The Impact of Corporate Governance and Audit Quality on the Cost of Private Loans*

The objective of this paper is to examine whether banks discriminate between firms on the basis of their financial condition when assessing the credit default risk, and to what extent corporate governance and auditor quality mitigate such risks in the pricing of new bank loans. The results indicate that, depending on the probability of bankruptcy, banks rely on different monitoring devices. For firms with a low probability of bankruptcy, banks do not rely on the quality of corporate governance or the auditor's industry specialization. However, auditor tenure and a change in auditor affect the spread. For firms with a high probability of bankruptcy, the spread is adjusted for the quality of corporate governance and the auditor's specialization. These results are robust to alternative specifications and measures.     

Financial Reporting Quality,Debt Maturity,and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the influence of different financing channels—bond issuance or bank loans—as well as debt maturity and the quality of financial reporting on the cost of debt in China. The authors find that conservative accounting is an important characteristic of high-quality financial reporting that can reduce the cost of longer maturity debt such as bank loans and bonds. Even state-owned enterprises, which have fewer financial constraints than non-state-owned enterprises, benefit from accounting conservatism's ability to reduce financial costs. Moreover, the findings indicate that bond investors are concerned about the issuer's fundamentals, while banks are more likely to focus on the operation and bankruptcy risk of borrowers.     

Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

Financial Markets and Economic Growth*

In this reprinting of the Nobel Prize‐winning financial economist's classic statement about the origins of financial crises, the Southeast Asian crisis of the late 1990s is attributed “not to too much reliance on financial markets, but to too little.” Like the U.S. economy a century ago, the emerging Asian economies did not then—and do not now—have well‐developed capital markets and remain heavily dependent on their banking systems to finance growth. But for all its benefits, banking is not only basically 19th‐century technology, but disaster‐prone technology. And in the summer of 1997, a banking‐driven disaster struck in East Asia, just as it had struck so many times before in U.S. history. During the 20th century, the author argues, the U.S. economy reduced its dependence on banks by developing “dispersed and decentralized” financial markets. In so doing, it increased the efficiency of the capital allocation process and reduced the economy's vulnerability to the credit crunches that have recurred throughout U.S. history. By contrast, Japan has not reduced its economy's dependence on banks, and its efforts to deal with its banking problems during the crisis of the late'90s served only to destabilize itself as well as its neighbors. Developing countries in Asia and elsewhere are urged not to follow the Japanese example, but to take measures aimed at developing financial markets and institutions that will either substitute for or, in some cases, complement bank products and services.     

Distress Risk,Growth and Earnings Quality

We extend and complement prior work by investigating the earnings quality of firms with different financial health characteristics and growth prospects. By using three alternative measures of default likelihood and two alternative measures of growth options, without being limited to a specific event, we provide a more comprehensive setup for analysing the earnings characteristics of the universe of firms than examining distressed firms with persistent losses, dividend reductions or bankruptcy‐filings. Our dataset consists of 15,049 healthy U.S. firms over the period 1990–2004. Results show that the relation between earnings quality and financial health is not monotonic. Distressed firms have a low level of earnings timeliness for bad news and a high level for good news, and manage earnings toward a positive target more frequently than healthy firms. On the other hand, healthy firms have a high level of earnings timeliness for bad news. Growth aspects play an important role in a firm's ability to manage earnings. In contrast to the findings of prior studies, growth firms have greater earnings timeliness for bad news, whereas value firms manage earnings toward a positive target more frequently than growth firms.     

The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System*

In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis—including “agency” problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms—at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving—to the extent possible and prudent—the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create “living wills” laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to “aggressively encourage” banks to issue “contingent” debt capital securities that convert into equity.     

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.     

Relationship Banking and Loan Syndicate Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors

Using a sample of syndicated loans to private equity (PE)‐backed initial public offering companies, we examine how a third‐party bank relationship influences the syndicate structure of a loan. We find that a stronger relationship between the lead bank and the borrower's PE firm enables the lead bank to retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE‐bank relationship also attracts greater foreign bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank's relationship with a large equity holder of the borrower facilitates information production in lending.     

Self-monitoring or reliance on media reporting: How do financial market participants process central bank news?

