Securitization without risk transfer

We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was an important motive behind setting up conduits. In particular, the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the run, as losses from conduits remained with banks instead of outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.     

影子银行与金融危机

本文认为,此次全球金融危机的根源在于回购市场挤提引起的银行恐慌。机构投资者是回购市场的需求者,他们向影子银行"存款",影子银行则以资产抵押支持证券保证"存款"的安全。当证券化资产的折价率大幅提高时,就出现了回购市场挤提,引起银行恐慌,从而导致了此次全球金融危机。     

Financial instruments,financial reporting,and financial stability

I review new empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis on the relation between financial reporting and financial stability. I draw the following conclusions: First, there is still no evidence that fair value accounting caused widespread fire sales of asset or contagion. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that accounting and regulation might have contributed to the crisis by allowing several banks to delay actions. Third, even if share prices reacted positively to the relaxation of fair value accounting rules during the crisis, the origin of the problem might be lax rules that allowed banks to run into financial and regulatory problems. Fourth, fair values can be relevant for assets that a bank intends to hold until maturity if that bank strongly relies on short-term financing. Fifth, the recognition of fair values is no substitute for information that allows investors to judge a bank's risk exposure and the validity of reported fair values.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Underwriter reputation and the pricing of securities: Evidence from asset-backed securities

This paper investigates whether and how the underwriter reputation can affect the pricing of securities. Using data on collateralized loan obligations (CLO), asset-backed securities (ABS), and asset-backed medium-term notes (ABN) from 2014 to 2019 in China bond market, we find that the underwriter's reputation has a significantly negative impact on the issuance spread. This effect is more pronounced in the CLO and ABS markets, while that in the ABN market is not significant. Furthermore, we find that the originators play a critical role in determining the issuance spread of securities, as state-owned and listed originator receive a lower initial yield spread. In addition, the number of tranches and the proportion of subordination in a deal also have a stronger effect on the relation between which the underwriters' reputation and securities prices. These results suggest that underwriters play a role in reducing information asymmetry between originators and investors, which is partly corrected via underwriter reputation.     

美国资产支持证券市场结构与次按危机解析

美国次按危机不仅给世界多家金融巨擎造成巨大损失,甚至险些在世界范围内酿成了一场全面的流动性危机。文章从信贷资产证券化发起机构、CDO发起流程、信用评级的制定及下调原理,流动性危机的成因这一逻辑顺序全面回顾了美国资产支持证券市场的运作机制以及次贷危机产生的根源,以期为深入研究次级债问题提供参考。     

Asymmetric information and the death of ABS CDOs

A key feature of the 2007 financial crisis is that for many securities trading had ceased; where trading did occur, market prices were well below intrinsic values, especially for ABS CDOs. One explanation is that information had been asymmetric, with sellers having better information than buyers. We first show the information advantages sellers had over buyers in both the issuance of CDOs and, through vertical integration, performance of the CDO collateral that could well have disrupted trading after the onset of the crisis. Using a “workhorse” model for pricing securities under asymmetric information and a novel dataset, we show how adverse selection could explain why the bulk of these securities either traded at significant discounts or did not trade at all.     

The shortage of safe assets in the US investment portfolio: Some international evidence

This paper develops a Bayesian Global VAR (GVAR) model to track the international transmission dynamics of two stylized shocks, namely a supply and demand shock to US-based safe assets. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that (positive) supply-sided shocks lead to pronounced increases in economic activity which spills over to foreign countries. The impact of supply-sided shocks can also be seen for other quantities of interest, most notably equity prices and exchange rates in Europe. Second, a demand-sided shock leads to an appreciation of the US dollar and generally lower yields on US securities, forcing investors to shift their portfolios towards foreign fixed income securities. This yields sizable positive effects on US output, equity prices and a general decrease in financial market volatility.     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

Crisis-related shifts in the market valuation of banking activities

We examine changes in banks’ market-to-book ratios over the last decade, focusing on the dramatic and persistent declines witnessed during the financial crisis. The extent of the decline and its persistence cannot be explained by the delayed recognition of losses on existing financial instruments. Rather, it is declines in the values of intangibles – including customer relationships and other intangibles related to business opportunities – along with unrecognized contingent obligations that account for most of the persistent decline in market-to-book ratios. These shifts reflect a combination of changed economic circumstances (e.g., low interest rates reduce the value of core deposits; meager growth opportunities reduce the value of customer relationships) and changed regulatory policies. Together, these changes in the business environment since the financial crisis have led investors to associate little value with intangibles. For example, changing market perceptions of the consequences of leverage have affected the way investors value banks; prior to the crisis, higher leverage, ceteris paribus, was associated with greater value (reflecting the high relative cost of equity finance), but during and after the crisis, as default risk and regulatory concerns came to the fore, lower leverage was associated with greater value. Reflecting the rising importance of regulatory risks (e.g., the uncertain consequences of the Volcker Rule), after controlling for other influences, dividend payments (a signal of management and regulatory perceptions of the persistence of financial strength) matter for market prices much more after the crisis, while increases in recurring fee income matter less.     

The subprime credit crisis and contagion in financial markets

I conduct an empirical investigation into the pricing of subprime asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and their contagion effects on other markets. Using data for the ABX subprime indexes, I find strong evidence of contagion in the financial markets. The results support the hypothesis that financial contagion was propagated primarily through liquidity and risk-premium channels, rather than through a correlated-information channel. Surprisingly, ABX index returns forecast stock returns and Treasury and corporate bond yield changes by as much as three weeks ahead during the subprime crisis. This challenges the popular view that the market prices of these “toxic assets” were unreliable; the results suggest that significant price discovery did in fact occur in the subprime market during the crisis.     

