International Corporate Tax Avoidance Practices: Evidence from Australian Firms

This paper examines the international corporate tax avoidance practices of publicly listed Australian firms. Based on a hand-collected sample of 203 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006–2009 period (812 firm-years), our regression results indicate that there are several practices Australian firms use to aggressively reduce their tax liabilities. Specifically, we find that thin capitalization, transfer pricing, income shifting, multinationality, and tax haven utilization are significantly associated with tax avoidance. In fact, based on the magnitude and significance levels of the regression coefficients in our study, thin capitalization and transfer pricing represent the primary drivers of tax avoidance, whereas income shifting and tax haven utilization are less important. Finally, our additional regression results show that tax havens are likely to be used together with thin capitalization and transfer pricing to maximize international tax avoidance opportunities via the increased complexity of transactions carried out through tax havens.     

The determinants of thinly capitalized tax avoidance structures: Evidence from Australian firms

This paper examines the determinants of thinly capitalized structures of publicly-listed Australian firms. Based on a hand-collected sample of 203 publicly-listed Australian firms over the 2006–2009 period (812 firm-years), our regression results indicate that the thin capitalization position of firms is significantly and positively associated with multinationality, tax haven utilization, withholding taxes and tax uncertainty. Multinationality and the use of tax havens are, in particular, strongly associated with thin capitalization. Our additional regression results provide evidence that shows that corporate governance monitoring mechanisms relating to board of director independence, institutional ownership and big-4 auditor utilization are significantly negatively associated with firms adopting thinly capitalized tax avoidance structures.     

Determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness: Empirical evidence from Australian firms

This study examines the major determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness. Based on a hand-collected sample of 183 publicly-listed Australian firms for the 2009 year, our regression results show that firm size, profitability, leverage, intangible assets, and multinationality are significantly positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness after controlling for industry-sector effects. Our additional regression results also indicate that firms augment their transfer pricing aggressiveness through the joint effects of intangible assets and multinationality.     

The influence of international taxation structures on corporate financial disclosure patterns

This paper investigates the extent of financial instrument disclosures (FIDs) within the annual reports of Australian listed extractive resource companies over a 4-year longitudinal period (2003–2006) and its association with international tax characteristics. Statistical analysis shows that thin capitalisation structures and withholding taxes are positively and significantly associated with disclosure patterns. In contrast, the occurrence of foreign sourced income and tax haven links are significantly negatively associated with FID patterns. These findings demonstrate that international tax structures can influence corporate disclosure patterns. This paper contributes to an understanding of the extent, trends and rationale behind resource firms’ financial instrument disclosure practices in Australia.     

Fiscal incentives, corporate structure and financial aspects of treasury management operations

This paper presents evidence that tax policy affects corporate structure and intra-group financial flows, using a data base of Irish registered firms. How MNC's corporate structure and financial flows react to tax policy is complex. Fiscal incentives play a key role in Irish industrial policy. The paper examines certain financial characteristics of financial subsidiaries (those managing group treasury functions) in Ireland. These characteristics are a tax haven connection, high ratios of revenues to pre-tax profits (in some cases greater than 100%), high intra-group borrowing or lending, large gross assets (in excess of €500 million) and low or zero employment. While these firms pay corporation tax in Ireland (at reduced rates), there is considerable loss to other exchequers. The paper concludes that such tax haven type activities are unlikely to remain a viable part of future industrial policy in Ireland.     

Theft and taxes

This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private benefits extracted by company insiders and that the quality of the corporate governance system affects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. Analyses of a tax enforcement crackdown in Russia and cross-country data on tax changes support this two-way interaction between corporate governance and corporate taxation.     

Intangible investment and Ramsey capital taxation

The standard analysis of optimal fiscal policy aggregates different types of assets into a unique capital good and all types of capital taxes into a unique capital tax. This paper considers a disaggregated framework: an economy with corporate and dividend taxes, where firms invest in both tangible and intangible assets (which can be expensed or sweat). In our setup, firms can always respond to changes in the timing of taxation. We find that the optimal long-run policy features zero corporate taxes and positive dividend taxes, with labor and dividend taxes being identical. Moreover, the initial capital levy is relatively small.     

Does the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations affect the cost of bank loans?

