Stock price behavior surrounding stock repurchase announcements: Evidence from Japan

This paper examines stock price behavior surrounding announcements of stock repurchases made by Japanese firms from 1995 to 1998. Our analysis shows that, much as in the case of the U.S. markets, stock prices in Japan go up in response to stock repurchase announcements. We also find that there is no significant difference between the market reaction to the announcement for intention of repurchase execution and the market reaction to the announcement of an article alteration to allow stock repurchases. On the other hand, there is a significant difference in the pre-announcement period returns motivating these two announcements. While a large decline in stock price will motivate a firm to execute a stock repurchase, a smaller price decline will motivate a firm to merely alter its articles of association to allow future repurchases.     

THE INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET SHARE REPURCHASES: CONTAGION OR COMPETITIVE?

We examine the extent to which announcements of open market share repurchase programs affect the valuation of competing firms in the same industry. On average, although firms announcing open market share repurchase programs experience a significantly positive stock price reaction at announcement, portfolios of rival firms in the same industry experience a significant and contemporaneous negative stock price reaction. This suggests that perceived changes in the competitive positions of the repurchasing firms occur at the expense of rival firms and dominate any signals of favorable industry conditions. Thus, the competitive intra-industry effects of open market repurchases outweigh any contagion effects. In addition, cross-sectional tests indicate that these competitive effects are more pronounced in industries characterized by a lower degree of competition and less correlation between the stock returns of the repurchasing firm and its rivals.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCEMENTS OF R&D EXPENDITURE INCREASES

We examine the effect of announcements of plans to increase R&D expenditures on the stock price of rival firms. We test two alternative hypotheses: the first-to-innovate hypothesis versus the free-rider of spillovers hypothesis. Analysis of 114 announcements of increases in R&D expenditures indicates that rival firms suffer a statistically significant negative abnormal return at announcement, which supports the first-to-innovate hypothesis. This result provides a rationale for the potentially costly voluntary disclosure of R&D expenditures. A cross-sectional analysis of the abnormal returns to rival firms reveals that a highly credible announcement has some spillover effects, and that the rival firm earns a much smaller but positive abnormal return. An important implication is that it is always strategically beneficial for the firm to disclose its future R&D plan.     

Open-Market Stock Repurchase and Stock Price Behavior When Management Values Real Investment

This paper provides a simple explanation of open‐market stock repurchases and the stock price behavior surrounding them. There is ex ante asymmetry of information with regard to the private benefits that corporate managers can attain from real investments. In our model, open‐market repurchase announcements reveal information about the managers' private benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm values. This study differs from previous studies in that we show that announcements of open‐market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the announcements are commitments. Empirically, the model simultaneously predicts that a stock price will drop prior to an open‐market repurchase announcement and will rise in response to the announcement. These predictions are consistent with stylized facts.     

Stock Returns and Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements

Recent studies document stock price underreactions and overreactions. This evidence is extended by studying open-market stock repurchase announcements. Repurchase announcements were chosen for the study because of the uncertainty regarding the appropriate interpretation of the repurchase announcement. Cross-section regression models are used to test the relation between the reaction to the repurchase announcement and returns in subsequent periods. The results indicate that the market overreacts to repurchase announcements that are deemed to be “good news” by the market. Neither reversal nor drift is observed following repurchase announcements considered to be “bad news” by the market. The results are robust and are not driven by a few influential observations, beta shifts, or bid-ask bounce.     

Mimicking repurchases

We study the tendency of firms to mimic the repurchase announcements of their industry counterparts. We argue that a firm, by repurchasing its shares, sends a positive signal about itself and a negative one about its competitors. This induces the competing firms to mimic the behavior of the repurchasing firm by repurchasing themselves. Using a broad sample of US firms from the period 1984–2002, we show that, in concentrated industries, a repurchase announcement lowers the stock price of the other firms in the same industry. The other firms react by repurchasing themselves to undo these negative effects. Repurchases are chosen as a strategic reaction to other firms’ repurchase decisions and are not motivated by the desire to time the market, i.e., to take advantage of a significantly undervalued stock price. Therefore, repurchasing firms in more concentrated industries experience a lower increase in value in comparison with their counterparts in less concentrated industries in the post-announcement era. Alternative methodologies used to estimate long-term performance confirm that it is only the repurchasing firms in low concentration industries that outperform the market, their non-repurchasing peers, and their counterparts in more concentrated industries by amounts that are economically and statistically significant.     

The Wealth and Information Effects of Insurers' Open Market Stock Repurchase Announcements

This article examines the use of an increasingly popular method of cash disbursement in the insurance industry: stock repurchase programs. Using a sample of stock repurchase announcements between 1981 and 1997, we examine the motivation for stock repurchase, estimate the market reaction to the repurchase announcement, and evaluate the magnitude of the reaction as it relates to particular insurance industry and firm characteristics. We examine the abnormal returns around the announcement day and find a significant positive wealth effect associated with repurchase announcements—a result that is consistent with that of other studies of both nonfinancial and financial firms. However, we suspect that the nature of the insurance product and the highly regulated status of the insurance industry might serve to mitigate the magnitude of an announcement effect. In fact, we find that the effect for all insurers is smaller than that obtained in samples of industrial firms. Finally, we examine the relationships between the magnitude of the announcement effect and various firm characteristics and test the significance of information signaling and Jensen's free cash flow theories in the insurance setting.     

