非均衡市场下房地产寡头产量竞争研究

在非均衡市场下建立房地产寡头产量竞争动态博弈模型,并分别用理论和数值模拟的方法对其演化加以分析。研究表明,在区域市场非均衡条件下,房地产寡头可以通过重复博弈达成产量竞争均衡;在房地产开发生产技术、管理水平的特定阶段和稳定的税赋政策下,市场供需的非均衡状态和地价房价比决定区域房地产寡头产量博弈的均衡解、均衡稳定性和均衡演化路径,从而决定房地产供给市场的类型。政府宜采取地价房价比控制、市场供需结构调节和税收调整同步的方式调控房地产市场,政策效果相得益彰。     

基于古诺模型与斯塔尔伯格模型的寡头垄断市场分析——以我国家电连锁企业为案例

本文通过双寡头及多头竞争中的古诺模型和斯塔尔伯格模型的比较,阐释了在寡头垄断市场中,厂商选择同时设定产量(同时博弈)还是产量领导(序贯博弈),对寡头利润会产生影响。另外寡头市场中企业数量的多少也会对厂商利润产生影响。并运用古诺均衡和斯塔尔伯格均衡讨论我国家电连锁企业发展现状及改进方向。     

三网融合背景下有线电视网络的业务竞争定价研究

三网融合后,有线电视网络已由区域垄断视频业务转变为与电信运营商在融合业务范围内开展寡头竞争。本文通过对三网融合背景下有线电视网络的视频、语音和数据业务竞争进行建模分析得到各类业务均衡价格与双侧用户的交叉网络外部性、同侧用户的网络外部性、用户需求价格弹性和运营成本等要素的性态关联,从而为各类业务定价作指导。     

三网融合背景下有线电视网络的业务竞争定价研究

三网融合后,有线电视网络已由区域垄断视频业务转变为与电信运营商在融合业务范围内开展寡头竞争。本文通过对三网融合背景下有线电视网络的视频、语音和数据业务竞争进行建模分析得到各类业务均衡价格与双侧用户的交叉网络外部性、同侧用户的网络外部性、用户需求价格弹性和运营成本等要素的性态关联,从而为各类业务定价作指导。     

浅析电信重组后的市场结构调整——以合作竞争视角分析

我国电信企业重组和"全业务"竞争时代的开启,使得电信市场结构面临新一次的调整。由于电信重组前各家电信运营商发展不均衡,使得重组后三家电信运营商在通信基础设施规模上的差异越发突出,由此带来了基础设施重复建设进而造成资源浪费、利用效率低下、建设成本过高等问题。本文运用古诺及共享博弈模型,对重组后的企业行为进行博弈分析,得出只有当博弈双方在共享基础设施的量上实现对等时,博弈均衡结果为双方均共享。所以在重组初期阶段解决这个问题的一个有效方法就是合作竞争理论中关联联盟这个组织形式。     

浅析电信重组后的市场结构调整——以合作竞争视角分析

我国电信企业重组和"全业务"竞争时代的开启,使得电信市场结构面临新一次的调整。由于电信重组前各家电信运营商发展不均衡,使得重组后三家电信运营商在通信基础设施规模上的差异越发突出,由此带来了基础设施重复建设进而造成资源浪费、利用效率低下、建设成本过高等问题。本文运用古诺及共享博弈模型,对重组后的企业行为进行博弈分析,得出只有当博弈双方在共享基础设施的量上实现对等时,博弈均衡结果为双方均共享。所以在重组初期阶段解决这个问题的一个有效方法就是合作竞争理论中关联联盟这个组织形式。     

创新驱动下商誉投资与动态产品创新决策

为探讨创新驱动下企业商誉与产品创新动态投资决策问题，构建了企业生产运营与营销的非合作微分博弈模型，分析企业定价及投资的反馈纳什均衡策略与最优时间演化路径。结果表明，质量与广告投资的演化路径单调，而商誉与价格的路径非单调。广告反馈纳什均衡策略随商誉与产品质量的提升而增长，价格敏感度与品牌重视度正向影响广告投资水平，与质量意识相反。产品创新投资策略在反馈纳什均衡及成本恒定条件下不随商誉和产品质量的变动而变动，而产品创新投资随品牌重视度和质量意识正向变动，与价格敏感度呈反向关系，此外，定价策略随产品质量、商誉、品牌重视度及质量意识的提升而增长，随价格敏感度的提升而下降。企业调控定价与投资决策以提升消费者需求与竞争力。     

基于进化博弈的电信企业监管应用研究

基于进化博弈理论,本研究对电信企业与监管机构间的博弈关系进行探讨。通过对均衡结果的比较分析,得出:博弈两方的收益大小受到策略选择比例大小影响,当决策行为侧重于企业长远利益时,企业才有可能获得更高收益。     

征信视角下小微企业融资的演化博弈分析

小微企业在经济发展中起着非常重要的作用,但其融资难问题一直没有得到有效解决.运用演化博弈分析的方法,对商业银行和小微企业两大类主体的信贷市场进行分析,并在加入征信机构后了解博弈双方的决策行为对其博弈均衡的影响.得到的基本结论是:商业银行和小微企业在博弈过程中合作与否,取决于对方行为策略的选择,而且最终与演化稳定策略和鞍点的大小有关;征信机构参与下的小微企业融资更有效率,会让博弈双方达到最优的演化均衡状态.在此基础上,提出了助力小微企业融资的政策建议.     

