国际税收协定与反避税

税收协定除对所得消除双重征税外,还有防止偷逃税(“财政逃避”)的重要目的。税收协定和反避税之间的关系十分紧密,反避税是税收协定的一个重要内容,是各国谈签协定的主旨之一。本文从反避税角度对协定中可能出现的协定滥用和避税问题进行了列举,并提出适时修订协定、完善国内法规、有效打击跨国偷逃税活动的建议。     

Withholding tax rates on dividends: symmetries versus asymmetries or single- versus multi-rated double tax treaties

Out of all double tax treaties (DTTs) in force in 2012, around 41% are symmetric (single-rated) and 59% are asymmetric (multi-rated), i.e., they prescribe different dividend withholding tax rates depending on the foreign investor’s ownership fraction. The paper investigates the reasons for this phenomenon, namely why some countries in their DTTs prefer homogenous withholding tax rates over separate rates for participation and portfolio dividends. In a theoretical model, I demonstrate why home countries may have an interest in a high withholding tax rate in the host country, even though they do not receive the revenue from this tax. Further, I find confirming evidence that a reason for having multi-rated withholding taxes on dividends is an existing spatial dependence on the rates of the countries’ peers that may be a driving factor for setting multi-rated taxes. Finally, I confirm that the spread itself (i.e., the difference between the portfolio and participation dividends negotiated in the tax treaty) is also affected by the peer countries.

     

One-Way Treaty with the World: The U.S. Withholding Tax and the Netherlands Antilles

This paper chronicles the experiences of the U.S. withholding tax on interest income. In 1984, the U.S. repealed its 30 percent withholding tax on interest income paid to foreign persons or corporations. While the tax raised little revenue, it had imposed substantial implicit costs on U.S. corporate borrowers. Since, prior to repeal, domestically issued bonds were subject either to withholding or strict information requirements, many U.S. multinationals raised funds through foreign finance subsidiaries, primarily in the Netherlands Antilles, to avoid the tax. Although the withholding tax rate was effectively reduced to zero in the U.S., this paper demonstrates that interest flows were highly sensitive to their after-tax cost.     

Do Taxes Matter for Foreign Direct Investment?

The tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI) has importantpolicy implications. If FDI is not responsive to taxation, thenit may be an appropriate target for taxation by the host country.This question is examined for Mexico by estimating the responseof FDI from retained earnings and transfers from abroad to thetax regimes in Mexico and the home country, the credit statusof multinationals, country risk factors, and regulatory andtrade regimes in Mexico. FDI in Mexico is found to be sensitiveto the tax regimes in Mexico and the United States, the creditstatus of multinationals, country credit ratings, and the regulatoryenvironment. Thus Mexico's current policies to dismantle regulationsand employ a tax system competitive with the United States areexpected to have salutory effects on FDI in Mexico.     

The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity

The effects of bilateral tax treaties on FDI activity have been unexplored, despite significant ongoing activities by countries to negotiate and ratify these treaties. This paper estimates the impact of bilateral tax treaties using both U.S. inbound and outbound FDI over the period 1980–1999. Robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications, we find little evidence that bilateral tax treaties increase FDI activity, contrary to OECD-stated goals for such treaties.     

Taxing Multinationals

This paper analyzes the effects of tax policy on the strategic choices of multinationals and on national welfare. Contrary to existing theory, in the absence of foreign taxation, deferral of home-country taxation until earnings on outbound FDI are repatriated is generally superior to including those earnings in current income. This holds even if the home country taxes domestic investment less generously. This is also generally superior to exempting foreign income. Foreign taxes permit foreign governments to capture some of the pre-tax economic rent from the home-country FDI; this reduces the benefit to the home country of more generous taxation of outbound FDI.     

Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment

This paper explores the effects of unilateral tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals’ tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax deductibility, so-called thin-capitalization rules, and regulations of transfer pricing by the host country affect investment and employment of foreign subsidiaries. The results indicate that introducing a typical thin-capitalization rule or making it more tight exerts significant adverse effects on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. Moreover, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules, the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI is increased. Regulations of transfer pricing, however, are not found to exert significant effects on FDI or employment.     

The Capital Structure of Large Firms and the Use of Dutch Financing Entities

Large firms may issue debt securities to obtain external financing or set up lowly‐taxed affiliates for internal debt‐shifting purposes. In addition, they may channel interest payments through Dutch special purpose entities (SPEs) to avoid withholding taxes, a widely‐used arbitrage strategy. Analysing the capital structure of large EU‐based multinationals, this paper provides evidence that the use of Dutch‐issuing SPEs is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity. Furthermore, it shows that EU subsidiaries of larger firms are more leveraged and that the use of Dutch on‐lending SPEs is also associated with higher subsidiary leverage. Thus, the paper provides evidence that Dutch SPEs facilitate higher external debt financing as well as internal debt shifting. The findings indicate that withholding taxes on interest payments to entities outside the EU, determined by individual EU member states, are not very effective. The national tax systems of EU countries such as the Netherlands, which does not impose interest withholding tax, allow large firms to avoid those taxes.     

Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties

This paper examines bilateral double taxation treaties, with an emphasis on information exchange among tax authorities. A major objective is to understand which countries are more likely to sign a tax-relief treaty and when information-exchange clauses will be added to a treaty. A simple model with two asymmetric countries and repeated interactions among governments is used. The paper shows that no information exchange clause may be added to a tax treaty when there is a reciprocity requirement, when there is a high cost of negotiation, when there is a cost of providing information, or with one-way capital flows. It is also shown that an information clause increases the gains from a tax relief treaty, but may make it less sustainable.     

Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus Performance

Bilateral tax treaties are an important method of international tax cooperation. I survey the existing literature on these agreements, highlighting the differences between the standard view that treaties increase foreign direct investment and the empirical evidence that finds little support for this. I also discuss the key differences in treaty formation between developed countries relative to that between developed and developing nations.     

QFII内地股票投资——免税的大餐?

合格境外机构投资者(Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors,以下简称"QFII")在内地股票投资的收益在国内法上负有向内地政府缴纳10%预提所得税的义务,但由于一部分中外税收协定对此的特殊规定以及公开证券市场交易的特殊性等原因,此类业务在事实上一直享受着"免税大餐"。本文建议内地税务机关委托内地资金托管银行代征QFII在内地的应纳税款。     

Host-country governance, tax treaties and US direct investment abroad

We investigate how the quality of the host-country governance and a bilateral US income tax treaty affect the rates of return that US companies require on their foreign direct investment (FDI). Using indexes of corruption and political instability, we find that poor governance causes the companies to require significantly higher rates of return. This lends support to earlier authors who have concluded that poor governance discourages both local investment and inward FDI. After accounting for the quality of host-country governance, however, no evidence could be found that an income tax treaty has any effect on the required rates of return.      

避税地避税及其防范

本文在对避税地的产生和发展,以及避税地对各国经济的危害进行深入研究并对世界各国应对避税地的措施进行比较分析的基础上,借鉴国际上的成功经验,对我国目前的跨国企业避税问题进行深入分析,提出了我国税制应对避税地的政策建议和税收征管上的改进措施。     

The tax-efficient use of debt in multinational corporations

Affiliates of multinationals borrow a considerable amount from their parent company, even when the parent is located in a high-tax country. This is at odds with standard theories of a tax-efficient capital structure. We set up a model that analyzes the functioning of the internal capital market and investigates the trade-off between tax savings and capital market frictions within the group. We test the model on data of the universe of German multinationals. The empirical analysis largely supports our model in that: (i) smaller multinationals often rely on parental debt financing; (ii) larger multinationals are more likely to use internal banks; (iii) parental debt and external debt are substitutes and the mix depends on the relative cost of raising capital through the parent and the affiliates; (iv) local and within-group tax incentives play an important role in determining all three types of debt.     

