上市公司股份回购对相关各方的影响浅析

股份回购是指上市公司从股票市场上购顺本公司一定数额的发行在外的股票。在国外股份回购很普遍，许多公司都把股份回购作为一种股利政策或资本运营工具加以运用。目前我国一些上市公司也开始进行股份回购，但其主要目的是为了配合国有上市公司进行国有股减持。因股份回购改变了上市公司的权益结构和股权结构，股份回购将对上市公司相关各方造成一定的影响。     

我国上市公司股份回购的动机与时机

选择股份回购的时机与进行股份回购的动机有着密不可分的关系。我国上市公司股份回购有其鲜明的特点,对照西方的三大动机假设既有发展又有创新。在此基础上建议法律上拓宽股份回购的使用范围,上市公司结合自身动机把握有利的股份回购时机。     

股份回购中的财富形成机制研究

2005年6月6日,中国证监会颁布了《上市公司回购社会公众股份管理办法(试行)》,规范了我国上市公司的股份回购行为。股份回购在经济发展中有许多积极作用。本文通过建立股份回购模型,来系统研究上市公司股份回购的财富效应。     

股份回购中的财富形成机制研究

2005年6月6日,中国证监会颁布了<上市公司回购社会公众股份管理办法(试行)>,规范了我国上市公司的股份回购行为.股份回购在经济发展中有许多积极作用.本文通过建立股份回购模型,来系统研究上市公司股份回购的财富效应.     

《上市公司回购社会公众股份管理办法（试行）》解读

近日，中国证监会发布了《上市公司回购社会公众股份管理办法（试行）》（以下简称《回购办法》），允许上市公司为减少注册资本而购买本公司社会公众股份并依法予以注销？本文对《回购办法》的立法背景、主要条款规定，并结合首例上市公司回购社会公众股份的案例——邯郸钢铁回购社会公众股，对其进行解读？     

公司动态

洋河股份拟首推制度化股份回购 在停牌一天后,洋河股份上周五发布公告,称公司拟制定2012年至2014年股份回购的长效机制。与之前宣布回购股份的上市公司不同,洋河股份此次建立的是一种制度,即在满足一定条件下长期实施股份回购计划。     

上市公司股份回购的溢出效应——基于公司债信用利差的经验证据

立足于我国股份回购制度重大修订以及债券市场债券违约潮的现实背景，以公司债信用利差为研究视角，考察上市公司股份回购在债券市场的溢出效应。结果表明，股份回购对公司债信用利差有正向影响，说明股份回购在债券市场存在溢出效应。进一步研究发现，股份回购是通过“风险防御”效应中的信息风险传导使得公司债信用利差增大。公司治理水平越低、融资约束程度越高，这种溢出效应越明显。拓展性检验结果表明，股份回购对公司债信用利差的正向影响在《公司法》修订后更为显著。研究结论不仅为上市公司股份回购的溢出效应研究提供了债券市场的经验证据，也为监管部门制定债权人利益保护政策提供了参考。     

股份回购如何影响股票流动性?

上市公司公开市场股份回购行为对股票市场微观运行的影响效应及其作用机制具有重要研究意义。本文从股票流动性的视角出发,使用手工收集的数据,实证检验了公开市场股份回购对股票市场流动性的影响。通过事件研究和回归分析发现,我国上市公司在二级市场实施回购降低了股票流动性。机制检验表明,股票回购提高了逆向选择成本,导致买卖价差扩大,股票流动性下降。进一步研究发现,上市公司的信息披露质量是重要的调节变量,提高上市公司信息披露质量能有效减弱股份回购对股票流动性的负向影响。本文结论有助于理解上市公司公开市场股份回购的微观影响机制,亦对监管部门制定股份回购监管政策具有启发作用。     

公司动态

宝钢称已在研究回购事宜 “公司管理层早在几个月前就开始研究股份回购事宜了，但与此次消息并无关联。不过，截至目前，公司还没有具体操作计划。”8月2日下午，针对监管部门支持“破净”上市公司回购股份的消息，宝钢股份证券部有关人士对媒体如此回应。     

关于股份回购的几点思考

20世纪对股份回购的经验实证研究得到了迅速的发展.按照一般的股份回购经验研究所得到的结论,在股份回购活动中,出让股份的股东会得到较高的收益率,而且会使普通股的市场价格有较长期的增长.本文通过对我国股份回购第一案例的分析,对这一课题进行探讨,并提出我国实行股份回购的对策.     

THE IMPACT OF TARGETED SHARE REPURCHASES ON THE WEALTH OF NON-PARTICIPATING SHAREHOLDERS

This paper examines empirically whether management is acting in the best interests of non-participating shareholders when it engages in a targeted share repurchase. Over the full purchase-to-repurchase period, non-participating shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns, providing additional evidence that shareholders benefit from the initial investment that leads to the share repurchase. On the repurchase date, however, shareholders experience a significant decrease in their wealth position that cannot be attributed solely to a wealth transfer from the non-participating to the participating shareholders. Consequently, one cannot generalize about management's intentions for a targeted share repurchase.     

