Leveraged buybacks

Debt-financed share buybacks generate positive short-term and long-run abnormal stock returns. Leveraged buyback firms have more debt capacity, higher marginal tax rate, lower excess cash and lower growth prospects ex ante, increase leverage and reduce investments more sharply ex post than cash-financed buyback firms. Firms that are over-levered ex-ante are associated with lower returns and real investments following leveraged buybacks. The lower announcement returns of over-levered firms are concentrated on firms with weaker corporate governance. The evidence is consistent with leveraged buybacks enabling firms to optimize their leverage, on average benefiting shareholders. The benefits decrease with a firm's leverage ex ante.     

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Growth,governance and corporate payout policy

We show that when growth opportunities decreased following the end of the Cold War, defence firms responded by increasing total payout. This change in policy was largely driven by increased stock buybacks as opposed to changes in cash dividends and primarily by firms that faced stronger external governance. On the other hand, firms with weaker internal governance that were more severely affected by the reduced growth chose to alter the mix of payout at the expense of repurchases. Overall, our findings (i) demonstrate a causal link where exogenous shocks to growth cause payout policy changes, (ii) support the role of internal governance in payout policy design where entrenched managers pre‐commit to higher dividends and (iii) emphasize the monitoring role of external governance in mitigating agency costs of free cash flow.     

Corporate payout policy in Australia and a test of the life‐cycle theory

We provide evidence on the frequency and size of payouts by Australian firms, and test whether the life‐cycle theory explains Australian corporate payout policies. Regular dividends remain the most popular mechanism for distributing cash to shareholders, despite a slight decline in the proportion of dividend payers since the relaxation of buyback regulations in 1998. Off‐market share buybacks return the largest amount of cash to shareholders. Dividend paying firms are larger, more profitable and have less growth options that nondividend paying firms. Consistent with the life‐cycle theory, we observe a highly significant relation between the decision to pay regular dividends and the proportion of shareholders’ equity that is earned rather than contributed.     

Excess Cash and Shareholder Payout Strategies

On March 19, 2012, Apple announced a program to distribute its “excess” cash to shareholders in the form of dividends and share buybacks. This announcement followed a pattern that is remarkably similar to the one leading up to Microsoft's announcement in 2004. Likewise IBM, the bluest of blue chips, made a path‐breaking decision to initiate share buybacks in the 1980s. And as recently as April 2012, IBM, along with many other large corporations, announced yet another major share buyback program together with an increase in its dividend. These actions underscore the reality that senior management's main job is to allocate capital efficiently—and that efficient allocation of capital means distributing it when necessary. In light of these events, and the demand from shareholders that appears to be driving them, this paper explores analytical and empirical issues related to excess cash and corporate payout policy. In so doing, it provides the outline of an analytical framework for executives when thinking about the allocation of excess cash among competing uses, including deleveraging, growth, special and regular dividends, and share buybacks. The essence of the framework is this: Once companies satisfy their demands for cash based on their expected financial transactions, their targeted capital structure, and prospective investment (mergers and acquisitions) considerations, management should turn its attention to capital structure and shareholder payout decisions. Assuming that the company's capital structure is reasonably close to its target, and that its rating agencies are supportive, management should aim to pay a level of dividends that (1) reflects the underlying strength and stability of their projected earnings streams and that (2) satisfies the expectations of its core shareholders while positioning itself for the future. For more cyclical and otherwise riskier companies, management should also consider the use of stock buybacks or special dividends as a way of paying out the more variable, or unexpected, part of their expected earnings stream.     

Cash flow uncertainty,financial constraints and R&D investment

Based on the data from Chinese listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2005 and 2016, we systematically examine the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and R&D investment, and further research the moderating effect of financial constraints on the association between the two. Our empirical results find that R&D investment decisions tend to be more conservative and cautious due to cash flow uncertainty, which is not conducive to innovation efficiency. Firms with higher cash flow uncertainty invest more cautiously in R&D innovation, whereas firms with lower cash flow invest more boldly in R&D innovation. Financial friction may exacerbate the negative impact of cash flow uncertainty on innovation activities. Strategic cash holding can help firms better deal with the risks caused by cash flow uncertainty. In provinces with high marketization, the market competition intensifies, resulting in more significant cash flow uncertainty.     

贸易自由化对制造业企业现金储蓄的影响——预防性动机还是投资挤压?

