浅议上市公司大股东行为治理

大股东控制上市公司,通过对上市公司的利益侵占获取私人利益,财务报告舞弊是隐瞒大股东行为的手段。本文从大股东损害上市公司利益的现象着手,研究股权结构与舞弊之间的相关性,从股权制衡与培育大股东诚信义务方面提出了治理大股东行为的建议。     

浅议上市公司大股东行为治理

大股东控制上市公司,通过对上市公司的利益侵占获取私人利益,财务报告舞弊是隐瞒大股东行为的手段。本文从大股东损害上市公司利益的现象着手,研究股权结构与舞弊之间的相关性,从股权制衡与培育大股东诚信义务方面提出了治理大股东行为的建议。     

全流通市场中大股东交易的影响因素研究——基于股权结构的视角

全流通市场中的大股东交易问题日益成为关注的焦点。以2007年至2010年A股市场大股东交易作为研究对象,验证了股权结构对不同类型大股东交易行为的影响。研究结果显示控股股东净购买率与股权集中度显著负相关,与股权制衡度显著正相关;而非控股股东净购买率与股权集中度显著正相关,与股权制衡度显著负相关。这说明现有股权结构对控股股东和非控股股东交易行为的影响存在显著差异,而这种显著差异又将导致未来上市公司股权结构发生明显变化。     

上市公司董事会制度与股权结构研究

上市公司的董事会制度是其股权结构的实现形式,该形式缺陷的根源是其股权结构的不合理。文章从提高董事会监督效率和决策效率的角度,建模论证了在股权较集中的我国上市公司、构建多个大股东相互制衡的股权结构对完善董事会制度的必要性。     

上市公司内部控制审计信息披露质量研究——基于股权结构视角

本文以2011年A+H股上市公司披露的内部控制审计信息为依据,构建了上市公司内部控制审计信息披露质量评价体系,并设置了信息披露质量指数,旨在研究股权结构与上市公司内控审计信息披露质量的关系。研究结果表明,股权结构是决定上市公司内控审计信息披露质量的重要因素。具体而言,控股股东所持股份比例越大,内控审计信息披露质量越低;第二大股东对第一大股东、第二至第三大股东对第一大股东、第二至第五大股东对第一大股东的股权制衡度越大,内控审计信息披露质量越高。基于此,本文建议上市公司要不断优化股权结构,尽量避免一股独大局面出现,同时应当充分发挥其他大股东对控股股东的制衡和监督作用,阻碍控股股东操纵信息披露。     

监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究

本文通过扩展LLSV(2002)的模型,在监督与共谋的视角下分析了大股东之间分享控制权的治理模式对公司价值的影响,并利用2000—2004年间我国上市公司的样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现:(1)股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司价值之间均存在显著的正相关关系;(2)在不同股东性质的公司中,股权制衡的效果存在明显差异,尤其当第一、二大股东均属于非国有性质时,股权制衡难以发挥积极作用。这些研究结果表明其他大股东虽然能够起监督作用,但也可能与控股股东达成共谋以分享控制权收益。     

外汇风险敞口、股权集中度与财务风险——基于出口上市公司的实证研究

选取沪深A股2010—2015年出口上市公司为研究对象,实证分析外汇风险敞口、股权结构对财务风险的影响.研究结果发现:(1)外汇风险敞口越大财务风险越高,股权集中度越高财务风险越低,股权制衡度越高财务风险越低;(2)相对国有公司,民营公司外汇风险敞口对财务风险的影响更为显著,股权制衡度抑制财务风险;(3)进一步研究发现,当公司财务风险处于安全区时,外汇风险敞口越大财务风险越高,股权制衡度越高财务风险越低;当公司财务风险处于灰色区和破产区时,外汇风险敞口越大财务风险越低.     