What Role Taxes and Regulation? A Second Look at Open Market Share Buyback Activity in the UK

This paper re-examines the evidence on open market share repurchase activity reported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) for the UK. Using data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), Rau and Vermaelen conclude that the level of repurchase activity is trivial. They attribute the low repurchase volume to regulatory restrictions that limit companies' ability to take advantage of an undervalued stock price and conclude that the bulk of repurchase activity that does occur is driven by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds. Using data collected from a variety of sources, we find that the SDC substantially understates UK open market buyback activity. Based on our more comprehensive dataset we conclude that (a) pension funds' tax considerations are not the primary cause of UK share repurchases and (b) despite the prevailing regulatory environment, underpricing still represents an important determinant of repurchase activity.     

Double signals or single signal? An investigation of insider trading around share repurchases

We examine directors’ dealing activity around share repurchasing periods in Hong Kong. There are significant insider trading activities before the share repurchasing period. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, the directors’ purchase activities during the share repurchase period are significantly higher than the expected level while the directors’ sale activities are significantly lower than the expected level. Double signals of share repurchase and directors’ purchases create a stronger signal in conveying undervaluation, while insider sales around share repurchase reduces the undervaluation signal. We find some evidence that is consistent with the free cash flow and signaling arguments for share repurchases.     

Capital structure,equity mispricing,and stock repurchases

We evaluate motives for share repurchases using a unified framework where a firm has a target capital structure and has equity that can be mispriced. We document that capital structure adjustments are a value-increasing motive for repurchases and that the extent to which adjusting capital structure through a repurchase creates value depends on the undervaluation of the firm. Underlevered and undervalued firms enjoy the greatest economic gains from a repurchase, as evidenced by the stock price reaction to the repurchase announcement, and these firms are more likely to announce a share repurchase program.     

Share repurchases,catering, and dividend substitution

We first extend Baker and Wurgler's (2004a) catering theory of dividends to share repurchases. Consistent with the notion that firms cater to investor demand for share repurchases, we report evidence that the market's time-varying repurchase premium positively affects firms' choice to repurchase shares. Next, we use the catering behavior as a novel framework for testing the dividend substitution hypothesis. Consistent with the notion that managers consider dividends and share repurchases to be substitute payout mechanisms, we find that the dividend premium negatively affects the repurchase choice, whereas the repurchase premium negatively affects the choice to pay dividends.     

THE DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION CONVEYED BY SHARE REPURCHASE TENDER OFFERS AND DIVIDEND INCREASES

We identify the difference in the private information conveyed by the announcements of a share repurchase tender offer and of a regular dividend increase. We find that, after controlling for timing, industry, size of cash distribution, and other firm-specific characteristics, a share repurchase tender offer causes a much larger stock price response than a regular dividend increase. The results suggest that the two cash distribution mechanisms convey differential information. Further examination of the differential information indicates that (1) the upward revision in financial analysts' earnings forecasts following a share repurchase is, on average, greater than that following a regular dividend increase, and (2) a repurchase announcement is followed by a permanent decline in the firms' systematic risk while a dividend-increase announcement is not.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

Share Repurchase Offers and Liquidity: An Examination of Temporary and Permanent Effects

Open-market repurchase programs do not allow for precise estimates of share buy-back intensity to measure liquidity effects. To circumvent the uncertainty surrounding the quantity and timing of shares truly acquired in repurchase programs and to measure their long-term impact, we examine Dutch auctions and fixed-price tender offers. We investigate both the temporary and permanent liquidity effects of share repurchase programs and find that the improvement in liquidity is transitory and limited to the tender period when the firm's offer to repurchase shares is outstanding. Improvements in liquidity over longer intervals appear to be the result of an overall price improvement and a reduction in volatility rather than the result of structural change in market dynamics.     

股票回购、现金股利替代性与研发投资——基于迎合渠道的比较分析

传统观点认为,股票回购与现金股利存在替代关系,同时在资金约束以及管理层短视情形下,二者对企业中长期研发投资支出产生负向冲击。而“边分红,边研发”却是目前我国上市公司的普遍现象。基于此背景,利用2014-2017年我国A股上市公司样本数据,在迎合渠道下分析股票回购与现金分红行为对研发投资的影响及差异。研究发现：两种分配行为并非具有完全替代性,虽然二者均会通过迎合渠道对研发投资产生正向影响,但迎合渠道又存在差异。其中,现金股利多通过股权融资渠道发挥作用,而股票回购多通过理性迎合渠道发挥作用。     

An empirical analysis of European stock repurchases

In this paper, we examine the share price effects and determinants of share repurchase programs for French, German, Italian, and British firms. Like US firms, we find that German and Italian share repurchases are met with a positive and significant share price response. However, British repurchase announcements exhibit small positive abnormal returns, and abnormal returns for French share repurchases are insignificantly different from zero, both results being quite different from results found in studies of US firms. We also investigate the determinants of the size of the share repurchase program.Our results indicate support for the Undervaluation Hypothesis and the Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis, and provide partial support for the National Investment Opportunity Set Hypothesis. Our results from our analysis of cumulative abnormal returns are also consistent with the Undervaluation, Takeover Deterrence, and National Investment Opportunity Set Hypotheses. However, we do not find support for the Excess Capital Hypothesis, the Intangibility Hypothesis or the Optimal Leverage Ratio Hypothesis.