Financial literacy and its consequences: Evidence from Russia during the financial crisis

The ability of consumers to make informed financial decisions improves their ability to develop sound personal finance. This paper uses a panel data set from Russia, an economy in which household debt has grown at an astounding rate, to examine the importance of financial literacy and its effects on behavior. The paper studies both the financial and real consequences of financial illiteracy. Even though consumer borrowing increased very rapidly in Russia, only 41% of respondents demonstrate an understanding of interest compounding and only 46% can answer a simple question about inflation. Financial literacy is positively related to participation in financial markets and negatively related to the use of informal sources of borrowing. Moreover, individuals with higher financial literacy are significantly less likely to report experiencing a negative income shock during 2009 and have greater availability of unspent income and higher spending capacity. The relationship between financial literacy and availability of unspent income is higher in 2009, suggesting that financial literacy may better equip individuals to deal with macroeconomic shocks.     

On the Instability of Long‐Run Money Demand and the Welfare Cost of Inflation in the United States

We evaluate the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation accounting for instabilities in the long‐run money demand for the United States over the period 1900–2013. We extend the analysis and reassess the results reported in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009), also considering the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2015). Breaks in the long‐run money demand give rise to regime‐dependent welfare cost estimates. We find that the welfare cost is about 0.1% of annual income over 1976–2013, as compared to 0.8% over 1945–75. Overall, these values are substantially lower than those reported in the literature.     

Household Wealth and Macroeconomic Activity: 2008–2013

This paper provides estimates of the effects of the fall in financial and housing wealth in 2008–09 on overall macroeconomic activity. When the wealth losses are run through a structural macroeconometric model, it is estimated that the fall in wealth contributed about 2.1 percentage points to the rise in the unemployment rate in 2009 and about 3.3 points in 2010. The contribution to the fall in real GDP was 4.5% and 5.4% in the 2 years. These estimates account for most—but not all—of the recessionary increase in unemployment. The remaining increase in unemployment may have resulted more directly from financial stresses, but little evidence is found for this in this study.     

Financial risks,monetary policy in the QE era,and regulation

At the beginning of the present century, the literature on financial integration focused on the benefits of increased integration. In particular, the literature emphasized that a well-integrated financial system allows economic agents to engage in risk sharing while enhancing the smooth transmission of monetary policy. However, the international financial crisis of 2007-08 and the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2009-15, brought to the fore the flip side of increased financial integration – namely, that higher financial integration among national jurisdictions creates the potential for destabilizing cross-country spillovers of capital flows. The papers in this Special Issue address financial system vulnerabilities in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crisis and the 2009-15 euro area crisis. In particular, the papers assess (1) vulnerabilities arising from such factors as the liberalization of financial systems, cross-country contagion, and climate change, and (2) policy responses, including macroprudential supervision and quantitative easing, to financial instabilities.     

Uncovering the US term premium: An alternative route

The estimates of the US term premium crucially depend upon the ex-ante decision on whether the short-term rate is either an I(0) or an I(1) process. In this paper we estimate a fractionally integrated (I(d)) model which simultaneously determines both the order of integration of the short-term rate and the associated term premium. We show that the term premium experienced a sharp increase from essentially zero in mid-2007 to almost 3% in 2009. We also show that unemployment and term premium dynamics exhibit a very significant positive co-movement.     

Disentangling demand and supply in credit developments: A survey-based analysis for Italy

This paper combines qualitative information from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey with micro-data on loans for the participating Italian banks to assess the role of supply and demand factors in lending to enterprises developments, with a focus on the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Both demand and supply have played a relevant role, in the whole sample period and during the crisis. A counterfactual exercise shows that the effect of supply factors on the growth of lending was strongest after the Lehman collapse. On average, over the crisis period the negative effect on the annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the panel banks’ lending to enterprises can be estimated in a range of 2.3-3.1 percentage points, depending on the specification. About one fourth of the total supply effect can be attributed to costs related to the banks’ balance sheet position, the rest to their perception of credit risk.     

Inflation Targeting Does Not Matter: Another Look at OECD Sacrifice Ratios

Recently in this journal, Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) concluded that inflation targeters were able to bring inflation down at less cost than nontargeters (p. 242). This comment shows that their conclusion is not robust but instead is the result of comparing a particular subset of inflation targeting (IT) disinflations with nonsimultaneous disinflations that occurred under very different macroeconomic conditions. In their sample, simple extensions such as justifiably varying the treatment group of IT disinflations, to control for common time‐varying effects or to control for the Maastricht Treaty effects, suggest that IT does not matter.     

TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

A look inside AMLF: What traded and who benefited

The Federal Reserve’s AMLF program was designed to provide liquidity to money market funds (MMFs). Between September 2008 and May 2009, the program made $217 billion in non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from MMFs. JP Morgan and State Street dominated the program, accounting for over 90% of all loans made. Our analysis suggests that JP Morgan exhibited more self-dealing behavior than State Street. We find that JP Morgan and State Street earned economically and statistically significant cumulative returns of 2.28% and 2.49% (respectively) over the first seven days of the program after controlling for market returns and heteroscedasticity.