Precautionary Reserves and the Interbank Market

Extreme disruptions in the interbank market severely hampered the broader financial system during the 2007–08 financial crisis. We use Fedwire data to estimate fed funds trades and track banks’ intraday balances. We show empirical evidence of banks’ precautionary holding of reserves and reluctance to lend linked to documented extreme fed funds rate volatility, including the fed funds rate spiking above the discount rate and crashing to zero. We develop a model of constrained banks that makes new predictions and provides a unified explanation for the stark anomalies during the crisis, our empirical findings, and previous stylized facts from normal times.     

Bank Disclosure and Market Assessment of Financial Fragility: Evidence from Turkish Banks’ Equity Prices

In this paper we explore whether Turkish banks with worsening indicators of financial fragility were subject to market monitoring during the years leading to the 2000/2001 crisis, and how the quality and timeliness of the disclosure affect market reaction. We find that shareholders reacted negatively to indicators of financial fragility such as increases in maturity mismatches, currency mismatches, and non-performing loans, showing shareholders’ concerns about the impact of financial fragility indicators on future profits. We also find that audited statements that show larger reporting lags, are not informative, pointing to the need of improving their timeliness. Finally, our study suggests that the finding that securities prices react to financial fragility indicators should not be taken as sufficient evidence of banks’ safety and soundness.     

Adverse Selection,Investor Experience and Security Choice in Venture Capital Finance: Evidence from Germany

This article analyses 336 German venture capital transactions from 1990 to 2005 and seeks to determine why selected financial securities differ across deals. We find that a broad array of financial instruments is used, covering straight equity, mezzanine and debt‐like securities. Based on the chosen financial securities’ upside potential and downside protection characteristics, we provide an explanation for the differing use of these securities. Our results show that investors’ deal experience, adverse selection risks and economic prospects in the public equity market influence the selection of financial securities.     

Female investors in the first english and Welsh commercial joint-stock banks

The 1826 Banking Act was passed to strengthen the banking sector. It allowed the establishment of joint-stock banks in England and Wales outside a 65-mile radius of Charing Cross, London. Institutions formed under this legislation could have an unrestricted number of partners but they did not enjoy the privilege of limited liability. This article examines the extent of female investors in joint-stock banks formed under the 1826 Act. Analysis of shareholdings found that female investors were in a minority yet their holdings in aggregate increased over time. They were primarily widows and spinsters, who collectively became significant in the emerging national financial securities market.     

交易型操纵行为影响证券价格的微观机制研究--以连续交易、虚假申报、对倒操纵典型案例为切入点

中国证监会行政处罚的典型案例显示,交易型操纵行为包括建仓持仓、通过不正当交易行为影响证券价格、反向交易获利或谋取其他利益等三个步骤。在连续交易操纵中,行为人大量以高于市场卖一价的价格申报并高比例成交,影响证券交易价格。虚假申报操纵是通过不以成交为目的频繁或大额申报、撤单,制造买盘汹涌的假象,误导市场投资者跟风交易,从而影响证券交易价格。对倒操纵是利用资金优势或持股优势,通过自买自卖放大证券交易量并拉抬证券价格。因此,交易型操纵实质上是通过不正当交易行为,在特定期间内制造虚假证券供求关系,从而扭曲证券市场价格。     

Sizing Up Repo

To understand which short‐term debt markets experienced “runs” during the financial crisis, we analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between nonbank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset‐backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset‐backed securities as well as the contraction in asset‐backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately affected a few dealer banks.     

The Paradox of Financial Fire Sales: The Role of Arbitrage Capital in Determining Liquidity

How can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well‐capitalized but nonspecialist investors? Our explanation combines rational expectations equilibrium and “lemons” models. When specialist (informed) market participants are liquidity‐constrained, prices become less informative. This creates an adverse selection problem, decreasing the supply of high‐quality assets, and lowering valuations by nonspecialist (uninformed) investors, who become unwilling to supply capital to support the price. In normal times, arbitrage capital can “multiply” itself by making uninformed capital function as informed capital, but in a crisis, this stabilizing mechanism fails.     

Tainted portfolios: How impairment accounting rules restrict security sales

Contrary to claims that fair value accounting exacerbated banks’ securities sales during the recent financial crisis, we present evidence that suggests – if anything – that the current impairment accounting rules served as a deterrent to selling. Specifically, because banks must provide evidence of their ‘intent and ability’ to hold securities with unrealized losses, there are strong incentives to reduce, rather than increase, security sales when market values decline to avoid ‘tainting’ their remaining securities portfolio. Validating this concern, we find that banks incur greater other‐than‐temporary impairment (OTTI) charges when they sell more securities. We then find that banks sell fewer securities when their security portfolios have larger unrealized losses (and thus larger potential impairment charges), and these results are concentrated in banks with homogenous securities portfolios, expert auditors, more experienced managers, and greater regulatory capital slack. Overall, our results suggest that – contrary to critics’ claims – the accounting rules appear to have reduced banks’ propensity to sell their securities during the financial crisis.     

Perpetual securities and stock prices: Korean evidence

Perpetual securities are classified as equity under the International Financial Reporting Standards, but various contract terms embedded in the securities create additional debt- and equity-like characteristics. This study examines whether stock market investors differentiate between diverse contract attributes. Using quarterly data on listed non-financial firms in the Korea Exchange that issued perpetual securities during 2012–2020, we document the following findings. First, perpetual securities are positively associated with stock prices. Second, the positive association is driven by perpetual securities convertible to stocks rather than non-convertible ones. Third, when further decomposing convertible perpetual securities based on whether the conversion price is fixed or floating, only fixed-priced convertibles show a positive association with stock prices. Overall, our findings suggest that equity investors consider the detailed contract attributes important for financial instruments.