What do dividend reductions signal?

Dividend reductions have long been considered a “last resort” action for firm managers. Managerial reluctance to reduce dividends emanates from the view that dividend drops signal managerial pessimism regarding future earnings. Contrary to expectations, studies show that earnings rebound significantly following a dividend reduction; yet investors react negatively to the dividend-drop announcement. We present an explanation for the anomalous behavior of earnings and returns around the time of a dividend drop. Our evidence suggests that a reduction in a firm's established dividend coincides with a decrease in the value of the firm's real options. Earnings rebound following the dividend reduction due to the savings that result as the firm allows growth options to expire; however, announcement period returns suggest that investors recognize the lost value associated with the forthcoming expiration of growth options.     

STOCK MARKET PERCEPTION OF INDUSTRIAL FIRM BANKRUPTCY

The objectives of this study are to determine (1) when the stock market first perceives the impending bankruptcy of a potentially bankrupt firm and (2) what firm-specific factors explain the interval between the perception time and the eventual date of bankruptcy (i.e., market lead time). A computational methodology based on the Hillmer-Yu technique is used to determine the month in which a structural change in the mean and variance of monthly stock return occurs for a potentially bankrupt firm. This parametric change month or the “market perception time” is computed for a sample of 47 industrial firms. The range of market lead times cautions against the common assumption of a uniform event period in event studies. The lead time interval (for both the mean and variance of monthly market return) of poteintially bankrupt firms is found to be positively related to the firm's earnings per share at the time of stock market perception of eventual bankruptcy. Neither the firm's asset size nor systematic risk appear to be significant indicators of lead time interval. Also, change in investment at market perception time is positively related to percentage change in the market lead times. This suggests that innovations in the investment variable are a source of new information to the security market in assesing the probability of future bankruptcy of a firm.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.     

Learn from peers? The impact of peer firms' analyst earnings forecasts on a focal firm's corporate investment efficiency

We explore whether a firm can learn from information on peers produced by analysts. Based on a sample of Chinese firms, we document that analyst earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion or optimism) of peer firms is positively (negatively) associated with the focal firm's investment efficiency. The effect is more salient when the focal firm operates in a competitive industry, when analysts are predicting positive earnings, when peers produce low-quality annual reports, or when the focal firm has high information asymmetry. Overall, our findings provide new insights on learning from peer information produced by a third party and show that analyst earnings forecasts have spillover effects in the product market.     

Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty

We examine optimal liquidity (retained earnings) and dividend choice incorporating debt financing with risk of default and bankruptcy costs as well as growth options under revenue uncertainty. We revisit the conditions for dividend policy irrelevancy and the broader role of retained earnings and dividends. Retained earnings have a net positive impact on firm value in the presence of growth options, high external financing costs and low default risk. High levels of retained earnings enhance debt capacity but have a negative effect on equity value due to the likelihood of losing accumulated cash balances in case of default, unless offset by high external financing costs. Opposite directional effects of retained earnings on equity and debt create a U-shaped relation with firm value. The framework is extended to analyze management-shareholder conflicts, demonstrating that managers accumulate higher than optimal cash.     

Corporate liquidity and dividend policy under uncertainty

We examine optimal liquidity (retained earnings) and dividend choice incorporating debt financing with risk of default and bankruptcy costs as well as growth options under revenue uncertainty. We revisit the conditions for dividend policy irrelevancy and the broader role of retained earnings and dividends. Retained earnings have a net positive impact on firm value in the presence of growth options, high external financing costs and low default risk. High levels of retained earnings enhance debt capacity but have a negative effect on equity value due to the likelihood of losing accumulated cash balances in case of default, unless offset by high external financing costs. Opposite directional effects of retained earnings on equity and debt create a U-shaped relation with firm value. The framework is extended to analyze management-shareholder conflicts, demonstrating that managers accumulate higher than optimal cash.     

Earnings Management in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

We study the impact of earnings management prior to bankruptcy filing on the passage of firms through Chapter 11. Using data on public US firms, we construct three measures of earnings management: a real activities manipulation measure (abnormal operating cash flows) and two accounting manipulation measures (discretionary accruals and abnormal working capital accruals). We find that, controlling for the impact of factors known to influence earnings management and firm survival in bankruptcy, earnings management prior to bankruptcy significantly reduces the likelihood of Chapter 11 plan confirmation and emergence from Chapter 11. The results are driven primarily by extreme values of earnings management, characterized by one or two standard deviations above or below the mean. The findings are consistent with creditors reacting positively to unduly conservative earnings reports and negatively to overly optimistic earnings reports. We also find that the presence of a Big 4 auditor is associated with a higher incidence of confirmation and switching to a Big 4 auditor before filing increases the incidence of emergence.     

