会计师事务所变更方向与审计意见的实证研究

会计师事务所变更是证券市场监管的一个重要问题,因为事务所变更往往被理解为审计意见购买.本文在细分会计师事务所变更类型的基础上,考察了不同事务所变更方向与审计意见之间的关系.本文以2007～ 2009年我国证券市场会计师事务所变更数据为样本,经研究发现,在控制其他影响审计意见的变量后,仅大所换为大所的变更对上市公司收到非标准无保留意见有显著影响,而其他三种变更类型对审计意见没有显著影响.     

会计师-客户关系与事务所变更

本文研究会计师-客户关系如何影响客户对事务所的选择。研究发现,如果负责某家上市公司年报审计业务的签字会计师不再为原事务所签字或离开原事务所,那么由该会计师负责签字的上市公司更换事务所的可能性显著提高。尤其是当签字会计师跳槽到另一家具有证劵审计资格的事务所时,客户变更事务所的可能性更高。进一步地,当两位签字会计师任期不同时,如任期较长的签字会计师不再为该客户签字,客户换所的可能性更高。这些结果表明,紧密的会计师-客户关系能够帮助事务所留住客户,对事务所而言具有重要价值。     

会计师事务所变更、分析师关注度与私有信息精度

上市公司会计师事务所变更事件对证券分析师的行为及预测精确度会产生什么样影响，是解读许多上市公司估值超常变更的关键。本文以2010-2019年分析师跟踪人数和私有信息精度数据为研究样本，结合上市公司会计师事务所变更信息，探讨了事务所变更对证券分析师行为的影响。研究结果发现：事务所变更事件会导致分析师减少对公司的跟踪，负向影响公司的市场关注度和估值；而仍保持跟踪的分析师则会加大信息收集和分析力度，增大私有信息精度。进一步的研究还发现，事务所、分析师和公司三个层面的异质性都会对上述关系产生影响：事务所从大所变更为小所的降级变更中，分析师的跟踪数量显著减少，而小所变更为大所的升级变更中，分析师的私有信息精度显著增大；相比明星分析师及来自大券商平台的分析师，非明星分析师和来自小券商平台的分析师呈现出明显的“重升弃降”特征；公司的国有属性和信息披露透明度可以缓解事务所变更带来的负面影响。     

我国上市公司变更会计师事务所情况的分析

我国上市公司变更会计师事务所的情况日益增多 ,本文为了探究上市公司变更会计师事务所受到哪些因素的影响 ,提了几个假设 ,并进行了实际的数据分析。研究结果表明 ,排除会计师事务所由于失去证券执业资格被更换的情况 ,会计师事务所出具过非标准无保留意见的审计报告以及会计师事务所与上市公司不在同一地域是影响上市公司变更会计师事务所的主要因素。     

2012年上市公司变更会计师事务所现状分析

上市公司更换会计师事务所的现象层出不穷,文章以2012年度更换会计师事务所的上市公司作为研究对象,对我国上市公司更换会计师事务所的情形进行分析,得出结论：上市公司后任会计师事务所的排名在前任会计事务所之前;处于财务困境的上市公司更倾向于变更会计师事务所,在变更会计师事务所后扭亏为盈的公司中有50％的上市公司曾处于财务困境;后任会计师事务所出具审计意见总体情况较前任会计师事务所有所改善.     

上市公司法律风险与审计收费——来自中国上市公司的经验证据北大核心

本文实证检验了法律风险对审计收费的影响。结果发现:上市公司的法律风险和审计收费显著正相关。进一步研究表明,国内会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费显著正相关,而由"四大"会计师事务所审计的上市公司,法律风险和审计收费相关性不显著。这可以用审计质量溢价来解释,比起国内会计师事务所,"四大"会计师事务所存在明显的审计质量溢价,在审计定价时,法律风险不是主要影响因素。     

企业集团统一审计能降低审计收费吗

审计收费是审计研究的重要问题。已有审计研究文献通常关注的是对单个公司的审计收费,本文则关注在同一实际控制人控制下的企业集团中,多家上市公司选择同一家会计师事务所审计,即集团统一审计对审计收费的影响。研究发现,集团统一审计不但不能降低审计收费,反而会增加审计收费;选择大所进行统一审计可以降低审计费用,而小所执行统一审计则可能存在牺牲独立性以获得更多审计收费的情形。此外,事务所尤其是小规模事务所,在招揽集团客户时存在激烈的低价竞争。     

上市公司变更会计师事务所的动因分析

证券市场的有效运行离不开独立审计,经会计师鉴证过的会计报表有利于提高会计信息的真实性和可靠性.但是,上市公司管理当局具有聘请会计师的选择权和决定权,当法律监管不严、审计行业过度竞争时,受某种利益驱使,上市公司就有可能利用其聘请选择权,通过变更会计师事务所的形式以实现其特定目的.因此,会计师事务所变更(以下简称“事务所变更”)可能影响会计师的独立性,从而影响审计质量和会计信息的可靠性.近几年来频繁发生的事务所变更问题已成为人们的关注热点.据统计,1997-2005年变更会计师事务所的上市公司数目,均超过当年上市公司总数的5％(表1),远超过国际成熟市场3％-4％的标准线.因此,本文拟探讨上市公司变更事务所的深层次原因.     

