The Changing Nature of Contracting and Trust in Public‐Private Partnerships: The Case of Victorian PPP Prisons

This paper examines shifting constructions of contracting and trust that are manifest between pre‐2000 and post‐2000 public‐private partnerships (PPPs) providing prison facilities and/or services in the Australian State of Victoria. As such, this paper is significant because it outlines longitudinal insights into the nature of changing practices sustaining these PPPs. The post‐2000 period examined reflects a change of government and the policy context. Our examination is based on a range of primary and secondary documents. The primary documents comprise three pre‐2000 Prison Services Agreements and two post‐2000 Facilities Services Agreements. A number of government and other reports constitute the secondary documents consulted. While there are many substantive similarities between the contracts, we find five main areas of changed contracting practices over the period examined. These relate to: first, the objectives of the PPP prisons; second, risk management practices; third, the approach to performance measurement and reporting; fourth, the structuring of incentive and payment mechanisms; and fifth, the emphasis on collaboration. Overall, we find that the post‐2000 contracts promote a more overt development of goodwill trust and relational contracting, building on presumptions of contractual and competence forms of trust. However, quite different outcomes have been achieved from particular contractual contexts. Our study suggests that in complex PPP contracts, the influences of both the transacting parties and the transaction environment have been insufficiently recognized in the literature on PPPs.     

Mortgage contract design and systemic risk immunization

This paper provides theoretical results for the design of contracts used in the market for residential household mortgages and mortgage securities. Critical elements in the problem of immunizing systemic risk through efficient contract design are identified. Using an extension of classical immunization theory, this paper demonstrates that systemic risk of long amortization mortgage contracts is reduced when term to maturity of the contract at origination is significantly less than the amortization period. In addition, incorporating prepayment and limited recourse default options into the mortgage contract increases systemic risk when compared with full recourse mortgage contracts having yield maintenance prepayment penalties. The theoretical results are used to evaluate the systemic risk management problems that have plagued the US mortgage funding system.     

Liquefying a Market: The Transition of LNG to a Traded Commodity

The Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry has grown significantly since it began a half‐century ago, and it will continue to diversify both its sources of supply and the contractual arrangements between suppliers and users. Economic theory says that contracting modes adapt to facilitate gains in efficiency, and that this process of adaptation responds to changes in technological, market, and regulatory factors. When an industry relies heavily on highly specialized assets with limited alternative uses, as is true of LNG, the use of longterm contracts (or vertical integration) will generally be more efficient than short‐term dealings. But once conditions begin to encourage vigorous competition among buyers and sellers, it becomes increasingly economical to rely on shorter‐term (and spot) markets for exchange. The history of the LNG industry supports these theoretical predictions, and illustrates the transition from one contracting mode to another. For most of its history, the specialization and scale of LNG assets dictated the predominant use of long‐term contracting. In recent years, however, market and regulatory changes have raised the demand for short‐term and spot contracting, which in turn has provided the impetus for a virtuous cycle of market liquidity. As buyers and sellers have become increasingly able to obtain or dispose of LNG in an active market, they have needed less protection against the opportunism of trading partners that long‐term contracts have provided in the past. Given this self‐reinforcing process, it is likely that the LNG market will soon look nothing like it did as recently as a decade ago. Buyers and sellers will rely on shorter‐term contracts, and the longerterm contracts that do exist will be linked to spot LNG prices rather than crude oil. Consumers and producers will also benefit from more flexible pricing that more accurately reflects rapidly changing fundamentals of supply and demand.     

Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts

In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake “soft” investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short‐term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long‐term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long‐term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short‐term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one‐period contracts than with a long‐term contract.     

Dynamic Insurance Contracts and Adverse Selection

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. We investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contracts where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents. Conditional dynamic contracts make the actual contract also depend on individual past performance (such as in car insurances). We show that dynamic insurance contracts yield a welfare improvement only if they are conditional on past performance. With conditional contracts, the first‐best can be approximated if the contract lasts long. Moreover, this is true for any fraction of low‐risk agents in the population.     

Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial Approach

This article discusses various approaches to pricing double‐trigger reinsurance contracts—a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ‘‘alternative risk transfer.’’ The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double‐trigger reinsurance contracts.     

Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich

This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost‐plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed‐price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from information rents and high‐risk premiums. This regulatory course undermined the credibility of the regulatory commitment, thereby weakening the incentives of the fixed‐price contracts still in use.     

The Recognition of Executory Contracts

This paper examines the nature of executory contracts using as examples forward exchange contracts, asset purchase commitments and leases. FECs are paid particular attention as they have not previously been the focus of discussions concerning executory contracts. The arguments in the literature for recognition of wholly executory contracts can be summarised as follows: recognition provides more relevant information for decision making and is therefore useful; and the contractual rights satisfy the control criterion required by most asset and liability definitions if the contract is firm, thereby evidencing the commitment of the parties. It is argued in this paper that the decision usefulness argument neglects representational faithfulness as it recognises rights that a party does not control; the rights under the contract can be separately identified as rights of alienation and use or conversion; and an approach using deprivai value provides a better indication of commitment than firmness.     

绿色PPP项目组合的最优契约:经济与环境效应的福利视角

绿色PPP搭配高收益项目的激励方式是吸引社会资本参与环境治理的举措之一。本文基于经济与环境的双重福利效应,从理论上研究了该激励方式的契约设计问题,阐释了博弈均衡的存在性以及最优特许期的形成逻辑和关键决定因素。研究表明:第一,绿色PPP搭配高收益项目能够提高企业利润,激发社会资本参与环境治理来应对环境风险。第二,政企双方博弈决策模式决定了契约能否订立。如果独立决策,使企业利润最大的特许期也能够带来最高的环境效益,但此时博弈结果展现为“刀刃上的均衡”,契约难以建立;如果合作博弈,双方最优特许期选择达成一致,契约得以订立,政府向企业让渡经济利润而收获环境效益,最终实现经济与环境福利的双赢。第三,绿色PPP搭配高收益项目优于传统政府补贴的激励方式,在收获同等环境效益的基础上,能够带动社会总福利的提升。研究结论为绿色PPP搭配高收益项目激励方式的推广实施、从而助力实现碳达峰和碳中和战略目标提供了契约设计理论依据和相关框架。     

The trust-control nexus in public private partnership (PPP) contracts

This study examines the trust-control nexus in the context of public private partnership (PPP) contracts. It draws on the literature and the case of two UK school PPP contracts with varying degree of trust among the partners to illustrate the role of control in building competence trust and goodwill trust, and how trust in turn affects control. Prior to entering into the PPP contract, under a condition of high risk and low trust, reliance was placed on formal control to evaluate competence trust for the purpose of selecting a preferred bidder, whilst goodwill trust, which takes time to evolve, played no role in the selection process. During contract implementation, formal control formed the basis for demonstrating competence and nurturing goodwill trust. Trust subsequently determined the extent of reliance on formal control and informal control. In the case of School 1, high level of trust led to a reliance on informal control which enabled partners to focus resources on solving problems, whilst formal control operated in the background. In the case of School 2, low level of trust and perceived lack of transparency led to a demand for additional formal control. This study adds to the trust-control literature by shedding light on how trust relates to control, in the context of long-term PPP contracts which are difficult to specify in advance.     

WHICH CAPITALISM? LESSONS FORM THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS

As a result of the Asian crisis, relationship-based economic systems are now under attack for corruption and inefficiency. Yet, until recently, they were held up as an alternative (and in some respects superior) form of capitalism to the arm's-length, market-based, Anglo-Saxon systems of the U.S. and the U.K. What went wrong? This paper suggests that relationship-based systems work well when contracts are poorly enforced and capital is scarce. Power relationships substitute for contracts, and can achieve better outcomes than a primitive contractual system. But a relationship-based system suppresses the price system and the signals it provides. As a result, relationship-based systems are likely to misallocate capital when presented with large external capital inflows. Since the external capital comes from arm's length investors who typically have few contractual rights or little power in a relationship system, and since these investors are aware of the potential for misallocation, they rationally choose to maintain control over borrowers by keeping their claims short term. Thus, the contact between the two systems creates a fragile hybrid that, while mutually beneficial to relationship borrowers and arm's length investors in normal times, is excessively prone to shocks. Where do we go from here? The authors suggest that while there may be some short-term benefits for emerging economies from reverting to the pure relationship-based system, in the long run such economies will be held back unless they develop the greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition of the arm's-length system. The current Asian crisis may be the most opportune moment for these economies to effect the transition between systems.     

