事务所战略、行业特征与客户选择

本文试图通过客户选择行为来研究事务所专门化经营战略及其实施的具体策略,以期为事务所从内涵发展方面实现做大做强提供有益的途径。研究发现,事务所的专门化经营战略促使客户偏好于集中选择事务所,而行业内的客户出于竞争驱动偏好于选择不同于竞争对手的事务所,从而促使其分散选择;说明专门化经营战略是有效的竞争战略,且更容易在竞争程度较低的行业内得到发展。这一结论将为我国事务所经营竞争战略和未来发展方向提供经验证据。     

会计师事务所合并与行业专门化战略研究

本文研究了1998至2007年间发生的会计师事务所合并事件,针对合并后会计师事务所在客户选择方面的战略变化进行了分析。研究发现,合并后会计师事务所的客户行业集中度在平均水平上与合并前持平,甚至有所下降,但是会计师事务所最具优势行业的客户集中度有显著增加。结果表明,与合并之前的战略模糊和多变的特点相比,会计师事务所在合并之后更多地采取了行业专门化的发展战略,审慎挑选适应会计师事务所发展的客户、培育行业专长。本土会计师事务所已经开始制定符合经营发展需要的战略规划,针对环境的变化实行战略转型。     

会计师事务所行业专门化经营的实证分析

行业专门化经营是会计师事务所产品差异的策略之一.理论上,行业专门化经营会在提高会计师事务所审计质量的同时,使采取行业专门化经营战略的会计师事务所获得审计溢价.对我国2006-2008年A股审计市场数据进行统计分析和实证检验结果表明,以事务所在某行业内的市场占有率来衡量,我国会计师事务所的行业专门化经营水平很低,采取行业专门化经营战略的会计师事务所没有因此而获得审计溢价.     

会计师事务所行业专门化探析

行业专门化是指会计师事务所在某种或少数几种行业的审计业务中培育了特殊专长,在这些行业的审计市场上占据了较大的份额,它是会计师事务所基于对行业知识和行业审计专长的高度重视而采取的一种经营战略和市场竞争策略.行业专门化为会计师事务所带来的既有利也有弊.在我国,事务所行业专业化不仅是行业发展趋势,也是政策导向之所在.     

基于种群竞争模型的中外会计师事务所竞争均衡分析及实证检验

我国审计市场的发展状况表明垄断型和过度竞争型的市场不利于审计行业的健康发展,前者不利于公平竞争、审计质量提高,后者则不利于提高审计效率、规模经济.目前,审计市场上的绝大多数优质客户资源被国外会计师事务所占据,国内会计师事务所在同其竞争时处于劣势地位.因此,提高本土会计师事务所的市场占有率,进而规范审计市场的竞争态势就显得尤为重要.本文利用种群竞争模型分析了影响会计师事务所实现竞争均衡的重要因素,得出我国会计师事务所应当实行差异化经营,同时要在自身的优势领域保持持续竞争力的结论.     

中国本土会计师事务所的市场地位与经济回报

区域规模化和行业专长化是会计师事务所通常采取的两种发展战略。本文分析和比较了具有区域市场领先地位以及具有行业市场领先地位的中国本土会计师事务所伴随的经济回报(以审计定价度量)。基于全样本的证据显示:本土会计师事务所仅仅通过在各省际市场取得领先地位并不足以获取明显的经济回报;具备行业市场领先地位则伴随着显著更高的经济回报;同时具备行业市场领先地位和区域市场领先地位则伴随着更大的经济回报。进一步的分析显示,不同本土会计师事务所可能需要考虑在发展战略及其实现途径上的差异化。本文的发现对本土会计师事务所制定符合自身特征的发展战略具有启示意义。     

会计师事务所业务拓展的现状与对策研究

考察中国注册会计师发展历程,我们发现目前注册会计师正处于大发展时期,但审计市场尚存在压价竞争、业务回扣等过度竞争现象,似乎暗示着中国注册会计师太多了.我们从会计师事务所现有业务发展的特征、业务拓展中遇到的障碍和如何拓展业务三个方面进行问卷调查,问卷调查研究结果表明,审计市场的过度竞争是结构问题和市场无序竞争所导致的,拟解决这个问题,我们倡导会计师事务实施业务差异化发展战略,以业务差异化凝聚事务所的核心竞争力,以核心竞争力为会计师事务所提供竞争优势,做精做强、做大做强,甚至走向国际化,进而为会计师事务所拓展更广阔的发展空间,提供更加多样化的业务机会.     

