Earnings Announcements: Good News for Institutional Investors and Short Sellers

In this paper, we consider the trading behavior of institutional investors and short sellers around earnings announcements. The results suggest that institutional investors, and to a lesser extent short sellers, successfully anticipate earnings news. In the period immediately after the earnings announcement, both types of traders are active in the market and trade in response to the earnings announcement. In particular, short sellers are quick to increase their short positions when a company releases bad news. Institutional traders also trade in response to the news; however, they take longer to react.     

The costs and benefits of short sale disclosure

In this study, we examine the impact of a market-wide mandatory disclosure policy on short selling on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find that average short selling slightly declined while investors’ shorting strategies changed significantly in response to the disclosure. Previously highly shorted stocks were shorted less and shorting activity shifted toward smaller and riskier stocks, suggesting that retail investors became the more likely short sellers. Short sales became more trend-chasing, prices became less informative, and short-term price volatility increased. Overall, the pricing efficiency benefits of short selling declined after the mandatory disclosure policy.     

Do investors affect financial analysts’ behavior? Evidence from short sellers

We examine how short sellers affect financial analysts’ forecast behavior using a natural experiment that relaxes short-sale constraints. We find that increased ease of short selling improves analyst earnings forecast quality by reducing forecast bias and increasing forecast accuracy. The improvements can be explained by both the disciplining pressure from short sellers and increased price efficiency from incorporating information in a timely manner. Although it is well documented that financial analysts can affect investors, our paper provides novel evidence on how sophisticated investors, short sellers, can affect analysts.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

Whose opinion matters when insiders disagree with short sellers?

This study investigates the credibility of conflicting trading signals from two well-informed and sophisticated parties: corporate insiders and short sellers. Our results suggest that insiders’ information is dominant when short sellers trade in the opposite direction. We attribute the positive price reaction following a disagreement to insiders’ superior information that is not available to short sellers. Our results do not support the managerial short-termism argument. Two additional tests show that insider buying credibility enhances when information asymmetry is high and that short sellers reverse their shorting position after the disclosure of insider buying. Both findings support the idea that short sellers may experience a previously unacknowledged barrier in accessing private information.     

The Cost of Short‐Selling Liquid Securities

Standard models of liquidity argue that the higher price for a liquid security reflects the future benefits that long investors expect to receive. We show that short‐sellers can also pay a net liquidity premium if their cost to borrow the security is higher than the price premium they collect from selling it. We provide a model‐free decomposition of the price premium for liquid securities into the net premiums paid by both long investors and short‐sellers. Empirically, we find that short‐sellers were responsible for a substantial fraction of the liquidity premium for on‐the‐run Treasuries from November 1995 through July 2009.     

卖空者与内幕交易——来自中国证券市场的证据

本文研究上市公司内部人减持、年报、诉讼、分析师评级、停复牌以及高送转等重大公告前后卖空交易行为的变化,系统考察卖空者是否参与内幕交易以及何种因素影响卖空者参与内幕交易,发现卖空率较高的股票具有较低的未来收益,表明卖空者拥有信息优势,属知情交易者;卖空者拥有非常精确的择时交易能力,在重大利空公告前显著增加卖空量,而在利好公告前则显著减少卖空头寸,表明卖空者作为知情交易者的信息优势源自内幕消息;公司内、外部投资者的信息不对称程度越低或公司所在地的法治水平越高,卖空者参与内幕交易的行为就越少。因此,监管机构应密切关注公司重大消息发布前后卖空量的异常变动,同时,完善信息披露规则、健全证券分析师制度并强化法律法规的执行力度,才能有效防范卖空者参与内幕交易。     

Who Believes the Hype? An Experimental Examination of How Language Affects Investor Judgments

This paper investigates the effect of vivid language on investor judgments. Recent research finds that investor judgments are significantly influenced by disclosure tone (positive versus negative). Holding tone constant, we investigate investors’ reactions to vivid versus pallid information. Drawing on theories from psychology, we predict that investors will be sensitive to the differences between vivid and pallid language when the underlying information is preference inconsistent, but not when the information is preference consistent. Results of two experiments support our prediction. Vivid language significantly influences the judgment of investors who hold contrarian positions (i.e., short investors in a bull market and long investors in a bear market). Interestingly, vivid language has limited influence on the judgment of investors who hold positions consistent with the general tenor of the market. Our results provide evidence regarding when vividness matters and when it does not in financial contexts, thereby contributing to both psychology and a growing literature on disclosure tone in financial reporting. In addition, our results also speak to concerns raised by regulators and academics asserting that vivid language can inflate bubbles and incite panics.     

Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from the 2007–2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis

This paper examines the short selling activities around financial firms’ announcements of asset write‐downs during the 2007–2008 subprime mortgage crisis. We find that short sellers accumulate short positions prior to write‐down announcements, and that stocks experience significantly negative returns around such announcements. These results suggest that the return predictability of short interests is due to short sellers’ informational advantage. Furthermore, we show that short sellers increase their positions significantly in the announcement month and keep increasing their positions afterward, suggesting the feedback effect of the disclosed write‐downs on financial firms’ existing exposures. The valuable information contained in the short interest should encourage regulators to mandate stock exchanges disclose short selling activities more frequently.     

Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct

We examine whether short sellers detect firms that misrepresent their financial statements, and whether their trading conveys external costs or benefits to other investors. Abnormal short interest increases steadily in the 19 months before the misrepresentation is publicly revealed, particularly when the misconduct is severe. Short selling is associated with a faster time‐to‐discovery, and it dampens the share price inflation that occurs when firms misstate their earnings. These results indicate that short sellers anticipate the eventual discovery and severity of financial misconduct. They also convey external benefits, helping to uncover misconduct and keeping prices closer to fundamental values.     

Are short sellers incrementally informed prior to earnings announcements?

Contrary to the hypothesis that informed short sellers increase their positions prior to earnings announcements, we find that short activity declines in the pre-announcement period compared with activity in non-announcement time. This statistically significant, but economically modest, decline may suggest that the fraction of informed short sellers actually increases if (as Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest) the uncertainty around earnings announcements increases short selling costs and causes uninformed short sellers to withdraw from the market. While we find a statistically and economically significant inverse relation between pre-announcement short activity and announcement period returns, when we control for the non-announcement ability of short sellers to predict future returns documented by Diether et al. (2009), the significance of the relation between pre-announcement short activity and announcement period returns vanishes. Thus, we infer that short sellers are not incrementally informed prior to earnings announcements.     

Examining the effect of deception detection decision aids on investors' perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest

Recent evidence suggests that the trend of issuing video disclosures is growing and investors are exposed to the risk of including deceptive information in their decisions. This study suggests that investors can use deception detection decision aids to identify deceptive behavior in video disclosures, and that the use of such decision aids affects their perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest. The theoretical framework of this study suggests that providing investors with a deception detection decision aid affects their willingness to invest through their perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that this effect is conditional on management's reputation. Using data from 387 nonprofessional investors, the findings provide support for the predicted effect of deception detection decision aid on investors' judgment and decision making. The effect of providing investors with a deception detection decision aid is fully mediated by investors' perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that effect is significantly stronger when management's reputation is good than when management's reputation is bad.     

Daily short interest,idiosyncratic risk,and stock returns

This paper examines the relation between short selling and returns and the impact of arbitrage costs on short sellers’ behavior. Using daily UK short selling data, we find that stocks with low short interest levels experience significant positive returns on both an equal- and value-weighted basis. Economic theory predicts that short sellers avoid establishing positions in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. Our results indicate a negative relation between short interest and returns among high idiosyncratic risk stocks and that short selling activity is mostly concentrated in low idiosyncratic risk stocks where it is less costly to arbitrage fundamental risk.     

Role of Speculative Short Sales in Price Formation: The Case of the Weekend Effect

We argue that short sellers affect prices in a significant and systematic manner. In particular, we contend that speculative short sales contribute to the weekend effect: The inability to trade over the weekend is likely to cause these short sellers to close their speculative positions on Fridays and reestablish new short positions on Mondays causing stock prices to rise on Fridays and fall on Mondays. We find evidence in support of this hypothesis based on a comparison of high short-interest stocks and low short-interest stocks, stocks with and without actively traded options, IPOs, zero short-interest stocks, and highly volatile stocks.     

