债务融资治理效应实证研究——基于三大债务结构的视角

本文以截至2009年12月31日发行过公司债券的上市公司为样本,以2005-2009年为时间窗口,从债务来源的角度,对比研究了银行债权、商业信用与公司债券融资的治理效应.研究发现,三种债务结构均对公司的债权治理效应影响很弱.     

国有股权、债务结构与大股东利益侵占

利用2010—2012年我国A股市场国有上市公司数据,研究了债务融资及其不同的组成部分在治理大股东侵占中小股东利益方面的作用。研究发现,债务融资与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著负向关系,即国有企业债务融资行为对大股东利益侵占具有治理作用;短期借款、非公开债务与公开债务均与国有企业大股东利益侵占呈显著正向关系、长期借款却无法充分发挥其治理作用。其政策含义是,债务融资在治理大股东对国有上市公司利益侵占时,应当关注短期借款以及债务的布置结构所带来的不利影响。     

浅析我国上市公司债务融资现状及优化对策

上市公司的债务融资对公司治理具有正面效应,但我国上市公司债务融资对公司治理效应发挥的作用比较薄弱.文章通过分析我国上市公司的债务融资现状,找到其问题和可能的原因,并提出一些优化对策.     

债务融资行为对亏损上市公司财务价值的驱动研究

文章研究了债务融资行为的三种特征(债务融资期限、债务融资方式和债务融资规模)对亏损上市公司财务价值的驱动路径和驱动机理。实证结果表明,债务融资期限结构对亏损上市公司的财务价值同时存在侵害和治理两种效应,并且随着流动负债比例的增加,亏损上市公司的财务价值表现出先升后降的趋势;从债务融资方式来看,银行借款的债务融资方式对亏损上市公司的财务价值也同时存在侵害效应和治理效应,但利用商业信用和临时性占用款进行债务融资的方式对亏损上市公司财务价值产生明显的反向驱动效应;债务融资规模对亏损上市公司的财务价值也同时存在正向和反向两种驱动效应,同样,随着负债比率的增加,亏损上市公司的财务价值也表现出先升后降的趋势。     

用自己的钱还是用别人的钱创新?——基于中国上市公司融资结构与公司创新的研究

中国上市公司是否对创新融资存在显著的选择偏好?本文利用2006～2010年中国上市公司的经验数据研究发现:(1)内源融资、外源融资对公司创新投资均存在显著的正面影响,但外源融资对创新投资的促进效应大于内源融资。(2)进一步考察股权融资、债权融资、政府补助三种外源融资对公司创新的影响可以发现,政府补助最能够显著提高中国上市公司创新投资,股权融资的影响次之,债权融资则不明显。(3)政府补助对债权融资与公司创新投资之间的关系存在显著的调节效应,政府补助可以"刺激"上市公司通过债权融资提高公司创新投资。本文对中国上市公司创新融资的内在逻辑进行了深入探讨,在一定程度上为国家促进企业自主创新和推动资本市场发展提供了理论依据与决策参考。     

优化资本结构发挥债务融资在公司治理中的效应

资本结构是公司长期债务资本和权益资本的构成比例。公司治理是处理公司股东、债权人、管理者等不同利益关系人之间关系，以实现经济目标的一整套制度安排。在公司治理方面，债权和股权不仅被看作是融资工具．还被认为是不同的治理结构，他们均对公司形成控制权，共同构成公司治理结构的基本内容。我国上市公司的资本结构中债务资本比例偏低．且对公司治理的作用有限。本文从优化资本结构出发。探讨债务融资在公司治理中的效应。     

债务融资与公司价值——基于内生性视角的经验证据

本文选取2006年沪深A股372家上市公司为数据样本,从相关变量之间的内生性角度出发,研究中国上市公司的治理机制中债务融资与公司价值的相互关系,实证研究结果表明,债务融资与公司价值是内生地相互决定的,且相互负相关,债务融资并没有发挥债务治理积极的作用.     

媒体报道对权益成本和债务成本的影响及其差异——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

近年来,媒体的公司治理作用引起了越来越多的研究关注。本文以资本成本为着眼点,利用中国沪深A股上市公司2006-2008年的面板数据实证分析了媒体报道水平对降低公司权益成本和债务成本的积极作用。研究结果发现,媒体报道能够显著降低中国上市公司的权益成本和债务成本,即上市公司受到媒体的报道越多,其股权融资或债务融资所需支付的成本就越低。而且,本文进一步发现,媒体报道对上市公司权益成本的影响要显著大于对债务成本的影响。     

内部控制与企业债务融资综述

我国上市公司当前普遍面临着不合理的债务期限结构以及过高的债务融资成本。内部控制作为公司治理的重要内容,能够保证企业信息生成的质量,从而有效缓解委托人与受托人之间的信息不对称。高质量的内部控制能显著提高财务信息的质量,缓解企业与债权人之间的信息不对称,进而降低融资成本。本文在对国内外研究内部控制与企业债务融资关系的文献进行评述的基础上,对内部控制对上市公司债务融资的作用机理进行探讨,并提出进一步研究的思路与方向。     

纺织业上市公司债务融资治理效率的实证分析

债务不仅是一种融资工具,同时还具有很好的公司治理作用。债务不仅能改善公司治理,还能增加公司价值。文章在理论研究的基础上,结合具体的实证研究方法,分析了纺织业上市公司的债务融资治理效率,并就我国纺织业上市公司如何加强债务融资的治理效率提出一些建议和改进措施。     

The impact of divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt

This paper examines the debt ownership structure of firms with corporate governance problems associated with the divergence in the controlling shareholders' voting and cash-flow rights. Previous studies suggest that debt can play an important role in mitigating corporate governance problems. However, not all debt can effectively manage the corporate governance problems associated with the financing of poorly governed firms. In this study, we find that firms with higher divergence in voting and cash-flow rights use significantly more bank debt financing. Moreover, the effect of the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt is greater in countries with weaker legal protection for investors. Overall, our findings suggest that bank debt has a comparative advantage in financing poorly governed firms.     

高管薪酬激励会关注债权人利益吗?——基于我国上市公司债务期限约束视角的经验证据

我国债权人利益司法保护体系尚不完善而产生的信贷约束,对上市公司的各项决策均产生了不同程度的影响。本文从这一特殊制度背景出发,研究了债务期限约束对上市公司高管薪酬激励强度的影响,研究发现债务期限约束强度与高管薪酬业绩敏感性负相关;对国有企业而言,其"天然的政治关系"消除了债务期限约束的负面影响,相反随着债务期限约束的弱化高管激励强度逐渐增强。研究结果表明,在信贷强约束条件下,公司制定高管薪酬契约过程中会关注债权人利益,降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性,削弱管理层风险转移的动机;而在信贷软约束时,债务融资的这种治理功能将受到限制。     

债务结构优化与企业创新——基于企业债券融资视角的研究

本文在我国保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景下,从债券融资的视角,探讨债务结构优化对企业创新的影响。研究发现,债券融资与企业创新之间显著正相关,表明债券融资优化企业债务结构、提升企业创新能力的积极作用占据主导地位。进一步研究表明:(1)债券融资能够通过降低整体债务融资成本并延长整体债务期限促进企业创新;(2)债券融资对于银行贷款存在溢出效应,即企业通过债券融资,还能降低银行贷款利率、延长银行贷款期限,进而促进企业创新;(3)产品市场竞争和代理问题会在一定程度上削弱债券融资对企业创新的促进作用;(4)不同类型的债券对企业创新能力的作用存在异质性,债券发行的便利性是其影响企业创新的一个重要因素。     

地方政府债务、金融营商环境与实体企业融资约束

文章基于"财政金融关联"视角,利用2015至2020年省级层面的面板数据,实证检验了地方政府债务、金融营商环境与实体企业融资约束三者间的作用效果.研究结果表明:地方政府债务与企业融资约束存在正向推高关系,而良好的金融营商环境对实体企业融资约束存在负向抑制关系;异质性检验显示,地方政府债务对民营实体企业、中西部实体企业融资约束的推高作用更强;交互效应结果显示,金融营商环境的优化能有效缓解地方政府债务对实体企业融资约束的推高作用.因此,提出改善地区金融营商环境、对差异化企业性质实施优惠帮扶政策以及严控地方政府隐性债务增量是缓解实体企业融资困境,促进地区经济平稳发展的重要措施.     

