放松卖空约束、现金持有水平及其市场价值——基于公司治理角度研究

基于放松卖空约束的政策实施,运用双重差分法考量放松卖空约束对现金持有行为影响及其产生的经济后果。结果显示：放松卖空约束增加了公司现金持有量,同时也增加了公司现金持有的边际市场价值;按照公司内部代理成本分组来看,内部代理成本越大的公司,放松卖空约束的治理效果越明显;进一步检验中,通过一系列稳健性检验发现主要结论依然成立;机制性检验表明放松卖空约束通过抑制公司过度投资行为增加了现金持有及其市场价值。结果表明：放松卖空约束作为一项重要的金融创新工具,可以通过外部治理监督作用缓解公司内部代理问题,从而影响上市公司现金持有行为。     

利率市场化与公司现金持有

利率市场化作为我国一项重要的金融改革对微观企业的现金持有决策产生了重要的影响。本文以2007～2017年我国非金融类上市公司为研究样本,考察了利率市场化对公司现金持有的影响,研究发现:利率市场化与公司现金持有水平呈正相关关系;利率市场化没有通过融资约束路径影响公司现金持有,而是经由公司治理效应路径在抑制超额持现的过度投资、增加公司现金持有水平的同时,增加了企业的研发投入;利率市场化对公司现金持有的影响在非国有企业、成长性高的企业和违约风险高的企业中更加明显,并且利率市场化下的现金持有行为对企业价值的提升作用主要存在于现金持有水平较低的样本。     

公司现金持有、产权性质与投资效率

本文考察了公司现金持有对投资不足和过度投资的影响。研究结果表明,公司现金持有增加有助于缓解公司投资不足。相比于国有企业,现金持有增加对民营企业投资不足的降低作用更为显著。在融资约束程度较高的民营企业中,这种缓解作用更为明显。超额现金持有则会加剧公司过度投资,从而降低公司效率。相比于民营企业,超额现金持有对国有企业投资效率的负向影响更大。同时,在代理成本较大的国有企业和融资约束程度较低的民营企业中,这种负向影响更为显著。本文的结论同时支持现金持有的预防动机和代理动机。     

中国上市公司高额现金持有动因研究——代理理论抑或权衡理论

对上市公司为何会连续几年持有大量高额现金这种令人困惑的现象,财务理论上有代理理论和权衡理论这两种截然不同的解释。本文以174家在1998—2000年连续3年持有高额现金的上市公司作为研究样本,通过验证高额现金持有的决定因素及其给企业业绩的影响,来回答我国企业的高额现金持有行为可以用何种理论解释。本文认为与代理理论相比,权衡理论更适合用来解释我国企业的高额现金持有行为。我们认为为了更好地维护现金安全,提高企业的资金使用效率,从源头上解决我国企业高现金持有问题,今后更多的应该是从减少企业融资成本、增加投资渠道入手。     

管理者过度自信对现金持有量的影响——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文选取2006—2010年沪深两市的公司为样本,实证分析了高管人员过度自信与现金持有决策的关系。结果发现,管理者的自信程度与现金持有显著正相关,证明管理者的过度自信是影响企业现金持有行为的一个重要因素,丰富和拓展了企业现金持有影响因素的研究。     

内部治理与企业现金持有相关性研究综述

现金资源与企业的经营业绩密切相关,其对企业的经营、投资、筹资等各方面的行为都有着重大影响,是企业至关重要的财务资源。合理的现金持有综合反映了公司的财务战略,是企业重要的理财行为,对公司价值有重要的影响。随着学术探讨的不断深入,内部治理对企业现金持有的影响越来越为人们所关注,通过对以往研究文献的整理,希望能发现当前研究存在的不足,为完善该方面的研究提供参考。     

内部治理与企业现金持有相关性研究综述

现金资源与企业的经营业绩密切相关,其对企业的经营、投资、筹资等各方面的行为都有着重大影响,是企业至关重要的财务资源。合理的现金持有综合反映了公司的财务战略,是企业重要的理财行为,对公司价值有重要的影响。随着学术探讨的不断深入,内部治理对企业现金持有的影响越来越为人们所关注,通过对以往研究文献的整理,希望能发现当前研究存在的不足,为完善该方面的研究提供参考。     

产业政策影响了公司现金持有吗?

