Financial reporting quality and outsourcing of accounting tasks: Evidence from small private firms

This study explores whether the financial reporting quality of small firms differs between firms that outsource accounting tasks and firms that perform these tasks internally. Using accruals quality as a measure for the financial reporting quality and a sample of small Finnish limited liability firms, we find that the quality among the firms is positively related to the decision of purchasing accounting services from an external service provider. This result is also economically significant. The evidence shows that outsourcing of accounting tasks such as the preparation of the statutory financial statements and longer outsourcing relationships increases reporting quality. However, outsourcing of additional tasks, such as payroll processing, does not result in higher quality. These findings are consistent with previous studies showing that small firms in general lack the resources and expertise to prepare high quality financial reports. We provide evidence of an important yet under-researched area of financial reporting quality among small firms.     

Algorithmic trading and block ownership initiation: An information perspective

This paper examines the impact of algorithmic trading (AT) on investors' incentives to initiate block ownership in U.S. public companies. We find that a one standard deviation change in AT activity reduces the block ownership initiation likelihood by 3.5%. Using the SEC's randomised tick size pilot experiment in 2016 as a negative shock to AT, we show that the effect of AT on block ownership initiation is causal. Further evidence supports the information-hindering explanation that AT discourages sophisticated investors from acquiring information, which results in a decrease in block ownership initiation. We find that the effect of AT is more pronounced among information-sensitive investors and that institutional investors reduce their information-gathering activities in AT-targeted stocks. Additional tests exploring information-based trading behaviour in the presence of AT provide strong evidence to support the explanation of information-hindering, and our results hold across a battery of robustness tests.     

Are Entrenched Managers’ Accounting Choices More Predictive of Future Cash Flows?

We examine the role manager entrenchment has on firms’ financial reporting quality. More specifically, we test whether entrenched managers’ reported accruals deviate from industry norms and whether entrenched managers’ abnormal accruals are more (or less) predictive of future cash flows. Consistent with implications from prior research, we find that firms with entrenched managers generally report lower levels of abnormal accruals (in an absolute sense), but the abnormal accruals utilized by entrenched managers are more predictive of future cash flows. Contrary to a more traditional view of manager entrenchment, our evidence suggests that entrenched managers report higher quality abnormal accruals. While prior research provides evidence that manager entrenchment is associated with negative economic outcomes, we argue that attempts to limit entrenchment are unlikely to improve financial reporting quality and may actually lower quality. Future corporate governance research should consider not only the level but also the quality of the association between accounting choices and manager entrenchment.     

Trust and Financial Reporting Quality

Using unique survey data from Great Place to Work® Institute, we investigate the association of intraorganizational trust (i.e., employees’ trust in management) with three aspects of financial reporting: accruals quality, misstatements, and internal control quality. We find that trust is associated with better accrual quality, lower likelihood of financial statement misstatements, and lower likelihood of internal control material weakness disclosures. However, these effects are not uniform across all companies. Consistent with trust improving financial reporting quality through improved information production and information sharing, we find that trust is significantly associated with financial reporting quality in relatively decentralized firms, but not in firms that are relatively centralized. Our results are robust to several analyses that attempt to control for potential alternative explanations.     

Does stakeholder orientation matter for earnings management: Evidence from non-shareholder constituency statutes

Using a difference-in-differences methodology, this paper finds that greater stakeholder orientation due to the adoption of non-shareholder constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider non-shareholder stakeholders' interests in decision making, significantly reduces discretionary accruals. The main effect is more pronounced for firms with greater tension between shareholders and stakeholders, and with higher information acquisition costs for the board. Further analysis shows that stakeholder orientation increases the value-relevance of earnings, and curtails real earnings management to some extent. Overall, my findings indicate that improved financial reporting quality can be a specific channel through which stakeholder orientation increases shareholder value.     

