公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析

以财务舞弊上市公司为研究对象，以董事会构成和所有权结构作为公司治理变量，研究公司治理和财务舞弊之间的可能关系。研究发现，发生财务舞弊与未发生财务舞弊上市公司董事会中外部董事比例不存在显著差异；股权集中度越高的上市公司越容易发生财务舞弊；控股股东性质与财务舞弊行为不存在显著相关性。研究还发现，上市公司配股活动与财务舞弊显著负相关、公司规模与财务舞弊显著负相关、董事会规模与财务舞弊显著正相关。     

公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究

本文选取了因财务报告舞弊而被证监会处罚的上市公司作为研究样本 ,从股权结构、董事会特征两方面 ,对公司治理与财务报告舞弊之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究结果表明 ,法人股比例、执行董事比例、内部人控制度、监事会的规模与财务舞弊的可能性正相关 ,流通股比例则与之负相关。此外 ,如果公司的第一大股东为国资局 ,公司更可能发生财务舞弊。因此要解决上市公司的会计信息失真问题 ,应该从完善公司治理入手。     

我国上市公司董事会特征与财务舞弊的实证研究

我国上市公司财务舞弊行为自资本市场建立以来也如影随形的出现,本文从董事会特征出发,研究其对财务舞弊的影响,实证结果表明某些董事会特征对财务舞弊存在着显著的影响.     

舞弊治理：基于上市公司财务舞弊特征的分析

选取2003～2007年度5645家沪深两地上市公司为样本,首先对其中209家舞弊公司财务舞弊的影响因素做统计分析,明晰上市公司财务舞弊的特征;然后,根据舞弊公司不同特征进一步实证检验,得出大规模事务所的选择、股权集中度、公司规模与财务舞弊负相关,独立董事比例与财务舞弊成"U"型关系,但没有发现代表财务状况指标净资产收益率的显著性影响,究其原因,发现舞弊公司存在虚增利润以外的其他更多隐性盈余操纵手段.     

财务舞弊公司董事会变更及其对审计师变更的影响——基于面板数据Logit模型的研究

本文以2002—2005年间因财务舞弊而被证监会、上交所和深交所谴责公告的61家A股上市公司为样本,以舞弊被公告前一年到公告后第三年为研究区间,运用配对样本T检验探讨后续治理中董事会成员和审计师如何变更,并建立面板数据Logit模型研究董事会变更对审计师变更的影响,得出了以下结论:从公告前一年到公告后第三年,财务舞弊公司的董事会发生了显著变更,但只有其非常规性变更才对审计师变更有显著正影响。然而,以控制组公司数据为对象,并未发现董事会变更会影响审计师变更。     

董事会特征与会计信息质量研究

<正>会计信息与投资者的投资决策、债权人的信贷决策、对企业经理人员的评价、对企业价值的评估、政府的监督管理等方面都密切相关。然而,上市公司会计信息造假、舞弊现象屡见不鲜。财务舞弊行为既影响了投资者的信心,损害了信息使用者的相关利益,又阻碍了我国证券市场的健康发展。本文在借鉴和吸取已有研究成果的基础上,通过实证研究分析董事会主要特征与企业会计信息质量之间的关系,以期更加深入地了解董事会对会计     

企业收入确认舞弊

收入是衡量企业财务业绩的关键指标之一,也是评价企业核心盈利质量的重要指数,所以企业财务舞弊中收入舞弊占有相当高的比例。财务舞弊是严重的经济违法行为,对企业、对整个社会都存在极大危害。因此对财务舞弊必须进行切实有效的治理。本文首先论述收入和财务舞弊的相关概念;其次对企业收入舞弊的手法进行研究,;然后从企业报表数据以及经营信息等的分析来识别收入舞弊;最后提出控制舞弊行为的建议。     

论对公司财务报告舞弊的治理

财务治理与财务报告舞弊之间存在密切关系，公司的内、外部财务治理结构包括管理当局、董事会、监事会、注册会计师等各方面，他们都对财务报告的生成与披露产生影响。因此，防范财务报告舞弊的措施应从分析公司相关财务治理结构对财务信息的监督与制衡功能出发，改变其中的薄弱环节，强化相关的治理功能。     

财务舞弊公司董事会规模对审计质量的影响——基于面板数据模型

<正>本文以2002-2005年间因财务舞弊而被证监会、上交所和深交所谴责公告的61家A股上市公司为样本,并配以控制组,以舞弊被公告前一年到公告后第三年为研究区间,运用配对样本T检验探讨后续治理中董事会规模和审计质量的变化,并建立面板数据模型研究董事会规模的变化对审计质量的影响,得     

财务舞弊的识别与治理

<正>进入21世纪以来,西方发达国家和我国都发生了上市公司的财务舞弊事件,引起了社会各界极大的关注,理论界和实务界都在积极的探讨财务舞弊的治理方法。本文阐述了财务舞弊的识别方法,并对财务舞弊的治理提出了策略。     

Financial fraud,director reputation,and shareholder wealth

We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm also exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.     