Overcoming Opportunism in Public‐Private Project Finance

The possibility of opportunistic behavior, whether by the private investors who operate public‐private projects or by the government agencies who oversee and administer them, can become a powerful deterrent to raising public‐private project financing, especially considering the scale of the investment in infrastructure. Nevertheless, both parties can protect themselves against the counterparty's possible opportunism by giving the investor an “exit” (or put) option and the public agent a “bail‐out” (or call) option on the private investor's shares. In describing the role and design of such puts and calls, this paper presents a mechanism for converting “natural monopolies” into competitive or contestable markets by using over‐the‐counter option contracts that combine the stability of long‐term contracts and the flexibility of short‐term contracts. In the language of economists, the exit/bail‐out option mechanisms presented here are seen as reducing barriers to entry by streamlining incomplete long‐term contracts and avoiding contractual problems related to “bounded rationality” and opportunism.     

Occupation,driving experience,and risk and accident perception

The contemporary understanding of public sector risk management entails a broadening of the traditional bureaucratic approach to risk beyond the boundaries of purely financial risks. However, evidence suggests that in reality public sector risk management does not always match the rhetoric. This paper focuses on the apparent inadequacy of any risk framework in the current Prudential Borrowing Framework (PBF) guidance in relation to that which was developed under Public Private Partnerships and Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Our analysis shows that the PBF and its associated indicators for local authorities adopt a narrow financial approach and fail to account for the full range of potential risks associated with capital projects. The PBF does not provide a framework for local authorities to consider long‐term risk and fails to encourage understanding of the generic nature of risk. The introduction of the PBF appears to represent a retrograde step from PPP/PFI as regards risk and risk management.     

Modelling Risk Perceptions of Stakeholders in Public–Private Partnership Toll Road Contracts

This paper investigates the risk perceptions of key stakeholder groups typically involved in public–private partnership (PPP) toll roads. Risk perceptions have an important impact on these PPP schemes for investing in public infrastructure. However, the nature and extent of risk associated with the specification of a PPP contract that commits contracting parties to deliver on their obligations remain unclear. In the context of major transport infrastructure, such as a new toll road, the often‐cited key risk to investors is the traffic (and hence demand) risk. There are, however, other risks, including political risk and media risk, the latter often causing untold harm resulting in modifications to the planned infrastructure. This paper develops a method to capture evidence on how public sector and private sector partners involved in previous PPPs perceive the levels of risk associated with each risk attribute, as a way of identifying the ex ante risk setting brought to negotiations in PPP toll road investments. Using a sample of 101 experts with contract experience in 32 countries, we develop a stated choice experiment and estimate a discrete choice model to quantify a risk profile index (RPI) to capture the perceived (relative) influence of each dimension of risk, and then identify sources of systematic differences in the RPI as a way of understanding the influence of personal traits and contextual and contractual factors.     

Mediated audits

I study optimal contracting where the principal can verify the agent's private information via auditing but cannot contractually commit to audit frequency. Optimal contracting requires sophisticated communication: the agent reports his information to a mediator, who randomly selects a contract. Mediation allows for fine‐tuning the information flow, because the principal observes the selected contract but not the agent's report. Simply offering a menu of contracts is, in general, not optimal. I characterize optimal mediated contracts, determine conditions for when auditing is profitable, and analyze contractual distortions. Mediated contracts can be implemented via negotiated rulemaking procedures, and potentially via sequential communication.     