财务困境公司变更会计师事务所的实证研究

近年来,我国上市公司更换会计师事务所的现象逐年增多,上市公司的管理当局利用更换会计师事务所粉饰会计报表从而误导投资者的恶性案件也日益增多。证券市场中陷入财务困境的上市公司是一个独特的群体,他们具有更为强烈的动机变更会计师事务所,来隐藏其存在的重大问题,这极有可能给投资者带来巨大的损失。本文是在前人研究的基础上进一步深入分析了有哪些因素影响财务困境公司变更会计师事务所及这些因素与事务所变更有怎样的关系,并关注财务困境公司变更会计师事务所所传递的信息,洞察陷入财务困境的上市公司变更事务所行为背后的真实动机,为完善中国证券市场的运作,改善监管部门的措施提供依据与政策建议。一、研究现状Schwartz和Melon(1985),他们研究了濒临破产公司变更会计师事务所的动机。他们认为[1]公司陷入财务困境可能会影响会计师事务变更,因为财务困境容易引起下列现象:会计师事务所与客户容易在财务报告的列报方面产生分歧、预期会被出具保留意见、就审计收费高低而产生分歧、保险动机,而上述因素均容易导致会计师事务所变更。他们认为,对会计原则的恰当运用方面所产生的分歧和即将被出具保留意见将会使客户与其主审会计师事务所之间的关系变得紧张。在...     

上市公司变更会计师事务所的动因分析

<正>证券市场的有效运行离不开独立审计,经会计师鉴证过的会计报表有利于提高会计信息的真实性和可靠性。但是,上市公司管理当局具有聘请会计师的选择权和决定权,当法律监管不严、审计行业过度竞争时,受某种利益驱使,上市公司就有可能利用其聘请选择权,通过变更会计师事务所的形式以实现其特定目的。因此,会计师事务所变更(以下简称"事务所变更")可能影响会计师的独立性,从而影响审计质量和会计信息的可靠性。近几年来频繁发生的事务所变更问题已成为人们的关注热点。据统     

会计师事务所的行业专门化是一种有效的竞争战略吗?——来自中国审计市场的经验证据

会计师事务所的行业专门化可以被视为一种相对于非行业专家审计师的可持续的竞争优势。本文的经验结果表明:行业专门化的审计师会以目标集聚为基本战略,基于其差异化的能力在大客户市场上实施差异化的具体战略,而基于其规模经济优势在小客户市场上实施成本领先的具体战略;相对于非行业专家,行业专门化的事务所在大小客户市场上均能获得超额利润。这一经验结果支持行业专门化的发展道路可以成为会计师事务所行之有效的一种竞争战略。     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary switches to Chinese auditors in Hong Kong

Hong Kong market regulators have permitted 12 large Chinese accounting firms to audit the financial statements of Chinese firms that cross list in Hong Kong (i.e., H-share firms) since 2010. This paper examines the characteristics of H-share firms that voluntarily replaced their Hong Kong (HK) auditors with Chinese auditors, and the market reaction to auditor switches following this policy. We find that 38 out of 147 H-share firms voluntarily switched to Chinese auditors during 2011–2013. Switching firms are larger in size and are less likely to use Big4; they also have less need for external financing, a longer cross listing history, and a lower percentage of foreign revenue. We also find that investors negatively react to the auditor switches from HK non-Big4 to China non-Big4, but do not react to the auditor switches from HK Big4 to China Big4. This suggests that investors perceived lower audit quality for China non-Big4.     