Go before the whistle blows: an empirical analysis of director turnover and financial fraud

This study investigates whether outside directors are aware of financial fraud. Our analysis focuses on the abnormal turnover of these directors during the fraud committing period, before fraud is discovered and before lawsuits are filed. Our empirical analysis shows that, during the fraud committing period, outside directors in fraud firms exhibit an abnormal level of turnover. Examining the characteristics of outside directors and boards at these fraud firms, we find strong evidence that female directors, directors who have greater stock ownership in the firm, and directors with multiple directorships at other firms are more likely to depart fraud firms. We also find some evidence that board size, number of meetings, and fraction of financial experts are related to abnormal turnover in fraud firms during the fraud committing period. We show that abnormal director turnover is significantly higher for fraud that is considered more egregious (i.e., involving fictitious transactions and disclosure problems). Lastly, directors are more likely to depart fraud firms with more serious fraud, as proxied by higher ex-post settlement amounts and longer fraud duration.     

Board composition and operational risk events of financial institutions

We investigate the relation between board composition and operational risk events of financial institutions in the period from 1996 to 2010. Drawing from corporate governance literature, we consider the impact of board characteristics on the likelihood of operational risk events. Overall, our findings suggest that board size is negatively and non-linearly associated with the possibility of operational risk events. For the event types of “Clients, Products, and Business Practices,” and “Internal Fraud and External Fraud,” firms with a higher proportion of independent directors are less likely to suffer from fraud or failure to comply with professional obligations to clients. Our results on age and tenure heterogeneity also indicate that having a more diverse board can have an adverse impact on the board monitoring function. These results can shed new light on board demographics and operational risk management in financial institutions.     

Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector

This paper examines the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector. We show how the board size, board independence and combining the role of CEO and chairperson in boards may affect corporate risk taking in financial firms. Our sample is based on a panel dataset of all publicly listed firms in the UK financial sector, which includes banks, insurance, real estate and financial services companies over a ten year period (2003 − 2012). After controlling for the effects of endogeneity through the application of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator, the findings of this study suggest that the presence of non-executive directors and powerful CEOs in corporate boards reduces corporate risk taking practices in financial firms. The negative relationship can be explained within the agency theory context, where managers are regarded as more risk averse because of the reputational and employment risk. An increased power concentration is therefore expected to enhance the risk aversion behaviour of directors. The findings however, do not show any significant effect of board size on corporate risk taking in financial firms. As this study covers recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code on the role of corporate boards in managing firms' risk, the empirical evidence could be useful for corporate governance regulation and policy making.     

Ownership structure,corporate governance,and fraud: Evidence from China

Our study examines whether ownership structure and boardroom characteristics have an effect on corporate financial fraud in China. The data come from the enforcement actions of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The results from univariate analyses, where we compare fraud and no-fraud firms, show that ownership and board characteristics are important in explaining fraud. However, using a bivariate probit model with partial observability we demonstrate that boardroom characteristics are important, while the type of owner is less relevant. In particular, the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure of the chairman are associated with the incidence of fraud. Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate corporate governance systems for listed firms. Moreover, our results provide information that can inform policy debates within the CSRC.     

Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk

This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the  difference  between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.     

Do Women and Ethnic Minority Directors Influence Firm Value? Evidence from Post‐Apartheid South Africa

Previous studies on the value relevance of board gender and ethnic diversity have produced mixed results. This paper re‐examines this relationship using hand‐collected data of 245 South African listed firms over the period 2008–2013. We document a positive and significant effect of both board gender and ethnic diversity on firm value. We also find that the increase in firm value is greater when boards have three or more women directors. In contrast, ethnic minority directors contribute less to firm value when there are three or more on the board. Furthermore, we document that ethnicity has a concave relationship with firm value, but gender does not. We demonstrate that in better‐governed firms, ethnic diversity is more value relevant than gender diversity. Our results also suggest that financial crisis is associated with the propensity to restructure boards along gender and ethnicity. This paper sheds new light on the effect of board diversity in South African firms as the government increasingly pursues policies aimed at eradicating the effects of apartheid. Our results are robust after controlling for self‐selection and various forms of endogeneity.     

Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?

This study examines the impact of corporate boards on firm performance during the current financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the crisis to measure firm performance, we find that board independence, as traditionally defined, does not significantly affect firm performance. However, when we redefine independent directors as outside directors who are less connected with current CEOs, a measure we call strong independence, there is a positive and significant relationship between this measure and firm performance. Second, outside financial experts are important for firm performance. We find that the positive impact of outside financial experts on firm performance is more significant than that of strong independence. Overall, our results suggest that firm performance during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate boards.     

Female tainted directors,financial reporting quality and audit fees

This paper examines the association between the presence of female tainted directors on corporate boards and audit committees and (1) financial reporting quality and (2) audit fees. Female tainted directors are defined as female directors who have been directors of the firms that have previously been involved in financial failures and integrity indiscretions. Using real earnings management and audit fees as proxies for effective governance and board reputation, we find that firms with female tainted directors have higher real earnings management and higher audit fees. However, since prior literature has demonstrated that audit fees are higher for firms with female directors because female directors demand better auditing, we corroborate a supply-side effect of auditors charging higher audit fees when female tainted directors exist. We demonstrate this by showing that while there is an association between audit fee and real earnings management, this association is higher for firms with female tainted directors. Arguably, the governance and reputational benefits of female directors on boards are negated if such directors have tarnished professional reputations.