Sustainable growth rate,optimal growth rate,and optimal payout ratio: A joint optimization approach

This study investigates the investment decision and dividend policy jointly from a non-steady state to a steady state. We extend ,  and  sustainable growth rate model and develop a dynamic model which jointly optimizes the growth rate and payout ratio. We optimize the firm value to obtain the optimal growth rate in terms of a logistic equation and find that the steady state growth rate can be used as the benchmark for the mean-reverting process of the optimal growth rate. We also investigate the specification error of the mean and variance of dividend per share when introducing the stochastic growth rate. Empirical results support the mean-reverting process of the growth rate and the importance of covariance between the profitability and the growth rate in determining dividend payouts. The intertemporal behavior of the covariance may shed some light on the fact of disappearing dividends over decades.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence from New Zealand

Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.     

Payout Policy Relevance and Accounting‐based Valuation

DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) (D&D) argue ‘payout policy is not irrelevant and investment is not the sole determinant of value, even in frictionless markets’. Consistent with this view, we argue that the concept of a perfect capital market in Miller and Modigliani (1961) (M&M) and Fama and Miller (1972) can be extended to allow for managerial moral hazard if managers are assumed not to participate in securities trading. An updated version of the M&M valuation model is presented and the possibility of managerial free cash flow (FCF) retention through operating expense manipulation and sub‐optimal investment policies is discussed. Our analysis supports D&D's argument that payout policy is relevant and indicates that value relevance of payout depends on the quality of earnings measurement and the optimality of investment policy. Following this, we develop a framework for analyzing valuation and informational roles of payout in accounting‐based valuation models and apply this framework to the Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1996) models. This analysis shows how these models permit payout valuation relevance due to managerial FCF retention but not payout informational relevance. Finally, we consider how the Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model can be extended to incorporate time variation in expected profitability of capital investment caused by time variation in managerial FCF retention activities and show that this explicitly affects payout value relevance. We conclude that the development of models where payout plays an explicit valuation role due to issues of moral hazard is an important direction for future research.     

Moral Hazard,Dividends, and Risk in Banks

In non‐financial firms, higher risk taking results in lower dividend payout ratios. In banking, public guarantees may result in a positive relationship between dividend payout ratios and risk taking. I investigate the interplay between dividend payout ratios and bank risk‐taking allowing for the effect of charter values and capital adequacy regulation. I find a positive relationship between bank risk‐taking and dividend payout ratios. Proximity to the required capital ratio and a high charter value reduce the impact of bank risk‐taking on the dividend payout ratio. My results are robust to different proxies for the dividend payout ratio and bank risk‐taking.     

What factors determine dividend smoothing by US and EU banks?

Using a relatively large sample of European and US banks for the period 1998–2016, we investigate the determinants of bank dividend smoothing based on agency, asymmetric information and risk‐shifting theories. We show that dividend payout ratio smoothing practices were implemented on both continents before and after the crisis of 2007 and were more strongly pronounced for EU banks. Our findings mostly support agency‐based explanations of bank dividend behavior as evidenced by higher payout ratio smoothing for banks with higher (initial) dividend payouts, lower ownership concentration, public banks, and banks with lower growth opportunities and weaker investor protection. Evidence in favor of asymmetric information explanations is stronger for EU countries, where smaller (more opaque) banks appear to smooth more. In both continents, banks that rely more heavily on equity issuances are found to smooth dividend payout ratios more, suggesting that banks aim at improving access to equity markets. We also provide evidence in support of risk‐shifting, as evidenced by the persistence of dividend payout ratio smoothing in the crisis years and higher dividend smoothing for banks under greater regulatory pressure. Additional analysis using a time series partial adjustment model for dividend levels provides evidence supporting the prevalence of dividend smoothing and the suggested theoretical explanations.     

GROWTH,BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS

A model of optimal dividend payout is presented in which increased dividends lower agency costs but raise the transactions cost of external financing. The optimal dividend payout minimizes the sum of these two costs. A cross-sectional test of the model relates dividend payout to the fraction of equity held by insiders, the past and expected future revenue growth of the firm, the firm's beta coefficient, and the number of common stockholders. The coefficients of all variables are significant in the predicted directions. The results indicate that investment policy influences dividend policy.     

Taxes and dividend policy under alternative tax regimes

This paper examines changes in corporate dividend policy around the introduction of a dividend imputation tax system. This represented a significant change to the Australian tax framework and allows us to test the effect of differential taxation on corporate dividend policy. Consistent with the tax preference for the distribution of dividends, we find dividend initiations, all dividend payout measures and dividend reinvestment plans increased with the introduction of dividend imputation. Similarly we find that gross dividend payouts are more volatile under dividend imputation. Finally, we find that the increase in dividend payout and initiations differs across firms. In particular, we find that the higher the level of available franking tax credits the higher the firm's gross dividend payout and the more likely the firm is to initiate a dividend.     

Dividend policy: Reconciling DD with MM

Miller and Modigliani [1961. Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433] establish the irrelevance of dividend policy in a perfect capital market. DeAngelo and DeAngelo [2006. The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 293–315.] suggest the Miller-Modigliani analysis is flawed and consequently their central conclusion is incorrect. The purpose of this paper is to show the vital role played by stock repurchases and agency costs in reconciling the two opposing views.     

