高管薪酬与公司业绩关系实证研究——基于我国中小企业板的实证研究

本文以583家中小企业板上市公司2007-2010年间的数据为样本,讨论并检验了高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的相关性。研究结果表明:无论最终控制人是国有法人还是非国有法人,中国中小企业上市公司的高管薪酬与公司业绩、公司规模之间都存在着显著的正相关关系;无论是国有控股还是非国有控股,高管持股比例均与高管薪酬显著正相关;在国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度正相关,在非国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度负相关;在国有控股的中小企业板上市公司中,公司的成长性与高管薪酬同步变化,而非国有控股的中小企业板上市公司的成长性与高管薪酬负相关。     

影响高管薪酬的因素探究——基于河北省上市公司数据的分析

近年来,关于高管薪酬的研究得到众多学者的重视,研究者从不同视角、以不同的方式对高管薪酬的合理区间进行了探究.本文在以往研究的基础上,通过建立回归模型,从高管持股比例、公司规模、公司业绩、国有持股比例四个方面分析了影响河北省上市公司高管薪酬的因素.研究发现,高管总薪酬水平只与企业规模存在显著的正相关关系,而与高管持股比例、公司业绩和国有持股比例存在显著的负相关关系.这说明河北省上市公司的薪酬激励制度的设计存在缺陷,应尽快设计更加完善的高管薪酬激励制度.     

控股股东利益侵占、信息不对称与高管更换

本文从高管更换视角考察控股股东侵占上市公司利益的行为是否以及如何影响其高管激励效率。我们检验发现:(1)控股股东利益侵占会降低公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性。(2)当信息不对称程度较高时,公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性受控股股东利益侵占的负向影响更大。(3)当市场化程度较高时,控股股东利益侵占对公司高管更换效率的损害更小。这些实证结果表明,控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突会损害高管激励效率,并且在信息不对称程度较高时更为严重,但市场化程度的提高可以在一定程度上抑制这种负面影响。     

民营上市公司高管-员工薪酬差距影响因素及其经济后果分析——以控股股东作为调节变量的分析

本文通过收集高管薪酬数据,以2012年民营上市公司为样本,以公平理论、社会比较理论以及锦标赛理论为基础,以控股股东作为调节变量,分析了我国民营上市公司高管-员工薪酬差距的影响因素及其经济后果。实证研究发现,民营企业高管团队的规模以及公司外部环境的不确定性均会显著影响高管与员工之间的薪酬差距,但是控股股东会产生抑制作用。此外,高管-员工薪酬差距对于公司业绩会产生显著正向影响,符合社会比较理论和锦标赛理论的预期,同样,控股股东会抑制薪酬差距与公司业绩之间的正向关系。     

高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究——基于山东省上市公司的实证分析

本文选取沪A股山东省33家上市公司作为主要研究对象,对公司高管薪酬、高管持股比率和国家(国家法人)持股的整体情况进行了分析,分别从高管薪酬、薪酬差距和高管持股的角度研究了这些因素与企业绩效的相关性,考察了企业规模与高管薪酬以及平均薪酬的相关性.在目前的薪酬体系下,山东省上市公司高管薪酬逐年增长.整体看来,这些公司中国家...     

信息披露质量与中小投资者利益保护——以纺织业上市公司为例

提高信息披露质量,能够缓解代理问题,减少信息不对称程度,切实保护中小投资者的利益。控股股东侵占外部投资者的利益主要通过资金占用、制定有利于自身的现金股利支付策略。高质量的信息披露可以约束控股股东机会主义行为,保障中小投资者的知情权。以2009～2011年深市的纺织行业上市公司为样本,建立多元回归模型,对信息披露质量与资金占用、公司价值和现金股利支付率之间的关系进行研究。     

薪酬管制对国有上市银行高管薪酬及与员工薪酬差距影响研究

以2006—2013年国有控股上市银行为样本,研究分析我国出台高管薪酬管制政策后,对国有上市银行高管薪酬以及高管与员工薪酬差距的影响。发现：薪酬管制政策对国有银行高管“限薪”效应不显著,但对高管薪酬结构和发放机制产生了影响。（2）国有银行高管薪酬远低于民营银行。（3）高管与员工薪酬绝对差距依然较大,薪酬管制没有达到预期政策效果;两者之间相对差距在薪酬管制政策后逐渐缩小。     

投资者保护与控股股东资产偏好

本文从控股股东资产偏好的角度构建了一个在股权集中型公司中研究控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为决策分析框架。理论分析表明,投资者保护可以缓解因控股股东对流动性资产的偏好而形成的投资不足,但公司现金持有水平取决于公司投资不足和控股股东资产转移两个方面的净效应。实证研究结果证实了较好的投资者保护能够在一定程度上缓解公司投资不足,并抑制控股股东的资产转移动机,从而促使外部投资者对公司所持有的现金予以较高的价值评估。我们还发现中国上市公司控股股东较高的现金流权对应着较高的控制权,其结果是加剧公司投资不足,导致公司现金水平较高而现金价值较低。     