探讨宏观经济政策对微观企业行为的影响是近年来的研究热点,本文基于2007～2017年中国全部A股上市公司的财务数据,探讨了产业政策对公司现金持有水平及其产品市场竞争效应的影响。研究发现,被产业政策扶持与引导的行业的公司持有现金水平会更低,被扶持与引导的行业的公司现金持有的市场竞争效应也更为显著,这是因为产业政策能使被其扶持的企业有更优良的投资环境,由此公司现金持有可以充分发挥其竞争效应;进一步区分产权性质,发现被产业政策扶持与引导的行业的民企现金持有竞争效应更显著,而被产业政策扶持与引导的行业的国企现金持有竞争效应无显著差异。本文为更好地了解产业政策的实施效果和企业根据宏观环境变动调整应对策略提供了经验证据。     

现金管理的最佳境界

学过帐务管理的人肯定知道，一个公司在任何时候都要保贸一定的现金结存额，这是为了满足三方面的动机：即交易动机、预防动机和投资动机。不管是哪一种动机，其实就是同一个目的、即保证公司在任何需要的时候有随时可动用的现金资产。所以问题的关键在如何能使公司的现金随用随有。传统的解决办法是公司在帐上随时保留足够的现金结存。但公司持有现金是有成本的，主要有三方面成本：管理成本、短缺成本和机会成本。管理成本是指公司对结存现金资产进行管理而支付的代价，这一成本与公司现金结存水平没有明显的关系。短缺成本是由于公司缺乏必要的现金资产而使公司蒙受的损失。比如丧失折扣优惠等。机会成本是指公司由于保持现金结存而放弃的一些获利机会，比如进行高收益投资等。当公司有远大的发展前景而不能使用作为备用的结存现金时，持有现金的机会成本是相当大的。     

产品市场竞争影响企业现金持有量吗?——基于掠夺理论的实证研究

文章根据掠夺理论来考察产品市场竞争对企业现金持有量的影响。结果表明:垄断性行业中的企业会持有更多的现金以防备潜在的掠夺风险,而且这样的效应在高成长性行业中更加显著;将公司治理因素纳入分析之后的结果同样表明这些企业确实会基于防范掠夺风险的动机而不是代理冲突而持有更多的现金。另外,文章还发现:位于垄断性行业中的企业具有较高的现金-现金流敏感度,其持有较多的现金有利于应对竞争对手增加投资的掠夺行为。     

First-mover advantage,time to finance,and cash holdings

We examine the strategic role of cash in a two-stage competition model featuring a first-mover advantage in product markets and time delays in outside financing. Due to the joint effect of the first-mover advantage, time to finance, market profitability, participation cost, and the arrival rate of investment opportunities, large cash holdings can arise in equilibrium in both concentrated and diffuse industries, leading to a rich relation between industry concentration and cash holdings. The model also reveals novel interactions of these drivers of cash holdings that are consistent with empirical evidence. Furthermore, despite that cash is held to enable fast responses to investment opportunities, the correlation between cash holdings and realized investment is low. Our model provides an explanation for the large variation in cash holdings across industries and over time, and the strong correlation between cash holdings and R&D.     

Information Asymmetry and Corporate Cash Holdings

This study analyzes the effect of information asymmetry on corporate cash holdings. Using various measures of information asymmetry, this study shows that companies that operate in environments with higher information asymmetry have smaller cash holdings. This study continues to find a negative relationship between information asymmetry and corporate cash holdings from a battery of sensitivity analyses, including the tests using different regression methods and the difference‐in‐difference tests employing brokerage‐firm merger and closure events. On the whole, the results support the monitoring cost hypothesis of cash holdings over the investment opportunities hypothesis.     

Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

In this paper, we explore the relation between the banking sector's risk-taking and a firm's investment (“corporate investment”). Specifically, we ask whether firms' cash holdings moderate the effect of the banking sector's risk-taking on corporate investment. Based on a panel sample of publicly listed non-financial firms in 15 EU countries during the period 1990–2015, we document several key findings. First, both cash holdings and the banking sector's risk-taking are positively associated with corporate investment. Second, bank loan growth, which roughly captures the supply of bank credit, is not related to corporate investment. Third, firms with smaller cash holdings disproportionately invest more than do firms with larger cash holdings during periods of higher risk-taking by the banking sector.     

CEO overconfidence and corporate cash holdings

This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.     

Effects of financial constraints on corporate policies in Australia

We jointly study the impact of financial constraints on Australian companies’ investment decisions and demand for liquidity. By examining a large sample of Australian firms over the period 1990–2003, we find that financial constraints not only reduce the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds, but also increase the responsiveness of cash holdings to internally generated cash flows. Further analysis shows that the impact of financial constraints varies across different cash flow states; that is, financial constraints have a small effect on corporate investment and cash policies when cash flows are positive. In contrast, the severity of constraints is high in negative cash flow years in which the cost disadvantage of external finance coincides with deteriorating operating performance.     

Parent-subsidiary investment layers and the value of corporate cash holdings

Our study investigates whether agency costs arising from organizational structure in terms of the number of investment layers which connect the parent firm and its lowest-tiered subsidiaries within the corporate pyramid are associated with the value of cash holdings. Using a sample of Taiwanese publicly traded firms, we find that a change of a dollar in cash holdings is associated with less than a dollar change in market value. In line with our expectation, we find that the marginal value of cash decreases with the number of investment layers, supporting the agency theory of excess cash holdings. We also find that the negative association between the number of layers and the value of cash holdings is stronger for firms with high deviation between cash flow and voting rights and for family-controlled firms.     

Cash-rich firms and carbon emissions

We investigate whether corporate cash holdings affect carbon dioxide emissions. Using a sample of 5402 firm-years observations from 943 U.S. firms during 2007–2017, we find that carbon emissions are lower in firms with higher corporate cash holdings. The effect of cash holdings on carbon emissions is more pronounced in firms with low leverage and less financial constraints. Our channel analysis further unveils that renewable energy consumption and carbon abatement investment are higher in cash-rich firms, which transmit lower carbon emissions. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies and alternative measures of cash holdings and carbon emissions. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence on the role of corporate cash holdings in mitigating carbon emissions.     

Why Do Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from EMU Countries

This paper investigates the determinants of corporate cash holdings in EMU countries. Our results suggest that cash holdings are positively affected by the investment opportunity set and cash flows and negatively affected by asset's liquidity, leverage and size. Bank debt and cash holdings are negatively related, which supports that a close relationship with banks allows the firm to hold less cash for precautionary reasons. Firms in countries with superior investor protection and concentrated ownership hold less cash, supporting the role of managerial discretion agency costs in explaining cash levels. Capital markets development has a negative impact on cash levels, contrary to the agency view.     

Cash holdings and bond returns around takeovers

Using a large sample of 2712 unique U.S. domestic takeovers over the period 1993 to 2014, we show a negative relation between the level of cash holdings and post-announcement corporate bond returns. Our findings support the agency cost of cash holdings view and show that bondholders and shareholders share the same interests with respect to cash policy around takeovers. We further find that cash holdings are viewed less negatively by bondholders in firms with strong shareholders. This paper is the first to document the role of cash holdings on bondholder wealth around takeover announcements.     

Corporate precautionary cash holdings

This paper models the precautionary motive for a firm's cash holdings. A two-period investment model shows that the cash holdings of financially constrained firms are sensitive to cash flow volatility because financial constraints create an intertemporal trade-off between current and future investments. When future cash flow risk cannot be fully diversifiable, this intertemporal trade-off gives constrained firms the incentives of precautionary savings: they increase their cash holdings in response to increases in cash flow volatility. However, there is no systematic relationship between cash holdings and cash flow volatility for unconstrained firms. We test the empirical implications of our theory using quarterly information from a sample of U.S. publicly traded companies from 1997 to 2002, and find that the empirical evidence supports our theory.