Stock Dividends,Stock Splits,and Signaling

This paper provides evidence that firms signal their private information about future earnings by their choice of split factor. Split factors are increasing in earnings forecast errors, after controlling for differences in pre-split price and firm size. Furthermore, price changes at stock dividend and split announcements are significantly correlated with split factors, holding other factors constant, and with earnings forecast errors. These correlations suggest that management's choice of split factor signals private information about future earnings and that investors revise their beliefs about firm value accordingly. The analysis also suggests, however, that announcement returns are significantly correlated with split factors after controlling for earnings forecast errors. This suggests that earnings forecast errors measure management's private information about future earnings with error, that split factors signal other valuation-relevant attributes, or that a signaling explanation is incomplete.     

Opportunistic earnings management or performance-related effects? Evidence from dividend-paying firms

We propose that much of the variation in standard (accruals and real-activities) earnings management metrics can be explained by firms' performance trajectories. We test our proposition using dividend change to distinguish high from low performance trajectory firms. We find that standard earnings management metrics have a stronger relation with performance trajectories than with unexpected earnings, a presumed target of earnings management. Firms that appear to manage earnings more are likelier to increase their dividends, but standard earnings management metrics do not explain changes in firm value around dividend change announcements. Applying standard earnings management metrics without taking performance trajectories into account can result in mistaking managers' efforts to increase firm value for earnings management.     

DOES IT PAY TO DISCLOSE MANAGERIAL EARNINGS INFORMATION EARLY?

Does it pay to voluntarily disclose the manager's private information about the firm's earnings prospects before the mandatory announcement date? This question has been a subject of much debate because prior research establishes both benefits and costs of early information disclosure. We provide evidence on the net effect of such disclosure by examining its impact on firm value. Using a large sample and correcting for self‐selection bias, we find that early disclosure of the manager's private earnings information enhances the end‐of‐period value of the firm.     

A MULTIPERIOD MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The continuing interest in the capital structure issue among financial researchers is evidenced by the stream of capital structure models that have appeared in the literature. Much of this research has used a risk-neutral and/or a single-period framework. In this paper, we develop a capital structure model for multiperiod firms and allow for the firm's cash flows to grow over time, for the firm to issue new debt, and for two types of bankruptcy costs to occur. The types of bankruptcy costs that occur are determined by the firm's uncertain operating cash flows and negotiations between the firm and creditors. Risk is priced via the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model. Multiperiod risk-priced models, we argue, realistically represent actual firms and are thus an important step toward the development of more testable and usable models of capital structure. We execute a demonstration example in which the value of the levered firm achieves a maximum and discuss the steps the firm would take to maximize shareholder wealth within this example. The example illustrates that the value of the firm passes through an interior optimum as the promised debt payment is increased. A simulation of the effect of changes in firm-specific parameters shows that the model exhibits expected and appealing relationships between these parameters and the value of the levered firm.     

Dealing with consumer default: Bankruptcy vs garnishment

What are the positive and normative implications of eliminating bankruptcy protection for indebted individuals? Without bankruptcy protection, creditors can collect on defaulted debt to the extent permitted by wage garnishment laws. The elimination lowers the default premium on unsecured debt and permits low-net-worth individuals suffering bad earnings shocks to smooth consumption by borrowing. There is a large increase in consumer debt financed essentially by super-wealthy individuals, a modest drop in capital per worker, and a higher frequency of consumer default. Average welfare rises by 1% of consumption in perpetuity, with about 90% of households favoring the change.     

Factors Affecting the Probability of Bankruptcy: A Managerial Decision Based Approach

The majority of classification models developed have used a pool of financial ratios combined with statistical variable selection techniques to maximize the accuracy of the classifier constructed. Rather than follow this approach, this article seeks to provide an explicit economic basis for the selection of variables for inclusion in bankruptcy models. This search to develop an economic theory of bankruptcy augments the existing bankruptcy prediction literature. Variables which occur in bankruptcy probability expressions derived from the solution of a stochastic optimizing model of firm behaviour are 'proxied' by variables constructed from financial statement data. The random nature of the lifetime of a single firm provides the rationale for the use of duration or hazard-based statistical methods in the validation of the derived bankruptcy probability expressions. Results of the validation exercise confirm that the majority of variables included in the empirical hazard formulation behave in a way that is consistent with the model of the firm. The results highlight the need for developments in the measurement of earnings dispersion.     