论博弈均衡与随机稳定状态

以均衡思想演化为主线,从内涵、性质及稳定性等方面全面地比较了非合作博弈理论与进化博彝理论的基本均衡概念--纳什均衡与进化稳定策略,在此基础上探讨了随机稳定状态在描述参与人行为演化的现实性,特别地给出了多常返状态随机稳定性的算法,例证并解释了严格劣策略会影响系统常返状态吸引域的宽度来影响随机稳定状态.     

Dynamic limit pricing

I study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one‐sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation involves setting prices such that the inefficient incumbent's profits from mimicking are negative. As the horizon increases or as firms become more patient, limit pricing becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in equilibrium.     

Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Liquidation equilibrium with seniority and hidden CDO

The aim of our paper is to price credit derivatives written on a single name when this name is a bank. Indeed, due to the special structure of the balance sheet of a bank and to the interconnections with other institutions of the financial system, the standard pricing formulas do not apply and their use can imply severe mispricing. The pricing of credit derivatives written on a single bank name requires a joint analysis of the risks of all banks directly or indirectly interconnected with the bank of interest. Each name cannot be priced in isolation, but the banking system must be treated as a whole. It is necessary to analyze the contagion of losses among banks, especially the equilibrium of joint defaults and recovery rates at liquidation time. We show the existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium. Then the standard pricing formulas are modified by adding a premium to capture the contagion effects.     

Steady-state equilibrium with state-dependent pricing

State-dependent pricing models are now an operational framework for quantitative business cycle analysis. The analysis in Ball and Romer [1991. Sticky prices as coordination failure. American Economic Review 81 (3), 539-552], however, suggests that such models may be rife with multiple equilibria, for in their static model, price adjustment is always characterized by complementarity, a necessary condition for multiplicity. We study existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium in a discrete-time state-dependent pricing model. We find only weak complementarity and no evidence of multiplicity. However, nonexistence of symmetric steady-state equilibrium with pure strategies arises in the region of the parameter space between flexible and sticky prices.     

First steps towards an equilibrium theory for Lévy financial markets

For a continuous-time financial market with a single agent, we establish equilibrium pricing formulae under the assumption that the dividends follow an exponential Lévy process. The agent is allowed to consume a lump at the terminal date; before that, only flow consumption is allowed. The agent’s utility function is assumed to be additive, defined via strictly increasing, strictly concave smooth felicity functions which are bounded below (thus, many CRRA and CARA utility functions are included). For technical reasons we require for our equilibrium existence result that only pathwise continuous trading strategies are permitted in the demand set. The resulting equilibrium asset price processes depend on the agent’s risk aversion (through the felicity functions). Even in our simple, straightforward economy, the equilibrium asset price processes will essentially only be (stochastic) exponential Lévy processes when they are already geometric Brownian motions. Our equilibrium asset pricing formulae can also be modified to obtain explicit equilibrium derivative pricing formulae.     

Inflation and output dynamics with state-dependent pricing decisions

This paper studies a state-dependent pricing model in which firms face a fixed cost of changing their pricing plans. A pricing plan specifies an entire sequence of time-varying future prices. Allowing firms to choose a pricing plan rather than a single price generates inflation inertia in the response of the economy to small changes in the growth rate of money. Allowing firms to choose when to change their pricing plan generates a non-linear response of inflation and output to small and large changes in the money growth rate. The non-linear solution method also reveals that the model generates an asymmetric response of output and inflation to monetary expansions and contractions.     

金融资产定价与普通商品定价的比较研究

站在时间的维度上,我们可以更加清楚地了解一般商品价格理论和金融资产价格理论的区别和内在联系。一般商品的价格理论是构建在个体和厂商之上的一般均衡分析,从时间的维度看,它是一种面向历史的分析范式。金融资产的定价则是建立在无套利均衡思想上的资本化定价,从时间的维度看,它是一种面向未来的分析范式。     

Alternate approach to unify CAPM and APT

We utilize the joint elliptical distribution to model a multi-factor return generating process and derive an equilibrium multi-beta capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in which the market portfolio and a set of nonelliptical factors are sufficient to price all financial assets. Most important, it is shown that the market portfolio, while generally nonelliptical, can proxy all elliptical factors and hence: including elliptical factors in addition to the market portfolio in the pricing equation contribute nothing to asset pricing. While the representative investor prices the exposure of aggregate wealth to various nonelliptical systematic risk factors, individual securities are priced in accordance to their contributions to different aspects of the risk of aggregate wealth. The present model collapses to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM when either the market investor is neutral to nonelliptical risk factors or when all risk factors follow a joint spherical distribution. When residuals cancel out of the market portfolio, the present model collapses to Conner (1984) pricing model.     

Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing

Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions. We envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real‐world accounting practices, including ones that confuse the relevance of variable, fixed, and sunk costs to pricing decisions. Firms follow “naive” adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies. Costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced. In some market structures, but not in others, this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions.