上市公司自愿进行信息披露存在的障碍和改进措施

上市公司自愿性信息披露对市场交易行为、金融工具创新等资本市场发展的因素有着重要的影响.然而,当前中国上市公司自愿性信息披露的实践并不令人十分满意.我们应当从完善上市公司的治理结构、提升投资者素质以及调整相关政策法规入手,改善我国上市公司自愿披露的现状.     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及对策

为了增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和有效性,本文通过研究自愿性信息披露的外部条件,阐述了上市公司自愿性信息披露的含义、背景、意义以及现状分析,得出了提升上市公司自愿性信息披露的外部性策略和方法,得出了关于上市公司自愿性信息披露相关制度的建议。     

论浙江省民营上市公司自愿性信息披露

随着我国资本市场的不断发展与壮大,上市公司会计自愿性信息披露的质量问题成为当前社会关注的重点。目前,我国上市公司会计信息披露的质量监控存在严重的问题,这对于信息使用者———公司股东、资本市场投资者、银行债权人等造成了严重的信息不对称,同时,对于资本市场的规范和快速发展也有很大的负面影响。本文通过对浙江省民营上市公司自愿性信息披露的现状进行探讨,并提出自己的建议。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露对股票流动性影响的实证研究

以2007～2008年沪深两市A股上市公司年报作为研究基础,运用描述性统计和两阶最小二乘法分析了自愿性信息披露对上市公司股票流动性的影响。验证了自愿性信息披露会促进上市公司股票的流动性,同时发现自愿性披露信息中财务方面信息对上市公司股票流动性的提高作用最大。     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及对策

为了增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和有效性,本文通过研究自愿性信息披露的外部条件,阐述了上市公司自愿性信息披露的含义、背景、意义以及现状分析,得出了提升上市公司自愿性信息披露的外部性策略和方法,得出了关于上市公司自愿性信息披露相关制度的建议。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露中信息偏差研究

自愿性信息披露是上市公司管理层的一种信息权力,这些权力形成了管理层的信息租金,他们经常会对自愿性信息披露进行选择,产生一定的信息偏差,利用这种非对称信息达到寻租目的,有必要对上市公司的自愿性信息披露行为进行有效的管制,提高自愿性信息披露的质量。     

上市公司自愿信息披露

自愿信息披露是相对于强制信息披露而言的。在西方成熟的资本市场上，管理者自愿披露的信息已经成为强制信息披露的有益补充，对提升资本市场效率起到了重要作用。从信息披露渠道看．自愿披露的信息一般包括管理人员在财务报告中对公司的盈利预期、新闻报道、通过公司的网站和其他信息渠道披露的信息。近年来．电话会议逐渐成为西方许多上市公司重要的自愿信息披露渠道。     

公司战略信息的自愿披露研究——基于零七股份案例分析

正随着我国证券市场的不断发展,对信息披露的期望越来越高,这要求上市公司要更多进行自愿性披露,战略信息就是其中之一。战略信息有助于人们理解企业未来增长性和盈利力,但这并不是上市公司强制披露的信息,本文从零七股份战略信息自愿披露纷争事件入手,分析战略信息自愿披露不当的原因及其市场反应,并据此提出完善公司战略信息自愿披露的建议。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露的博弈分析

本文运用博弈论分析方法,对自愿性信息披露的主体、行为策略及支付函数等进行分析,以促使会计信息资源优化配置的效用达到"帕累托最优",实现自愿性信息披露的纳什均衡.并借助于博弈分析的结论,指出改善我国自愿性信息披露有关问题的对策建议.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露问题探究

随着中国证券市场的发展和经济环境的不断变化,信息使用者对会计信息披露提出了更有效、更高、更严的要求,单一强制性信息披露机制已不能充分满足资本市场发展的要求。自愿性信息披露是在原有强制性信息披露的基础上为了增加市场有效性而进行补充披露。研究中国上市公司自愿性信息披露对整个资本市场的发展与完善,有着极其重要的理论和现实意义。本文通过分析各行业自愿性信息披露存在的问题,并提出如何增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和可靠性的建议与方法。     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.     

Determinants of voluntary disclosure of segment information: A re-examination of the role of diversification strategy

This paper explores the determinants of management's decision to voluntarily disclose segment information. It is an extension of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) who investigate the role of six hypothesised determinants. Their results indicate that firm size, industry membership, ownership diffusion, and the level of minority interest are related to the voluntary disclosure of segment information. However, they find that leverage and diversification into related versus unrelated industries are not related to this disclosure. It is the diversification finding that motivates our work. This paper explores the effect of differences in data, differences in samples, and differences in the measurement of diversification on the McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) results. Using an alternative definition of diversification, we find diversification strategy, firm size, and the level of minority interest to be related to segment disclosure while the results for ownership diffusion and industry are mixed. We find no support for a leverage effect.     

Hedge fund ownership and voluntary disclosure

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using 13F filings from 1996 to 2011, we document that hedge fund holdings are negatively associated with the subsequent frequency of portfolio...     

Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report

This paper examines whether the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information (i.e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts. Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings (i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings news). This finding raises the question of whether voluntary information in the annual report contains value‐relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates.     

Effects of prior voluntary disclosure on earnings announcements in an environment with low information and regulation

This study examines the association between levels of annual report voluntary disclosure and the market reaction to the next interim earnings announcement in a market with both low regulation and analyst following. We examine the first order effects of voluntary disclosure by using direct measures for both the level of voluntary disclosure, and the market effects of such disclosure. The results show that preannouncement voluntary disclosure significantly reduces the price and volume reactions in the earnings announcement period, and is consistent with the Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) framework and the Atiase and Bamber (1994) empirical findings. We extend the analysis to investigate trading behavior during the earnings announcement period, and observe the trading behavior predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994). We conclude that voluntary disclosure in annual reports can be regarded as an important determinant of preannouncement information precision in markets with low regulation and analyst following, and observe the expected trading behavior as modeled in Kim and Verrecchia (1991a), and extended in Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994).     

Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure

This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find that the presence of an external governance mechanism, the regulatory environment, enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. This association is some two to three times greater under a “disclosure-based” regulatory regime than under a “merit-based” regulatory regime.     

A theory of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital

This paper explores the links between firms’ voluntary disclosures and their cost of capital. Existing studies investigate the relation between mandatory disclosures and cost of capital and find no cross-sectional effect but a negative association in time-series. In this paper, I find that when disclosure is voluntary firms that disclose their information have a lower cost of capital than firms that do not disclose, but the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital for disclosing and nondisclosing firms is positive in aggregate. I further examine whether reductions in cost of capital indicate improved risk-sharing or investment efficiency. I also find that high (low) disclosure frictions lead to overinvestment (underinvestment) relative to first-best. As average cost of capital proxies for risk-sharing but not investment efficiency, the relation between cost of capital and ex ante efficiency may be ambiguous and often irrelevant.     

Causal reasoning in financial reporting and voluntary disclosure

Causal reasoning involves understanding the cause of events that have already happened (i.e., diagnosis) as well as predicting which future events will occur (i.e., prediction). Although this type of reasoning is an important part of financial reporting and voluntary disclosure, very little research has relied on it as a basis for developing and interpreting testable research ideas. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, we review key theories from psychology that pertain to causal reasoning. Second, we identify how these theories can be successfully used by behavioral researchers interested in financial reporting and voluntary disclosure.