浅议创业板上市公司股权结构与企业经营绩效关系

本文通过建立多元线性回归模型,对创业板上市公司股权结构与企业经营绩效的关系进行研究。实证结果发现:第一大股东持股比例与企业的经营绩效具有弱的正相关关系;提高股权制衡度有利于提高企业的经营绩效;增加管理层的持股比例能够提高企业的经营绩效。     

创新型企业股权结构与成长性的关系研究——基于沪深上市企业的实证检验

基于沪深上市的创新型企业2008～2010年的经验数据,以因子分析法所计算的企业成长性综合指数衡量创新型企业成长性,运用平衡面板数据固定效应模型,实证分析股权集中度、股权制衡度与股权性质三个股权结构维度对创新型企业成长性的影响。研究结果表明:股权集中度与企业成长性显著负相关,股权制衡度与企业成长性显著正相关,第一大股东性质为非国有股的企业成长性要显著好于第一大股东性质为国有股的企业成长性。并从改善和优化股权结构视角来推动创新型企业持续成长提出对策建议。     

股权结构与并购绩效的关系研究

在当前快速发展的经济形势下,畅通的资本流通渠道让更多的企业采取并购的方式来获取更多价值的提升,依托资本市场的并购重组在短时间内迅速的扩大企业的规模,实现既定的绩效目标。股权结构即所有权结构,在上市公司内部不同类型的股东所持有的股份数量是不一样的,这些不同类型股东之间形成的股份比例也有所不同,这种比例关系就是股权结构。上市公司股权结构的形成受多方面因素的影响,同时股权结构的形成也与该国证券市场的状况相关。本文主要从股权集中度、股权制衡度和第一大股东性质三个方面,阐述股权结构对上市公司并购绩效的影响,进一步提出优化股权结构和完美并购绩效的建议。     

从股权结构到股东关系

近80年来,国内外学者围绕股权结构问题开展了广泛且颇具影响力的研究。其中,对股权结构定性或定量的测度是所有研究开展的基础。本文系统总结了股权结构相关研究的内容、技术路线及对股权结构的刻画方式。分析表明,仅从产权维度和垂直方向认识股权结构及代理问题存在明显的局限和偏差。为此,本文从横向网络以及股东之间多种形式的契约出发,考察股东关系对公司产权分布体系的影响。在股东关系的框架下,我们重构了公司股东的产权、利益和势力结构,并用一套较详细且操作性较强的指标体系对股东关系进行了刻画。本文提出的"关系基础"的股权结构将为深化与拓展股权结构、公司治理和投资者保护等研究提供有益的帮助。     

股权制衡与公司业绩：理论与事实

运用中国上市公司2003年度的数据,比较股权制衡的公司与股权集中、股权分散公司经营业绩,得出股权制衡的公司业绩要好于股权分散和股权集的公司,因而股权制衡对上市公司绩效产生正面影响。     

Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support,board response,and market reaction

Although the owners of publicly traded companies have had the right to offer shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 for several decades, the effectiveness of the rule has been frequently questioned because few of these proposals received substantial support from other shareholders and even fewer have been implemented by boards. Using new data from the 2002–2004 proxy seasons, we analyze shareholder voting patterns on these proposals, board reactions to them, and market responses. We find some big changes from earlier periods: many more proposals are receiving majority shareholder support during our sample period relative to earlier studies, and this support has translated into directors implementing more of the actions called for by shareholders. In particular, boards are increasingly willing to remove important anti-takeover defenses, such as the classified board and poison pill, in response to shareholders' requests, something rarely seen in the past. Despite the increase in support for shareholder proposals and board action in response, we find small and insignificant stock market reaction. We conclude that shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have an emerging role in reducing agency costs by increasing director responsiveness to shareholder concerns to open the market more fully to corporate control.     

