Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations

English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).     

Earnings Management in Public Family Firms under Economic Adversity

This paper explores the relationship between the ownership of public firms and their motivation to implement earnings management practices, providing evidence on whether family businesses differ from non‐family businesses in terms of earnings management practices. In addition, it focuses on the possibility of asymmetrical earnings management policies between periods of stability and economic adversity. Based on a sample of Portuguese listed family‐controlled firms for the 1999–2011 period and using a panel data approach, we find no significant differences in the incentive to manage earnings between public family and non‐family firms, suggesting a compensation between the alignment hypothesis, the long‐term orientation of family firms and the desire to pass firms onto succeeding generations, and the entrenchment effect. The evidence shows that earnings management decreases with firms’ profitability, and non‐family firms’ discretionary accruals are mainly influenced by the board of directors. In crisis periods, the discretionary accruals of family firms are especially influenced by firm size. After controlling for different earnings management measures, the determinants of earnings management practices seem somewhat sensitive to the earnings quality proxies. The results provide evidence that directors and policy makers should prevent earnings management procedures in particular situations.     

Non-audit fees, long-term auditor–client relationships and earnings management

We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.     

CAP Forum on Enron: Former Audit Firm Personnel as CFOs: Effect on Earnings Management*

Corporate hiring of former audit personnel to fill key financial positions is a practice that has attracted attention from the media, the accounting profession, and regulators. The concern is that the former external auditor who now holds a key position with the client may be able to circumvent the audit or exert pressure on the audit team and adversely influence audit quality. We compare a sample of 172 test companies that appointed to the position of chief financial officer (CFO) personnel who are former employees of the companies' auditors, with a control sample of companies that appointed new CFOs who were not affiliated with their auditors. We investigate whether the level of discretionary accruals is greater for the test sample compared with the control sample during the two years following appointment of the CFO. Both univariate and multivariate results for signed discretionary accruals suggest some support for the hypothesis that firms with affiliated CFOs are associated with greater earnings management than firms with unaffiliated CFOs. Furthermore, the results for signed discretionary accruals suggest that the association is stronger for nonpartners who moved from the audit firm to the client with little or no time gap. On average, the results for absolute discretionary accruals do not suggest differences in earnings management between affiliated and unaffiliated CFOs. However, they do indicate some earnings management relative to unaffiliated CFOs by CFOs who had little or no time gap between leaving the audit firm and joining the client firm, although at a weaker level of significance.     

Predictive versus opportunistic earnings management,executive compensation,and firm performance

We examine the association between earnings management and an important component of corporate governance, the incentives provided through compensation. We argue that firms with predictive (opportunistic) earnings management, in which discretionary accruals do (do not) relate to future cash flows, provide a more (less) ideal setting for the use of compensation as incentives. Our empirical tests show that CEO compensation levels (measured by salary, bonus, and other forms of compensation) are positively related to predictive earnings management and negatively related to opportunistic earnings management. We also find that predictive earnings management is positively associated with future returns, whereas opportunistic earnings management is negatively associated with future returns. Overall, our results suggest that firms provide more incentives if their earnings are also more informative because of discretionary accruals.     

Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance

Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.     

CEO Horizon,Optimal Pay Duration,and the Escalation of Short‐Termism

This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very sensitive to short‐term performance. This generates an endogenous horizon problem whereby managers intensify performance manipulation in their final years in office. Contracts are designed to encourage effort while minimizing the adverse effects of manipulation. We characterize the optimal mix of short‐ and long‐term compensation along the manager's tenure, the optimal vesting period of incentive pay, and the dynamics of short‐termism over the CEO's tenure.     

The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of Earnings Management

This paper examines the implications of using the absolute value of discretionary accruals when testing for earnings management. First, we analytically develop the mean and variance of the distribution of absolute discretionary accruals, and show that the expected value is an increasing function of the variance in the underlying error term from the first‐stage discretionary accrual estimation model. Second, we highlight several firm characteristics that are related to the error variance in discretionary accrual estimation models. Using simulations, we show that correlation between the earnings management partitioning variable and these firm characteristics leads to an overrejection of the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Third, we provide research design suggestions to help researchers mitigate the potential bias arising from the use of unsigned measures of earnings management. Using these suggestions, we replicate a recent study, and demonstrate that the inferences change after controlling for operating volatility.     

Managers: Their Effects on Accruals and Firm Policies

This paper investigates whether top executives have significant individual‐specific effects on accruals that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Exploiting individual executive and firm data from a period of 37 years, we find that individual executives play a significant role in determining firms’ accruals. We examine whether executives’ effects on accruals are related to their personal styles on firm policies, investment, financing and operating decisions. Our results show that individual executives’ effects on accruals are more correlated with their operating decisions than investment and financing decisions. We next investigate whether managers themselves also have a personal style for directly affecting accruals. We compare effects exerted by CEOs to CFOs. We find CEOs are more likely to affect accruals through firm policy decisions and CFOs are more likely to affect accruals through accounting decisions. CFOs tend to report more ‘solid’ earnings than CEOs, i.e., CFOs are more likely to push accruals to zero.     

Internal governance structures and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of a firm's internal governance structure in constraining earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including the board of directors, the audit committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Based on a broad cross‐sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms, for the financial year ending in 2000, a majority of non‐executive directors on the board and on the audit committee are found to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management, as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of auditor are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Our additional analysis, using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management, also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit committee.     

