基于FDIC实践的中国上市银行存款保险费率测算

本文以美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)实施存款保险制度框架为基础,测算中国各上市银行2011~2012年的存款保险费率和存款保险制度成本负担。结果表明,实施显性存款保险制度将显著增加银行的保险费负担,现阶段中国大范围推行显性存款保险制度存在一定的制度执行阻力;中国显性存款保险制度应当实现银行存款全覆盖,但应当分批参保,先在总体风险小的银行间推行,再在风险相对较高的银行间推行,以确保存款保险基金的保障能力;短期内高风险银行需要政府担保,但中国最终应当建立独立于政府的市场化显性存款保险制度。     

显性存款保险与隐性存款保险中的道德风险分析

在我国,自1993年提出要建立存款保险基金以来,存款保险制度已经酝酿研究了多年,作为一道金融安全网一直存在着争议,而且这项制度有着不可避免的道德风险,这引起了人们的关注和担心。因此研究存款保险制度带来的道德风险和道德风险对存款保险制度危害情况以及设计规避道德风险的方案变得紧迫。那么显性存款保险制度相对隐性存款保险中的道德风险是高是低。本文从这一问题出发,对显性存款保险与隐性存款保险制度下的道德风险进行分析,并且对二者之间的道德风险的高低进行了比较,最后得出中国应推出显性存款保险制度,来保障存款人的资金安全,以及来增加金融系统的稳定性。     

显性存款保险与隐性存款保险中的道德风险分析

在我国,自1993年提出要建立存款保险基金以来,存款保险制度已经酝酿研究了多年,作为一道金融安全网一直存在着争议,而且这项制度有着不可避免的道德风险,这引起了人们的关注和担心。因此研究存款保险制度带来的道德风险和道德风险对存款保险制度危害情况以及设计规避道德风险的方案变得紧迫。那么显性存款保险制度相对隐性存款保险中的道德风险是高是低。本文从这一问题出发,对显性存款保险与隐性存款保险制度下的道德风险进行分析,并且对二者之间的道德风险的高低进行了比较,最后得出中国应推出显性存款保险制度,来保障存款人的资金安全,以及来增加金融系统的稳定性。     

编织金融安全网——“存款保险国际论坛”综述

存款保险制度是保障经济健康发展的重要基础建设．是一国金融安全网的重要组成部分。上世纪80年代以来，系统性银行危机被及垒球，发达国家和发展中国家都受到严重威胁。为了避免金融危机的发生．减少金融危机造成的社会成本．各国都着手建立金融安全网。在金融安全网框架中．显性存款保险制度捍到了迅速推广。迄今为止，全球约有90个国家和地区建立了显性存款保险制度．     

我国显性存款保险制度的建立与国家制度环境

在研究我国是否建立显性存款保险制度的过程中,我国大部分学者都是将存款保险纳入委托———代理的框架中,研究如何通过存款保险制度的设计来避免由建立存款保险制度所带来的逆选择和道德风险问题。但是从德国存款保险制度的实践来看,尽管其设计中有许多地方会导致逆选择和道德风险的产生,德国却是世界上存款保险制度运行的最成功的国家之一。笔者认为,这是由于德国拥有使存款保险制度高效运行的制度环境的结果。因此,我国要建立存款保险制度,必须要采取制度先行的方法,即首先完善能使存款保险制度高效运行的制度环境,然后再考虑存款保险制度本身的制度设计问题。     

我国银行存款保险制度模式研究——基于一个博弈的视角

近年来,隐性存款保险制度愈发彰显出弊多利少的特征,制约了我国银行业的进一步发展。本文基于建立显性存款保险制度环境已具备,通过采用博弈模型就是否参加存款保险问题上分析了国有商业银行和中小银行之间的行为抉择,以及存款保险机构的职能问题进行了探讨,最终提出了我国理应不失时机地推出显性存款保险制度,坚持强制性投保与共同保险中的限额赔付相结合,以及实行简单差别费率及赋予监督职权的策略。     

我国建立存款保险制度的必要性及模式选择

存款保险制度具有稳定金融体系、保护存款人利益、降低金融风险等功能。本文从隐性存款保险制度的缺陷以及建立显性存款保险制度的重要性两方面分析了我国建立存款保险制度的必要性;并从存款保险组织机构的形式选择、存款保险范围及方式的确定、存款保险最高限额的确定以及存款保险费率的设定等方面,探讨了选择符合我国国情和经济发展状况的存款保险制度模式。     

