论公司法人人格否认制度

公司的法人人格否认制度对于保护债权人的合法权益有着十分重要的意义,它可以有效地抑制公司股东利用公司人格的这种否认制度而滥用股东权利。《公司法》规定公司股东应遵守法律、行政法规和公司章程,对公司股东滥用公司法人独立地位和股东有限责任、逃避债务、严重损害债权人的合法利益,应当承担连带和赔偿责任。本文主要介绍了公司法人人格否认的概念、相关的立法、以及该制度的益处和缺陷。     

引入公司法人人格否认制度与金融债权的保护

为防止股东滥用公司法人人格以损害公司和债权人利益，各国纷纷引入公司法人人格否认法理，对公司人格独立制度和股东有限责任制度加以修正和补充，对公司的独立人格不予以考虑，直接追究股东的个人责任，以平衡公司与股东的权利和股东与债权人的风险，这便是公司法人人格否认理论。作者认为，我国引入法人人格否认制度有利于金融债权的保护，必须从立法和司法实践两方面尝试和完善法人人格否认制度，从而抑制社会信用缺失现象进一步蔓延。     

浅谈公司法人人格否认制度

在现实经济生活中，公司的股东滥用公司独立人格行为时有发生，而公司法人人格否认制度则有效地防范了股东利用公司的有限责任特点逃避承担法定或约定义务的行为，从而积极地维护了公司制度的健康运行。研究公司法人人格否认制度的含义、产生原因及适用条件，是为了更好地认识该制度，以发挥该制度对公司法人制度的补充作用。     

一人公司法人人格否认探析

公司法人人格否认的适用实质是对公司股东有限责任的排除.我国新<公司法>虽然确定了公司法人人格否认制度,但未在法律条文中明确其适用的相关问题.笔者通过对一人公司和法人人格否认制度的分析,尝试在立法和司法实践中完善一人公司法人人格否认制度.     

论我国公司法人人格否认制度

本文对公司法人人格否认制度进行了简要介绍,并从我国建立公司法人人格否认制度的迫切性出发,对我国《公司法》第20条规定的公司法法人格否认制度进行了论述,论述的角度为公司法人人格否认制度的适用要件和适用范围,适用要件包括主体要件、行为要件和结果要件,适用范围主要为资本显著不足、利用公司规避合同及法律义务以及股东与公司间的人格混同三个方面。     

公司法人人格否认制度适用期间企业所得税征收的相关问题探析北大核心CSSCI

公司法人人格否认制度适用期间,所涉公司的民事主体地位与税法地位将经历由法人到非法人经济组织、再恢复到法人的动态变化阶段。根据民事主体地位与税法地位相对应的一般准则,所涉公司的税法地位也会由法人降格为非法人经济组织。因此,税务机关针对所涉公司征收的企业所得税也会因其税法地位的变化而发生改变。基于此,本文阐释了公司法人人格否认制度适用期间,税法地位变化引发的企业所得税征收的相关问题,并指出税务机关应严格根据司法机关判决书的签署日期及司法机关在所涉公司人格恢复公告中的具体日期来确定该公司法人资格被否定的实际时间区间。     

浅议公司法人人格否认制度

我国2005年《公司法》确立了公司法人人格否认制度,但是真正法律意义上的法人人格否认制度在我国司法实践活动还尚不成熟。本文从公司法人人格否认制度在我国的适用条件和现状入手,旨在探讨我国公司法人人格否认制度立法上的完善。     

公司法人人格否定的证据分析

公司法人人格否定理论是在针对公司股东滥用法人人格,而给相对债权人造成损害所提出来的。由于审判机关在适用此制度时,缺少相应的程序法规定,往往没有达到此制度设立之初衷,所以本文就此制度的适用情况和审理时的证据认定、举证责任和证明标准做一定程度的探讨。     

公司法人格否认会计问题研究

在现代企业制度下,如果公司的股东没有真正地将财产经营权转让给公司,而是借助股东有限责任的保护滥用公司独立人格,破坏公司法人格制度所代表的风险与收益合理匹配机制,公司的债权人和其他各方利害关系人的经济利益可能会因此受到严重侵害。一些经济发达国家司法界因此而产生了公司法人格否认的司法实践和法理研究。由此产生的会计理论问题是,用于限定会计核算空间范围的会计主体假设不能成立或者部分地不能成立;导致的会计实践问题是,如何确认和计量由于公司法人格否认而产生的所有者权益减损和补偿金额。在我国,个别股东滥用公司独立人格的行为通常伴随着严重的国有资产流失现象。这个问题的研究和解决对于完善现代企业制度和维护国家权益有重要意义。     