The effect of tick size on managerial learning from stock prices

We investigate the effect of tick size, a key feature of market microstructure, on managerial learning from stock prices. Using a randomized controlled tick-size experiment, the 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program, we find that a larger tick size increases a firm's investment sensitivity to stock prices, suggesting that managers glean more new information from stock prices to guide their investment decisions as the tick size increases. Consistently, we also find that changes in managerial beliefs, as reflected in adjustments of forecasted capital expenditures, respond more strongly to market feedback under a larger tick size. Additional evidence suggests the following mechanism through which tick size affects managerial learning: a larger tick size reduces algorithmic trading, in turn encouraging fundamental information acquisition. Increased fundamental information acquisition generates incremental information about growth opportunities, macroeconomic factors, and industry factors, with respect to which the market has a comparative information advantage over management.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

Increasing the Tick: Examining the Impact of the Tick Size Change on Maker‐Taker and Taker‐Maker Market Models

We investigate the effects of an increase in tick size on order and trading flow across market fee models. Using the pilot firms in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Tick Size Pilot Program, we document that trade and order volume declines on maker‐taker fee models after the tick size implementation. We find that the inverted fee models (taker‐maker) experience an increase in both trade and order volume. Additionally, we find that a tick size adjustment has a substantial influence on market participation in maker‐taker fee models. We also find that measures of both hidden and algorithmic trading decline with an increasing tick size, which is strongly moderated by the differences in the maker‐taker and taker‐maker fee models.     

Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees and Financial Reporting Quality

This paper examines whether the audit committee members of a board improve financial reporting quality if they are also on their organisation's compensation committee. Audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process of organisations and have been urged to broaden their understanding of business risk and of the incentives provided by their firms’ executive compensation structures. Acknowledging the interrelationships among executive compensation, risk‐taking and financial reporting quality, members of audit and compensation committees have been advocating more information sharing between the two committees. Using archival data from a sample of Australian Stock Exchange listed companies, and discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality, this study finds that firms with overlapping committees have better quality financial reporting than those without such an overlap. Our evidence for this is stronger in cases where managers tend to manage earnings upwards in order to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We also find that the beneficial effect of the existence of overlapping committees is adversely affected by the equity holdings of directors with overlapping memberships.     

Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View

We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.     

Serving the truth: Do directors with media background improve financial reporting quality?

This study examines whether and how independent directors with media background affect financial reporting quality. Using a proprietary dataset of independent directors' backgrounds, we find that firms with media backgrounds directors sitting on the board have lower absolute discretionary accruals. Besides, the effect is more pronounced when media background independent directors are from a news agency, or the directors bear higher reputation cost. Furthermore, media independent directors play a monitoring role by saying “no” at the board meeting and increasing the probability of exposure to financial frauds to reduce discretionary accruals. Overall, our evidence suggests that media independent directors with higher integrity and reputation concerns could improve firms' financial quality.     

Short sellers and insider trading profitability: A natural experiment

We examine the impact of short sellers on insider trading profitability using a natural experiment of a pilot program which relaxed short-selling constraints for randomly selected pilot stocks. We find that pilot firms experienced a significant decrease in insider trading profitability during the pilot program. The results are more pronounced for the pilot firms with poor information quality, and for the pilot firms without corporate restrictions on insider trading. Our evidence suggests that short sellers serve an important market disciplinary role by reducing insider trading profitability.     

Non-audit fees, institutional monitoring, and audit quality

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with high institutional ownership. Our results are robust after controlling for auditor industry specialization, firms’ operating volatility, size effect, and potential endogeneity between institutional ownership and audit quality.     

Audit quality,accruals quality and the cost of equity in an emerging market: Evidence from Vietnam

This study explores the relationship between audit quality, accruals quality, and the cost of equity in the context of Vietnam. Particularly, we examine the impact of auditor size and accruals quality on the industry-adjusted earnings – price ratio. Using a sample of Vietnamese listed companies, the study shows that firms audited by a Big Four auditor are associated with a lower cost of equity than firms with a non-Big Four auditor. The results indicate that the auditors' information role is more relevant than the insurance role in a civil law context with a relatively low auditor litigation risk. In addition, the findings show that companies with better accruals quality are associated with a lower cost of equity. The study has implications for managers and regulators. The findings highlight the importance of ensuring sound auditing practices and maintaining high-quality financial reporting for corporations.     