The Effect of Past Earnings and Dividend Patterns on the Information Content of Dividends When Earnings Are Reduced

This study pursues two objectives: first, to provide evidence on the information content of dividend policy, conditional on past earnings and dividend patterns prior to an annual earnings decline; second, to examine the effect of the magnitude of low earnings realizations on dividend policy when firms have more‐or‐less established dividend payouts. The information content of dividend policy for firms that incur earnings reductions following long patterns of positive earnings and dividends has been examined ( DeAngelo et al., 1992, 1996 ; Charitou, 2000 ). No research has examined the association between the informativeness of dividend policy changes in the event of an earnings drop, relative to varying patterns of past earnings and dividends. Our dataset consists of 4,873 U.S. firm‐year observations over the period 1986–2005. Our evidence supports the hypotheses that, among earnings‐reducing or loss firms, longer patterns of past earnings and dividends: (a) strengthen the information conveyed by dividends regarding future earnings, and (b) enhance the role of the magnitude of low earnings realizations in explaining dividend policy decisions, in that earnings hold more information content that explains the likelihood of dividend cuts the longer the past earnings and dividend patterns. Both results stem from the stylized facts that managers aim to maintain consistency with respect to historic payout policy, being reluctant to proceed with dividend reductions, and that this reluctance is higher the more established is the historic payout policy.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

The impact of government ownership on dividend policy in China

We investigate the impact of State ownership on Chinese corporate dividend policy. We find that Chinese firms' dividend payout rates respond fairly quickly to earnings changes, and the average actual payout ratio for Chinese firms falls between the payout ratios for emerging-market and developed firms. These results are consistent with the dividend policies of developing economies in general. We also find that dividend payouts among dividend-paying firms, and the likelihood that a firm will pay a dividend, are increasing in State ownership. Our findings are consistent with the State's need for cash flow as a partial motivation for continued State ownership of a significant portion of the corporate economy, and support the agency and tax clientele explanations for dividend policy.     

Carbon risk and dividend policy: Evidence from China

Using a large sample of Chinese listed industrial firms from 2009 to 2019, this study investigates the effect of firm-level carbon risk on dividend policy. We find that carbon risk has a significant and negative impact on a firm's dividend payout level. We also find that when firms' capability in innovation is stronger, the degree of earnings uncertainty is higher, a firm belongs to high‑carbon industries, the negative relationship between carbon risk and dividend payout level is more significant. Furthermore, financial constraints and cash holdings are two underlying channels through which carbon risk affects cash dividend payouts. Our findings remain consistent across several robustness checks.     

Dividends and economic policy uncertainty: International evidence

We provide the first international evidence on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on dividend policy. Using data from 19 countries, we find that a high level of EPU is positively associated with dividend payout. This evidence is robust to using alternative dividend payout measures, to controlling for other sources of uncertainty, and to addressing endogeneity. We further find that the effect of EPU on dividend policy is moderated by firms' free cash flows and governance quality, and by the quality of country-level indicators of shareholder protection, disclosure, enforcement, and creditor protection. Collectively, our novel evidence suggests that dividends help mitigate agency problems during high-EPU periods.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence

Bhattacharyya (2007 ) develops a model in which compensation contracts motivate high‐quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low‐quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. In equilibrium, the model shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. Results of tests of US data show that executive compensation is positively (negatively) associated with earnings retention (dividend payout). Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy is perhaps best understood by considering the payout ratio (dividends divided by earnings), rather than the level of cash dividends alone.     

Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Factorial Analysis

This paper re-examines the dividend policy issue by conducting a simultaneous test of the alternative explanations of corporate payout policy using a two-step procedure that involves factor analysis and multiple regression. Several new proxies for theoretical attributes that have appeared in the literature are introduced, including the role of managerial dimensions in determining dividend policy. Strong support is found for the transaction cost/residual theory of dividends. pecking order argument, and the role of dividends in mitigating agency problems. Strong support is also found for the role of managerial consideration in affecting the firm's payout policy; specifically, firms that maintain stable dividend policies and firms that enjoy financial flexibility pay higher dividends. The results appear to support the tax clientele argument.     

Shareholder Protection,Ownership, and Dividends: Russian Evidence

This article investigates the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in Russian firms. Using a sample of Russian listed firms over the period 1998–2003, we estimate models for dividend pay probability and payout size. We find that there has been a significant increase in dividend payout levels which coincide with improvements in legal shareholder protection. State controlled firms are more frequent dividend payers as compared to other majority owned firms. We also find that dual share firms, in which corporate charters protect minority interests, have a higher dividend pay probability; while firms reporting according to US GAAP, which may be less likely to manipulate earnings, have a lower dividend payout.     

Consumption, Aggregate Wealth, and Expected Stock Returns

This paper studies the role of fluctuations in the aggregate consumption–wealth ratio for predicting stock returns. Using U.S. quarterly stock market data, we find that these fluctuations in the consumption–wealth ratio are strong predictors of both real stock returns and excess returns over a Treasury bill rate. We also find that this variable is a better forecaster of future returns at short and intermediate horizons than is the dividend yield, the dividend payout ratio, and several other popular forecasting variables. Why should the consumption–wealth ratio forecast asset returns? We show that a wide class of optimal models of consumer behavior imply that the log consumption–aggregate wealth (human capital plus asset holdings) ratio summarizes expected returns on aggregate wealth, or the market portfolio. Although this ratio is not observable, we provide assumptions under which its important predictive components for future asset returns may be expressed in terms of observable variables, namely in terms of consumption, asset holdings and labor income. The framework implies that these variables are cointegrated, and that deviations from this shared trend summarize agents' expectations of future returns on the market portfolio.     

A Note on the Stock Market Reaction to Dividend Announcements

In this paper, we examine the stock market reaction to dividend announcements. A sample of dividend increases and decreases is partitioned by payout ratio increases and decreases. Previous research has examined the differential reaction to payout ratio increases and decreases only for dividend increases. In addition to an event study, cross-sectional regressions are estimated using the percent changes in payout ratio and dividend to explain abnormal returns. We conclude that payout ratio changes appear to be only an artifact of an earnings stream that is more variable than the dividend stream, rather than revealing any significant shifts in managerial policy.