股权分置改革、控股股东与现金股利——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以2003-2007五年间存在控股股东的分红上市公司为研究样本,采用多变量回归分析方法对股权分置前后上市公司现金股利政策进行了比较研究。实证研究结果表明,股权分置改革前,上市公司每股现金股利与控股股东持股比例正相关,支持现金股利的"侵占"假说;股权分置改革后,存在控股股东的上市公司现金股利支付水平下降,并且每股现金股利与控股股东持股比例的正相关系显著减弱,从而证实股权分置改革后现金股利的"隧道"效应减弱。     

超募资金投向、股权结构与现金股利政策

本文利用中国上市公司公开披露的募集资金使用情况,探讨首次公开发行超募资金的不同投向对上市公司现金股利政策的影响。研究发现,上市公司现金股利支付水平随着超募资金补充流动资金的增加而提高,超募资金为现金股利的发放提供了“资金源”。而且,在大股东持股比例较高的公司中,超募资金补充流动性的程度和现金股利支付水平之间的正向关系更显著,说明大股东攫取上市公司、侵占中小股东利益的情况更严重。进一步研究发现,超募资金补充流动资金的程度和现金股利的市场反应负相关,而且在大股东持股比例高的公司中市场反应比大股东持股比例低的公司更为消极。作为少有的研究中国资本市场超募资金投向对上市公司股利分配影响的文章,本文的结论丰富了募集资金使用效率方面的文献,其研究结果对于政策制定者和投资者具有重要借鉴意义和参考价值。     

上市公司现金持有水平的影响因素：财务特征、股权结构及治理环境

本文研究了1999—2003年间中国上市公司现金持有水平的影响因素,包括财务特征、股权结构和治理环境。就全部样本来说,我们发现,(1)上市公司的现金持有水平与规模和财务杠杆负相关,与资产周转效率、现金流量、成长性／投资机会、股利支付需要和融资需要等正相关。(2)第一大股东持股比例与超额现金持有水平之间存在着显著的U型非线性关系,外部大股东持股比例与超额现金持有水平之间存在着显著的正相关关系;治理环境基本上与超额现金持有水平之间呈现出明显的负相关关系。同时,我们还根据控股股东性质对四个子样本进行了分析,发现在不同子样本的实证结果之间存在着一些比较明显的差异。     

股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论

本文以763家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,检查了股利政策和第一大股东持股以及企业成长性机会之间的统计关系,考察了股利政策的股权效应,并比较分析了企业成长性机会对股利政策股权效应的影响程度。作者发现,第一大股东具有发放现金股利的显著动机,而且这种动机不受股东性质的显著影响。文章进一步观察到,企业成长性机会能够弱化第一大股东分配现金股利的激励,并促使公司保留更多的现金用于有价值的投资机会。本文的经验结果并不支持“掏空”理论,而更支持自由现金流理论:第一大股东能够迫使公司吐出多余的自由现金流,并能根据企业的成长性机会调整股利政策(在成长性高的公司增加投资,在成长性低的公司增加股利)。     

机构投资者、公司治理与上市公司股利政策

本文实证研究了2001—2004年间中国证券市场中机构投资者持股、公司治理与上市公司股利政策之间的关系。针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利政策的两种理论观点——“自由现金流假说“和“利益输送假说“以及在我国资本市场上呈现的“恶意派现“现象,实证检验了我国机构投资者是否能够发挥治理、监督作用。研究结果发现:在2001—2004年间,机构投资者持股公司的每股现金股利发放水平显著地高于非机构投资者持股的公司,发放现金股利公司的机构投资者的持股比例显著地高于不发放现金股利公司,公司现金股利发放水平成为投资者构建投资组合的重要标准;机构投资者的持股比例不会对上市公司的股利政策产生影响,对于我国上市公司近年来出现的“恶意派现“现象,机构投资者发挥了其监督治理职能,机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司发生“恶意派现“的可能性越小。     