Options trading volume and stock price response to earnings announcements

We examine the effect of options trading volume on the stock price response to earnings announcements over the period 1996–2007. Contrary to previous studies, we find no significant difference in the immediate stock price response to earnings information announcements in samples split between firms with listed options and firms without listed options. However, within the sample of firms with listed options stratified by options volume, we find that higher options trading volume reduces the immediate stock price response to earnings announcements. This conforms with evidence that stock prices of high options trading volume firms have anticipated and pre-empted some earnings information in the pre-announcement period. We also find that higher abnormal options trading volume around earnings announcements hastens the stock price adjustment to earnings news and reduces post-earnings announcement drift.     

Patriotic Stock Repurchases: The Two Weeks Following the 9–11 Attack

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks created a unique situation where patriotism became a significant motive for companies to make stock buyback announcements. Officials from the stock markets and the SEC encouraged stock repurchase announcements to help stabilize the markets. However, some analysts questioned the wisdom of repurchase announcements at this time of economic uncertainty, given that buybacks reduce the firm's cash and equity. This study finds that announcements made during the two weeks following the attacks had a positive effect on a firm's stock price. It was also found that the earlier the announcement following the attacks, generally the more positive the market response. This suggests the possibility of a patriotism effect where the firms most eager to show their patriotism were rewarded by patriotic investors.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

OPEN MARKET STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAMS AND LIQUIDITY

In this paper I examine the behavior of bid and ask spreads and depths around announcements of open market stock repurchase programs. For a sample of 195 announcements from 1988 to 1990, I find statistically significant evidence of a small decline in spreads and no evidence of a shift in depths following the announcement date. Results are similar for a subsample of firms experiencing post-announcement declines in the number of shares outstanding. I conclude that open market repurchase programs as used recently do not adversely affect market liquidity.     

Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Intraday Stock Price Variability Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

This study investigates the relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcements is positively related to the degree of analysts' predisclosure earnings forecast dispersion. Additionally, firms with high levels of forecast dispersion exhibit significant increases in price variability for longer periods prior to and following earnings announcements than do firms with low levels of forecast dispersion. These results suggest that there is information about the earnings announcement that becomes available to at least a subset of investors prior to the earnings release and that market participants take different amounts of time to process the information conveyed by the earnings announcement.     

Corporate Dividends and Seasoned Equity Issues: An Empirical Investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to benefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking dividend and stock offering announcements.     

THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

The Wealth Effects of Repurchases on Bondholders

Prior research has documented positive abnormal stock returns around the announcements of repurchase programs; several explanations of these returns have been suggested, including signaling, free cash flow, and wealth redistributions. This study analyzes abnormal stock, bond, and firm returns around repurchase announcements to examine these hypotheses. We find evidence consistent with both signaling and wealth redistribution. The loss to bondholders is a function of the size of the repurchase, and the risk of the firm's debt. We also find that bond ratings are twice as likely to be downgraded as upgraded after the announcement of the repurchase program.     

INSIDER TRADING EFFECTS ON STOCK RETURNS AROUND OPEN-MARKET STOCK REPURCHASE ANNOUNCEMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

In this paper we empirically examine the effects of insider trading activities, the percentage of common shares outstanding authorized for repurchase, and management ownership on stock returns around open-market stock repurchase announcements. The study is conducted on a sample of 204 firms that announced open-market stock repurchases between 1982 and 1990. Results show that insider trading activities during the month that immediately precedes the announcement have a significant effect. While stockholders of firms with insider net selling activities earn positive excess returns, those of firms with insider net buying activities earn larger and more significant excess returns. Insider trading activities during more distant periods do not show any effects on stock returns. Results also indicate that management ownership has a significant positive effect on stock returns, and this effect is more positive when the percentage of common shares outstanding authorized for repurchase is large.     

OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES: THE VALUE FROM BUYING SHARES AT A DISCOUNT

This article shows that share repurchase announcements create value for shareholders when the shares of the industrial firm sell at a discount from the value of the underlying assets, even when shareholders and managers share full information about the firm's prospects and the firm's operating performance is not expected to improve. The value created by capturing the discount on the repurchased shares is a function of only two variables: the percentage discount prior to the announcement and the proportion of shares to be repurchased.
For a sample of 100 companies selling below net asset value, the authors report that the excess stock returns surrounding their announcements of open market repurchases are (significantly) positively associated with the authors' estimates of the value captured from buying shares at a discount. Moreover, the stock market's response to repurchase announcements by companies that are selling at a discount is considerably more positive than to announcements by firms selling at a premium.     

Firm strategy and market reaction to earnings

We examine whether a firm's strategy affects the information content of the firm's earnings announcement. A cost leadership strategy is characterized by low sales margins coupled with large sales volumes, economies of scale and major investments in plant and physical assets, whereas a differentiation strategy involves high sales margins achieved through product quality and branding realized by investments in intangibles such as R&D and advertising. These characteristics of the strategies result in differential impact on investor reactions to new information that is revealed about firms. Our results show that firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy have earnings announcements that are more commonly interpreted and result in a greater change in the average belief about stock price. On the other hand, earnings announcements of firms pursuing a differentiation strategy result in more heterogeneous interpretation accompanied by a smaller change in the average belief about stock price. This paper advances our understanding of the cross-sectional variation in the market's reaction to earnings announcements. In addition, the paper demonstrates a predictable instance of divergence in the price reaction and trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement.     

Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.