基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

中国银行业竞争与非金融企业影子银行化

本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。     

From me to you: Measuring connectedness between Eurozone financial institutions

This paper aims to analyse the tail risk spillover between banks, insurance companies and the shadow banking system in the Eurozone contest. These intra-sectoral interdependencies between financial market participants have contributed to the spread of instability in the financial system. Therefore mapping these links is important for policy-makers to provide supervisory tools and can be a key input into the design of macroprudential policies. For this purpose, we adopt the Tail-Event driven NETwork (TENET) risk model. The TENET is a useful method to map the tail interconnection between the three sectors and to provide systemic risk measures that take into account the “too big to fail” and “too big to interconnected” concepts. The results suggest that each financial sector has a significant impact on the other. By comparing the contribution of each sector, we show that banks are the largest emitters of risk. However, also shadow banking firms are systemic important, given their high level of connection. The work provides a clear view of risk spillovers and interconnection dynamics during the crisis providing a meaningful ranking of the systemic important financial institutions.     

Bank risk,competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review

The outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and of the European sovereign debt crisis again raised questions about the vulnerability and the behaviour of banking institutions. The unconventional monetary policies that followed have flattened the yield curve and created a low interest rates environment. This can give rise to risk-taking behaviour from banks and can therefore undermine the stability of the banking system with negative impact of the credit supply, corporate investment and real economy. This article proposes a literature review on the main determinants of bank lending and risk-taking decisions, going through the competition in the banking market, the bank connectedness with firms and the role of monetary and banking authorities. The systemic risk concept is also discussed as well as its drivers and potential measures that should be monitored by prudential authorities in order to preserve financial stability.     

经济结构转型与“双支柱”调控框架

理解经济运行环境的变化才能更有针对性地制定和实施货币政策和宏观审慎政策。中国经济在2012年前后迈过工业化的高峰期,家庭部门发生从制造到服务的消费升级,企业部门出现从资本密集型向人力资本密集型的产业结构转型,中国的经济结构转型进程与高收入国家类似发展阶段的经历高度一致。经济结构转型过程中,传统资本密集型行业信贷需求大幅下降,新兴人力资本密集型行业信贷需求相对较低且在债务主导的金融服务体系中面临融资供给制约。由于市场内生的企业信贷供给和需求双双下降,总需求不足问题凸显。宏观经济稳定方面,宏观经济运行特征由此前的“易热难冷” 转向“易冷难热”,“债务—通缩”风险加大。这要求货币政策在执行中更加注重温和通胀目标,充分运用各种政策工具确保总需求和总供给的平衡。金融稳定方面,防范系统性风险的重点要与时俱进地调整。时间轴上要特别关注经济周期和金融周期下行叠加带来的系统性风险;空间轴上不仅要关注“大而不能倒”的系统重要性机构,还须加强“小广散”金融机构的稳定性,注重与其相关的风险传染。     

Social trust and corporate financial asset holdings: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of social trust on firms’ holdings of non-currency financial assets using a large sample of firms in China’s real sector. We find that firms in regions of the high social trust hold fewer financial assets, consistent with the notion that credibility in high-trust regions reduces information asymmetry and transaction cost among market participants. This leads to better access to formal and informal financing and higher profitability for the real economy, eventually depressing firms’ financial asset allocations. We also find that the negative effect of social trust on financial asset holdings is more prominent for private firms and firms with weak internal monitoring from large shareholders, suggesting that corporations rely more on trust in these cases; it is less pronounced when firms are in regions with good legal systems, proving social trust to be a substitute for formal institutions.     

基于房地产市场的我国系统性金融风险测度与预警研究

本文阐释了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险形成机制,据此建立了分阶段、跨部门的房地产市场的系统性金融风险网络模型,并运用2006-2017年16家上市银行数据,分析和测度了我国房价大幅下跌所引发的系统性金融风险水平和结构,构建了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标并进行测算。研究发现:在房价下跌30%的压力情景下,我国金融体系的潜在总损失总体呈级数式上升,年均增长22.70%;基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险值(SR)呈现先上升后波动下降的总体趋势;系统性金融风险(SR)的脆弱性指标(FLI)整体呈现波浪式振荡变化,且与房地产贷款/权益整体呈反向变动,系统性金融风险(SR)的传染性指标(CTI)在2012-2017年呈持续下降趋势,且与金融市场压力指数、金融机构间资产占总资产比重呈现出高度的一致性变化趋势。最后,基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标(SRWI)值呈收敛式振荡走势,表明基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险总体可控且呈收敛式下降。     