创业板上市公司股利分配研究

本文以截止2010年4月30日79家创业板上市公司为对象,以实证分析的方法研究创业板上市公司股利分配。结论显示,创业板上市公司股利分配与第一大股东持股比例之间没有显著关系;公司成长性对现金股利发放水平有抑制作用;公司盈利能力、货币资金充足率及盈余积累水平对公司现金股利分配水平有显著影响。本文的研究表明,创业板公司股利分配行为不支持股利迎合假说及利益输送假说,公司股利分配在一定程度上反映了公司的组织结构特征。     

股权集中度与上市公司经营绩效 ——基于我国通讯行业的实证分析

本文利用2010~2017年通讯类行业上市公司面板数据,考察股权集中度对上市公司经营绩效的影响。在控制了公司规模、资产负债率、存货周转率、经营现金流之后,发现第一大股东持股比例、前五大股东持股比例均与公司绩效正相关,第一大股东与第二大股东持股之比、第一大股东与第二大至第五大股东持股之和的比值与公司绩效负相关,并且以每股收益(EPS)作为被解释变量的替代变量进行稳健性检验,检验结果与前面一致,因此本文结论是稳健的。     

家族企业现金持有量影响因素分析

本文分析了我国家族上市公司现金持有量的影响因素。与已有的研究结论不同,本文实证回归结果表明,家族上市公司资产负债率、董事长和总经理两职合一、现金替代物、债务融资成本与现金持有量显著负相关,公司投资机会、第一大股东持股比例、股利支付率与现金持有量显著正相关,企业规模、银行借款比重、控制权与现金流权分离度和股权制衡比例和现金持有量没有显著相关性。融资约束是影响家族企业现金持有量决策的重要因素,而且家族控股股东对上市公司主要体现为支持动机,而不是一般认为的掏空动机。     

家族企业现金持有量影响因素分析

本文分析了我国家族上市公司现金持有量的影响因素。与已有的研究结论不同,本文实证回归结果表明,家族上市公司资产负债率、董事长和总经理两职合一、现金替代物、债务融资成本与现金持有量显著负相关,公司投资机会、第一大股东持股比例、股利支付率与现金持有量显著正相关,企业规模、银行借款比重、控制权与现金流权分离度和股权制衡比例和现金持有量没有显著相关性。融资约束是影响家族企业现金持有量决策的重要因素,而且家族控股股东对上市公司主要体现为支持动机,而不是一般认为的掏空动机。     

控股股东、财务柔性与现金股利政策的实证研究

选取我国A股上市公司2012-2017间财务数据为研究样本,实证检验了控股股东、财务柔性与公司股利政策间的关系。结果表明,上市公司的财务柔性有利于提升公司分配现金股利的意愿和水平。进一步考察控股股东在财务柔性与现金股利政策间的调节作用,发现控股股东持股比例越高的企业,财务柔性储备越高,越能提升公司现金股利分配意愿和水平。     

Equity ownership segregation, shareholder preferences, and dividend policy in China

We investigate how listed Chinese firms pay different types of dividend to satisfy shareholders, different dividend preferences shaped by institutional factors such as share tradability and asymmetrical taxation. We find that the cash dividend level is significantly and positively related to the proportion of non-publicly tradable shares and this relation is mainly driven by legal person shareholders' preferences for cash dividends. In contrast, the stock dividend level is significantly and positively associated with the proportion of publicly tradable shares. These findings provide an empirical rationale for the current reform on the segregation of equity ownership rights in China.     

Does strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation? Evidence from China’s dividend tax reforms

According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China, large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends. They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights. An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase. However, when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder, expropriation activities ease significantly.     

