgo a long way towards explaining the level of expected corporatebond returns. Adding a positive default event risk premium helpsto explain the remaining error, although this premium cannotbe estimated with high statistical precision.