现金股利迎合、再融资需求与企业投资——投资效率视角下的半强制分红政策有效性研究

评价半强制分红政策保护投资者利益目标是否实现,不能仅仅着眼于现金分红水平是否提高,更要关注上市公司现金分红能力和资本投资效率是否改善。本文基于我国上市公司数据,对半强制分红政策下的现金股利决策对公司投资效率和融资约束的影响进行分类研究。研究发现:对于有再融资需求公司,不仅迎合现金分红会提高公司的投资-现金流敏感性,而且过度现金分红会加大公司再融资需求与投资不足的敏感性;对于无再融资需求公司,迎合现金分红不会增加公司的投资-现金流敏感性,但门槛现金分红也不能降低公司自由现金流与投资过度的敏感性。这给优化半强制分红政策、完善股利决策自治机制提供现实启示和实证依据。     

机构投资者、公司治理与上市公司股利政策

本文实证研究了2001—2004年间中国证券市场中机构投资者持股、公司治理与上市公司股利政策之间的关系。针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利政策的两种理论观点——“自由现金流假说“和“利益输送假说“以及在我国资本市场上呈现的“恶意派现“现象,实证检验了我国机构投资者是否能够发挥治理、监督作用。研究结果发现:在2001—2004年间,机构投资者持股公司的每股现金股利发放水平显著地高于非机构投资者持股的公司,发放现金股利公司的机构投资者的持股比例显著地高于不发放现金股利公司,公司现金股利发放水平成为投资者构建投资组合的重要标准;机构投资者的持股比例不会对上市公司的股利政策产生影响,对于我国上市公司近年来出现的“恶意派现“现象,机构投资者发挥了其监督治理职能,机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司发生“恶意派现“的可能性越小。     

现金质量、内部现金流与投资效率

本文主要研究现金质量对内部现金流与投资效率之间关系的影响。研究结果发现,我国上市公司中,高现金质量有利于抑制内部现金流富余的公司进行过度投资,低现金质量会抑制内部现金流不足的公司的投资不足行为。     

国有企业过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究——基于我国A股市场实证

以在我国沪、深两地A股上市的710家国有及国有控股企业2006年的数据为样本,借鉴Vogt的模型,从股权结构、公司治理结构、股利政策等方面对我国国有企业的投资效率及其制约机制进行了实证分析。结论为:(1)我国国有企业存在过度投资行为,且过度投资程度和企业自由现金流正相关。(2)国有法人持股、两权分离度、资产负债率可以有效抑制国有上市企业的过度投资行为;独立董事制度、机构持股、管理层持股、现金股利不能抑制企业的过度投资行为。     

自由现金流、现金股利与中国上市公司过度投资

处于经理人控制之下的自由现金流有可能被投入到损害公司价值的非盈利项目上，从而导致过度投资。股利代理成本理论认为，较高的股利支付水平可以迫使经理人“吐出”自由现金流，从而降低企业自由现金流代理成本。但本文实证研究表明，中国上市公司过度投资程度与现金股利支付水平无关。其原因在于，上市公司股利政策受到监管层政策驱动因素的影响，造成股利政策扭曲，并被“异化”为大股东“利益输送”的一种手段。     

浅论现金股利政策的代理成本理论在我国的应用

股利政策实际上是企业在期末如何分配其盈利的决策。不同于国外公司,我国上市公司一直没有稳定的发放现金股利的传统。采用现金股利分配的公司比率经历了减少———增加———减少———增加———稳定的过程。伴随派现公司比率增加出现的派现金额两极分化、现金股利收益率并不     

现金股利政策的影响因素实证研究——基于我国A股上市公司的经验数据

现代公司的股利政策多种多样,面临的选择非常多,在不同的行业不同的时期,可能选择的股利政策又是不一样的。公司的股利政策有股票股利、现金股利等的区分,现金股利又是我们最常见的股利政策之一。发放现金股利政策也是能够向市场释放公司"现金流充足"的信号,有利于公司的股价上扬,但现金股利是从企业的税后利润中分配的,会减少企业的现金储备量,在面对有外部良好机会进行投资时可能缺乏现金,这就是发放了现金股利的两面性,如何进行现金股利的发放对于公司的成长至关重要,究竟公司会从哪些方面考虑企业是否发放现金股利以及发放的数量,本文将会具体来讨论影响企业现金股利政策的因素。     

股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论

本文以763家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,检查了股利政策和第一大股东持股以及企业成长性机会之间的统计关系,考察了股利政策的股权效应,并比较分析了企业成长性机会对股利政策股权效应的影响程度。作者发现,第一大股东具有发放现金股利的显著动机,而且这种动机不受股东性质的显著影响。文章进一步观察到,企业成长性机会能够弱化第一大股东分配现金股利的激励,并促使公司保留更多的现金用于有价值的投资机会。本文的经验结果并不支持“掏空”理论,而更支持自由现金流理论:第一大股东能够迫使公司吐出多余的自由现金流,并能根据企业的成长性机会调整股利政策(在成长性高的公司增加投资,在成长性低的公司增加股利)。     

现金股利政策的影响因素实证研究——基于我国A股上市公司的经验数据

现代公司的股利政策多种多样,面临的选择非常多,在不同的行业不同的时期,可能选择的股利政策又是不一样的.公司的股利政策有股票股利、现金股利等的区分,现金股利又是我们最常见的股利政策之一.发放现金股利政策也是能够向市场释放公司“现金流充足”的信号,有利于公司的股价上扬,但现金股利是从企业的税后利润中分配的,会减少企业的现金储备量,在面对有外部良好机会进行投资时可能缺乏现金,这就是发放了现金股利的两面性,如何进行现金股利的发放对于公司的成长至关重要,究竟公司会从哪些方面考虑企业是否发放现金股利以及发放的数量,本文将会具体来讨论影响企业现金股利政策的因素.     

