On the estimation of stock-market reaction to corporate layoff announcements

This study investigates the stock-market reaction to layoff announcements where more than 1000 workers are affected. We employ a dummy variable regression (DVR) version of the market model and compare the results obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) versus exponential GARCH (EGARCH), and value-weighted (VW) versus equally weighted (EW) market index. We find that the stock market responds negatively to layoffs attributed to low demand. We also find that contrary to prior research, the market reacts positively to restructuring-related layoffs on the announcement date. This pattern of market reaction is observed regardless of the market index used or the parameter estimation methods employed, although the empirical results indicate that using EGARCH/VW market index tends to generate fewer statistically significant test results and smaller (in the absolute size of the cumulative) abnormal returns (ARs). Taken together, our study provides additional support for the claim that studies of stock-market reaction to corporate events must account for the time variation in return volatility. Ignoring these could result in erroneous inferences.     

The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).     

Information Leakage Prior to Takeover Announcements: The Effect of Media Reports

There is considerable evidence documenting pre-bid price and volume reaction to takeover announcements. This has at times been argued to constitute evidence of insider trading. Although insider trading probably occurs, much pre-bid trading may result from event anticipation. This paper documents the effects of one source through which such anticipation is disseminated, namely the print media. Our results show that measures of unexpected returns and turnover can be reduced by one third when the information from media reports is controlled for. The general implication of our finding is that, if other such sources were taken into account (for example, information conveyed by substantial shareholder notices and the transactions costs of trading), then previous evidence of statistically significant unexpected pre-bid returns and turnover may be substantially reduced if not eliminated.     

Does Inefficient Risk Sharing Increase Public Self-Protection?

This paper studies how the risk of having an unequal distribution of income across the population affects the investment in a public self-protection policy, such as financial regulation or climate change mitigation. Two economies are compared. In the first economy, there is perfect risk sharing, i.e., individuals can credibly commit on a set of transfers that will remove ex-post inequalities in consumption. In the second economy, no risk sharing takes place. By referring to the literature on background risks, I determine some conditions in terms of change in risk aversion and prudence, which guarantee an increase in self-protection under inefficient risk sharing. Generally speaking, if self-protection reduces the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when either the probability of a catastrophic event and/or the risk of inequality are sufficiently low. If self-protection increases the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when both the probabilities of aggregate loss and the increase in the risk of inequality are sufficiently small.     

An Entrepreneur's Guide to Understanding the Cost of Venture Capital

Entrepreneurs who deal with a venture capital firm (VC) for the first time often find themselves unprepared for the experience. The deal structure language used to describe financing terms, and the methods used to value the investment, are unique to the VC world. The authors have two objectives in preparing this entrepreneur's guide to venture capital finance: First, they explain why VCs require rates of return that are considerably higher—even after adjusting for difference in risk—than the returns required by the shareholders of established companies. Their explanation focuses on differences of opinion between overly optimistic entrepreneurs and less sanguine VCs. Second, the authors discuss the difficulty faced by entrepreneurs when trying to understand the actual cost of VC financing (including the dilution of value that occurs when entrepreneurs fail to meet targets or milestones). The problem can be traced to deal structure terms that typically call for the VC to receive preferential treatment in the event the entrepreneur's scenario does not turn out to be accurate. More specifically, entrepreneurs often grant VCs control rights as well as liquidation rights that, when things go wrong, dramatically increase the effective cost to entrepreneurs of venture financing.     

The Pricing of Event Risks with Parameter Uncertainty

Financial instruments whose payoffs are linked to exogenous events, such as the occurrence of a natural catastrophe or an unusual weather pattern depend crucially on actuarial models for determining event (e.g., default) probabilities. In many instances, investors appear to receive premiums far in excess of these modeled actuarial probabilities, even for event risks that are uncorrelated with returns on other financial assets. Some have attributed these larger spreads to uncertainty in the probabilities generated by the models. We provide a simple model of such parameter uncertainty and demonstrate how it affects rational investors' demand for event risk exposures. We show that while parameter uncertainty does indeed affect bond spreads, it does not tend to increase spreads by much. Indeed, the spread increases due to parameter uncertainty in our numerical examples are on the order of only 1–2 basis points. Moreover, in many instances, including those that have the most sensible correlation settings, parameter uncertainty tends to decrease the size of bond spreads. We therefore argue that parameter uncertainty does not appear to be a satisfactory explanation for high event-risk returns.     

