首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 234 毫秒
1.
资金侵占是控股股东利用控制权获取私人利益的重要表现形式,也是其解决资金缺乏的重要途径,普遍存在于信息不对称严重的公司。而有效的信息披露制度则会提高公司透明度,减轻信息不对称程度,保护中小投资者免受控股股东的掠夺。作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,也能够缓解代理问题,对中小投资者起到保护作用。因此,本文选取深圳A股上市公司作为样本,研究信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用以及审计师选择之间的关系。实证结果发现,信息披露质量越高的公司会减少控股股东的资金占用并且倾向于选择高质量的审计师,高质量审计师也能够起到降低控股股东的资金占用的效果。这一研究结果对加强信息披露监管以及审计的治理效应有着重要的启示。  相似文献   

2.
本文以2006-2009年深圳A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了机构投资者总体以及各类型机构投资者持股对会计信息质量的影响。结果发现,机构投资者总体持股降低了财务报告可靠性,但能提高信息披露透明度。分类来看,证券投资基金、保险公司、社保基金和QFII等持股不影响财务报告可靠性,但能提高信息披露透明度;一般法人持股降低了财务报告可靠性,特别是加大了公司向下盈余管理程度,但不影响信息披露透明度;信托公司持股既不会影响财务报告可靠性,也不会影响信息披露透明度。结果表明,不仅机构投资者总体对上市公司会计信息质量影响的渠道不同,而且不同类型机构投资者对上市公司会计信息质量影响的渠道也存在差异。  相似文献   

3.
资本市场中存在的信息不对称加剧了控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占。信息披露作为一种旨在减轻信息不对称程度的机制,有助于提高上市公司的透明度,保护中小股东利益。本文以2007-2009年深市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了信息披露质量对控股股东资金占用的影响。研究发现,控制相关因素后,信息披露质量与资金占用呈显著负相关,提高信息披露质量可以有效地降低控股股东资金占用;进一步研究发现,控股股东资金占用越少的公司价值越高,并且相比而言,信息披露质量越高,公司价值也越高。  相似文献   

4.
随着我国资本市场的发展,监管机构和市场投资者对上市公司信息披露的质量提出更高要求,而作为重要的利益相关者,共同机构投资者连结企业之间的经济关联在资本市场中越来越常见,探讨机构共同持股对公司透明度的影响对于完善和发展我国证券市场具有深刻意义。本文以2007-2019年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察机构共同持股对公司透明度的影响。实证结果表明,机构共同持股能够显著提高公司透明度。同时,进一步研究发现,机构共同持股通过减少恶性竞争、降低披露的专有成本和缓解代理问题,降低代理成本这两条路径提高公司透明度。在国有企业、创新型企业中,机构共同持股更能提高公司透明度。本文结论为推进股票发行注册制,进一步完善以信息披露为核心的制度体系提供了理论指导,为资本市场信息环境的改善提供了理论支持。  相似文献   

5.
陈超  甘露润 《金融研究》2013,(1):92-106
风险管理已经成为商业银行稳健经营的关键问题,本文对银行风险管理与资本市场的关系进行研究。通过对2001~2010年435个交易金额在1000万元以上的以现金方式支付的股权收购样本的分析,发现接近50%的收购公司在并购前披露了银行贷款信息,披露贷款信息的收购公司可以取得更高的并购宣告收益;银行风险管理水平的提升使贷款信息披露对并购宣告收益的影响更显著。研究认为,银行风险管理增加了贷款中的信息含量;贷款信息披露降低了股票投资者的逆向选择,避免了高质量公司遭受价值低估的损失;加强银行风险管理不仅有助于商业银行的稳健经营,而且还对资本市场产生正的外部性影响,提高了资本市场的定价效率。  相似文献   