Assessing the Risk Potential of Premium Payment Options in Participating Life Insurance Contracts

Most life insurance contracts embed the right to stop premium payments during the term of the contract (paid-up option). Thereby, the contract is not terminated but continues with reduced benefits and often provides the right to resume premium payments later, thus increasing the previously reduced benefits (resumption option). In our analysis, we start with a basic contract with two standard options, namely, an interest rate guarantee and annual surplus participation. Next, in addition to the features of the basic contract, a paid-up and resumption option is included in the framework. The valuation process is not based on assumptions about a particular policyholders' exercise strategy but instead assesses the risk potential from the insurer's viewpoint by providing an upper bound for any possible exercise behavior. This approach provides important information to the insurer about the potential hazard of offering the paid-up and resumption option. Further, the approach allows an analysis of the impact of guaranteed interest rate, annual surplus participation, and investment volatility on the values of the premium payment options.     

Does futures exhibit maturity effect? New evidence from an extensive set of US and foreign futures contracts

In a seminal article, Samuelson (1965) [Samuelson, P. A. (1965), “Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly,” Industrial Management Review 6, 41-49.] proposes the maturity effect that the volatility of futures prices should increase as futures contract approaches maturity. This study provides new evidence on the maturity effect by examining a more extensive set of futures contracts than previous studies and analyzing each contract separately. Using 6805 futures contracts drawn from 61 commodities, including some data from non-US markets, we find that the maturity effect is absent in the majority of contracts. In addition, the maturity effect tends to be stronger in agricultural and energy commodities than in financial futures. We also examine the hypothesis in Bessembinder et al. (1996) [Bessembinder, H., J. F. Coughenour, P. J. Seguin, & M. M. Smoller (1996), “Is there a term structure of futures volatilities? Reevaluating the Samuelson hypothesis,” Journal of Derivatives 4, 45-58.], which states that negative covariance between the spot price and net carry cost causes the maturity effect in futures. Our results provide very weak evidence in favor of this hypothesis.     

Risk assessment for public–private partnership projects: using a fuzzy analytic hierarchical process method and expert opinion in China

Public–private partnerships (PPP) have been widely used in China to procure public facilities and services. Complicated problems in PPP projects in China arise because of a variety of risk factors. A proper risk assessment model is needed to identify risks and provide risk response strategies for future Chinese PPP projects. The fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (F-AHP) method provides the ability to solve complex risk assessment of PPP projects. Current risk assessment models are limited to PPP projects in specific countries and do not consider unique risks in China, especially political, economic, social, and legal risks. This paper designed a risk evaluation index system for PPP projects based on the Delphi expert investigation method, and then established an optimized risk evaluation model for PPP projects in China using the F-AHP method. The risks identified are confirmed by interviewing experts from Chinese local government departments, private enterprise, third-party intermediary consulting and regulatory agencies, and academic organizations. The results show that the risks that ranked among the top ten are closely related to China’s political and economic policies and relationships among stakeholders. It can be concluded that government authorities play a critical role in providing a favorable political, social, and economic environment and an effective institutional framework for PPP projects. Furthermore, it is also important to deal with relationships among stakeholders based on the public–private ‘win–win’ principle. This study provides risk response strategies, addressing key issues from eight aspects: an impeccable legal and regulatory framework; a central coordinating and regulating PPP authority; supportive governmental authorities; institutional capacity-building; favorable economic conditions and viability; community, partner, and moral accountability; clear division of responsibilities through contracts; and effective advisory management. These effective measures may be useful in reducing the adverse effects of risk for PPP projects in China.     

Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.     

Contemporary public–private partnership: Towards a global research agenda

This paper reviews the research agenda lineage on public–private partnerships (PPPs) from Broadbent and Laughlin's seminal piece in 1999. The PPP phenomenon is viewed at five levels: project delivery, organisational form, policy, governance tool and as a phenomenon within a broader historical and cultural context. We argue that whilst a variety of research issues will continue to be relevant, five corresponding areas deserve future visibility for a renewed research agenda: (1) Financialisation of PPPs, (2) global PPP market actors, (3) internationalisation of policy on PPPs, (4) long‐term complex contracts as a governing regime and (5) PPPs in BRICS and developing countries.