保险消费行为的有限理性与保险产品结构调整研究

面对复杂的保险产品,消费者的消费行为往往呈现出不理性的特征。针对消费者的有限理性行为进行了分析,并提出通过调整保险产品结构来引导消费者理性消费的思路。     

保险消费决策行为分析——一个行为保险学的研究框架北大核心CSSCI

虽然期望效用理论公理化的研究框架在推动保险理论的发展过程中起到了举足轻重的作用,但由于该理论假定过强,以致现实解释力有限。保险学有必要从行为的角度分析保险市场、尤其是保险消费决策,提出能够更有效地解释现实的保险消费决策的模式,从而提高理论的实践指导意义。本文在行为保险学已有研究成果的基础上,借鉴前景理论,尝试构建更符合现实消费模式的保险消费决策模型,并运用调查问卷从实证角度验证本文所构建的被保险人最优决策模型。研究发现,被保险人的最优保险选择是保险分层的赔款安排,面对较小或巨大的损失被保险人会选择风险自留,只有在较小和巨大损失之间的损失被保险人才会选择购买保险;寿险中带有投资理财性质的产品以及非寿险中的足额保险产品更受消费者青睐;相对于男性决策者来说,女性面对不确定性时表现得更为谨慎。     

保险消费决策行为分析——一个行为保险学的研究框架

虽然期望效用理论公理化的研究框架在推动保险理论的发展过程中起到了举足轻重的作用,但由于该理论假定过强,以致现实解释力有限。保险学有必要从行为的角度分析保险市场、尤其是保险消费决策,提出能够更有效地解释现实的保险消费决策的模式,从而提高理论的实践指导意义。本文在行为保险学已有研究成果的基础上,借鉴前景理论,尝试构建更符合现实消费模式的保险消费决策模型,并运用调查问卷从实证角度验证本文所构建的被保险人最优决策模型。研究发现,被保险人的最优保险选择是保险分层的赔款安排,面对较小或巨大的损失被保险人会选择风险自留,只有在较小和巨大损失之间的损失被保险人才会选择购买保险;寿险中带有投资理财性质的产品以及非寿险中的足额保险产品更受消费者青睐;相对于男性决策者来说,女性面对不确定性时表现得更为谨慎。     

投保“后悔药”

在保险产品推销中,夸大保险产品投资收益、隐瞒产品风险的情形时有发生.而保险消费者对保险产品的认知有限,保单合约的描述又不够通俗易懂,这种在购买保险时的信息不对称,造成日后理赔纠纷屡现.     

行为保险学系列(三) 风险判断偏差与非理性保险决策(上)

在《什么是对的保险决策？理性保险决策理论及其由来》一文中,基本结论是：由于多数人是风险厌恶的,愿意支付风险溢价购买保险,所以,只要保险价格不是超出纯保费太多,多数消费者都愿意购买保险。     

消费者购买分红型保险产品时应注意的问题

分红险因为相较于传统的保险产品附加了一定的理财投资功能而备受消费者欢迎。然而,近年来,由于预期收益和实际收益的差距,分红险一直是保险消费投诉的"重灾区"。从一些现实的案例中我们可以发现,造成保险公司分红险产品屡遭投诉的原因有两个:第一,销售人员在一线进行产品销售的时候存在一定的销售误导,故意隐瞒产品风险;第二,消费者在购买保险产品的时候对分红型产品本身存在一些认识上不足。因此,本文将根据以上两个导致消费者投诉的原因,着重分析消费者在购买分红型保险时应该注意哪些问题。     

浅议加强保险消费者权益保护对策

由于保险产品的特殊性、专业性,再加上消费者往往以"价格优先"作为选择保险公司的首要考虑因素,导致保险消费纠纷不断,加强保险消费者权益保护势在必行,且应从多方面人手。     

个人理财新观念

秘笈一:零距离接触相信大家都有这样的常识:当你从零售商处购买产品时,所支付的价格要高于直接从产品生产者手中购买所付的价格,中间的差价是支付给中间人的。保险产品也不例外,甚至更严重。如果你从保险代理人手中购买保险,那么你支付的保费中的相当一部分(佣金)是归代理人所有。因此,如果你有时间和精力,可以方便、容易地从保险公司直接购买保险产品的话,不妨如此,这样可以轻而易举地为你节省一笔不小的支出。秘笈二:货比三家随着保险市场竞争的加剧及保险中介市场的繁荣,应该刻意利用中介的服务来指导保险的消费,尤其是对于那些对我们影…     

