A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

What is the net effect of financial liberalization on bank productivity? A decomposition analysis of bank total factor productivity growth

We employ a unique framework to quantify the net effect of financial liberalization on banks’ total factor productivity (TFP) growth through a decomposition analysis of two effects: a positive direct effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth; and a negative indirect effect operating through a higher propensity to systemic banking crisis. The empirical decomposition is based on a sample of 1530 banks operating in 88 countries over the period 1999–2011. We find that the net effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth is positive: the direct positive effect outweighs the negative one. An important policy implication flows from these findings.     

Econometric measures of connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors

We propose several econometric measures of connectedness based on principal-components analysis and Granger-causality networks, and apply them to the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies. We find that all four sectors have become highly interrelated over the past decade, likely increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries through a complex and time-varying network of relationships. These measures can also identify and quantify financial crisis periods, and seem to contain predictive power in out-of-sample tests. Our results show an asymmetry in the degree of connectedness among the four sectors, with banks playing a much more important role in transmitting shocks than other financial institutions.     

A risk assessment model for banks

Summary. This paper proposes a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction among banks, where the actual risk an individual bank bears also depends on its interaction with other banks and investors. We develop a two-period general equilibrium model with three active heterogeneous banks, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. The model is calibrated against UK banking data and therefore can be implemented as a risk assessment tool for regulators and central banks. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors.We are grateful to Lea Zicchino, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the Bank of England, and the third Conference in Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Syros, for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England.This revised version was published online in January 2005 with corrections to the Cover date.     

Assessing financial instability: The case of Brazil

In this paper we use the arbitrage pricing theory to infer the probability of financial institution failure for banks in Brazil. We build an index of financial stability for Brazilian banks. Empirical results seem to provide evidence that after the Russian crisis in 1998, systemic risk has increased in the country but this risk has decreased over time through 2002. Furthermore, for individual major banks the probability of failure has decreased monotonically after the Russian crisis with the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime, an inflation-targeting framework and the introduction of the new payment system.     

Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax

Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk (SR), the risk that a major fraction of the system ceases to function, and collapses. It has recently become possible to quantify SR in terms of underlying financial networks where nodes represent financial institutions, and links capture the size and maturity of assets (loans), liabilities and other obligations, such as derivatives. We demonstrate that it is possible to quantify the share of SR that individual liabilities within a financial network contribute to the overall SR. We use empirical data of nationwide interbank liabilities to show that the marginal contribution to overall SR of liabilities for a given size varies by a factor of a thousand. We propose a tax on individual transactions that is proportional to their marginal contribution to overall SR. If a transaction does not increase SR, it is tax-free. With an agent-based model (ABM) (CRISIS macro-financial model), we demonstrate that the proposed ‘Systemic Risk Tax’ (SRT) leads to a self-organized restructuring of financial networks that are practically free of SR. The SRT can be seen as an insurance for the public against costs arising from cascading failure. ABM predictions are shown to be in remarkable agreement with the empirical data and can be used to understand the relation of credit risk and SR.     

西方银行贷款定价理论评述

作为金融中介理论的重要组成部分，银行贷款定价理论围绕对银行行为的探讨而展开，已形成了较完整的理论体系。本文选择三种有代表性的银行贷款定价理论——基于市场结构的贷款定价、基于关系型贷款的定价和最前沿的基于风险的贷款定价理论进行介绍与评价，以期为我国银行贷款定价实践提供理论指导。     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

A Time Series Analysis of Financial Fragility in the UK Banking System

This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004, 2005, 2006) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the UK banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be readily used to assess financial fragility given its flexibility, computability, and the presence of multiple contagion channels and heterogeneous banks and investors. JEL Classification Numbers C68, E4, E5, G11, G21 We are grateful to seminar participants at the Bank of England, European Central Bank, University of Oxford, University of Pireaus, 59th International Atlantic Economic Conference, London and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions     

BAD taxation: Disintermediation and illiquidity in a bank account debits tax model

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the economic effects of bank account debits (BAD) taxation. Australia and various Latin American countries have levied or levy BAD taxes. Aspects such as financial disintermediation, market illiquidity, and impacts on dividend and interest rates are considered. Part of the BAD tax revenue may be fictitious, due to increased interest payments on government debt. The Brazilian BAD tax (CPMF) experience is evaluated. The empirical analysis confirms some theoretical predictions. Incidence base over GDP appears to be sensitive to the tax rate, possibly engendering a Laffer curve. The tax may also cause real interest rates to increase. Furthermore, the deadweight losses are relatively large, even if revenues are small. The theoretical and empirical results suggest that the BAD tax is not adequate for revenue collection. JEL Code E62 · H20     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.     

A portfolio based theory of excessive foreign borrowing and capital control in a small open economy

We develop a simple model of portfolio choice in a mean variance framework to address the issue of international borrowing and financial crisis. Instead of adverse selection or moral hazard of lending and borrowing activities we emphasise the role of exchange rate movement. Syndicated borrowing by way of internalising the aggregate effect tends to restrict excessive borrowing from external source. However, this may undermine the welfare consequences by further aggravating the extent of risk undertaken in the process. There is a built-in externality in the model that leads to over exposure to foreign currency debt and readily calls for intervention by the government. Government intervention by way of a tax on foreign borrowing may help restrain the amount of external debt and implement the first best.     

声誉风险视角下商业银行服务收费问题分析

近年以来,服务收费问题令商业银行面临严峻的声誉风险考验。随着银行市场经济主体地位的转型和强化,实施服务收费已是大势所趋。因此,有必要采取以下措施:加强有关法律与银行服务价格管理办法之间的衔接,引导社会公众树立有偿金融服务理念;增强服务定价机制的科学性与收费行为的公信力,有效保证客户的事前知情权和交易选择权,促进服务收费过程的透明化和合理化;站在公共利益角度切实加强对银行服务收费的外部监督管理,维护良好的市场竞争秩序;将服务收费标准的提高建立在服务增值的基础之上,通过效率的改进实现银行与客户的互惠共赢。     

Social networks in the global banking sector

We show that banks with shared social connections partner more often in the global syndicated loan market and that central banks in the network play dominant roles in various interbank transactions, indicating that social connections facilitate business connections. However, more centralized banks in the network also contribute significantly to the global systemic risk. Moreover, we find the soft information generated by social networks is particularly valuable when potential partners operate under different accounting and regulatory standards. Finally, we show that the recent banking crisis significantly limited the positive soft information effects of social networks in the global banking system.     

A semiparametric model for the systematic factors of portfolio credit risk premia

The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical relationship between daily fluctuations in the risk premium for holding a large diversified credit portfolio, which we approximate by a benchmark credit index, and some tradeable market factors which capture systematic risk. The analysis is based on an adaptive nonparametric modelling approach which allows for the data-driven estimation of the nonlinear dynamic relationship between portfolio credit risk premia and their hypothetical components. Our main finding is that the empirical weights of the systematic factors display sudden jumps during market crises and a less intense time-dependent behaviour during normal market conditions. In addition, we find that during market crises the directions of the empirical relationships are often inconsistent with ordinary economic intuition, as they are influenced by the specific circumstances of financial markets distress.     

Estimating the marginal contribution of adjustable-rate mortgage selection to termination probabilities in a nested model

In this study we measure the marginal contribution of ARMs to termination probabilities. To do this we develop a modified nested-logit model of mortgage selection and termination and identify the role of risk aversity in the selection process. Simulations of termination probabilities under different economic scenarios indicate how ARMs decrease overall portfolio risk through declines in prepayment probabilities which more than offset the increases in default probabilities associated with them.