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1.
Abstract:   This paper investigates the capital investment decisions of Korean firms and their impact on shareholder wealth. Overall, we find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcements of 697 cases of investment projects during the period 1992–1999. This paper also finds that the investment decisions of business group ( chaebol ‐affiliated) firms do not increase shareholder wealth, while the capital investment decisions of non‐ chaebol firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. The multivariate tests provide consistent evidence that the announcement effects for chaebol firms are lower than for non‐ chaebol firms, after growth opportunities, investment size and firm size are controlled for. The findings support the view that the organizational structure of Korean chaebols creates an incentive for managers to make non‐value maximizing capital investment decisions.  相似文献   

2.
Modigliani and Miller show that, in perfect capital markets, the optimal investment decisions of a firm are not affected by how these investments are financed. Miller and Modigliani further imply that, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, a firm's investment decisions are not affected by its dividend decisions, although dividend decisions may or may not be influenced by investment decisions. Fama and Miller label this result the separation principle. Most recent studies of the separation principle that take into account the existence of market imperfections report sharply contradictory results. This paper tests for linear and nonlinear causality between dividends and investments using both firm-specific and aggregate data for a sample of 417 firms over the 1962 to 2004 period. In general, linear causality tests support the separation principle, whereas nonlinear causality test results contradict the separation principle by revealing strong bi-directional linkages between dividends and investments.  相似文献   

3.
The Corporate Cost of Capital and the Return on Corporate Investment   总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8  
We estimate the internal rates of return earned by nonfinancial firms on (i) the initial market values of their securities and (ii) the cost of their investments. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital. The estimate of the real cost of capital for 1950–96 is 5.95 percent. The real return on cost is larger, 7.38 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A by-product of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns.  相似文献   

4.
We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book‐to‐market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic‐related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform after years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book‐to‐market (i.e., HML), size (i.e., SMB), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.  相似文献   

5.
Watts (2003), among others, argues that conservatism helps in corporate governance by mitigating agency problems associated with managers’ investment decisions. We hypothesize that if conservatism reduces managers’ex ante incentives to take on negative net present value projects and improves the ex post monitoring of investments, firms with more conservative accounting ought to have higher future profitability and lower likelihood (and magnitude) of future special items charges. Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms with more conservative accounting have (i) higher future cash flows and gross margins and (ii) lower likelihood and magnitude of special items charges than firms with less conservative accounting.  相似文献   

6.
This study identifies several interrelated reasons why firms’ depreciation method choice is likely to influence managers’ capital investment decisions. We find that firms that use accelerated depreciation make significantly larger capital investments than firms that use straight-line depreciation. Further, we find that there has been a migration away from accelerated depreciation to straight-line depreciation over the past two decades. Firms that make such accounting changes make smaller capital investments in the post-change periods than in the pre-change periods. These results suggest that a choice made for external financial reporting purposes influences managers’ capital investment decisions.  相似文献   

7.
Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.  相似文献   

8.
Prior research has shown that differential access to debt markets significantly affects capital structure. In this paper, we examine the effect of access to debt markets on investment decisions by using debt ratings to indicate bond market access. We find that rated firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions than nonrated firms. This finding remains even after accounting for firm characteristics, for the probability of being rated, and in matched sample analysis as well as in subsamples based on leverage, firm size, age and information opacity. Rated firms also pay higher premiums for their targets and receive less favorable market reaction to their acquisition announcements relative to non-rated firms. However, the average announcement returns to rated acquirers are non-negative. Collectively, these findings suggest that the lack of debt market access has a real effect on the ability to make investments as well as on the quality of these investments by creating underinvestment, instead of simply constraining overinvestment.  相似文献   

9.
A bond rating upgrade (downgrade) is more likely when preceded by acquisitions that meet with positive (negative) announcement-period abnormal returns suggesting that decisions of rating agencies are partly influenced by the quality of investments undertaken by companies. Parsing the sample along takeover motives reveals that rating upgrades are more likely in value-creating acquisitions motivated by synergy while acquisitions motivated by agency considerations are more likely to elicit a rating downgrade. Following a rating downgrade however, firms seem to significantly alter their investment policies as such firms tend to make fewer but higher quality acquisitions. In addition, value creation through synergy seems to be the dominant motive in acquisitions for downgraded firms post rating downgrade.  相似文献   

10.
This paper analyzes the relation between bidder gains and the source of financing funds available. We document that after controlling for the form of payment, financing decisions during the year before a takeover play an important role in explaining the cross section of bidder gains. Bidder announcement period abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to the amount of ex ante equity financing. This relation is particularly strong for high q firms. We further report a negative and significant relation between bidder gains and free cash flow. This relation is particularly strong for firms classified as having poor investment opportunities. The amount of debt financing before a takeover announcement is not significantly related to bidder gains. Together, we take these findings as supportive of the pecking-order theory of financing and the free cash flow hypothesis.  相似文献   

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