我国保险直销渠道创新私探

在以代理为特征的间接营销渠道取得不断发展的同时,直接营销渠道的发展也不容忽视。为了使直接营销渠道更好地发挥作用,有必要对其进行不断的创新,未来的保险直销渠道可采取以下方式。一、构建"保险超市""保险超市",指能够兼容优良品质和宽广适应性为一体的各类保险产品的场所。在"保险超市"内,消费者可以根据自己的经济能力和消费偏好,自由的选择和组合各种保险产品,而且还可以根据消费者的特殊要求来制定其所需要的保险产品,满足市场多样化的需求。保险超市作为一种新型的营销方式,有着其它营销方式无法比拟的优势。1."保险超市"能使一部分潜在的消费者转变为现实的消费者,有效的激发保险消费需求。通过"保险超     

从心理学角度研究风险知觉和保险购买意愿相关关系——以旅游短期意外险为例

近年来,随着我国经济社会快速发展,保险业也驶入了发展的快车道,保费增速持续提高,产品服务不断丰富。本研究尝试以应用心理学研究方法,从旅游短期意外险这样一个小险种切入,通过引入对旅游短期意外险的价值感知这一中介变量和消费者的卷入度这一调节变量,研究保险消费者的旅游风险知觉、对保险产品价值的认识和保险产品消费三者之间的相关关系。通过量化分析我们得出结论：保险消费者感知旅游风险越高,对旅游短期意外险的购买意愿越强,消费者对旅游短期意外险的价值感知则中介了这一影响。感知到的旅游风险会让消费者更加能够感知到旅游短期意外险的价值,增强对旅游短期意外险的购买意愿。同时,消费者的卷入度调节了该中介作用,当消费者卷入度较高时,消费者对旅游风险的感知会更加敏感,对旅游短期意外险的价值感知更高,对旅游短期意外险的购买意愿更强,反之亦然。这一结论对其他险种也具有一定借鉴意义。     

Price presentation and consumers’ choice

Currently, regulatory authorities and consumers ask for more cost transparency with respect to financial product components. In life insurance, for instance, the premium for products should be split in its components: A premium for death benefits, the savings premium, the cost of an investment guarantee, and the administration costs. In this regard, it is important for insurance companies and regulators to know to what extent the way of presenting the prices of an offer affects consumer evaluation of the product. Based on a paper by Huber et al. (How do price presentation effects influence consumer choice? The case of life insurance products. Working paper, 2011) as presented at the annual meeting of Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft in 2011, this article presents the effects of different forms of presenting the price of life insurance contract components and especially of investment guarantees on consumer evaluation of this product. This is done by means of an experimental study using a representative panel for Switzerland and by focusing on unit-linked life insurance products. The findings reveal that, contrary to consumer products, there is no effect of price bundling and price optic on consumer evaluation and purchase intention for life insurance products. However, there is a significant moderating effect of consumer experience with insurance products on this relationship.     

An Analysis of the Demand for Earthquake Insurance

This research examines the decision to purchase earthquake insurance by analyzing data on earthquake insurance price and penetration in the New Madrid fault zone in Missouri. Earthquake risk is of concern to consumers, the insurance industry, industry regulators, and government agencies because of the potentially catastrophic nature of losses resulting from a major earthquake. Despite the significance of the earthquake peril, the recent literature does not contain estimates of the price and income elasticity of the demand for earthquake insurance. Our analysis indicates that homeowners acquire earthquake insurance because of risk considerations, at higher levels of risk the demand for earthquake insurance is higher, and the price of earthquake coverage does not provide incremental information in explaining the demand for earthquake coverage.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.     

Consumer obfuscation by a multiproduct firm

This article shows that a multiproduct firm has incentives to obfuscate its products by using search costs to induce consumers to search through its products in a particular order. The consumers who draw high valuations of the first product terminate their search earlier than the consumers who draw low valuations. Thus, the firm has incentives to raise the price of the earlier searched product. The optimal search cost for an obfuscated product is such that consumers inspect the product only if the match values of the previously searched goods have been very poor.     