6.
场外市场会计盈余的信息含量   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
以万德数据库提供的新三板企业为样本,检验场外主体市场的会计盈余信息含量。混合样本检验显示,盈余信息披露对投资者超额收益有显著影响。分期检验中,2009年披露的盈余信息还不具备有效的信息含量;2010年披露的盈余信息具有信息含量,可能预示着场外市场的完善和成熟。此外,样本检验结果没有找到场外市场具有半强势有效的证据,但可以推断该市场处于弱势有效状态。  相似文献   

7.
王宗美  李军训 《时代金融》2013,(17):198+200
提高信息披露质量,能够缓解代理问题,减少信息不对称程度,切实保护中小投资者的利益。控股股东侵占外部投资者的利益主要通过资金占用、制定有利于自身的现金股利支付策略。高质量的信息披露可以约束控股股东机会主义行为,保障中小投资者的知情权。以2009~2011年深市的纺织行业上市公司为样本,建立多元回归模型,对信息披露质量与资金占用、公司价值和现金股利支付率之间的关系进行研究。  相似文献   

8.
上市公司信息披露是投资者进行投资决策的重要依据,高质量的信息披露能够有效提升资本市场资源配置效率。作为公司治理的关键环节,董事会领导权结构对信息披露质量起着重要作用。本文从董事长与总经理两职兼任角度讨论其与信息披露质量之间的关系,选取深圳证券交易所2012-2014年A股上市公司为样本进行了实证分析。  相似文献   

9.
本文基于2015-2018年深交所A股主板上市公司样本,实证检验股权质押对上市公司信息披露质量的影响。研究发现:股权质押对上市公司信息披露质量具有负面影响。在股权质押背景下,国有企业相比于非国有企业的信息披露质量更高,同时规模大的公司比规模小的公司信息披露质量更高。针对以上研究结论,提出相关政策建议:一是加强外部监管,降低公司与投资者之间的信息不对称性;二是优化股权结构,加强公司内部中小股东对大股东的制衡作用;三是完善公司治理,公司控股股东在加强内控的同时有效激励公司管理层;四是保护非国有企业,制定有效政策以降低非国有企业融资困难的风险。  相似文献   

10.
加强信息披露监管维护证券市场健康发展   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
上市公司信息披露的内容主要包括两类 :一类是投资者评估公司经营状况所需要的信息 ,另一类是对股价运行可能产生重大影响的事项。这两类信息主要通过四种形式披露 :招股说明书、上市公告书、定期报告和临时报告。前两者是公司发行和上市时初次披露的内容 ,其目的是帮助投资者对股票发行人的经营状况和发展潜力进行评估 ;后两者是公司上市后持续信息披露的内容 ,其目的是及时披露可能对股票价格产生实质性影响的信息。招股说明书是含有股票发行条件的法律文件 ,是向投资者提出的认购股票的书面要约 ,各国都对其格式和内容做了明确的规定。上…  相似文献   

11.
Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.  相似文献   

12.
阮睿  孙宇辰  唐悦  聂辉华 《金融研究》2021,488(2):188-206
提高信息披露质量对于改善上市公司治理结构和保护股东权益具有重要意义。本文利用2014年开通的“沪港通”机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放是否提高了企业的信息披露质量。从2010-2019年A股上市公司年报文本中提炼可读性指标衡量信息披露质量,使用匹配和双重差分方法进行实证研究,发现“沪港通”机制实施以后,标的公司(纳入“沪港通”的A股上市公司)的信息披露质量显著提高。这一结论对不同的估计方法、样本区间及控制变量组均保持稳健。异质性分析表明,对于盈余操纵水平较高、股价信息含量较低的企业,资本市场开放能够更好地改善其信息披露质量。本文丰富了资本市场开放对企业行为和绩效影响的实证研究,为继续推进资本市场开放政策提供了理论依据。  相似文献   