上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究

经理的机会主义引发企业过度投资行为,西方学者通过考察投资现金流相关性研究企业过度投资问题并找到相应经验证据。利用上市公司(2000—2002)数据研究上市公司是否存在过度投资行为以及相关制约机制是否有效,结果表明,(1)我国上市公司存在过度投资行为;(2)现金股利、举借债务是过度投资行为的有效制约机制;(3)公司治理机制在制约过度投资行为中基本有效,但是,独立董事并未发挥作用。     

Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives

This paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over- and under-investment incentives associated with risky debt. We show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under-investment but increases over-investment, and vice versa. Under symmetric information, the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets (i.e., project financing). Under asymmetric information, the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project's cash flow in the same rate. If this is not possible, the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large. With regard to dividend convenants, we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments. When they are unconditioned, allowing more dividends increases the under-investment incentive. In contrast, conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over-investment incentive.     

现金股利研究的新视角:基于企业生命周期理论

论文选取2000～2006年A股非金融行业上市公司为样本,首先采用专门方法来区分企业所处的生命周期阶段,然后采用多元回归、参数检验、非参数检验来检验上市公司是否会根据企业所处的生命周期阶段调整其现金股利政策,不同生命周期阶段的企业在现金股利支付意向及现金股利支付率是否存在显著差异.结果表明,我国上市公司的确会基于不同的生命周期采取不同的股利政策,但会受到证监会配股增发政策的影响.     

Equity ownership segregation, shareholder preferences, and dividend policy in China

We investigate how listed Chinese firms pay different types of dividend to satisfy shareholders, different dividend preferences shaped by institutional factors such as share tradability and asymmetrical taxation. We find that the cash dividend level is significantly and positively related to the proportion of non-publicly tradable shares and this relation is mainly driven by legal person shareholders' preferences for cash dividends. In contrast, the stock dividend level is significantly and positively associated with the proportion of publicly tradable shares. These findings provide an empirical rationale for the current reform on the segregation of equity ownership rights in China.     

Dividend preference of tradable‐share and non‐tradable‐share holders in Mainland China

Comprehensive data on corporate announcements of Chinese firms allows us to examine the preference for, and determinants of, cash and stock dividends. The results indicate that Chinese public investors prefer stock dividends over cash dividends, which are preferred by large state and legal person shareholders generally. Stock dividends, which do not require an explicit cash outflow from a firm, are found to be positively related to higher earnings, supporting the signalling hypothesis of dividend policy. In an imperfect market, these results have some implications for government regulation of financial markets.     

现金股利政策与企业生命周期——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

以中国2006～2010年A股上市公司为样本,基于企业生命周期考量公司现金股利政策与企业生命周期之间的关系。结果表明:中国上市公司生命周期不同阶段现金股利政策具有显著的差异,公司盈利能力是形成企业不同生命周期阶段现金股利政策差异的显著原因。企业不同生命周期公司治理结构差别不大,在不同生命周期阶段对企业现金股利政策的影响在不同生命周期阶段也大同小异。     

我国上市公司现金股利的信息内涵实证分析

股利的信号传递理论认为股利的变化意味着企业未来盈利能力的变化，即股利有信息内涵。但国内外学者仅仅从收益角度来分析股利的信息内涵，所得到的实证结果与理论假设并不一致。本文从上市公司信息风险和未来盈利能力相结合的角度探讨股利的信息内涵。实证结果表明我国上市公司现金股利变化包含收益和风险两方面的信息，上市公司应该根据对未来现金流持续性的预期来制定现金股利政策。     

The role of cross-listing,foreign ownership and state ownership in dividend policy in an emerging market

In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type. Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts (reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms (tunneling effect) – which could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect firms with foreign ownership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have different dividend policies and practices than those that are not, and firms with more state ownership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using firms from an emerging economy (China), we examine whether these effects exist in corporate dividend policy and practice. We find that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have significant negative effects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling effect and the notion of reduced tunneling activities for firms with the ability to raise capital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling effect, we find that firms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public (individual) ownership. Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the effect of state ownership on dividend policy. Our results have significant implications for researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.     

A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns

This paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance. I present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends, and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity shocks. The model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice. These interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows. The optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows. I also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads.     

Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conflict), and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.     

Dividend payout determinants for Australian Multinational and Domestic Corporations

I investigate the determinants of dividend payments for Australian Multinational Corporations (MCs) and Domestic Corporations (DCs). Six measures of dividend payout ratios are investigated, and five international factors are employed in addition to traditional factors. I find: MCs pay significantly less regular cash, special cash, total dividends and net dividends relative to DCs; the degree of foreign involvement is important in determining special cash and net dividend payments; MCs are more active than DCs in dividend increasing activities; and MCs are significantly less likely to be a dividend payer relative to DCs due to tax disadvantages coupled with unfavourable foreign risk exposures.