The impact of nominal stock price on ex-dividend price responses

In this paper, we examine whether nominal stock price can help to explain the ex-dividend day anomaly where stock prices drop by less than the dividend amount on the ex-dividend date. We find that stocks with lower nominal prices have ex-dividend day price drops that are more consistent with theoretical predictions based on an efficient market. After controlling for factors that have been previously documented to influence ex-dividend day stock price behavior, price-drop-to-dividend ratios are closer to one for lower priced stocks. To further explore this phenomenon, we examine the change in the price-drop-to-dividend ratio around stock splits. Firms that split their shares have a larger price-drop-to-dividend ratio after the split, and companies that reverse split their shares have a smaller price-drop-to-dividend ratio after the split. Our evidence indicates that ex-dividend day stock price behavior is influenced by the nominal price of a share and that this relation could also influence the decision to split a firm’s shares.     

Around-the-Clock Performance of Closed-End Funds

Herein, we find that the market price of closed-end fund shares tends to increase (decrease) in anticipation of a rise (fall) in the net asset value (NAV). Similarly, an increase (decrease) in the reported NAV tends to be followed by a rise (fall) in the price of the fund's shares. Interestingly, we also find a powerful negative autocorrelation between closed-end fund shares’ overnight and intraday returns in both univariate and multivariate tests for both the overall sample and a number of subsamples. We believe that this tendency results from the strategies that many specialists employ when they open their assigned shares.     

The Effectiveness of Price Limits and Stock Characteristics: Evidence from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges

We examine the effectiveness of price limits on Chinese A shares and investigate the characteristics of those stocks that hit their price limits more frequently. We find that the effect of price limits is asymmetric for the A shares in upward and downward price movements and different for bullish and bearish sample periods. During a bullish period price limits effectively reduce stock volatility for downward price movements, but not for upward price movements; while during a bearish period price limits effectively reduce stock volatility for upward price movements, but not for downward price movements. Second, price limits delay efficient price discovery for upward price movements, but not for downward price movements. However, we do not find evidence to suggest that price limits harmfully interfere with the stock trading processes in the Chinese A share markets. Finally, we find that actively traded stocks hit their price limits more often and tend to hit the lower limit more frequently when overall market conditions are bearish. Stocks with high book-to-market values of equity hit their upper price limits more frequently, while stocks with a high ratio of tradable shares tend to hit their price limits less frequently.JEL Classification: G10, G14, G15     

Pre-bid price run-ups and insider trading activity: Evidence from Canadian acquisitions

A sample of 128 Canadian acquisitions from 1985 through 1995 is used to examine the relationship between pre-bid price run-ups in target shares and insider trading activity. We find that abnormal stock price performance at an early stage before the acquisition announcement is due to actual trading by corporate insiders. However, the run-up immediately preceding the takeover announcement appears due to market anticipation about an impending bid for the target. Furthermore, our results identify the stages in the acquisition process at which each effect occurs.     

Restricted Voting Stock, Acquisition Premiums, and the Market Value of Corporate Control

This paper examines the valuation and financial histories of 152 British firms that have two or more common share classes with differential voting rights outstanding at some time between 1955 and 1982. Over 16,000 monthly price pairs are examined, and on average, the superior voting (SV) shares market prices exceed those of the otherwise equivalent class of restricted voting (RV) shares by 13.3 percent. Liquidity factors, if anything, attenuate this result since RV shares trade much more frequently than SV shares. Forty-three of the sample companies are acquired while they have multiple share classes outstanding, and a higher price is paid for the SV share class than for the RV share class in 37 cases. The SV share price premium is found to be positively related to insider holdings of SV shares and negatively related to insider holdings of RV shares.     

An Option-Theoretic Approach to the Valuation of Dividend Reinvestment and Voluntary Purchase Plans

Many firms with dividend reinvestment plans also allow their shareholders to voluntarily invest supplemental funds to purchase additional shares. The purchase price for newly-issued shares often is determined by the average stock price over a prespecified time period preceding the investment date. This gives the firm's shareholders an option to invest in additional shares only when the stock price exceeds the computed average. This paper uses both theoretical and numerical methods to analyze the value of these voluntary purchase options in theory and practice.     

The value of dividends: Evidence from cum-dividend trading in the ex-dividend period

What is the market value of a dollar of fully franked dividends? We address this question by exploiting a new phenomenon in the Australian capital market—the trading of shares cum-dividend during the ex-dividend period. This allows a relatively clean measurement of the combined value of dividends and the associated tax effects net of transactions costs. Consistent with the theoretical model that we develop, the evidence from this sample is that one dollar of fully franked dividends, after tax effects and transaction costs, is worth significantly more than one dollar. We also show that, in contrast to our measure, the traditional measure of the ex-dividend price drop-off, based on close to close prices, has a lower average value and exhibits substantially more cross sectional variation.     

On the prediction of financial distress in developed and emerging markets: Does the choice of accounting and market information matter? A comparison of UK and Indian Firms

We examine differences in price delay for a sample of real estate investment trust (REIT) and non-REIT matched pairs. Results suggest an economically and statistically higher level of price delay for REIT securities, which implies heightened frictions that increase the time needed for new information to be impounded into the prices of REIT shares. The primary drivers for the observed delay differential include differences in idiosyncratic volatility, market risk, and the number of days traded. Within-REIT determinants of delay confirm findings for the pooled sample of matched pairs. Importantly, we infer find that REIT investors are not compensated for restricted information flow, as excess returns are unrelated to the price delay.     

Market Segmentation and Stock Prices: Evidence from an Emerging Market

We examine the relationship between stock prices and market segmentation induced by ownership restrictions in Mexico. The focus is on multiple classes of equity that differentiate between foreign and domestic traders, and between domestic individuals and institutions. Significant stock price premia are documented for shares not restricted to a particular investor group. We analyze the theoretical and empirical determinants of premia across firms and over time. In addition to economy-wide factors, segmentation reflects the relative scarcity of unrestricted shares. The results provide additional support for Stulz and Wasserfallen's (1995) hypothesis that firms discriminate between investor groups with different demand elasticities.     

Private benefits, block transaction premiums and ownership structure

A simple model shows that both price premiums and standardized block premiums (SBPs) are biased measures of private benefits because they do not account for the transfer of control effectively taking place with the block. This depends not only on the fractional size of the block, but on the whole distribution of shareholdings. We propose an alternative methodology to measure private benefits which makes it possible to weight the size of traded blocks on the basis of their strategic power. We apply our method to a sample of Italian block transactions and show that the traditional method underestimates control rents. The sensitivity of private benefits to net worth, leverage, and nonvoting shares is also examined. Finally, we show how to forecast the price of out-of-sample blocks of shares on the basis of information on company capital and ownership structure.