Shareholdings by Financial Institutions, Information Asymmetry and the Intertemporal Return-Earnings Relation in Japan

Using a large sample of Japanese firms, we examine informational effects of the joint ownership of debt and equity by financial institutions. In particular, we argue that shareholdings by financial institutions are associated with increased monitoring and reduced information asymmetry. Our results support the hypothesis that stock prices incorporate information about future earnings earlier for firms with higher equity ownership by financial institutions. In a nutshell, shareholdings by financial institutions appear to be an important institutional factor in Japan to alleviate information asymmetry, thereby serving as a substitute for the market-based monitoring.     

Good for one,bad for all: Determinants of individual versus systemic risk

We analyze a sample of large international banks in major advanced economies and examine the impact that bank-specific factors have on an institution's solvency risk and its contribution to systemic risk. We focus on the five categories that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has recently proposed as indicators of systemic importance. Our findings suggest that unstable funding is the main factor driving systemic risk. Furthermore, the combination of significant trading activities with global presence appears to exacerbate spillover risks to the global financial system. Interestingly, whereas trading activities contribute to the build-up of correlated or ‘wrong-way’ risk they help to mitigate individual solvency risk. Conversely, a decentralized approach to liquidity management seems to alleviate individual solvency risk but amplifies the transmission of financial distress across the financial system. This suggests that a macro-prudential approach to financial regulation should focus not only on scaling up micro-prudential measures but also on enabling the efficient transfer of risk between financial institutions.     

Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd–Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance,a review

This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.     

关于开放市场条件下防范系统性风险的研究

随着经济金融全球化程度的加深,评价和防范开放经济条件下一国系统性金融风险的重要性日益明显。文章根据系统性金融风险的表现形式,提出了一个三层次的风险评价指标体系,并通过熵值法确定各子系统风险因子之间的权重。实证分析结果显示,近年来我国金融业总体稳健程度得到有效提升,但未来仍需密切关注风险因素的动态变化,采取切实有效的措施夯实系统性金融风险管理体系建设。     

Human capital,pay structure,and the use of performance measures in bonus compensation

Traditional financial measures have been criticized for lacking relevance in today's economy where firms are increasingly competing with intangible assets. However, perhaps this criticism is not detrimental to firms if they take actions to supplement the information contained in financial measures. Thus, it is important to explore whether and when firms recognize this potential deficiency and take action to acquire the appropriate information. This study hypothesizes that two human resource variables, reliance on human capital and the firm's pay structure, are associated with the use of non-financial measures in top managers’ bonus compensation contracts since they provide information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures. Using archival data from 177 firms, I estimate binary and multi-response ordered logit models. The binary logit model provides evidence that labor-intensive firms have a higher probability of placing emphasis on non-financial measures (along with traditional financial measures) and a lower probability of relying solely on traditional financial measures. Moreover, this relationship is moderated by the firm's pay structure. Analysis shows that the relationship is stronger in firms that employ a hierarchical pay structure. Furthermore, the multi-response logit model extends these finding by showing that these firms also have a higher probability of relying on human resource measures.     

基于房地产市场的我国系统性金融风险测度与预警研究

本文阐释了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险形成机制,据此建立了分阶段、跨部门的房地产市场的系统性金融风险网络模型,并运用2006-2017年16家上市银行数据,分析和测度了我国房价大幅下跌所引发的系统性金融风险水平和结构,构建了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标并进行测算。研究发现:在房价下跌30%的压力情景下,我国金融体系的潜在总损失总体呈级数式上升,年均增长22.70%;基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险值(SR)呈现先上升后波动下降的总体趋势;系统性金融风险(SR)的脆弱性指标(FLI)整体呈现波浪式振荡变化,且与房地产贷款/权益整体呈反向变动,系统性金融风险(SR)的传染性指标(CTI)在2012-2017年呈持续下降趋势,且与金融市场压力指数、金融机构间资产占总资产比重呈现出高度的一致性变化趋势。最后,基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标(SRWI)值呈收敛式振荡走势,表明基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险总体可控且呈收敛式下降。     