Futures signals sense-making framework (FSSF): A start-up tool to analyse and categorise weak signals, wild cards, drivers, trends and other types of information

This article introduces future signals sense-making framework (FSSF), an alternative philosophy towards weak signals, emerging issues, drivers, and trends, that is in contrast to the traditional single signal or path extrapolation approach. The philosophy of FSSF is based on the principles of environmental scanning and pattern management, which state that if there is a grand transformation process on the way or if there is a new emerging pattern or phenomenon, such a process will certainly be reflected in many different ways. Therefore, in this philosophy, futures knowledge is believed to be fragmented between various simultaneous and overlapping sources. Here, a researcher's task is to carry out a sufficient environmental scanning process and to cluster and sense how to create the emerging future through a pattern management process where FSSF plays a role as the first start-up tool. Alternatively, FSSF can also be used as a general knowledge management and sense-making tool for any kind of analyses.     

THE VALUE ADDED BY BANK ACQUISITIONS: LESSONS FROM WELLS FARGO'S ACQUISITION OF FIRST INTERSTATE

Wells Fargo's recent acquisition of First Interstate Bancorp represents one of the relatively uncommon cases in which the economic values of both the acquiring and acquired banks increased sharply upon announcement of the deal. The transaction is also one of the few cases where the bidder in a major bank acquisition chose purchase instead of pooling accounting–despite the fact that the deal was openly hostile and that Wells Fargo had to fight off a competing bid from First Bank Systems.
Based on the stock market's reaction to this merger battle, as well as the results of their study of 153 bank mergers over the period 1985–1991, the authors argue that the most promising mergers are those presenting large opportunities to reduce costs by eliminating redundant operations. The stock market is much less responsive to other merger rationales such as diversification or entry into new markets in pursuit of growth.
The Wells case also suggests that a preoccupation with the accounting treatment of a merger is a mistake if it becomes the primary reason for turning down a deal that creates economic value, or if it prevents the bidder from choosing the lowest-cost method of financing the deal. Throughout the bidding contest for First Interstate, the stock market responded positively to the success of Wells Fargo's efforts, even though purchase accounting would have a large adverse impact on reported earnings.
But if the stock market does not appear to care about the accounting treatment of a merger, the method of financing does appear to matter to investors. In general, acquisitions financed with cash are viewed more favorably by the market than stockfunded transactions. The evidence also suggests, however, that acquiring firms can reduce the negative impact of stock deals by making conditional offers (those in which the number of shares depends on the stock price performance of the acquirer) and by combining such offers with stock repurchase programs.     

Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries

The pattern of legal change in countries that have their legalsystems transplanted from abroad differs markedly from countriesthat develop their own systems, irrespective of the legal familyfrom which their laws come. In "transplant" countries, law oftenstagnates for long periods of time; when change takes place,it tends to be radical, if not erratic. External models remaindominant even years after the law was transplanted. Althoughthere is some evidence that transplant countries have engagedin comprehensive legal reforms in response to the pressuresof globalization, it is still too early to judge whether thesenew changes can be taken as a sign that the legal systems inthese countries have started a process of endogenous legal evolution.      

A basic user utility preference to reduce uncertainty: A dissent to reporting and asset measurement

Legitimacy and self-regulation of the accounting profession dictates that it typifies integrity and credibility in both the form and substance of its accounting standards. Unsound and dishonest business practices are not evident in the financial reports, nor are they the responsibility of accounting standard setters. Nevertheless, professional accountability is not enhanced if the financial reporting standards permit a great deal of choices, variation and interpretation, particularly in asset values. In pursuit of professional legitimacy and the credibility, accounting standards can reduce opportunities for intruding bias, inept judgement, or interpretation perspectives adding to user uncertainties. The thesis of this conceptual paper is that key user groups have an intrinsic homogeneous preference utility for information relating to financial risk, which can be satisfied by a simple asset value, based on a market bid. The balance sheet can contain a segregation of asset values, either in supplementary or classification form.     

Using matched samples to test for differences in trade execution costs

This paper provides guidance on how to use matched samples to test for differences in trade execution costs (e.g., quoted and effective spreads). Based on extensive simulation results, we conclude that the best practice is to match firms one-to-one based on market capitalization and share price, and to test for differences between the matched pairs using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We demonstrate that pre-sorting by industry groups or discarding apparent poor matches may reduce test power. We show that, in general, tests based on one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching have comparable power and less size distortion than alternatives that place more weight on distant firms. We find that matching without replacement can reduce size distortion when the control sample is relatively small. We highlight conditions under which matched sample estimation may be preferred to the corresponding event study.     

Conducting Event Studies on a Small Stock Exchange

Abstract

This paper analyses whether it is possible to perform an event study on a small stock exchange with thinly trade stocks. The main conclusion is that event studies can be performed provided that certain adjustments are made. First, a minimum of 25 events appears necessary to obtain acceptable size and power in statistical tests. Second, trade to trade returns should be used. Third, one should not expect to consistently detect abnormal performance of less than about 1% (or perhaps even 2%), unless the sample contains primarily thickly traded stocks. Fourth, nonparametric tests are generally preferable to parametric tests of abnormal performance. Fifth, researchers should present separate results for thickly and thinly traded stock groups. Finally, when nonnormality, event induced variance, unknown event day, and problems of very thin trading are all considered simultaneously, no one test statistic or type of test statistic dominates the others.     

Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

I find that the market reaction to a merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement predicts whether the companies later consummate the deal. The relation cannot be explained by the market's anticipation of the closing decision or its perception of the deal quality at the announcement. Merging companies appear to extract information from the market reaction and later consider it in closing the deal. Furthermore, the relation varies with deal characteristics, suggesting that companies seem to have a higher incentive to learn from the market when canceling the announced deal is easier or when the market has more information that the companies do not know.     

Dividend changes and earnings performance in Japan

This paper tests the dividend-signaling hypothesis using Japanese data. It is found that firms that increase dividends experience earnings growth in the preceding years but earnings declines in the subsequent years. Just the opposite tendency is found for firms that decrease and omit dividends. These results go against the hypothesis. Nevertheless, the event study results show that the market reacts positively (negatively) to the announcements of dividend increases (decreases). Thus, the evidence indicates that managers tend to be overly optimistic or pessimistic about future earnings when changing dividends, and the market tends to overreact to dividend change news.     

Weekend Effect, 'Reverse' Weekend Effect, and Investor Trading Activities

Abstract:   In this study, we document evidence of a 'reverse' weekend effect – whereby Monday returns are significantly positive and they are higher than the returns on other days of the week – over an extended period of eleven years (from 1988 to 1998). We also find that the 'traditional' weekend effect and the 'reverse' effect are related to firm size in that the 'traditional' weekend effect tends to be associated with small firms while the 'reverse' weekend effect tends to be associated with large firms. In addition, we find that during the period in which the 'reverse' weekend effect is observed, Monday returns for large firms tend to follow previous Friday returns when previous Friday returns are positive , but they do not follow the previous Friday returns when Friday returns are negative . Furthermore, we find that during the period in which the 'reverse' weekend effect is observed, Monday returns are positively related to the volume of medium‐size and block transactions, but negatively related to the volume of odd‐lot transactions.     