13.
This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.  相似文献   

14.
We examine the effect of the firm’s information environment on its liquidity policy by exploiting a natural experiment involving Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD). We find, on average, Regulation FD has a negative impact on firm cash holdings. We also directly evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find the negative Regulation FD-cash holdings relation is stronger for firms that increased public disclosure and holds largely for firms that faced lower proprietary costs of public disclosure. Furthermore, we find this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with limited access to the credit market. We capture the medium-term effect of Regulation FD two years before and two years after the implementation. Overall, our results suggest that the change in the amount of information disclosed in response to Regulation FD, an externality effect, affects information asymmetry between firms and outside investors and thus cash holdings.  相似文献   

15.
We argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership, thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors. We explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency, focusing on their role as monitor in-place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control. To test these notions, we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial US firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22% and 25% of these firms, respectively. Our analysis indicates that, in large, publicly traded companies, both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms. We also find that founder and heir-controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms. Surprisingly, additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control (management type, dual class shares, and board influence) appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control. Finally, we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components, finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors. However, irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity, our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large, publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors.  相似文献   

16.
To date, there is only meager research evidence on the usefulness of mandatory annual report risk disclosures to investors. Although it has been argued that corporate disclosure decreases information asymmetry between management and shareholders, we do not know whether investors benefit from high-quality risk reporting in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment. In this paper, we performed association tests to examine whether the quality of firms' mandatory risk disclosures relate to information asymmetry in the Finnish stock markets. In addition, we analyzed whether the usefulness of risk disclosures depends on contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition. We demonstrate that the quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on information asymmetry. We also document that risk disclosures are more useful if they are provided by small firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst coverage. We also found that momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of firms' risk reports.  相似文献   

17.
Using the adoption of SFAS 131, I examine the effect of segment disclosure transparency on internal capital market efficiency. SFAS 131 requires firms to define segments as internally viewed by managers, thereby improving the transparency of managerial actions in internal capital allocation. I find that diversified firms that improved segment disclosure transparency by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131 experienced an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets after the adoption of SFAS 131. In addition, I find that the improvement in internal capital market efficiency was greater for firms that suffered more severe agency problems before the adoption of SFAS 131 and also for firms whose managers faced stronger incentives to improve efficiency after the adoption of SFAS 131. My results suggest that more transparent segment information can help resolve agency conflicts in the internal capital markets of diversified firms, thus improving investment efficiency.  相似文献   

18.
Abstract:  Auditors, as corporate insiders, have access to private information regarding the firm's financial and business opacity that is unavailable to outside investors. We test whether auditors price their knowledge of firm opacity in their audit fees by examining two competing hypotheses. The first states that higher audit fees may reflect the greater risk that the auditor faces in auditing an opaque firm. Under this hypothesis, market based measures of opacity will be positively correlated with higher fees. The second hypothesis states that firms buy reputational capital from their auditor by paying high fees in an attempt to improve the market's perception of the firm's transparency. In this case, higher audit fees are negatively correlated with market based measures of opacity. Our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, that auditors price opacity risk into their fees.  相似文献   

19.
Firms increasingly are utilizing outsourcing to enhance or maintain their competitiveness. Prior research shows that capital markets value a firm's decision to outsource. This study uses a sample of firms announcing outsourcing arrangements in a press release to examine which factors are associated with the subsequent decision to voluntarily provide or withhold information about outsourcing in their annual report. The paper also examines whether annual report disclosure is a reliable signal of future market performance. We find that underperforming firms, larger firms, and firms experiencing negative outsourcing announcement market returns and negative long-term market returns are more likely to disclose outsourcing in their annual reports. There is also evidence that firms' disclosure of outsourcing in the annual report signals an improvement in market performance that is credible to the capital markets. We contend that the disclosure and subsequent firm performance issues we investigate apply to any type of outsourcing arrangement, and therefore our results are relevant to future information systems research on this subject. Our findings also suggest that regulatory standards could reduce private information search costs for investors by providing a common disclosure methodology for outsourcing activities.  相似文献   

20.
Information and the Cost of Capital   总被引:33,自引:2,他引:33  
We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号