Exploring the Agency Cost of Debt: Evidence from the ISS Governance Standards

Corporate governance is usually viewed in the context of strengthening shareholder rights and enhancing shareholders’ welfare. However, the impact of corporate governance on bondholders is much less understood. We explore how corporate governance influences the cost of debt financing. Using broad governance metrics encompassing fifty governance attributes reported by The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we document that stronger corporate governance is associated with a higher cost of debt. As governance strengthens by one standard deviation, the cost of debt rises by as much as 11 %. The results are robust even after controlling for both firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. Our results are important because they suggest that corporate governance has a palpable effect on critical corporate outcomes such as credit ratings and bond yields. More importantly, we show that, while corporate governance may mitigate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, it appears to exacerbate the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders (the agency cost of debt).     

MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP,TAKEOVER DEFENSES,AND DEBT FINANCING

We examine the effect of agency conflicts on debt financing and show that managerial ownership and its interaction with takeover defenses affect these decisions. We find that (1) the relation between leverage and takeover defenses becomes insignificant when we control for the interaction of these defenses with managerial ownership, and (2) firms with large managerial ownership operate at high debt levels unless they have a large number of takeover defenses. Therefore, a two‐dimensional aspect of governance that includes the interaction between managerial ownership and takeover defenses is useful in understanding the effect of agency conflicts on firms' debt financing decisions.     

Do shareholder protection and creditor rights have distinct effects on the association between debt maturity and ownership structure?

This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by country-level governance factors that enhance outside monitoring by minority shareholders and debtholders. Our investigation is based on a dataset of 50,599 firm-year observations from 38 countries. We use a propensity-score matching approach and find that the effect of ownership concentration on debt maturity is conditional to country-level governance attributes. Ownership concentration has a negative effect on debt maturity in countries where both shareholder protection and creditor rights are weak. Ownership concentration, however, tends to lengthen debt maturity as protection increases, and this positive effect on the length of debt maturity is stronger in countries enhancing protection towards debtholders (instead of shareholders). We also explore other characteristics of ownership structure, such as the identity and presence of controlling shareholders. These results corroborate the view that entrenched shareholders may use debt maturity opportunistically. Our study provides new insights into the interplay between firm- and country-level governance mechanisms and a deeper understanding of cross-country differences in the association between ownership structure and debt financing.     

政策不确定性与企业债务融资的实证研究——来自地级市层面的证据

采用2008-2015年各地级市主政官员(市长或者市委书记)更替事件作为政策不确定性的代理变量,实证检验地方主政官员更替产生的政策不确定性对企业债务融资产生的影响,并进一步考察银行关联和政治关联的作用。研究发现：存在政策不确定性时,企业会显著降低债务融资水平,且这种影响对短期债务融资水平的影响更为显著。进一步考察结果发现：建立政治关联或者银行关联的企业政策不确定性对企业债务融资水平的影响更低。     

Fetching better deals from creditors: Board busyness,agency relationships and the bank cost of debt

In a cross-country setting, we document that busy boards of directors (i.e., outside directors with multiple directorships) enhance a bank's financing capacity by lowering its cost of debt, which is consistent with the signalling quality hypothesis. Our analysis further reveals that this negative association is more pronounced in conventional banks than their Islamic counterparts. Possibly owning to the distinctive governance structure and the complexity of the Islamic business model, which requires closer monitoring, Muslim debtholders might depreciate a busy board of directors as it is likely to associate with lower scrutinising effectiveness. Our results provide a positive counterpoint to the negative relationship that exists between busy directors and firm performance, and contributes to understanding the indispensable role busy boards play in debt financing.