Multiple taxes and alternative forms of FDI: evidence from cross-border acquisitions

This paper explores the role of tax instruments in affecting foreign direct investment (FDI), paying particular attention on their effect on two forms of FDI strategy, ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’. Applying a decomposition of FDI strategies to the universe of cross-border mergers (the dominant form of FDI) over the period 1999–2010, it emerges that taxes have a much more nuanced effect on FDI than frequently suggested; while corporate taxes affect FDI negatively, the tax elasticity varies depending on the FDI strategy (with vertical FDI being in general more responsive), the exact measure of taxation, and international tax considerations (double taxation, withholding taxes). Sales taxes also affect FDI, but only horizontally.     

Corruption and competition for resources

An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that differ from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a developing country context. We show how differences in the investors’ level of technology and differences in the host country government’s trade-off between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. One finding is that competition from a bribe-willing investor may induce a bribe-averse investor to enter into corruption. Surprisingly, however, we also find that competition with a bribe-willing investor may induce the bribe-averse investor to increase its tax payments.     

当前中国吸收外国直接投资面临的形势分析

<正> 一、当前我国吸收FDI的有利因素 首先,中国已于1999年11月15日与美国达成双边协议,加入WTO的最大障碍已经排除,普遍预计将于2000年底加入世界贸易组织。这是我国吸收FDI最大的有利因素。我国加入WTO后,服务业等投资领域的开放,市场准入程度的提高将使外国投资者获得更多的投资机会。同时我国承诺遵守WTO规则,与国际规则接轨,法制化、规范化程度将会提高,可使外商打消对我国政策多变、随意、不透明的疑虑,对在华投资能够做出预测,产生良     

税收优惠因抵免制而失效?——基于美国对华直接投资的研究

在国际直接投资研究领域,人们普遍认为,当母国对来源于外国的所得实行抵免制以避免国际重复课税时,东道国对外资企业的税收优惠往往转化为母国政府的财政收入,母国的投资者无法获得东道国给予的税收优惠.通过对1990～2004年实行抵克制的美国及实行豁免制和饶让抵免制的其它西方发达国家在华直接投资进行比较,未发现美国与其它西方发达国家在华直接投资的积极性存在显著差异.由于美国对该国投资者给予税收递延,使得投资者依然能够获得东道国的税收优惠,美国实行的抵免制并未阻碍该国投资者的在华投资热情.     

Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment: Evidence from emerging market firms

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) help developing countries attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed countries. However, whether BITs matter for emerging market firms’ (EMFs) FDI is unclear. This paper investigates how BITs affect EMFs’ FDI locations using conditional logit models with firm-level panel data from 2003 to 2015. The results show that BITs can help host countries attract FDI from emerging market countries. BITs work alongside good institutions to increase the attractiveness of FDI, irrespective of a host country being developed or not.     

An empirical study of the impact of corporate taxation on the global allocation of foreign direct investment: a broad tax attractiveness index approach

The question of whether a country’s corporate tax regime has a significant influence on the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) into that country is an important consideration in the design of national tax policy. This is especially relevant today in view of the recent increase in the global mobility of capital and subsequent increase in the importance of FDI to nations’ economies. Although several prior quantitative studies have investigated the link between taxation and FDI, they have tended to be restricted in geographical scope and in their measure of taxation.This study constructs indices of “corporate tax attractiveness” for selected countries and then analyses the relationship between the indices and measures of the flow of FDI into those countries. The indices are constructed by obtaining evaluations from international investors and taxation experts on the various attributes of the tax systems of those selected countries. A significant positive relationship was found to exist between the indices and measures of FDI inflows, and between individual tax system attributes and those inflows, thus adding support to the supposition that host country corporate taxation influences the size of FDI inflows.