Asymmetric trading by insiders – comparing abnormal returns and earnings prediction in Spain and Australia

This paper examines whether the ‘external governance’ imposed by comparative financial accounting standards reduces the trading advantage of insiders. We do this by directly comparing insider trading returns and insider’s ability to predict future earnings from accruals in Spain and Australia. Results show higher excess returns and greater prediction of future earnings from conditioned insider trading in Australia that is then utilized by financial analysts to lower forecast errors – particularly in contrarian‐based accruals trading. Possible explanations include: (i) a high asymmetric quality for market‐based accruals, (ii) information transfer from informed insiders to uninformed insiders and financial analysts and (iii) a more timely dissemination of financial information in Spain through different ownership and governance structures.     

The price of sinful behavior window dressing: Cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages and financial reporting quality

Using hand-collected data from China, we examine whether cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages affects corporate financial reporting quality, and further investigate the moderating effect of foreign directors. The findings reveal that firms in provinces with more cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages exhibit significantly higher extent of discretionary accruals. This finding suggests that cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages as a tobacco-related sinful behavior window dressing shapes unethical social atmosphere, elicits unethical managerial behavior, brings out information distortion, and eventually reduces financial reporting quality. Moreover, the positive relation between cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages and discretionary accruals is less pronounced for firms with foreign directors than for their counterparts. Furthermore, our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests using alternative proxies for cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages and financial reporting quality, and further our conclusions still stand after employing the difference-in-difference approach, two-stage least square regression procedure and two-stage Heckman method to address the endogeneity problem. Lastly, pictorial health warnings on cigarette packages are significantly negatively related with country-level smokers, but cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages is significantly positively associated with tobacco consumption at the province level and owner-manager agency costs in China, providing supportive evidence to our findings.     

State ownership and abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms: Evidence from China

We examine how state ownership affects Chinese firms’ abnormal accruals during a period of high valuation. We find the magnitude of abnormal accruals first increases for up to three years of high valuation, and then reduces after the fourth year. We also find that managers turn to using abnormal real transactions after four consecutive years of high valuation. Next, we examine whether the degree of abnormal accruals in highly-valued firms differs between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-NSOEs. Supporting the view that SOE managers have less incentive to sustain high stock prices, we find evidence that highly-valued SOEs have significantly lower levels of abnormal accruals than highly-valued NSOEs during the period of high valuation. Our findings contribute to the literature on the cross-sectional variation in the relation between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock prices and their accounting choices in firms with different ownership structures.     

Internal control reporting and market liquidity

We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on information asymmetry by analyzing the relation between SOX Sections 302 and 404 control reports and market liquidity using bid-ask spreads. Lower market liquidity indicates higher levels of information asymmetry implying that market participants perceive financial statement misstatement risk is higher. If SOX disclosures contain relevant information, then one would expect firms reporting internal control material weaknesses to have lower market liquidity. Accordingly, we find that market liquidity is lower (i.e., bid-ask spreads are higher) for firms reporting ineffective control compared to firms reporting effective control using either annual SOX 404 internal control reports or quarterly SOX 302 disclosure control reports, which suggests that SOX 302 and 404 reports provide useful information for identifying firms with a higher risk of financial statement misstatement. However, we do not find consistent results using two alternative liquidity measures: trading volume and market quality indices. We then examine whether changes in control reports are associated with changes in market liquidity. We generally do not find that firms with improved (deteriorated) control reports experience a larger decrease (increase) in bid-ask spreads or larger increases (decreases) in trading volume and market quality indices compared to other firms, suggesting that market participants do not discern a change in information asymmetry when the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting changes.     

Institutional incentives and earnings quality: The influence of government ownership in China

We examine the effect of government ownership and its associated institutional incentives on firms’ earnings quality using a sample of Chinese firms during the transitional economy between 1998 and 2005 when state-owned and non-state-owned firms were traded in the stock exchanges. We find that, in China, state-owned firms exhibit a lower earnings quality property than non-state-owned firms. Particularly, state-owned firms have more earnings smoothing, more frequently managed earnings toward target, less frequent timely recognition of losses, and less value relevance, relative to non-state-owned firms. We also find that state-owned firms have significantly higher discretionary current accruals than non-state-owned firms. We conclude that the Chinese government, through its controlling ownership of state-owned firms, creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively influence these listed firms’ financial reporting.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.