薪酬管制对国有上市银行高管薪酬影响研究

本文以2006~2013年国有控股上市银行为样本,研究分析我国出台高管薪酬管制政策后,对国有上市银行高管薪酬以及高管与员工薪酬差距的影响。研究发现:薪酬管制政策对国有银行高管"限薪"效应不显著,但对高管薪酬结构和发放机制产生了影响,国有银行高管薪酬远低于民营银行。高管与员工薪酬绝对差距依然较大,薪酬管制没有达到预期政策效果,两者之间相对差距在薪酬管制政策后逐渐缩小。以上研究,为我国合理评估政府薪酬管制和市场化改革等政策,进一步改革国有银行高管薪酬制度,科学制定高管薪酬机制和有效缩小高管与员工的薪酬差距提供了经验数据。     

控股股东干预与国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性:来自董事长/CEO纵向兼任的经验证据

以董事长/CEO在非上市控股股东单位兼任为切入点,本文分析控股股东干预对国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果发现,董事长/CEO纵向兼任会提高企业薪酬水平,降低薪酬—业绩敏感度。进一步的检验发现,董事长/CEO纵向兼任会显著降低高管薪酬、提高员工薪酬、降低员工薪酬—业绩敏感度,缩小高管-员工薪酬差距。本文的研究结果支持国有上市公司董事长/CEO纵向兼任的"和谐目标"假说,即纵向兼任增强了非上市控股股东的干预程度,导致上市公司承担更多的员工和谐目标,进而降低国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性。就监管政策而言,本文的研究结果意味着,我国需要同时进行非上市国有股东和国有上市公司的市场化改革,以提高国有企业的效率。     

管理层权力与上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的实证研究——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

本文在对国内外文献进行充分回顾的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,以国有上市公司为研究样本,检验了管理层权力对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。在此基础上,本文利用回归模型对上市公司的业绩进行了分离,经验证据发现,在管理层权力的影响下,高管薪酬与上市公司非正常业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系,与此同时,高管薪酬与上市公司的正常业绩之间的相关性却明显减弱。     

Top Management Incentives and Corporate Performance

There is little agreement about either the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance or the best way to measure the strength of executive incentives. With little guidance from academic research, managers and directors continue to rely heavily on the percentage of pay "at risk" as a proxy for incentive strength.
Starting with the premise that managers, like investors, are motivated by prospective changes in their wealth, this article presents a measure of incentive strength called "wealth leverage" that reflects the sensitivity of an executive's company-related wealth—total stock and option holdings plus the present value of expected future compensation, including future salary, bonus and stock compensation—to changes in shareholder wealth. After estimating top management's wealth leverage at 702 companies, the authors conclude that: 1) the median company has significant wealth leverage; 2) almost all corporate wealth leverage comes from their accumulated stock and option holdings, not from current compensation; and 3) companies with higher wealth leverage significantly outperform their industry competitors.     

Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China

Conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could affect executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we use data on Chinese listed companies and show that controlling shareholders’ tunneling reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. These results suggest that while incentive payment schemes are generally adopted in Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders who obtain private benefits from listed companies have less incentive to strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.     

高管减持如何影响投资者预期?——基于超额融券的经验证据

随着我国融资融券业务逐步扩容,投资者向证券公司融券卖出的卖空交易成为市场消化负面信息的重要机制。本文以高管减持事件窗口期的超额融券量为研究对象,采用事件研究法考察我国企业高管减持所任职公司股票对市场预期的影响。实证结果表明,相比估计期,高管减持窗口期超额融券量显著增长,并且减持比例越高或者减持金额越大,超额融券量越高,表明高管减持显著降低了外部投资者对公司股票的价值预期。进一步研究显示,良好的信息透明度能够显著降低高管减持对超额融券量的正向影响。本文用超额融券量直观地度量投资者预期变化,丰富和发展了高管减持经济后果的研究,对规范我国上市公司高管减持行为及监管部门完善相关监管规定具有启示意义。     

股权分置改革的盈余质量效应

股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。     

Vertical interlock and the value of cash holdings

We test whether vertical interlock endangers cash resources that manifests in a lower value of cash in listed companies affiliated with business groups. Using a sample of 9,032 observations from 2007 to 2016 in the Chinese market, we find that investors tend to value cash holdings in companies with vertical interlock substantially less than in those without. The marginal effect of vertical interlock on the value of cash remains significantly negative after controlling for existing governance mechanisms, accounting conservatism and internal control quality, shedding light on agency problems between majority shareholders and minority shareholders within business groups of emerging markets.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

融资约束、审计费用与现金持有价值

审计费用和现金持有价值是公司财务审计研究领域的两个重要话题。审计费用高低所隐含的公司风险程度影响着投资者对公司增加现金持有量将产生积极还是消极效应的判断,会导致公司股票超额回报率的变化,进而也可能影响其现金持有价值,目前尚无相关的研究。本文以现金持有的边际价值模型为基础,引入审计费用和融资约束变量,对融资约束条件下审计费用与公司现金持有价值的关系进行研究后发现,过高的审计费用会降低公司的现金持有价值,审计费用增加得越多,公司的现金持有价值越低。进一步的分析发现,相对于其面临较高程度的融资约束时,公司面临较低程度的融资约束时审计费用对其现金持有价值的负向影响更为显著。     

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.