Banks’ earnings: Empirical evidence of the influence of economic and financial market factors

The structure of income is a foremost address within research on banks’ performance, especially with regard to effects on the resilience of banks’ earnings. Indeed, given their central position in the economy, banks shall thrive to generate sustainable earnings and control for their potential volatility. Existing studies mostly consider the weight of non‐net interest income (nonNII) as opposed to the traditional NII income source. Such aggregated nonNII is found to increase earnings risk but more granular studies conflict. We propose an original investigation of the influence of economic and financial conditions on various income types, assuming that performance may actually be driven by both the income structure and external conditions. We focus European banks, which have long been allowed to diversify beyond retail banking. Out of a straight panel framework, we question if the influence of external conditions spreads to earnings components other than credit losses and trading income and if it does allow for diversification benefits among components. We find that each component actually evolves owing to its own equation. Furthermore, effects of single variables may cumulate over different components of earnings (e.g. GDP) or provide with diversification benefits. These effects are all the more important since they are not mitigated by operating expenses. Hence, over a regarded period, banks’ performance depends upon their structure of income and upon volatilities and correlations of influential variables. Besides controlling for ex‐ante volatility, our approach shows that a given structure of income is not necessarily more resilient than others but that selected non‐banking income may support a higher stability of Earnings     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart before the Horse

This paper reviews the progress in European banking integration over the last twenty years, and evaluates the current system of banking supervision and deposit insurance based on ‘home country’ control. The public policy implications to draw from the paper are threefold: First, after a relatively slow start, European banking integration is gaining momentum, in terms of cross‐border flows, market share of foreign banks in several domestic markets, and cross‐border M&As of significant size. If this trend continues, the issue of adequate supervision and safety nets in an integrated European banking market will become even more pressing. Second, although until recently banks have relied mostly on subsidiary structures to go cross‐border, this is changing with the recent creation of the European company statute, which facilitates cross‐border branch banking. A review of the case of the Scandinavian bank, Nordea Bank AB, helps to understand some remaining barriers to integration, and the supervisory issues raised by branch banking. Third, it is argued that the principle of ‘home country’ supervision is unlikely to be adequate in the future for large international banks. Because the closure of an international bank would be likely to have cross‐border spillovers, and because some small European countries might be unable to finance the bail‐out of their very large banks, centralization, or at least Europe‐wide coordination, of the decision to close or bail‐out international banks is needed. This raises the issue of European funding of bail‐out costs, European banking supervision, and European deposit insurance.     

Banks’ Financial Reporting and Financial System Stability

The use of accounting measures and disclosures in banks’ contracts and regulation suggests that the quality of banks’ financial reporting is central to the efficacy of market discipline and nonmarket mechanisms in limiting banks’ development of debt and risk overhangs in economic good times and in mitigating the adverse consequences of those overhangs for the stability of the financial system in downturns. This essay examines how research on banks’ financial reporting, informed by the financial economics literature on banking, can generate insights about how to enhance the stability of the financial system. We begin with a foundational discussion of how aspects of banks’ accounting and disclosures may affect stability. We then evaluate representative papers in the empirical literature on banks’ financial reporting and stability, pointing out the research design issues that empirical accounting researchers need to confront to develop well‐specified tests able to generate reliably interpretable findings. To this end, we provide examples of settings amenable to addressing these issues. We conclude with considerations for accounting standard setters and financial system policy makers.     

Inside debt and shadow banking

This study examines the effect of inside debt arising from CEO compensation deferral policies on shadow banking. We construct a parsimonious model that shows that increased bank inside debt leads to increased shadow banking. Using a CEO compensation deferral policy imposed on the Chinese banking industry in 2010, we empirically test our theoretical prediction on the effect of inside debt on shadow banking proxied by non-principal-guaranteed wealth management products. We find that banks that adopt the CEO compensation deferral policy exhibit higher levels of shadow banking than their counterparts and that this result is not contingent on bank size or the extent of government control. Moreover, the effect of inside debt on shadow banking is stronger in banks with higher loan-to-deposit and non-performing-loan ratios and in banks with CEO turnover, suggesting that the compensation deferral policy induces CEOs, especially newly appointed CEOs, to do more shadow banking to circumvent regulations regarding the balance-sheet risk and to boost performance.     

Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System

Through the profiling of institutional cash pools, this paper explains the rise of the “shadow” banking system from a demand‐side perspective. Explaining the rise of shadow banking from this angle paints a very different picture than the supply‐side angle that views it as a story of banks’ funding preferences and arbitrage. Institutional cash pools prefer to avoid too much unsecured exposure to banks even through insured deposits. Short‐term government guaranteed securities are the next best choice, but their supply is insufficient. The shadow banking system arose to fill this vacuum. One way to manage the size of the shadow banking system is by adopting the supply management of Treasury bills as a macroprudential tool.     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay

This paper studies the default risk of banks generated by investment and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. Competition for bankers generates a negative externality, driving up market levels of banker remuneration and hence rival banks’ default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured limit on the proportion of the balance sheet used for bonuses. However, stringent bonus caps are value destroying, default risk enhancing, and suboptimal for regulators who control only a small number of banks.     

Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.     

Systemic Risk in the Chinese Shadow Banking System: A Sector-Level Perspective

We propose to measure the systemic risk in the shadow banking sector. Instead of testing how many institutions will fail due to the initial breakdown of one institution as extant network models do, we associate the systemic risk of one shadow banking sector with the total amount of unexpected losses it might generate both directly and indirectly. Our model focuses on balance sheet contagion and applies a loop algorithm to risk transfer. The result shows that trust companies were the main culprit of financial instability and commercial banks assumed the main risks over 2007–12 in the Chinese shadow banking system.     

Efficiency in Turkish banking: post-restructuring evidence

Turkish banking sector went through a significant restructuring process in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000–2001. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of banking performance using a novel approach due to Ray [(2007). “Shadow Profit Maximization and a Measure of Overall Inefficiency.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 27, 231–236]. We derive ‘shadow unrealized profit scores’ as well as ‘shadow input–output prices’ for each year and bank in the sector from 2002 to 2011. We argue these scores operationalize the Hicksian concept of ‘monopolistic quiet life’. We provide some evidence the sector came closer to the ‘zero profit condition’ as well as displaying a closer approximation to the ‘law of one price’ over time. We show the variability of these ‘shadow prices’ essentially coincides with that of corresponding actual prices. We utilize shadow price information to show that business models and competitive choices of banks differ across ownership types with foreign banks competing on the broadest front compared to state-owned and privately owned Turkish banks.     

The Real Effects of FAS 166/167 on Banks’ Mortgage Approval and Sale Decisions

We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks’ loan‐level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811 billion of securitized assets on balance sheet. We find that banks that recognize more securitized assets exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and larger increases in mortgage sale rates. These effects significantly exceed those of banks’ off–balance sheet securitized assets, consistent with our results being driven by the consolidation of securitization entities rather than by securitization per se. We conduct tests that help rule out the financial crisis as an alternative explanation for our results. Further analyses suggest that mechanisms underlying the results include consolidating banks’ reduced regulatory capital adequacy, increased market discipline, and consequent desire not to recognize high‐risk mortgages on balance sheet.     

Public bank lending in times of crisis

This paper studies the role of government-owned banks in the event of financial crises. The study takes an empirical perspective focusing on bank lending. We compare the lending responses across government-owned and private banks to financial crises using the balance sheet information of 764 major banks headquartered in 50 countries over the period of 1994–2009. Using a nested panel regression framework that allows for parameter shifts in the bank lending equation, we find robust evidence that government-owned banks increase their lending during crises relative to normal times, while private banks’ lending decreases. Government-owned banks thus counteract the lending slowdown of private banks. The findings suggest that governments can play an active counter-cyclical role in their banking systems directly through government-owned banks.     