我国存款保险制度的风险管控研究

目前,存款保险制度在我国刚刚建立,本文首先对存款保险制度运作机制进行了解读,根据银行风险度量的指标联系存款保险制度中的差别费率,认为差别费率可以根据银行不良贷款率、贷款损失准备占贷款总额的大小来最终确定。显性存款保险制度的道德风险问题普遍存在,对此提出风险管控建议。     

中国建立存款保险制度的国际经验

正在中国建立存款保险制度是业界期待多年的一项制度建设,党的十八届三中全会提出建立存款保险制度。在近日国务院批转发展和改革委员会《关于2014年深化经济体制改革重点任务的意见》中,建立存款保险制度又位列其中。目前全球已有超过半数的国家建立了显性的存款保险制度,而中国尚未建立该制度。作为建立存款保险制度的"后来者",中国若能有效借用国际镜鉴,可以做到少走弯路并降低改革成本。鉴于银行机构的系统重要性及其内在的脆弱性,建立显性的存款保险制度已成为多数国家的共识,其构建有助于保障储户利益和防范金融危机。美国智库彼得森     

我国显性存款保险制度若干问题的思考——基于中小银行视角

我国显性存款保险制度的构建应充分考虑中小银行的特殊情况,注重中小银行与大型银行在制度中的"实质公平",具体表现为保险标的的设计参照机动车辆责任险险种设置,保险费率的设计实行"有差别"的单一保费制度。我国显性存款保险制度中有利于中小银行的安排,可避免引发中小银行的"道德风险"问题。     

Market discipline and deposit insurance

Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline.     

Deposit insurance and international bank liabilities

This paper examines the responsiveness of external bank liabilities to deposit insurance policies for a sample of developed countries. External bank liabilities held by non-banks are found to increase after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. Deposit insurance schemes tend to exclude interbank deposits from coverage and the response of external interbank liabilities to deposit insurance appears to be varied. Neither external non-bank nor external interbank liabilities are found to be materially affected by deposit insurance design. This suggests that international competition in the area of deposit insurance design – as possible under the EU deposit insurance directive of 1994 – would be fruitless.     

The pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies

The paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis, despite of the potential moral hazard problems. We argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance, especially when the insured institution is insolvent. Applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option, we first derive a closed-form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Then, we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for. The properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk-based pricing scheme.     

Deposit insurance coverage,ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This “risk-minimizing” deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.     

存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后,全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐,2015年5月,我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据, 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担,表现为道德风险效应。此外,本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论,提出相关政策建议。。     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting

Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This paper seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk-shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.     

建立存款保险制度对地方性金融机构的影响研究——以延边州农村金融机构为例

建立存款保险制度是成熟市场经济国家的通行做法，我国存款保险立法的步伐也正在加紧。建立存款保险制度对地方性金融机构到底有何影响，本文以延边州农村金融机构为例，通过定性定量分析，提出若干建议，以期既能保证存款保险制度的适时推出，又尽可能减少政策对地方性金融机构的震动。     

Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.     

市场约束、显性存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于回归控制法的研究

基于我国利率市场化进程日趋完善和新推出显性存款保险制度的金融大背景,本文从市场约束与显性存款保险制度的视角,将显性存款保险制度政策视为一个“准自然实验”,采用2010~2016年的面板数据,研究了存款保险制度及其与市场约束的相互作用对银行风险承担的影响,并藉此评价了其政策效应。研究结果表明:(1)我国不同类别商业银行的两类市场约束效应存在较大差别。就价格约束效应而言,对地方银行显著有效,而对全国性银行和外资银行则不显著;就数量约束效应而言,三类银行均不显著。(2)基于回归控制法的估计结果表明,存款保险制度的实施对银行风险承担有显著的正向影响,且其对地方银行的冲击强于全国性银行。(3)进一步基于非线性双重差分的估计结果显示,存款保险制度显著弱化了市场约束对银行风险承担的负向影响,表明我国存款保险制度的政策影响逐渐开始发挥出来。