股利政策、股权制衡与公司成长性

本文以我国2005年-2007年中小板市场上市公司为样本（面板数据），从公司成长性的角度考察了股权结构对现金股利政策的实证影响。具体检查了现金股利和第一大股东、股权制衡以及公司成长性之间的计量关系，经验结果表明：中小板公司的第一大股东具有强烈的发放现金股利的激励，公司成长性不能弱化第一大股东对现金股利的偏好，其他大股东不能够对第一大股东的行为进行监督和牵制，甚至存在附和第一大股东的倾向。     

Ownership structure and tax-friendly dividends

The paper examines the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles using the novel environment of Australia, which has operated a full dividend imputation system since 1987. The analysis jointly focuses on the tax-based preferences of five categories of shareholders, including both domestic and foreign-domiciled shareholder classes. Incorporating the dividend franking percentage as a direct measure of the degree of tax benefit associated with dividends, strong evidence supporting the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles is present for both domestic and foreign shareholder categories. This includes domestic corporate blockholders and company directors, and local institutional investors following tax reforms in 2000, and foreign institutional shareholders which, alternatively, demand lower dividends and dividend franking. These findings persist after considering the effect of share repurchases, and under various model specifications controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity and potential endogeneity between ownership structure and dividend payout policy.     

Trading restrictions and firm dividends: The share lockup expiration experience in China

Chinese firms experienced a substantial reduction in nontradable shares following the Split-Share Structure Reform that began in 2005. The decrease in nontradable shares, or increase in share tradability, is associated with a decline in the firms’ cash dividend payouts. The positive association is attenuated in firms with fewer financial constraints, only weakly affected by firm governance, and not affected by investment opportunities or controlling shareholder type. The results highlight the fact that firms disgorge cash to compensate shareholders for trading restrictions and conclude that dividends persist when firms have easier access to external financing. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of nontradable shares, after controlling for firm fixed effects and omitted changing firm characteristics.     

Tax reform and payout policy: Do shareholder clienteles or payout policy adjust?

Changes in taxation of corporate dividends offer excellent opportunities to study dividend clientele effects. We explore payout policies and ownership structures around a major tax reform that took place in Finland in 2004. Consistent with dividend clienteles affecting firms' dividend policy decisions, we find that Finnish firms altered their dividend policies based on the changed tax incentives of their largest shareholders. While firms adjust their payout policies, our results also indicate that ownership structures of Finnish firms also changed around the 2004 reform, consistent with shareholder clienteles adjusting to the new tax system.     

Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World

This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.     

Dividend taxation and the ownership structure of private firms

This paper examines the effect of dividend taxation on the ownership structure of private firms. I exploit a German dividend tax increase that only affects corporate shareholders owning a minority stake. Using data on private German firms and their shareholders, I find that corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes in firms after the dividend tax reform. This result is in line with the notion that, because minority shareholders do not have sufficient decision-making power to influence the payout policy, they can only react to a dividend tax increase by selling their shares. This effect is larger when the affected minority shareholders face high dividend tax costs. However, I find a smaller effect when the benefits of the minority stakes are highly relevant for the firm and the affected shareholders, suggesting that non-tax factors mute the response to dividend taxes. In addition, I find that the largest shareholder of the firm buys the minority stake, resulting in greater ownership concentration. These findings extend the prior literature that finds no effect of dividend taxes on the ownership structure of private firms.     

Minority Protection and Dividend Policy in Finland

This paper highlights some theoretical arguments and empirical results on whether legal‐based minority protection affects corporate cash dividends in Finland. The Company Act in Finland states that shareholders having one tenth of all shares can demand a so‐called minority dividend, which is half of the profit of the fiscal year, yet not more than 8% of the equity. Minority dividend, as in Finland, is rarely used in EU countries. I find, that minority protection is a better influence over managerial control than controlling shareholders having absolute voting power. When there is no controlling shareholder and coalition costs are lowest, minority protection in Finland is better than minority protection in mandatory dividend countries. Combining strong shareholder rights (as in the USA) and minority dividend (as in Finland) could decrease agency costs both vertically and horizontally.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.