法律责任、审计风格和感知的会计信息可比性

本文以2010年会计师事务所实施特殊普通合伙制转制为背景,研究市场是如何感知审计师法律责任对会计信息可比性的影响.研究发现:(1)市场感知转制增强了审计师的法律责任,提高了会计信息可比性.(2)市场感知法律责任的增强,不仅降低了不同会计师事务所之间的审计风格差异,提高不同会计师事务所客户之间的会计信息可比性,同时也降低了同一会计师事务所中不同合伙人之间的审计风格差异,提高了同一会计师事务所不同合伙人客户之间的会计信息可比性.本文研究对于监管者、行业协会、会计师事务所、企业管理层具有重要意义.     

会计师事务所竞争力浅析

笔者认为,会计师事务所竞争力应是其在会计市场上的竞争优势,具体包括会计师事务所的规模、职业道德、专业胜任能力、管理水平等方面的优势。 会计师事务所的规模是竞争的基础,     

中国本土会计师事务所市场地位与经济回报探析

规模化和专长化是会计师事务所通常采取的两种发展战略.本文分析和比较了具有行业市场领先地位以及具有区域市场领先地位的中国本土会计师事务所伴随的经济回报.研究发现:本土会计师事务所仅仅通过在各省际市场取得领先地位并不足以获取明显的经济回报,而通过在各行业做专则可以获取明显的经济回报,而同时实施“专长化”和“规模化”则伴随着更大的经济回报.进一步的分析显示,本土会计师事务所可能需要考虑做强做大、做精做专战略及其实现途径的差异化.本文对本土会计师事务所制定符合自身特征的发展战略具有启示意义.     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

Does Auditor Industry Specialization Improve Audit Quality?

This study examines whether auditor industry specialization, measured using the auditor's within‐industry market share, improves audit quality and results in a fee premium. After matching clients of specialist and nonspecialist auditors on a number of dimensions, as well as only on industry and size, there is no evidence of differences in commonly used audit‐quality proxies between these two groups of auditors. Moreover, there is no consistent evidence of a specialist fee premium. The matched sample results are confirmed by including client fixed effects in the main models, examining a sample of clients that switched auditors, and using an alternative proxy that aims to capture the auditor's industry knowledge. The combined evidence in this study suggests that the auditor's within‐industry market share is not a reliable indicator of audit quality. Nevertheless, these findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for auditors, but that the methodology used in extant archival studies to examine this issue does not fully parse out the effects of auditor industry specialization from client characteristics.     

外资银行目前在华经营策略及趋势分析

中国银行业已经实现了全面的开放,外资银行如何实施自己的经营战略直接决定了其在中国的市场前途。本文分析了外资银行目前在华经营策略及其趋势的变化,在中国采取的四种经营战略包括：客户战略,产品战略,人才战略和并购战略。     

Do goodwill impairments affect audit opinions? Evidence from China

There has been a steady growth of goodwill impairments in the Chinese stock market since the adoption of the impairment approach in accounting. The influence of goodwill impairments on a firm’s financial position and profitability give reason to doubt its current and future performance. We examine whether auditors, as a crucial external monitor, identify the information risks of goodwill impairments and express their concerns about financial reporting quality in their audit opinions. Using a sample of firms listed on China’s A-share market from 2007 to 2017, we test the association between goodwill impairments and the type of audit opinion received in the same financial period. Our findings are as follows. First, the probability of receiving a modified opinion increases with the amount of goodwill impairments. Second, the positive association between goodwill impairments and modified audit opinions is driven primarily by earnings management risks. Third, this positive association is more salient when auditors are industry experts and there is no auditor–client mismatch. Fourth, auditors are more sensitive to the amount of goodwill impairments than to their mere existence. Overall, we document that auditors perceive goodwill impairments as a signal of information risks and communicate their concerns to investors to avoid litigation.     