The Informational Role of Short Sellers: The Evidence from Short Sellers’ Reports on US‐Listed Chinese Firms

Using US‐listed Chinese firms as the setting, this paper studies a novel channel through which investors can acquire information about firms’ financial reporting quality, that is, the reports published voluntarily by short sellers. I find that short sellers tend to target firms that have financial reporting red flags and that exhibit ‘good’ operating performance and stock valuations. Targeted firms experience an average three‐day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of ?6.4%, and ?13.6% for initial coverage of the firm, and the CARs are more negative when the reports allege more severe misconduct of the firms. Non‐targeted firms also experience losses in value following short seller reports, especially when they hire the same non‐Big 4 auditors as targeted firms and when their earnings quality is poor. In comparison, analysts fail to perform proper due diligence and are much less effective than short sellers in exposing misreporting risk in Chinese firms.     

The consequences of deviating from financial reporting industry norms: Evidence from the disclosure of foreign cash

This study examines how investors respond to firms’ disclosure practices that deviate from the majority of industry peers (i.e., industry norms). The SEC has made repeated calls for the disclosure of foreign cash in order for investors to have more information in determining firms’ liquidity positions. We examine the association between firm value and the non-disclosure of foreign cash in industries where the majority of firms choose to disclose foreign cash. We define partial disclosure as disclosing permanently reinvested earnings (PRE), but withholding the disclosure of foreign cash, and find that when the majority of industry peers disclose foreign cash, investors discount the firm-specific partial disclosure of foreign operations. This finding suggests that investors have similar information demands as the SEC, and that withholding foreign cash results in a valuation discount. We also find that this discount is more pronounced for firms predicted to have higher levels of foreign cash and higher levels of PRE. The discount in firm value is also concentrated among firms with managers who have more career concerns, suggesting that managers shift the cost of partial disclosure to shareholders instead of bearing the personal reputational cost of full disclosure. Our results are robust to multiple matched samples and entropy balancing. While previous literature has considered the valuation implications of foreign cash disclosures, we reveal the consequences of opting to withhold the disclosure of foreign cash. Our findings should be of interest to both managers and policy-setters in forming their disclosure protocols.     

Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements

We study the behavior of short sellers around earnings restatements. We find that short sellers accumulate positions in restating firms several months in advance of the restatement and subsequently unwind these positions after the drop in share price induced by the restatement. The increase in short interest is larger for firms with high levels of accruals prior to restatement. We document that heavily shorted firms experience poor subsequent performance and a higher rate of delisting. Overall, these results suggest that the motive for short selling is, at least in part, related to suspect financial reporting and that short sellers pay attention to information being conveyed by accruals.

Large Investors, Price Manipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage: An Anatomy of Market Corners

Corners were prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. We first develop a rational expectations model of corners and show that they can arise as the result of rational behavior. Then, using a novel hand-collected data set, we investigate price and trading behavior around several well-known stock market and commodity corners which occurred between 1863 and 1980. We find strong evidence that large investors and corporate insiders possess market power that allows them to manipulate prices. Manipulation leading to a market corner tends to increase market volatility and has an adverse price impact on other assets. We also find that the presence of large investors makes it risky for would-be short sellers to trade against the mispricing. Therefore, regulators and exchanges need to be concerned about ensuring that corners do not take place since they are accompanied by severe price distortions.     

Information,sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance

Using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity, we study foreign and domestic investors’ trading activities and investment performance ahead of open-ending events of Taiwanese closed-end funds. Simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open-ending generates large abnormal returns. All information required to execute this strategy is made public, so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade, holding constant access to information. Foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open-endings, more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns. Domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large, and forego large abnormal returns. The results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors.     

PRICE PRESSURE AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN CLOSED-END FUNDS

A trader-identified transactions database is employed to investigate: (1) the relation between order-flow imbalance and closed-end fund share prices and discounts; and (2) the role of institutional investors in closed-end funds. Empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that buyers (sellers) of closed-end funds face upward-downward-) sloping supply (demand) curves. The results also demonstrate that ownership statistics do not accurately reflect institutional investors' importance in the closed-end fund market. The results fail to provide evidence that institutional investors offset the positions of individual investors or that institutional investors face systematic “noise trader risk.”