Banking Market Size Structure and Financial Stability: Evidence from Eight Asian Countries

Using commercial bank data from eight major Asian countries, we examine the relationship between the banking market size structure and the stability of financial institutions. We also analyze the effect of bank upsizing on the financial stability. Our results show that a rise in large banks’ market power, accompanying an increase in their market shares, lowers the capital adequacy of small banks. Small banks’ nonperforming loans and the possibility of their bankruptcy also increase as large banks’ market shares rise. We further show that larger banks tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, and distance-to-default ratios. Our study suggests that large banks’ greater market shares are associated with small banks’ financial instability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion of the recent banking literature that has important antitrust policy implications.     

审计质量对影子银行业务风险的影响研究 ——基于中国商业银行数据的实证研究

以中国68家非上市银行和16家上市银行2007-2017年的数据为样本,检验注册会计师审计在抑制商业银行从事影子银行业务风险中发挥的重要作用,并探究高质量的审计对商业银行从事影子银行业务风险的具体影响.研究表明:国际四大会计师事务所的审计质量更高,更能有效抑制银行从事影子银行业务的风险;股权集中度较高和处于法律保护水平较低地区的银行从事影子银行业务的风险更大,高质量的审计对其风险的抑制效果更强.     

Shadow price of equity and political connectedness: A study of Chinese commercial banks

This study estimates the shadow price of equity capital applying a directional distance function for Chinese commercial banks. Using an unbalanced panel of 746 observations from 2013 to 2019, we find that the average shadow price of equity in the Chinese banking system is 2.94%. Moreover, in our sample, the price of equity of most banks is lower than that of deposits, suggesting that the majority of sampled banks are underleveraged during the study period. We also find that politically connected banks have higher prices of equity than their non-politically connected counterparts, and that the price of equity is positively related to ownership concentration. Furthermore, large politically related banks tend to have lower shadow prices of equity than large non-politically related banks, although large banks usually have higher prices of equity than small banks.     

商业银行影子银行业务风险监管研究

美国金融危机的爆发,使影子银行成为国际社会关注的焦点。由于我国稳健货币政策的实施,使得商业银行传统信贷业务被进一步压缩,一些商业银行纷纷通过业务创新来寻找新的利润增长点。我国商业银行在进行金融创新的同时,影子银行业务也得到不断发展。但是,这些影子银行业务将传统的表内资产转到表外,具有监管套利的性质,给影子银行的运行带来较大的潜在风险,同时也加大了政府宏观调控的难度。本文结合当前国内商业银行影子银行业务发展现状,对商业银行影子银行业务的风险监管进行了研究,并提出相关监管对策。     

Financial institutions’ business models and the global transmission of monetary policy

Global financial institutions play an important role in channeling funds across countries and, therefore, transmitting monetary policy from one country to another. In this paper, we study whether such international transmission depends on financial institutions’ business models. In particular, we use Dutch, Spanish, and U.S. confidential supervisory data to test whether the transmission operates differently through banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. We find marked heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy across the three types of institutions, across the three banking systems, and across banks within each banking system. While insurance companies and pension funds do not transmit home-country monetary policy internationally, banks do, with the direction and strength of the transmission determined by their business models and balance sheet characteristics.     

中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算

2008年国际金融危机以后,中国金融体系发生的重大变化之一是影子银行的较快发展,其规模迅速膨胀,交易结构日趋复杂,各类市场主体都牵涉其中。这些变化吸引了政策制订者和学术界的广泛关注。本文给出了中国影子银行的功能性定义,即依赖于银行信用、从事银行业务、但又没接受严格的银行业监管的金融业务,具体指传统的银行表内贷款和债券投资以外的,具备完整的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换功能的金融业务。本文逐项分析影子银行业务,详细总结各类型业务的交易结构、业务主体、业务实质、资金来源、法律基础、资产负债表表示,准确测算了2002年至今影子银行总量和资产负债表结构月度数据。只从资产负债表的负债端着手加总,既完整地涵盖了影子银行的全部业务,得到其宏观总量,又剔除了重复计算。本文测算数据为后续研究打下了基础。