We study how financial market participants process news from four major central banks—the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Federal Reserve (Fed)—using a novel survey of 195 financial market participants from around the world. Our results indicate that, first, respondents rely more on media reports of central bank events than they do on self-monitoring. The only exceptions are interest rate decisions in the respondent’s home region. In general, the Fed is watched most closely, followed by the ECB, the BoJ, and the BoE. Second, ordered probit estimations reveal that the perceived reliability of media coverage is negatively associated with degree of self-monitoring and positively related to the probability of using media reports, particularly in the case of asset managers. The perceived importance of central bank events is positively related to the degree of self-monitoring in the case of traders. Finally, portfolio managers tend to self-monitor their home central bank significantly more often than other central banks.     

The Relationship Between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Evidence from Japan

Using stock price data drawn from the 1990s in Japan, this paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that investors misinterpreted high reported earnings as favorable information about bank financial health. We also show that the negative relationship was very powerful prior to the major bank failures in late 1997 and 1998, but it diminished subsequent to the failures. We conclude that investors started to anticipate potential manipulation of financial reports by bank managers more rationally after the major bank failures.     

The Relationship between Bankruptcy Model Predictions and Stock Market Perceptions of Bankruptcy

This study uses a cumulative sum technique to determine the point at which the stock market first perceives that a firm may file for bankruptcy. The study then attempts to identify information, whether from financial statements or from other sources, that may have influenced the market in its reassessment of the firm's prospects. The results indicate that the switching point of the mean and variance of stock returns appears to be related both to financial statement information (as measured by changes in bankruptcy model probability assessments) and the release of unfavorable news in the Wall Street Journal.     

Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific

Analysis of the tradeoff between competition and financial stability has been at the center of academic and policy debate for over two decades and especially since the 2007–2008 global financial crises. Here we use information on 14 Asia Pacific economies from 2003 to 2010 to investigate the influence of bank competition, concentration, regulation and national institutions on individual bank fragility as measured by the probability of bankruptcy and the bank’s Z-score. The results suggest that greater concentration fosters financial fragility and that lower pricing power also induces bank risk exposure after controlling for a variety of macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory and institutional factors. In terms of regulations and institutions, the results show that tougher entry restrictions may benefit bank stability, whereas stronger deposit insurance schemes are associated with greater bank fragility.     

Understanding the rise and decline of the Japanese main bank system: The changing effects of bank rent extraction

This paper shows how main bank rent extraction affects corporate decisions about investment and financing during financial regulatory reform. Our model predicts that limited loanable funds can initially contain main bank controlled overinvestment, even when new equity is available to the firm. Abundant funds facilitate overinvestment to the detriment of firm profitability. A shift of control rights back to the firm due to financial deregulation produces an “equity for upside potential and bank debt for downside risk” bias against the banks. A stock market and real estate boom in Japan made it harder than ever for the banks to diversify risk. The insights from this analysis help explain why Japan’s main bank system was beneficial in the (capital constrained) postwar period but became harmful during the (capital abundant and even bubbly) 1980s, and why the adverse shocks of the post-deregulation 1990s had such severe effects on the banking system.     

Credit Contagion Channels: Market Microstructure Evidence from Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy

Immediately after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, many firms disclosed their financial exposure (or lack thereof) to Lehman. This offers a clean setting to test two credit contagion channels through which a financial firm's bankruptcy can affect other firms—“counterparty risk” and “information transmission” channels. Using market microstructure variables to measure the various dimensions of contagion effects, we provide robust evidence supporting the significance of counterparty risk. Firms with exposure to Lehman suffered more severe negative effects—wider bid‐ask spread, higher price impact, greater information asymmetry, and greater selling pressure—than unexposed firms. We find mixed evidence regarding the information transmission hypothesis.     

Hurdles to debt relief for “no income no assets” debtors in Germany: A case study of failed consumer bankruptcy law reforms

Given that many overindebted households have low or no assets and income, governments have increasingly tried to adapt their consumer bankruptcy regimes to the needs and capacities of these NINA (“no income, no assets”) debtors. Most notably, since the mid‐2000s, some countries from the Anglosphere have created low‐cost, means‐tested, and administrative (i.e., nonjudicial) debt relief procedures as alternative to traditional bankruptcy for NINA debtors. By contrast, in some European countries such as Germany, legislators have tried—but until today failed—to create efficient debt relief measures for NINA debtors. This contribution aims to make English‐speaking readers familiar with the history of consumer insolvency law in Germany, with a focus on legislative developments regarding NINA debtors, and to identify actors, institutions, and ideas that have contributed—especially during the 2000s—to the failure of consumer bankruptcy reforms addressing the main problems of NINA cases in Germany (i.e., high hurdles to relief for debtors, high administrative efforts for trustees and courts, high costs for the public purse, and yet very few payments to creditors). The German case is relevant not only because it is a striking case of failure to adapt a debt relief regime to NINA debtors but also because German consumer bankruptcy law—despite its shortcomings—continues to serve as a template for insolvency law reforms in European and other countries.     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.     