This study examines whether the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) is associated with the cost of bank loans. We find that more intensive tax haven subsidiary use by MNCs is positively associated with the cost of bank loans. In cross-sectional analyses, we identify channels through which the positive association between tax haven intensity and bank loan costs is more pronounced, such as a weak information environment, poor corporate governance, high CEO pay-for-performance and corporation-related wealth, and low managerial ability. We also find that intensive tax haven use is positively (negatively) associated with non-price loan contract terms, such as collateralization and financial covenants (loan maturity and general covenants). Our main result holds when public bonds are substituted for bank loans. Finally, additional analysis shows that MNCs with high levels of tax haven intensity are more likely to rely on bank loan financing than on raising debt from the bond market. Overall, this study adds to an emerging body of literature on corporate taxation and debt policy.     

Government ownership,corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China

This study investigates how government ownership and corporate governance influence a firm's tax aggressiveness. Using Chinese listed companies during 2003–2009, we find that compared with government‐controlled firms, non‐government‐controlled firms pursue a more aggressive tax strategy. In particular, non‐government‐controlled firms with a higher percentage of the board shareholdings and with a CEO who also serves as the board chairman are more aggressive. For government‐controlled firms, we find that board shareholding has an impact on tax aggressiveness and it does not differ between local and central government‐controlled firms. However, local government‐controlled firms in less developed regions where the implementation of corporate governance measures is generally less effective are more tax aggressive than those in other regions.     

Corporate Social Responsibility,Tax Aggressiveness,and Firm Market Value

This paper examines the relationship of corporate social responsibility (CSR), tax aggressiveness, and firm market value. An economic model has been developed to show that profit‐maximization firms are willing to incur additional costs in CSR, such as paying more taxes, as long as they can differentiate their products from non‐CSR firms, and that socially conscious consumers will buy products from CSR firms at prices higher than those of non‐CSR firms. The empirical study in this paper indicates that the higher the CSR ranking of a firm, the less likely a firm is to engage in tax aggressiveness. It also indicates that a reputation of higher CSR will enhance firm market value. Using Canadian companies listed in the S&P/TSX 60 index, I find that both firms’ five‐year effective tax rates and annual effective tax rates are positively associated with their overall CSR scores as well as with their social scores. Firms’ five‐year effective tax rates are also positively associated with their governance index. I also find that firms’ overall CSR ranking and governance scores are positively associated with their market value.     

How much of the corporate bond spread is due to personal taxes?

Existing term structure models of defaultable bonds have often underestimated corporate bond spreads. A potential problem is that investors’ taxes are ignored in these models. We propose a pricing model that accounts for stochastic default probability and differential tax treatments for discount and premium bonds. By estimating parameters directly from bond data, we obtain significantly positive estimates for the income tax rate of a marginal corporate bond investor after 1986. This contrasts sharply with the previous finding that the implied tax rates for Treasury bonds are close to zero. Results show that taxes explain a substantial portion of corporate bond spreads.     

On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long‐Term Return Reversals

Prior studies have linked long‐term reversals to the magnitude of locked‐in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked‐in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns.     

The Capital Structure of Large Firms and the Use of Dutch Financing Entities

Large firms may issue debt securities to obtain external financing or set up lowly‐taxed affiliates for internal debt‐shifting purposes. In addition, they may channel interest payments through Dutch special purpose entities (SPEs) to avoid withholding taxes, a widely‐used arbitrage strategy. Analysing the capital structure of large EU‐based multinationals, this paper provides evidence that the use of Dutch‐issuing SPEs is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity. Furthermore, it shows that EU subsidiaries of larger firms are more leveraged and that the use of Dutch on‐lending SPEs is also associated with higher subsidiary leverage. Thus, the paper provides evidence that Dutch SPEs facilitate higher external debt financing as well as internal debt shifting. The findings indicate that withholding taxes on interest payments to entities outside the EU, determined by individual EU member states, are not very effective. The national tax systems of EU countries such as the Netherlands, which does not impose interest withholding tax, allow large firms to avoid those taxes.     

Does recent empirical evidence support the existence of international corporate tax competition?

Recent reductions in institutional barriers to international investment have meant that the existence of international corporate tax differentials is now one of the most significant remaining causes of distortion to the optimum global allocation of resources, and hence to international trade. In the debate as to how to reduce such distortion, two main schools of thought have emerged. The first believes that this result can be achieved primarily through the international co-ordination of corporate taxes. To date, efforts in this direction have not made significant progress. The second contends that market forces, through tax competition, will spontaneously reduce international corporate tax differentials. In this article, an analysis of recent trends in corporate tax rates supports this second contention: statutory and effective corporate tax rates are continuing to decline and converge. However, recent tax revenue data give little support for the existence of tax competition; the expected shift in the tax burden from corporate profits onto less mobile factors such as labor has largely failed to materialize. Several explanations for these contrasting findings are outlined and analyzed.     