Accruals quality and the incentive contracting role of earnings

This paper investigates the association between accruals quality and the usefulness of accounting earnings in incentive contracting. Accruals quality, which measures the precision with which accruals predict future cash flows, has two potential opposing effects on the noise in earnings as a measure of managerial performance. Specifically, higher quality accruals should decrease the deviations of earnings from future cash flows and increase the sensitivity of earnings to cash flows that are not attributable to managerial actions. My evidence indicates that better accruals quality is associated with a higher weight on earnings in compensation contracts, which suggests that accruals quality overall reduces the noise in earnings. I also find that the positive association between accruals quality and the weight on earnings is mainly driven by innate accruals quality rather than discretionary accruals quality. Therefore, accrual errors resulting from the volatility of the operating environment are a primary source of noise in earnings considered by compensation committees.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Motivating high‐impact innovation: Evidence from managerial compensation contracts

We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.     

会计师事务所人力资本特征与审计质量——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

人力资本在会计师事务所中具有十分重要的意义。本文利用2009年我国会计师事务所及其非金融类上市公司客户的数据,以操控性应计额度量审计质量,检验会计师事务所中注册会计师所占比重以及注册会计师的学历、年龄、参加行业领军人才培训情况等人力资本特征对审计质量的影响,结果发现,在我国本土事务所中,注册会计师的年龄以及入选行业领军人才培训计划的人数与正向的操控性应计额之间存在显著的负向关系,这表明,会计师事务所中注册会计师的经验丰富程度和对培训的重视程度对于抑制客户的正向盈余管理行为、提高审计质量具有积极作用。文章没有发现会计师事务所中注册会计师的比重以及注册会计师中高学历者所占比重与审计质量之间存在显著关系的证据。     

Why Do Canadian Firms Cross‐list? The Flip Side of the Issue

We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits.     

Increased Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Governance Decisions: Evidence from Chief Financial Officers in the Pre‐ and Post–Sarbanes‐Oxley Periods

I study how increased internal control disclosure requirements mandated by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) affect annual corporate governance decisions regarding CFOs. Using non‐CEO, non‐COO executive officers as a control group, I find that CFOs of firms with weak internal controls receive lower compensation and experience higher forced turnover rates after the passage of SOX. In contrast, CFOs of firms with strong internal controls receive higher compensation and do not experience significant changes in forced turnover rates. These results are consistent with the “disclosure of type” hypothesis, which suggests that the mandatory internal control disclosures under SOX are a credible mechanism that effectively distinguishes good CFOs from bad ones by revealing the firm's internal control quality. The empirical evidence thus supports the notion that mandated increases in disclosure reduce information asymmetry in the executive labor market.     

CFO gender and earnings management: evidence from China

We study the effect of chief financial officer (CFO) gender on earnings management (EM) in China’s listed firms from 1999 to 2011. In the cross-sectional analysis, we find that female CFO firm-years exhibit significantly lower discretionary accruals, lower total accruals, lower abnormal production costs, and higher abnormal discretionary expenditures, than the male CFO firm-years. We further examine the relation between CFO gender and EM surrounding CFO transitions. We find that the departing male CFOs are more aggressive than the departing female CFOs in managing up earnings during their last year with the firm and the newly appointed male CFOs are more aggressive than the new female CFOs in managing down earnings during their first year on the job. The evidence surrounding CFO transitions suggests that male CFOs are more aggressive than female CFOs in manipulating earnings, either in the last attempt to save their jobs or to take bigger credit for any future performance gains. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that female CFOs engage in less EM and are more conservative in financial reporting than their male counterparts.     

Hedging and earnings management in the light of IFRS implementation: Evidence from the UK stock market

This study examines the association between IFRS implementation, hedging and earnings management. It identifies the financial attributes of firms that utilise hedging and explores the IFRS transition process for hedgers and non-hedgers. This study also investigates the effects of a firm’s decision to use hedging or earnings management on firm value. The findings show that the transition to IFRSs has affected the equity, earnings, leverage and liquidity of hedgers in a significantly positive manner as opposed to non-hedgers, who presented a generally significant negative change in their respective figures. Hedgers tend to be larger sized and exhibit higher profitability, growth, leverage and liquidity. Hedgers also tend to have foreign revenues, be cross-listed in foreign stock markets and audited by a Big 4 auditor. This study reports that hedging and earnings management display an inverse relation. Firm value is found to be positively related to hedging and negatively related to discretionary accruals and managerial opportunism. Effective corporate governance mechanisms are found to display a negative association with discretionary accruals and a positive relation with firm value.     

Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relation between discretionary accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The analyses also show that firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items. In particular, evidence shows that negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment. Finally, the research indicates that the association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. This study contributes to the literature on earnings management from an international comparative perspective since most previous studies on earnings management and executive compensation have focused on U.S. firms.     

中国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励与盈余管理

以中国国有控股上市公司为样本,从盈余管理对高管薪酬及其薪酬业绩敏感性的影响两方面,研究高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的关系,实证检验表明在调高操控性应计利润情况下,盈余管理程度分别与管理者的年度报酬水平和股权激励呈正相关关系,另外,盈余管理对薪酬业债敏感性也有正向影响,据此提出了有效控制盈余管理行为的政策建议.