Implications of bank regulation for loan supply and bank stability: a dynamic perspective

ABSTRACT

We show that internal funds play a particular role in the regulation of bank capital, which has not received much attention, yet. A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and its future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. Using a partial equilibrium model, we study how internal funds affect these intra- and intertemporal links. Moreover, our positive analysis identifies the effects of risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios, liquidity coverage ratios and regulatory margin calls on the dynamics of internal funds and thus loan supply and bank stability. Only regulatory margin calls or large liquidity coverage ratios achieve bank stability for all risk levels, but for large risks a bank will stop credit intermediation.     

MERTON MILLER'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO MODERN FINANCE

Winner of the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics, and widely regarded as the “father of modern finance,” the University of Chicago's Merton Miller died last June at age 77. This article attempts to sum up Miller's career in terms of a single governing principle: the role of arbitrage in ensuring the “efficiency” of financial markets and, more generally, the effectiveness of such markets in promoting economic growth and creating social wealth. Starting with the formulation of Proposition I (also known as the capital structure irrelevance proposition) with Franco Modigliani in 1958, Miller's research over the next 40 years is seen as applying—with remarkable clarity and consistency—the principle of arbitrage to the study of many aspects of financial markets. Miller's main accomplishment, according to the author, is to have made arbitrage arguments the cornerstone of modern finance. The arbitrage proof of Proposition I introduced a new standard in finance—namely, that any finding in financial research deserving serious consideration must have the critical property that it cannot represent opportunities for riskless profit by investors. And the article goes on to show that arbitrage is a constant theme in Miller's writings, from his work in corporate finance to his later studies of financial innovation, derivatives markets, and financial crashes and crises. Having started and presided over the transformation of financial studies from a “glorified apprenticeship system” into a scientific discipline, Miller devoted much of the last 15 years of his life to a different, though clearly related undertaking: the defense of financial markets against the attacks of politicians and regulators, as well as businessmen intent on stifling competition (including hostile takeovers). Whether it was the alleged role of the stock index futures markets in the 1987 market crash, the claims of “overleveraging” in the LBOs of the '80s, or the derivatives fiascos in the mid‐'90s, Miller was there to provide careful economic analysis of the problems. In the early '90s, he explained why the “myopia” of the U.S. stock market was likely to cause far fewer problems than the “hyperopia” induced by regulatory distortions of the Japanese market. And in one of his last speeches, Miller showed that the primary cause of the recent Asian crisis was not “too much reliance on financial markets,” as claimed by politicians and the popular press, but “too little”—in particular, the heavy dependence on bank financing (particularly state‐owned banks) and the failure to develop alternative sources of capital that continue to depress the Japanese economy.     

The financial distress pricing puzzle in banking firms

This paper examines whether the financial distress pricing puzzle observed for non-financial firms is also observed for financial firms and how this puzzle differs according to the extent of short-sale constraints. By using the eight distress measures developed for financial firms, we find that there is a strong negative relation in the cross-section between financial distress and subsequent bank stock returns, regardless of adjustment for risk. However, this distress pricing puzzle is statistically significant only for high short-sale constrained banks, but not for low short-sale constrained banks. Thus, short-sale constraints are at least one non-risk attribute that causes the distress pricing puzzle for financial firms. We also find that despite its simple form, compared to the other complex distress measures, non-performing loans (NPLs) are the most informative in predicting future bank stock returns as well as bankruptcy and failure.     

Optimal mortgage contracts with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper integrates a time-inconsistent preference into the mortgage design problem and studies the corresponding effects on the optimal contract. By assuming exogenous time inconsistency in borrower's preference, we find that the time-inconsistent preference increases the loss in the lender's value and the compensation boundary. We implement the optimal contract using standard securities and option adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). The findings show that the time-inconsistent preference increases the default rate, and relative to standard securities, option ARMs increase the total debt capacity, but the borrower's time inconsistency can lead to sudden jumps in the total debt capacity. We also consider the endogenous time inconsistency in the borrower's preference and derive the corresponding mortgage contract; we find that a lender can perfectly offset the effect of a borrower's time inconsistency on the value function and compensation strategy. The liquidation boundary at the low interest rate varies with the degree of time inconsistency, explaining the heterogeneity in mortgage default behaviors observed in practice.