Has SOX Enhanced Non–Big 4 Auditors' Ability to Deal with Client Pressure?

We investigate whether non–Big 4 auditors have enhanced their ability to resist client pressure over accrual reporting following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Regressing abnormal accruals on proxies for economic bonding, we find that changes in the association, defined as (Post–Pre), are significantly negative, implying an improvement in auditor independence after SOX. Among non–Big 4 auditors, only Tier 3 auditors compromised reporting objectivity before SOX, but neither Tier 2 nor Tier 3 auditors yielded to client pressure after SOX. Evidence that these two groups of non–Big 4 auditors differ in the way they cope with client pressure in a loose regulatory regime highlights the importance of assessing the efficacy of SOX separately for subsets of auditors and contributes to an understanding of the underresearched, but inherently important, segment of the audit market served by non–Big 4 auditors. Further analysis indicates that the low pre‐SOX audit quality observed in the full sample is driven by non–PCAOB registrants.     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

On the effort-saving effect of audit committee–auditor interlocking

Using unique data on audit hours from China, this paper investigates the effort-saving effect of the audit committee–auditor interlocking (AClk). We find that AClk is negatively associated with audit effort without any deterioration in audit quality. The results suggest that AClk has an effort-saving effect through information sharing between interlocked audit committee members and auditors. However, auditors retain the effort-saving benefits of AClk without sharing them with their client firms. Further analysis shows that the effort-saving effect of AClk is more pronounced for client firms whose auditors have industry expertise, for client firms that share the same individual auditor, or for client firms that share audit committee members with financial expertise.     

The impact of audit firms’ characteristics on audit fees following information security breaches

Given the importance of auditors’ assessing business risks and evaluating internal controls, we investigate whether an audit firm’s industry expertise, tenure, and size can help its auditors better understand external and internal threats faced by the client with less effort. Using reported information security breach incidents from 2004 to 2013, we find that, consistent with prior studies, audit fees are higher after the occurrence of an information security breach. However, such an association is negatively moderated when the audit firm has industry-specific expertise, longer experience with the client, and is one of the Big 4 firms. Our results suggest that because of their better knowledge about a specific industry, increased familiarity with the client’s operations, and more resources to understand a client’s vulnerabilities and/or information security policies and procedures, these auditors are more capable of assessing the potentially changing information security risks implied by the occurrence of information security breach incidents. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.     

The impact of auditor rotation on auditor–client negotiation

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor–client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor’s preferences than with the client’s preferences and more negotiation impasses.     

The impact on the market for audit services of aggressive competition by auditors

Supporters of direct uninvited solicitation activities argue that clients can make more informed choices of auditors when auditors are allowed to solicit prospective clients. In banned markets, auditors are allowed to submit bids to provide audit services only when invited by the client. This study provides theoretical models that examine the efficiency of client–auditor alignments in the banned and allowed market. We identify conditions under which realignment differences between the two markets occur and derive client losses in the banned market as compared to the allowed market. We also identify conditions under which independence may be impaired in the allowed market, consistent with the claims of solicitation opponents. However, we believe that, in view of the potential positive effects related to audit pricing and client–auditor alignment, restrictions on advertising or direct uninvited solicitation are not necessarily indicated. Instead, regulators or market mechanisms should insure that the independence (truth-telling) condition is so readily satisfied as to be virtually irrelevant. This can happen in one of two ways: (a) increased scrutiny, leading to an increased likelihood of discovery, or (b) increased penalties when an audit failure is discovered, leading to increased costs of an audit failure, or both.