The term structure of inflation expectations

We use information in the term structure of survey-based forecasts of inflation to estimate a factor hidden in the nominal yield curve. We construct a model that accommodates forecasts over multiple horizons from multiple surveys and Treasury real and nominal yields by allowing for differences between risk-neutral, subjective, and objective probability measures. We establish that model-based inflation expectations are driven by inflation, output, and one latent factor. We find that this factor affects inflation expectations at all horizons but has almost no effect on the nominal yields; that is, the latent factor is hidden. We show that this hidden factor is not related to either current and past inflation or the standard set of macro variables studied in the literature. Consistent with the theoretical property of a hidden factor, our model outperforms a standard macro-finance model in its forecasting of inflation and yields.     

The aggregate cost of equity underdiversification

We analyze equity diversification of all retail investors in a country (Denmark). We find that underdiversification is pervasive. We calculate the nationwide aggregate loss due to underdiversification and express it in absolute and expected‐return terms. The aggregate loss is large. We find that investors with low education, low income, and low wealth are more likely to underdiversify. Despite better diversification, the larger fraction of the aggregate loss nevertheless adheres to the top of the income/wealth distribution. Finally, our results indicate that underdiversification arises because investors have limited information about the benefits of diversification.     

The Effect of Market Structure on the Incentives to Quote Aggressively: An Empirical Study of Nasdaq Market Makers

We use data on Nasdaq stocks to study arguments that preferencing reduces incentives to quote competitively. We examine a market maker's volume as a function of various measures of quoting aggressiveness. We find that more aggressive quoting does indeed result in more business. We also examine the relation between volume and quote aggressiveness as a function of the competitiveness. We find that in less (more) competitive markets, increased quote aggressiveness has a smaller (larger) impact on market share. We argue that preferencing arrangements could be more harmful to public investors in markets where competition is weak.     

Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach

The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of exercise is the claims-premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error. We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that the public insurance providers are about 20% more cost efficient than their private counterparts.JEL Classification No.: C21, D21, L84     

Early indicators of fundraising success by venture capital firms

We show how a venture capital firm's fundraising is affected by its investment choices. We investigate three leading indicators that are calculated from the types of investments the venture capital firms make: style drift investments, follow-on investments, and investments in which the venture capital firm is not the lead investor in the portfolio company. We find that these investment characteristics are associated with lower fundraising. Characteristics and the reaction of fundraising to characteristics are both moderately stable through time. We also find some evidence that information about investment characteristics is more important for fundraising during bad states of the world and that ex-ante characteristics are related to eventual exit outcomes and financial performance.     

News release and the role of different types of investors

We examine how investors react to positive and negative news in the Chinese stock market. We show that positive news is followed by a reversal in stock price, while negative news reports are accompanied by a drift. Using a unique account-level dataset, we find that institutional investors' attention bias contributes to the market's absorption process for different types of news, which is different from the conclusion that the phenomenon is driven by retail investors in the U.S. market. We explain the differences between the two markets as the short-sale constraints induce the attention bias of institutional investors in China. Individual investors are not able to correctly judge the content of news reports, and act as a liquidity provider. We highlight the market regulation plays an important role in the process of investors analyzing information.     

An improved estimation method and empirical properties of the probability of informed trading

We report evidence that boundary solutions can cause a bias in the estimate of the probability of informed trading (PIN). We develop an algorithm to overcome this bias and use it to estimate PIN for nearly 80,000 stock-quarters between 1993 and 2004. We obtain two sets of PIN estimates by using the factorized likelihood functions in both [Easley et al., 2010] and [Lin and Ke, 2011], respectively. We find that the estimate based on the EHO factorization is systematically smaller than the estimate based on the LK factorization, meaning that there is a downward bias associated with the EHO factorization. In addition, we find that boundary solutions appear with a very high frequency when the LK factorization is used. Thus it is necessary to use the LK factorization together with the algorithm in this paper. At last, we document several interesting empirical properties of PIN.     

Disagreement and Learning: Dynamic Patterns of Trade

The empirical evidence on investor disagreement and trading volume is difficult to reconcile in standard rational expectations models. We develop a dynamic model in which investors disagree about the interpretation of public information. We obtain a closed‐form linear equilibrium that allows us to study which restrictions on the disagreement process yield empirically observed volume and return dynamics. We show that when investors have infrequent but major disagreements, there is positive autocorrelation in volume and positive correlation between volume and volatility. We also derive novel empirical predictions that relate the degree and frequency of disagreement to volume and volatility dynamics.     

The influence of incoming CEOs

We introduce a novel index capturing the power of an incoming CEO and explore the association between the appointment of a new CEO and turnover in the top management team (TMT). We document a statistically and economically significant relation between the level of new CEO power and the departure of senior executives. Specifically, we find that in addition to CEO origin, new CEO power is positively related to TMT turnover. We also find that in the post-SOX period, CEO power is more significant in affecting TMT turnover and that directorship and ownership of senior executives reduce departure.     

The networking function of investment banks: Evidence from private investments in public equity

We examine investment banks' networking function in capital markets, using a sample of Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs). We argue that investment banks develop relationships with investors through repeat dealings, and that investment banks' networks of relationship investors form the basis of their networking function. We find that investment banks, especially those with larger investor networks, help issuers attract investors. Correspondingly, an issuer that desires more investors is more likely to hire an investment bank than place the shares directly. We also find that issuers pay higher fees to hire investment banks with larger investor networks. Our empirical findings suggest that the networking function of investment banks is important in securities offerings.     