监管风险、事务所规模与审计质量

我国会计师事务所规模与审计质量之间是否存在正相关关系,现有研究一直存在争议。本文从注册会计师的执业环境出发,对此进行了重新审视。用上市公司实际控制人的控制权与现金流权之差衡量事务所面临的监管风险,研究发现,大事务所只对监管风险较高的客户提供高质量的审计服务。进一步的研究表明,事务所面临的监管环境改善后,大事务所才对所有客户提供高质量的审计服务,审计质量与事务所规模之间的正相关关系不再依赖监管风险而存在。因此,在法律环境相对薄弱的情况下,加强监管是促使会计师事务所提供高质量审计服务的有效机制。     

Government and managerial influence on auditor switching under partial privatization

We investigate how auditor switching is affected by government influence, misalignment between type of auditor (government vs. private) and type of controlling shareholder (government vs. private), and misalignment between an incumbent auditor and imputed preferences of managers in a market characterized by continued substantial government ownership in listed entities. We exploit a natural policy and regulatory experiment in Iran that allows us to investigate what happens when previously government-owned entities are partially privatized as listed entities where, in many cases, the government retains significant ownership interests. At the same time, there were significant changes in the audit market, resulting in large increases in the number of private sector auditors competing for previously state-administered audits. We find the likelihood of auditor switches is strongly associated with measures of misalignment between type of auditor and type of controlling shareholder and auditor–managerial misalignment, but these associations are constrained by significant government influence. Exposing the constraining effect of significant government influence on auditor switching is an important contribution to our understanding of privatizations, government shareholder influence and auditor choice. These results have implications for policy development in other emerging and transition economies where privatization remains largely partial, and competition among private sector auditors is still emergent.     

Precision in auditing standards: effects on auditor and director liability and the supply and demand for audit services

Theoretical research suggests that large auditors have more incentive to issue accurate reports compared to small auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). Controlling for the client characteristics of large and small auditors, this paper shows that large auditors issue reports that are more accurate and more informative signals of financial distress. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of a positive relationship between auditor size and auditor accuracy.     

Client Importance and Auditor Independence: The Effect of the Asian Financial Crisis

This paper investigates the effect of the Asian financial crisis on the relationship between client economic importance and auditor independence. Using data from 1994 to 2001 in six Asian markets (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), we find that auditors are less likely to compromise their independence for important clients after a crisis. The result is consistent with Coffee's (2001) crash‐then‐law hypothesis and supports the notion that financial crisis triggers public concern over auditors’ independence. Furthermore, we find the effect of financial crisis on auditor independence is more pronounced in weaker investor protection regimes.     

Auditor objectivity as a function of auditor negotiation self-efficacy beliefs

This study empirically examines whether an auditor's perceived ability to negotiate discretionary accounting issues with clients (auditor negotiation self-efficacy) is related to auditor objectivity, and whether an auditor's negotiation self-efficacy has a greater impact on her objectivity when the auditor's accuracy motive (professional identity) is strong rather than weak. We tested the hypotheses using a cross-sectional survey design and obtained 146 responses from among 800 surveyed experienced Swedish auditors. The findings indicate that auditors with higher negotiation self-efficacy were more likely to make decisions on a material and discretionary accounting issue contrary to their clients' desires compared to auditors with lower self-efficacy. The relationship between negotiation self-efficacy and auditor objectivity was not moderated by professional-identity strength. These research findings suggest that recruiting and training auditors to increase their negotiation self-efficacy may be an effective method to enhance auditor objectivity without the problems inherent in other methods, such as auditor rotation. Our sample was obtained in Sweden, which allows long auditor tenures. We caution that, although our analysis controlled for auditor tenure, the effect of auditor negotiation self-efficacy may not be generalizable to countries that limit tenure through regulation.     

Does auditor designation by the regulatory authority improve audit quality? Evidence from Korea

In Korea, the regulatory authority designates external auditors for firms that are deemed to have strong incentives and/or great potential for opportunistic earnings management, and mandates these firms to replace their incumbent auditors with new designated auditors and to retain them for a certain period, typically one to three years. We call this regulatory regime ‘auditor designation’. This paper investigates whether the auditor designation rule in Korea is effective in deterring managers from making income-increasing earnings management. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the level of discretionary accruals is significantly lower for firms with designated auditors than firms with a free selection of auditors. We also find that firms with mandatory auditor changes (i.e., auditor designation) report significantly lower discretionary accruals compared to firms with voluntary auditor changes. The above findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that the auditor designation enhances audit quality and thus the credibility of financial reporting.     

Does Auditor Industry Specialization Improve Audit Quality?

This study examines whether auditor industry specialization, measured using the auditor's within‐industry market share, improves audit quality and results in a fee premium. After matching clients of specialist and nonspecialist auditors on a number of dimensions, as well as only on industry and size, there is no evidence of differences in commonly used audit‐quality proxies between these two groups of auditors. Moreover, there is no consistent evidence of a specialist fee premium. The matched sample results are confirmed by including client fixed effects in the main models, examining a sample of clients that switched auditors, and using an alternative proxy that aims to capture the auditor's industry knowledge. The combined evidence in this study suggests that the auditor's within‐industry market share is not a reliable indicator of audit quality. Nevertheless, these findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for auditors, but that the methodology used in extant archival studies to examine this issue does not fully parse out the effects of auditor industry specialization from client characteristics.     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: Evidence from China

As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.