中国金融部门间系统性风险溢出的监测预警研究——基于下行和上行ΔCoES指标的实现与优化

为了对我国金融部门间的系统性风险溢出进行实时监测和有效预警,本文基于Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) 的CoES指标构想,在左尾视角的基础上进一步引入右尾视角,构建下行和上行ΔCoES分别作为系统性风险的同期度量指标和前瞻预警指标,并提出了更为有效合理且同时适用于下行和上行ΔCoES的计算方法。本文一方面采用下行和上行ΔCoES对我国银行、证券、保险三个金融部门间的系统性风险溢出进行监测预警研究,另一方面还基于我国的经验数据检验上行和下行ΔCoES的性质。研究结果显示,我国金融部门间具有显著的系统性风险溢出效应,且三个部门间的风险溢出存在非对称性,银行部门是系统性风险的主要发送者,证券部门是系统性风险的主要接收者;三个部门两两间的风险溢出水平表现出明显的协同性和周期性,且上行的风险溢出水平高于下行。同时,基于我国的经验数据发现,上行ΔCoES对下行ΔCoES具有显著的先导性、前瞻性,上行ΔCoES可以作为系统性风险的前瞻预警指标。此外,下行ΔCoES能够引领ΔCoVaR和基于MES估计方法计算的短期ΔCoES指标,表明本文构建的下行ΔCoES实时性更强,更适合作为系统性风险的实时监测指标。     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

Measuring systemic importance of financial institutions: An extreme value theory approach

This paper proposes a set of market-based measures on the systemic importance of a financial institution or a group of financial institutions, each designed to capture different aspects of systemic importance of financial institutions. Multivariate extreme value theory approach is used to estimate these measures. Using six big Canadian banks as the proxy for Canadian banking sector, we apply these measures to identify systemically important banks in Canadian banking sector and major risk contributors from international financial institutions to Canadian banking sector. The empirical evidence reveals that (i) the top three banks, RBC Financial Group, TD Bank Financial Group, and Scotiabank, are more systemically important than other banks, while we also find that the size of a financial institution should not be considered as a proxy of systemic importance; (ii) compared to the European and Asian banks, the crashes of the U.S. banks, on average, are the most damaging to Canadian banking sector, while the risk contribution to the Canadian banking sector from Asian banks is quite lower than that from banks in the U.S. and euro area; (iii) the risk contribution to Canadian banking sector exhibits “home bias”, that is, cross-country risk contribution tends to be smaller than domestic risk contribution.     

A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions

In this paper we propose a framework for measuring and stress testing the systemic risk of a group of major financial institutions. The systemic risk is measured by the price of insurance against financial distress, which is based on ex ante measures of default probabilities of individual banks and forecasted asset return correlations. Importantly, using realized correlations estimated from high-frequency equity return data can significantly improve the accuracy of forecasted correlations. Our stress testing methodology, using an integrated micro–macro model, takes into account dynamic linkages between the health of major US banks and macro-financial conditions. Our results suggest that the theoretical insurance premium that would be charged to protect against losses that equal or exceed 15% of total liabilities of 12 major US financial firms stood at $110 billion in March 2008 and had a projected upper bound of $250 billion in July 2008.     

Trust and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This paper examines the impact of social trust on stock price crash risk. Social trust measures the level of mutual trust among the members of a society. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms for the 2001–2015 period, we find that firms headquartered in regions of high social trust tend to have smaller crash risks. This result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests and is more prominent for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), for firms with weak monitoring, and for firms with higher risk-taking. Moreover, we observe that firms in regions of high social trust are associated with higher accounting conservatism and fewer financial restatements. Our study suggests that social trust is an important variable that is omitted in the literature investigating the predictors of stock price crashes.     

Does societal trust make managers more trustworthy?

This study examines the effects of shareholders' trust on managers' bad news hoarding. Using a large sample of listed firms from 33 countries, we find that firms domiciled in countries with higher societal trust have higher stock price crash risk, which indicates that managers may exploit shareholders' trust to conceal bad news and that a low-trust society can be beneficial in restraining management misconduct due to the monitoring undertaken by low-trust outsiders. We also find that the positive association between societal trust and crash risk is less pronounced (1) when low-trust foreign shareholders have greater control over a country's firms, in line with the view that low-trust shareholders' concerns about being expropriated by managers and the consequent strong efforts at monitoring; (2) when long-term investors have greater control over a country's firms, suggesting that long-term investors playing a complementary role in monitoring corporate governance; and (3) when a country has strong formal institutions, such as investor protection and financial accounting systems, suggesting that robust formal institutions are substitute for social norms.