股权制衡与公司绩效关系研究——基于内外生双重视角的经验证据

以2007～2010年798家A股上市公司为样本,从股权结构外生和内生双重视角,探讨股权制衡与公司绩效的关系。结果表明,在外生性视角下,股权制衡对公司绩效有显著的促进作用,但促进作用的强弱与绩效指标的选取有关;考虑内生性的影响后,股权制衡对公司绩效的显著促进作用仍然存在,与外生性视角下的促进作用相比明显增强。研究还发现,公司绩效对股权制衡存在显著的正向反馈效应。     

Shareholder election of CSR committee members and its effects on CSR performance

We examine the election of directors to corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees and whether shareholder votes influence CSR committee effectiveness. Our study is motivated by the importance that shareholders place on CSR and the responsibilities of the board in overseeing a firm's CSR practices. We find that CSR committee members receive greater shareholder support than other directors. We further find that among CSR committee members, those who are more experienced and skilled receive greater shareholder support. Furthermore, when a firm's CSR performance is poorer (better), CSR committee members receive lower (greater) shareholder support compared with other directors. Finally, we find that through voting, shareholders can increase the efficacy of the CSR committee, leading to improvements in CSR committee structure and performance. Overall, our results suggest that shareholders value the services and expertise of CSR committee members and hold them accountable for CSR performance. Shareholder votes are also effective in enhancing CSR performance.     

股东提案权制度:美国的立法与启示

股东提案权制度使股东在一定条件下可向股东大会提出议案,从而更加积极地参与公司经营管理。美国是世界上最早确立该制度的国家,经过近70年的发展,很多规定已经颇为完善:对提案股东自身要求明确;对提案本身的形式有清晰的可操作性的界定;在公司对提案处理及违规的规定方面也形成了有力的约束。相比之下,我国关于股东提案权制度在提案股东资格限定、提案形式、提案排除及救济等方面存在缺陷。根据美国在相应方面的经验与启示,对我国股东提案权制度提出了改进建议。     

Trading and Shareholder Democracy

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.     

Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals

Shareholder proposals are a common form of shareholder activism. Voting for shareholder proposals, however, is nonbinding since management has the authority to reject the proposal even if it received majority support from shareholders. We analyze whether nonbinding voting is an effective mechanism for conveying shareholder expectations. We show that, unlike binding voting, nonbinding voting generally fails to convey shareholder views when manager and shareholder interests are not aligned. Surprisingly, the presence of an activist investor who can discipline the manager may enhance the advisory role of nonbinding voting only if conflicts of interest between shareholders and the activist are substantial.     

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans

This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross‐sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies.     

Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? The Case of the United Kingdom

A large number of studies have shown that many companies have made large acquisitions that their own shareholders probably would not have approved if given the opportunity to do so. In this article, which summarizes the findings of their study published recently in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors present evidence that suggests the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a corporate governance mechanism designed to prevent such value‐reducing acquisitions from taking place. The authors' study focused on acquisitions in the U.K. where proposed transactions that exceed a series of 25% relative size (target's as a percentage of the acquirer's) thresholds are defined as “Class 1” transactions and require shareholder approval. The authors found strikingly positive stock market reactions to the announcements of such Class 1 acquisitions—as compared to zero if not negative average announcement returns for Class 2 transactions that were not subject to a shareholder vote. And when the authors extended their analysis to U.S. M&A markets, they found that the larger (again, in relative size) U.S. deals—large enough that they would have required a shareholder vote in the U.K.—provided returns to their shareholders that were negative, and thus significantly lower than those of their U.K counterparts. In terms of the economic significance of their findings, the authors found that Class 1 transactions were associated with aggregate gains to acquirer shareholders of $13.6 billion. By contrast, U.S. transactions of similar size, which again were not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $210 billion for acquirer shareholders; and Class 2 U.K. transactions, also not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $3 billion. In a further series of tests designed to shed light on how mandatory shareholder voting generates such substantial value improvements for acquirer shareholders, the authors also found evidence suggesting that when faced with the requirement of a shareholder vote, CEOs and boards are more likely to resist the temptation to overpay to close a deal. And the fact that the shareholders of the Class 1 acquirers did not end up blocking a single transaction that was submitted to a vote suggests that this mechanism works without the need for shareholders to actually vote down a deal. In other words, mandatory shareholder voting on acquisitions is a powerful deterrent to “bad deals” because, first of all, the vote is triggered automatically by the relative size tests and, second, CEOs and boards, with the help of their bankers, have a pretty good idea well in advance of the vote whether their shareholders are going to vote “no”—and such a vote would be viewed by top management as a major rejection, a strong vote of no confidence.