随着加入世界贸易组织,中国企业的出口及投资机会增多,但与此同时面临的进口竞争压力也与日俱增。本文基于1998-2007年中国工业企业数据和行业进口关税数据,以中国2001年加入世界贸易组织为准自然实验,采用双重差分法(DID)模型,首次系统地考察了贸易自由化对制造业企业现金储蓄的影响及作用机制。研究发现:(1)中国贸易自由化不仅没有提高国内制造业企业的现金储蓄率,反而通过投资挤压显著降低了企业的现金储蓄率,这与发达国家的相关研究结果大相径庭。(2)贸易自由化对企业现金储蓄的作用依赖于市场竞争程度,即关税减让会显著降低竞争性行业以及高集聚区域内企业的现金储蓄率。(3)高关税行业的关税降低后,进口竞争会侵蚀纯内销企业的投资机会,尤其是小规模企业,进而降低其现金储蓄。经过一系列检验后,结论依然成立。     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WILLINGNESS OF COMPANIES TO INVEST AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

In this article we investigate the changes in corporate investment dynamics in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Using firm-level data from six Latin American countries from 2002 to 2015, we show that firms are less constrained and have greater ability to invest after the crisis. However, the willingness of firms to invest optimally is reduced. This is supported by strong evidence that during the postcrisis period investment–cash flow sensitivity disappears, investment-q sensitivity increases, and the estimated speeds of adjustment for target investment decrease. Moreover, after the crisis, firms notably increase their efforts to attain optimal cash and leverage levels. Our analysis implies that firms may not always be willing to invest optimally. The willingness to invest optimally appears to be time variant and moves together with the dynamics of cash and leverage policies, albeit in opposite directions.     

How does the Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans Affect Investment Decisions of Firms in the United States?

We investigate whether the flexibility in making contributions towards defined benefit pension plans sponsored by firms in the United States allows managers to save cash and increase investments. Firms invest more at higher levels of pension deficit, defined as pension benefit obligations less pension assets, and scaled by total assets. At the median level (90^th percentile) of pension deficit, investments increase by 6.7 cents (9.4 cents) for every dollar increase in cash. As the pension deficit increases, firms deviate more from the predicted level of investment. These findings suggest that the incremental investments are more likely to represent overinvestment by managers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns that may arise if investments are jointly determined with the funding policy of pension plans and the firm's target cash level. We repeat our main analysis for the United Kingdom and also find for that country that, at a fixed cash level, total investment increases as pension deficit increases.     

Investor Protection,Investment Efficiency and Value: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

We examine the impact of improved investor protection due to cross‐listing on foreign firms’ investment decisions and firm value. While we find that cross‐listing increases firms’ capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions activities, cross‐listed firms also invest more in research and development, make better acquisition decisions, and have higher profitability compared to non‐cross‐listed firms. Moreover, cross‐listing is associated with better cash utilization by foreign firms for investments. These improvements in investments and cash utilization are more pronounced for firms cross‐listed on US exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor protection laws.     

Cash holdings in private firms

Evidence from a wide sample of Italian private firms shows that cash holdings are significantly related with smaller size, higher risk and lower effective tax rates, therefore supporting predictions from the trade-off model. More cash is also held by firms with longer cash conversion cycles and lower financing deficits, as predicted by the financing hierarchy theory. Reported evidence also shows that dividend payments are associated with more cash holdings, and both bank debt and net working capital represent good cash-substitutes. When controlling for macroeconomic and industry factors, some variables lose their significance, but the general findings are confirmed. Finally, cash-rich companies are found to be more profitable, to pay more dividends and to invest more in a medium-term future horizon.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of finance academics and practitioners discusses a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerged was that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial fl exibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate “free cash flow problem.” Both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks represent a commitment by management to shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce growth at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends appear to provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve a higher degree of managerial fl exibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial fl exibility; too little can mean lost investment opportunities but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

MORGAN STANLEY ROUNDTABLE ON Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of distinguished finance academics and practitioners discuss a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerges is that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial flexibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value both by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate free cash flow problem. In such cases, both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks signal management's commitment to its shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce low‐return growth that comes at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve more flexibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial flexibility: too little can mean lost investment opportunities, but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

Partial adjustment toward optimal cash holding levels

Recognizing that industry and capital market conditions may impede a firm's desire to achieve its targeted cash holding levels, we estimate a dynamic model that allows firms to adjust their cash holding levels over time and find evidence consistent with a trade-off type behavior in cash holding levels. We estimate a partial adjustment model and find that firms rapidly correct any deviation from their targeted cash levels. A typical firm in our sample closes this gap within two years. Inconsistent with the agency view of excess cash holdings, we find that cash holding levels for firms with excess cash persists over time compared to those that have a deficit. We also find that smaller firms typically hold excess cash and are quicker to correct deviations than large firms consistent with the view that it is more costly for financially constrained firms to operate at sub-optimal levels of liquid assets.     

Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

In this paper, we explore the relation between the banking sector's risk-taking and a firm's investment (“corporate investment”). Specifically, we ask whether firms' cash holdings moderate the effect of the banking sector's risk-taking on corporate investment. Based on a panel sample of publicly listed non-financial firms in 15 EU countries during the period 1990–2015, we document several key findings. First, both cash holdings and the banking sector's risk-taking are positively associated with corporate investment. Second, bank loan growth, which roughly captures the supply of bank credit, is not related to corporate investment. Third, firms with smaller cash holdings disproportionately invest more than do firms with larger cash holdings during periods of higher risk-taking by the banking sector.     

Cybersecurity breaches and cash holdings: Spillover effect

This paper shows that firms significantly increase cash holdings after they have experienced a cybersecurity attack, and this behavior persists for years. A cyberattack increases cash holdings from a base level of 23% of assets to 26.87%. Similar firms, defined by industry and geographical proximity also increase their cash holdings. Suppliers of attacked firms are also affected. Overall, the results of this study indicate that the detrimental effects of a cybersecurity breach are not isolated to the attacked firms, and peer firms are quick to follow in taking precaution.     

Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean `chaebols'

We compare the investment–cash flow sensitivity of Korean chaebols (conglomerates) and non-chaebol firms. We show that investment–cash flow sensitivity is low and insignificant for chaebol firms but is high and significant for non-chaebol firms. On the other hand, a chaebol firm's investment is significantly related to the growth opportunities but that of a non-chaebol firm is not. A chaebol firm's investment is significantly affected by the cash flow of other firms within the same chaebol even though they are independent legal entities. With these findings, we argue that there is an internal capital market in a chaebol and the internal capital market reduces the financing constraints of the chaebol. However, the operation of the internal capital market does not improve the efficiency of allocation of scarce funds in the Korean economy since we find that chaebols invest more than non-chaebol firms despite their relatively poor growth opportunities.     

Are U.S. Companies Really Holding That Much Cash—And If So,Why?

Non‐financial S&P 500 companies are now estimated to hold a total of $2.1 trillion of “cash,” a figure that is larger than the annual GDP of all but eight countries. In this report, J.P. Morgan's Corporate Finance Advisory team notes that while many observers have attributed the buildup to offshore cash growth alone, onshore cash levels are also up significantly. To be sure, the companies that have shown the greatest increases also tend to be highly successful, with strong cash flow and business performance. And the managers of such companies tend to prefer to retain much if not most of this cash to take advantage of investment opportunities and to maintain the flexibility to respond to the next economic downturn. Also adding to the cash build‐ups, the executives of large MNCs with significant overseas cash holdings typically try to avoid the higher tax bill triggered by repatriating funds to the U.S. Nevertheless, investors continue to expect growth and high returns on capital; and corporate distributions of capital in the form of dividends and stock buybacks can play an important role in encouraging companies to operate efficiently. While pursuing both of these goals—preservation of enough cash to weather downturns and invest in all positive‐NPV projects, and commitment to paying out excess capital—boards and senior decision makers should continuously reexamine their cash holdings and capital allocation policies to ensure they are appropriate not only for today's environment, but throughout the economic cycle.     

Organizational capital,corporate tax avoidance,and firm value

We show that firms with higher levels of organizational capital (OC) exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance and that shareholders view tax avoidance of high OC firms as value-enhancing. We also show that the OC-tax avoidance relation mainly manifests in firms with good internal governance and information environment and in firms that face tight financial constraints. In addition, we document that tax avoidance by high OC firms increases future cash flow and that high OC firms are more likely to invest in tax haven subsidiaries. Overall, our evidence suggests that OC enhances firms' tax efficiency.     

Investment decisions and internal capital markets: Evidence from acquisitions

In this paper, we examine the workings of internal capital markets in diversified firms that engage in related and unrelated corporate acquisitions. Our evidence indicates that bidders invest outside their core business (diversify) when the cash flows of their core business fall behind those of their non-core lines of business. However, bidders invest inside their core business (i.e., undertake non-diversifying investments) when their core business experiences superior cash flows. We also find that bidders whose core business are in industries with low growth prospects engage in diversifying acquisitions while bidders whose core business are in high growth industries undertake non-diversifying acquisitions. The pre-acquisition evidence, then, suggests that firms tend to diversify when the cash flows and the growth opportunities of their core business are considerably lower than those of their non-core business. Subsequent to acquisitions we find that diversifying bidders continue to allocate financial resources from less profitable business segments (i.e., core business) to more profitable business segments (i.e., non-core business). Given the low profitability of diversifying bidders’ core business, this capital resource allocation suggests that diversification increases do not result in capital allocation inefficiencies. The evidence for non-diversifying bidders, however, supports the existence of “corporate socialism” in the sense that there is transfer of funds from the profitable (core) to the less profitable (non-core) business segments in multi-segment bidders. We find that the capital expenditures of bidders’ non-core business segments rely on both core and non-core cash flows.