Does corporate tax avoidance promote managerial empire building?

We examine the association between corporate tax avoidance and empire building using 35,060 firm-year observations from the United States (US) for the period 1991–2015. We build a composite empire building measure by conducting a factor analysis on four popular empire building proxies used in the literature. We find a positive association between this composite measure and the four proxies used to represent the tax avoidance of firms in our sample. As our results suggest, agency problems are inflicted upon firms employing tax avoidance strategies which, in turn, facilitate managerial rent extraction through aggressiveness in growth and the accumulation of assets. Furthermore, the relationship of corporate tax avoidance to managerial empire building is found to be more pronounced in firms with weak governance, poor monitoring mechanisms, greater Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power and weak corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We also find that empire building-motivated tax avoidance leads to lower firm valuation. Our results remain insensitive even when employing several robustness tests.     

The effect of taxes on multinational debt location

We provide new evidence that differences in international tax rates and tax regimes affect multinational firms' debt location decisions. Our sample contains 8287 debt issues from 2437 firms headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in 59 countries. We analyze firms' marginal decisions of where to issue debt to investigate the influence of a comprehensive set of tax-related effects, including differences in personal and corporate tax rates, tax credit and exemption systems, and bi-lateral cross-country withholding taxes on interest and dividend payments. Our results show that differences in personal and corporate tax rates, the presence of dividend imputation or relief tax systems, the tax treatment of repatriated profits, and inter-country withholding taxes on dividends and interest significantly influence the decision of where to locate debt and the proportion of debt located abroad. Our results are robust to firm and issue specific factors and to the effect of legal regimes, debt market development, and exchange rate risk.     

对我国成本分摊协议税收管理的几点建议

近年来,越来越多的跨国企业采用成本分摊的方法从事无形资产的研发、分摊集团劳务成本等活动。由于成本费用的分摊直接影响参与企业的所得税税基,各国税务局对关联企业间成本分摊安排的商业实质及公平交易原则的合规性甚为关注,相继出台了针对成本分摊协议(CCAs)的规定。本文就成本分摊协议的国际动态、国内现状作了一些分析,并对我国成本分摊协议的税收管理提出了建议。     

The impact of tax enforcement on corporate investment efficiency: evidence from the tax administration information system

Information technology is essential in tax enforcement. This study found that stronger tax enforcement after the tax administration information system reform improved corporate investment efficiency by reducing excessive investment expenditures. The effect is more significant under higher local government fiscal pressure, poorer external information environments, weaker external corporate governance, and stronger tax avoidance motivation. The main mechanism is based on the quality of the accounting information. This study enriches the literature on the economic consequences of tax enforcement and adds investment efficiency as an influential factor, which provides implications for international governments to use information technology to strengthen tax enforcement.     

Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Corporate Tax Reform

Corporate tax reform has been a controversial issue in the U.S. for several years, particularly as U.S. companies have accumulated cash in lower‐tax overseas subsidiaries, while some have used “inversions” to establish overseas corporate domiciles. Two features of U.S. corporate taxation stand out: 1. U.S. corporate income tax rates are the highest in the industrialized world. The federal rate is 35%; and, when combined with state taxes, it averages 39%, as compared to an OECD average of 24%. 2. U.S. corporations pay U.S. tax on their worldwide income, but can choose to avoid indefinitely corporate tax on foreign profits by not repatriating them. Neither feature is present in most other Western countries, where the norm is a “territorial” system that taxes companies only on their domestic profits. The Trump administration has proposed to cut U.S. corporate tax rates to 20%, thereby bringing them down to the OECD average, and to adopt a territorial tax regime like those found in most other Western nations. In this statement signed by 31 senior financial economists, the authors recommend cutting U.S. corporate tax rates, but retaining the current system of taxing the worldwide profits of U.S. companies (while giving them credit for taxes paid in overseas jurisdictions). Once U.S. rates drop to the international average, the economists point out, U.S. companies would have much less incentive under the worldwide system to use transfer pricing schemes to shift their profits to low‐tax jurisdictions than under the proposed territorial alternative. Indeed, under the current system, if the lower rates under consideration are enacted, the location of a company's business activity (including the firm's underlying intellectual property) would not affect its taxation. Along with lower corporate tax rates, the economists also recommend that Congress limit or remove the corporate option to defer the taxation of offshore profits and provide a schedule for repatriating off‐shore funds, using the inducement of the now lower rates as well as the possibility of a “tax holiday.”