Loss firms’ annual report narratives and share price anticipation of earnings

We extend prior research into the association between disclosure quality and share price anticipation of earnings by discriminating between firms that report profits and firms that report losses. As a measure of disclosure quality we count the number of forward-looking earnings statements in annual report narratives. To measure the extent to which current share price movements anticipate future earnings changes we regress current stock returns on current and future earnings changes. The coefficients on the future earnings change variables are our measure of share price anticipation of earnings.Our regression results show that the association between annual report narratives and share price anticipation of earnings is not the same for profit and loss firms. For loss firms we find that the ability of stock returns to anticipate next period's earnings change is significantly greater when the firm provides a large number of earnings predictions in annual report narratives. We make no such observation for profit firms. In addition, once we control for variations in the intrinsic lead–lag relation between returns and earnings across industries, the observed difference between profit and loss firms becomes statistically significant. Overall, our results are consistent with annual report narratives being a particularly important source of information for loss-making firms.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

Asset specificity and conditional accounting conservatism

Asset specificity, the redeployability of an asset to alternative uses, is a key determinant of an asset's resale value. Asset specificity has a direct impact on a firm's ongoing fair value determination, bankruptcy risk, liquidation value, and abandonment option. We document a significant negative association between asset specificity and conditional conservatism. Further tests reveal that this inverse relation manifests as bad news being less quickly incorporated in earnings as asset specificity increases. We find no difference in the extent to which good news is delayed in earnings for firms conditional on asset specificity. In addition, the documented association is stronger when asset specificity arises from lower within‐industry acquisition activity. The association is also more pronounced for firms that are in less competitive industries, have institutional investors, have limited access to the public debt market, and/or have more unsecured debt. Our findings are noteworthy for regulators and researchers given the recent interest in the determinants of conservatism.     

Personal Taxation in Firm Market Valuation: Theory and Test*

In this paper, I extend Ohlson's 1995 firm market valuation model to incorporate personal taxes: the taxes on dividends and the taxes on capital gains. Without personal taxes, firm market value can be expressed as the present value of future benefits received by the shareholders (dividends, in this case). With personal taxes, the benefits received by the shareholders should be classified into three categories (due to their different tax treatments): dividends, share repurchases, and new share issues (i.e., contributed capital). The extended model shows the effects of personal taxation on firm market valuation: retained earnings are valued less than contributed stocks, both dividends taxes and capital gains taxes affect retained earnings valuation and firm market value, and firms choose cash distribution methods (paying dividends and repurchasing shares) to increase their retained earnings valuation, therefore increasing their market value. An empirical test using a sample from the Disclosure Select Canada and Financial Post Card data bases for the years 1995‐98 supports these personal tax effects.     

Optimal Contracts with Performance Manipulation

We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior to being hired by a firm. In order to incentivize the manager to exert productive effort, the firm designs a compensation contract that is based on reported earnings, which can be manipulated by the manager. Our model predicts that (1) the optimal compensation contract is convex in reported earnings; (2) the optimal contract is less sensitive to reported earnings than it would be absent the manager's ability to manipulate earnings; and (3) higher costs of manipulating reported earnings (e.g., due to higher governance quality) are associated with higher firm value, lower expected level of earnings management, and higher output.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON ENTERPRISE-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT

For many years, MBA. students were taught that there was no good reason for a company that hedged a large currency exposure to trade at a higher P/E than an otherwise identical company that chose not to hedge. Corporate stockholders, simply by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of interest rate and currency risk on corporate values. And thus corporate efforts to manage risk were thought to be “redundant,” a waste of corporate resources on a function that was already accomplished by investors at far lower cost. But the theory underlying this “perfect markets” framework has changed in recent years to focus on ways that corporate risk management can add value. The academics and practitioners who participated in this roundtable began by discussing in general terms how risk management can be used to support a company's strategic plan and investment policy. At Merck, for example, where R&D spending was determined as a percentage of earnings, a policy of hedging foreign currency exposure to reduce earnings volatility was viewed as adding value by “protecting” the firm's R&D. The panelists also agreed that a well executed risk management policy can increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital by lowering the likelihood of financial distress. For example, companies with debt covenants might undertake a risk management program to lower earnings volatility and ensure a minimum level of earnings for debt compliance purposes. But one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that risk management and earnings management are not the same thing, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic functions. Moreover, in making decisions to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. That is, if there is an outside firm or investor willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. In addition to the cost savings and higher return on capital promised by such an approach, a number of the panelists also pointed to a less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—namely, a marked improvement of the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the firm's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among the firm's business units.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.