Price Regulation in Secondary Insurance Markets

Secondary life insurance markets are growing rapidly. From nearly no transactions in 1980, a wide variety of similar products in this market has developed, including viatical settlements, accelerated death benefits, and life settlements and as the population ages, these markets will become increasingly popular. Eight state governments, in a bid to guarantee sellers a “fair” price, have passed regulations setting a price floor on secondary life insurance market transactions, and more are considering doing the same. Using data from a unique random sample of HIV+ patients, we estimate welfare losses from transactions prevented by binding price floors in the viatical settlements market (an important segment of the secondary life insurance market). We find that price floors bind on HIV patients with greater than 4 years of life expectancy. Furthermore, HIV patients from states with price floors are significantly less likely to viaticate than similarly healthy HIV patients from other states. If price floors were adopted nationwide, they would rule out transactions worth $119 million per year. We find that the magnitude of welfare loss from these blocked transactions would be highest for consumers who are relatively poor, have weak bequest motives, and have a high rate of time preference.     

Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand

The gross price elasticity of demand for medical care is decomposed into two separate  observable  components: the medical care gross price elasticity of insurance choice and the cost-sharing elasticity of medical care. When consumers alter their choice of health-care plans, the price elasticity of medical care is no longer equivalent to the cost-sharing elasticity; using the latter as a proxy for the former may produce misleading results. We present conditions under which the medical care price elasticity is  positive , the case of a quasi-Giffen good, and provide a theoretical foundation for extant empirical findings of a positive medical care price elasticity of  insurance  demand.     

Homeowners Insurance With Bundled Catastrophe Coverage

We estimate the demand for homeowners insurance in Florida and New York with indicated loss costs as our proxy for the quantity of real insurance services demanded. We decompose the demand into the demand for coverage of catastrophe perils and the demand for noncatastrophe coverage and estimate these demand functions separately. Our results are relatively consistent in New York and Florida, including evidence that catastrophe demand is more price elastic than noncatastrophe demand. We also find evidence that consumers value options that expand coverage, buy more insurance when it is subsidized through regulatory price constraints, and consider state guaranty fund provisions when purchasing insurance.     

投资连结保险产品设计及推广分析

投资连结保险的产品设计独特,将其保障功能与投资功能分开,一方面为消费者提供了调整保险和投资计划的便利,另一方面也使之与资本市场的走势密切相关。我国寿险市场上的供给方存在资本市场繁荣时过多引导消费者关注投资收益,边缘化其保险功能的问题;需求方则由于对投资连结保险产品收益的刚性预期,不能接受产品收益下降的情况。两方面共同的结果是导致投资连接保险成为寿险市场上的不稳定因素。为促使投资连接保险在我国的健康发展,应当强调投资连接保险的保障功能;针对销售导向进行实质的约束;利用税收对市场进行引导等。     

论产品召回保险的性质

产品召回的前提是产品存在系统性缺陷而不管该缺陷是否已经造成损害.产品召回风险是一种或有的法定义务风险,即在一定条件下才存在的法定义务.召回费用是厂商履行召回义务的费用,而非民事损害赔款.因此,产品召回不是厂商对私法责任的承担而是对公法义务的履行.产品召回保险是一种义务保险而非责任保险,其标的应为整批产品虽存在系统性缺陷...     

中国寿险市场存在逆向选择吗?——来自CHARLS数据的经验证据

我国寿险市场是否存在逆向选择问题,在理论和实证两个方面缺乏细致的讨论。本文利用CHARLS数据和正相关理论检验了我国定期寿险和终身寿险市场中的逆向选择问题。我们选取了死亡率这一远期指标和健康状况这一近期指标来衡量消费者的死亡风险,从广延边际和集约边际两个方面利用正相关理论进行了深入的研究。实证结论表明,以死亡率和健康状况衡量的死亡风险与寿险消费负相关或者不相关,即我国寿险市场并不存在逆向选择问题。然后,我们讨论了模型的内生性问题,并根据年龄变量检验了结论的稳健性,实证结果表明我们的结论是稳健的。最后,本文利用双变量Probit模型设计了一个机制,并利用该机制验证了利他动机是我国寿险市场不存在逆向选择的原因之一。