Last look

In over-the-counter markets, a trader typically sources indicative quotes from a number of competing liquidity providers, and then sends a deal request on the best available price for consideration by the originating liquidity provider. Due to the communication and processing latencies involved in this negotiation, and in a continuously evolving market, the price may have moved by the time the liquidity provider considers the trader’s request. At what point has the price moved too far away from the quote originally shown for the liquidity provider to reject the deal request? Or perhaps the request can still be accepted but only on a revised rate? ‘Last look’ is the process that makes this decision, i.e. it determines whether to accept—and if so at what rate—or reject a trader’s deal request subject to the constraints of an agreed trading protocol. In this paper, I study how the execution risk and transaction costs faced by the trader are influenced by the last look logic and choice of trading protocol. I distinguish between various ‘symmetric’ and ‘asymmetric’ last look designs and consider trading protocols that differ on whether, and if so to what extent, price improvements and slippage can be passed on to the trader. All this is done within a unified framework that allows for a detailed comparative analysis. I present two main findings. Firstly, the choice of last look design and trading protocol determines the degree of execution risk inherent in the process, but the effective transaction costs borne by the trader need not be affected by it. Secondly, when a trader adversely selects the liquidity provider she chooses to deal with, the distinction between the different symmetric and asymmetric last look designs fades and the primary driver of execution risk is the choice of trading protocol.     

Arbitrage Chains

A privately informed trader will engage in costly arbitrage, that is, trade on his knowledge that the price of an asset is different from the fundamental value if: (1) his order does not move the price immediately to reflect the information; and (2) he can hold the asset until the date when the information is reflected in the price. We study a general equilibrium model in which all agents optimize. In each period, there may be a trader with a limited horizon who has private information about a distant event. Whether he acts on his information, and whether subsequent informed traders act, is shown to depend on the possibility of a sequence or chain of future informed traders spanning the event date. An arbitrageur who receives good news will buy only if it is likely that, at the end of his trading horizon, a subsequent arbitrageur's buying will have pushed up the expected price. We show that limited trading horizons result in inefficient prices, because informed traders do not act on their information until the event date is sufficiently close. We also show that limited horizons can arise because of the cost-carry associated with holding an arbitrage portfolio over an extended period of time.     

Models of asset returns: changes of pattern from high to low event frequency

In this paper we have analysed asset returns of the New York Stock Exchange and the Helsinki Stock Exchange using various time-independent models such as normal, general stable, truncated Lévy, mixed diffusion-jump, compound normal, Student t distribution and power exponential distribution and the time-dependent GARCH(1, 1) model with Gaussian and Student t distributed innovations. In order to study changes of pattern at different event horizons, as well as changes of pattern over time for a given event horizon, we have analysed high-frequency or short-horizon intraday returns up from 20 s intervals to a full trading day, medium-frequency or medium-horizon daily returns and low-frequency or long-horizon returns with holding period up to 30 days. As for changes of pattern over time, we found that for medium-frequency returns there are relatively long periods of business-as-usual when the return-generating process is well-described by a normal distribution. We also found periods of ferment, when the volatility grows and complex time dependences tend to emerge, but the known time dependences cannot explain the variability of the distribution. Such changes of pattern are also observed for high-frequency or short-horizon returns, with the exception that the return-generating process never becomes normal. It also turned out that the time dependence of the distribution shape is far more prominent at high frequencies or short horizons than the time dependence of the variance. For long-horizon or low-frequency returns, the distribution is found to converge towards a normal distribution with the time dependences vanishing after a few days.     

Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.     

RST–GCBR‐CLUSTERING‐BASED RGA–SVM MODEL FOR CORPORATE FAILURE PREDICTION

Corporate bankruptcy is perceived as a shocking event. Several researchers focused on the prediction of these phenomena using various methods aiming to avoid high generated costs. In this paper, a new hybrid approach is proposed to deal with corporate failure prediction. Based on financial ratios as input data and in order to predict if the business unit will fail or not, our approach integrates rough set theory, Gaussian case‐based reasoning‐clustering, real‐valued genetic algorithm with support vector machines. This combination is justified by a high accuracy rate, reaching 100% at 1 year before failure and 94.0925% at 3 years before failure. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.