关联公司人格混同情形下法人人格否认问题之探讨

随着我国市场经济的快速发展,许多投资者投资设立多个公司,以实现自己利益的最大化,关联公司应然而生。在实践中,大量出现投资者利用其设立或者控股的各个公司来进行有利于自身利益的行为,比如转移关联公司的财产,以最大化实现自己的利益。与之同时,许多关联公司发生人格混同的司法案件在实践中出现,并且成上升趋势,典型案例为最高法2013年公布的指导案例15号。虽然,我国公司法规定了法人人格否认的规则,即公司股东滥用公司法人独立地位和股东有限责任,逃避债务,严重损害公司债权人利益的,应当对公司债务承担连带责任。但是我国法律并没有规定关联公司发生人格混同的情形下要否认法人独立地位,也没有人格混同的法律概念。实践中关联公司发生人格混同的情形下,是否能够适用公司法第二十条第三款规定的法人人格否认规则,从指导案例15号的判决中可以看出,我国人民法院将关联公司发生人格混同的情形扩大至法人人格否认制度,理由是为了保护债权人的利益。这样的处理方法是否妥当?为此,本文试图通过分析司法实践中有关关联公司人格混同的案例,比较相关案例判决的异同,在结合法人人格否认制度的理论基础,从而给出作者的一些建议。     

Arguments in Favour of Tax Neutral Cost Allocation

When considering corporate taxes in a cost allocation context a trade‐off is generated for shareholders. On the one hand, accelerated depreciation increases the value of a project due to the depreciation tax shield. On the other hand, accelerated depreciation most likely does not induce robust goal congruency between managers and shareholders when utilizing residual income as an incentive system and, as a consequence, over‐ or underinvestment could result. In this context, the literature suggests the application of particular allocation rules. When extending the relative marginal benefits cost allocation rule (Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) to include corporate taxes we find it to be tax neutral and to maintain its properties of generating robust incentives. As a consequence the over‐/underinvestment problem is solved, but the depreciation tax shield is often not maximized. However, we illustrate that in competitive markets shareholders ought to prefer a tax neutral allocation scheme over an accelerated depreciation schedule. Thus, we show that shareholders as well as regulators have—for different reasons—a preference for tax neutral cost allocation.     

The value of a flow-through entity in an integrated corporate tax system

In an integrated corporate tax system, resident shareholders receive a tax credit for corporate tax paid that can be used to offset personal tax on dividend income. Nonresident and tax-exempt (pension plan) investors cannot use the tax credit on corporate dividends and thus prefer to invest in flow-through entities. We estimate the value of the flow-through entity to nonresident and pension plan investors by examining the price change around the date of an unexpected announcement of a change in tax law related to Canadian publicly traded income trusts units creating an entity-level tax that makes them no longer tax-favored to these investors.     

Dividend taxation and the ownership structure of private firms

This paper examines the effect of dividend taxation on the ownership structure of private firms. I exploit a German dividend tax increase that only affects corporate shareholders owning a minority stake. Using data on private German firms and their shareholders, I find that corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes in firms after the dividend tax reform. This result is in line with the notion that, because minority shareholders do not have sufficient decision-making power to influence the payout policy, they can only react to a dividend tax increase by selling their shares. This effect is larger when the affected minority shareholders face high dividend tax costs. However, I find a smaller effect when the benefits of the minority stakes are highly relevant for the firm and the affected shareholders, suggesting that non-tax factors mute the response to dividend taxes. In addition, I find that the largest shareholder of the firm buys the minority stake, resulting in greater ownership concentration. These findings extend the prior literature that finds no effect of dividend taxes on the ownership structure of private firms.     

Corporate taxes,strategic default,and the cost of debt

The current US tax code’s loss carry provisions provide implicit tax subsidies to financially troubled firms. Since shareholders ultimately decide when to announce bankruptcy, such tax subsidies can incentivize them to strategically postpone default. Therefore, corporate taxation can influence corporate cost of debt. Using a large panel of corporate bonds, we find supporting evidence: credit spreads become smaller as tax loss carries grow larger. In contrast, tax shields such as depreciation, which limit loss carry gains, lead to wider spreads. Interestingly, when stockholders hold greater bargaining power – due to large managerial ownership – larger corporate tax shields lead to even narrower credit spreads.     