Consequences of fraud and overcoming negative market reaction

We examine the market reaction to a sample of firms following the announcement of the firms' involvement in fraud, referred to as the trigger event. We find that these firms experience negative and significant returns following the announcement of fraud, in contrast to a control sample. More importantly, we examine tactics, such as changes in executives, auditing firm, and company name, that these firms may use to regain the market's confidence. We find that the market reacts negatively right after the change in executives, but the negative trend is reversed in the long-term for firms that make an executive change quickly after the trigger event. Similarly, firms that quickly change their auditing firm fare better. We also find that there is significantly more information asymmetry during the trigger event and at the litigation date, as well as during changes in CEO, CFO, and auditor. We find a prompt change in CFO is positively and significantly related to, and therefore predicts, better long-term stock performance.     

Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital

We test the relation between financial and social disclosure and the cost of equity capital for a sample of Canadian firms with year-ends in 1990, 1991 and 1992. We find that, consistent with prior research, the quantity and quality of financial disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst following. Contrary to expectations, there is a significant positive relation between social disclosures and the cost of equity capital. This positive relationship is mitigated among firms with better financial performance. We consider some biases in social disclosures that may explain this result. We also note that social disclosures may benefit the firm through its effect on organizational stakeholders other than equity investors.     

Wealth Effects of Private Equity Placements: Evidence from Singapore

We examine institutional characteristics and the wealth effects of private equity placements in Singapore. Our findings show that private placements in Singapore generally result in a negative wealth effect and a reduction in ownership concentration. We find that at high levels of ownership concentration, the relation between abnormal returns and changes in ownership concentration is significantly negative. We also show that the market reacts less favorably to placements in which management ownership falls below 50%, but more favorably to issues to single investors. We do not find evidence suggesting that our results are due to an information effect.     

The power of sentiment: Irrational beliefs of households and consumer loan dynamics

We examine whether household sentiment can explain fluctuations in newly issued consumer loans. We construct a novel measure of household sentiment using detailed data from the harmonized consumer surveys conducted in European countries. We differentiate between rational sentiment, which mimics dynamics in macroeconomic fundamentals, and irrational sentiment, which proxies households’ optimism/pessimism on top of their rationally sourced beliefs. We show that shocks to the sentiment of households do have a measurable impact on growth of consumer loans. Specifically, we assert a significantly positive role of irrational sentiment on top of the economic fundamentals identified in the literature. Moreover, a closer examination reveals that the studied relationship is not symmetric over the business cycle — the effect of irrational sentiment is present only in periods in which a country’s output is well above its potential.     

Stock price and systematic risk effects of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs

We extend the evidence on whether investors impound efficiently into stock prices new disclosures about corporate R&D programs. We find that firms that disclose the discontinuation of some of their R&D programs experience a significant negative announcement-period stock price response which is worse for growth stocks, for small-size firms, and for firms with low operating cash flow. We find no evidence that R&D discontinuing firms experience an event-induced change in their systematic risk. We find evidence of a one-year-long price reversal; however, it is not robust to controlling for possible risk dimensions for firms with R&D capital that the three-factor model does not capture. Evidently, investors' initial response at disclosures of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs is efficient.     

The value relevance of corporate voluntary disclosure in the Middle-East: The case of Jordan

We examine whether higher voluntary disclosure, resulting from privatization and the accompanying governance reforms, enhances the value of privatized Jordanian firms. We use panel data for 243 firm-year annual reports (over a period of 9 years from 1996 to 2004) and employ univariate and multivariate tests in order to test our hypothesis,. We construct a governance index to proxy for the impact of privatized firms’ governance on voluntary disclosure. Also, we control for the endogeneity of voluntary disclosure in its relation with firm value. Our multivariate results indicate that voluntary disclosure is positively associated with firm value. We also find that firm value is associated with industry types as a proxy for size. However, we did not find that growth and liquidity are associated with firm value.     

Intra-lndustry Effects of Corporate Capital Investment Announcements

We examine how announcements of corporate capital investments by one firm affect the stock prices of its competitors. We find that on average, rivals experience a signifi cantly negative valuation effect. The results suggest that for the sample as a whole, the competitive effect dominates the contagion effect. We further examine various factors that could potentially explain the heterogeneous intra-industry effects of capital investment announcements. We find that rivals' share prices are more adversely affected when the announcer experiences a higher announcement effect or is the first mover in the industry. We also show that rivals experience a greater wealth loss when they have poorer investment opportunities or higher financial leverage.     

The use of performance measurement systems in the public sector: Effects on performance

We study the use of performance measurement systems in the public sector. We hypothesize that the way in which these systems are being used affects organizational performance, and that these performance effects depend on contractibility. Contractibility encompasses clarity of goals, the ability to select undistorted performance metrics, and the degree to which managers know and control the transformation process. We expect that public sector organizations that use their performance measurement systems in ways that match the characteristics of their activities outperform those that fail to achieve such fit. We test our hypotheses using survey data from 101 public sector organizations. Our findings indicate that contractibility moderates the relationship between the incentive-oriented use of the performance measurement system and performance. Using the performance measurement system for incentive purposes negatively influences organizational performance, but this effect is less severe when contractibility is high. We also find that an exploratory use of the performance measurement system tends to enhance performance; this positive effect is independent of the level of contractibility. The effectiveness of the introduction of performance measurement systems in public sector organizations thus depends both on contractibility and on how the system is being used by managers. These findings have important implications, both for practice and for public policy.