Corporate site visit and tax avoidance: The effects of monitoring and tax knowledge dissemination

This study examines how institutional investors' corporate site visits affect tax avoidance. Using quantile regressions, we find that corporate site visits decrease tax avoidance for firms at high levels of tax avoidance and increase tax avoidance for firms at low levels. The effect of corporate site visits on tax avoidance is stronger for firms subject to a weaker information environment, which suggests that institutional investors acquire additional firm-specific information via corporate site visits and play a more effective monitoring role. We also find that visitors who visited low-tax firms in prior years share tax-planning knowledge with high-tax firms which they visit in the current year. The effect of tax knowledge transfer is more pronounced when the visitors are from incumbent institutional shareholders. This study identifies corporate site visits as a channel via which institutional investors serve as monitors to managers and as facilitators of tax knowledge transfer.     

Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?

This paper investigates how corporate governance plays a role in long-run tax management and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we add insight into the horizon problems related to executive and director compensation and show that incentive compensation provides long-term incentives to improve performance by establishing a link between higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower taxes. Second, this is one of the first papers, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the role of governance in corporate tax management from a long-term perspective in order to better understand the lasting effects of governance. We find that incentive compensation drives managers to make investments into longer-horizon pay outs such as tax management. Furthermore, we find that this investment into tax management benefits shareholders; better tax management is positively related to higher returns to shareholders. We also address the endogeneity issues of corporate governance and performance measures. Finally, our paper is unique in examining which type of tax management strategy (domestic or foreign) different firms focus on. Our results shed light into how governance can improve firm performance and increase shareholder value in the long run.     

Does Brazilian allowance for corporate equity reduce the debt bias? Evidences of rebound effect and ownership-induced ACE clientele

We analyse if the Brazilian Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE-type system) reduces the debt tax bias. Specifically, we study if the continuous treatment effect of interest on equity negatively affects the level of financial leverage. We find that the tax policy implemented is similar to the deductible cash dividends and not to an ACE. The empirical implication is that the interest on equity treatment increases the debt tax bias, producing a rebound effect to what is expected for this policy on the risk-taking behaviour and corporate capital structure. This rebound effect is homogeneous in firms with different financial constraints status. There are evidences that shareholders influence the cash distribution policy, adjusting the later to their own tax preferences. Therefore, there may be an “ACE clientele effect” induced by heterogeneity in tax preferences among shareholders.     

Shareholder taxation and aggregate dividend payout: Evidence from the tax reform act of 1986

The effect of shareholder taxation on corporate dividend policy is a major controversy in financial economics. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the statutory tax disadvantage of dividends versus long-term capital gains for individual shareholders. Using aggregate time series data I find evidence that corporate dividend payout has become more generous in the period after tax reform.     

The Norwegian shareholder tax reconsidered

S?rensen (Int. Tax Public Finance 12(6):777–801, 2005) gives an in-depth account of the new Norwegian Shareholder Tax, which allows the shareholders a deduction for an imputed risk-free rate of return. S?rensen’s positive evaluation appears as reasonable for a closed economy where the deduction for the imputed return is capitalized into the market prices of corporate shares. We show that in a small open economy where no capitalization occurs, the Norwegian shareholder tax is likely to leave the distortions caused by the corporate income tax unaffected, and to add new distortions to shareholders’ portfolio decisions.     

Tax avoidance in family firms: Evidence from large private firms

Ownership structure plays an important role in firms’ decisions on tax avoidance. Recently, the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance has become an issue of increasing interest among scholars from both the fields of family business research and tax research; however, empirical findings have so far remained ambiguous. Based on a unique sample of 678 large private firms from Germany, we show that for unlisted large firms (i) family firms avoid more tax than non-family firms, (ii) tax avoidance increases with the percentage of family ownership, and (iii) tax avoidance is a function of the number of shareholders. We interpret our results as evidence that benefits from avoiding taxes outweigh the non-tax costs in the case of large private family firms in Germany. Furthermore, as the number of family shareholders increases, family firms satisfy increasing demand for dividends by avoiding taxes.